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A b s t r a c t
llie  object o f mv research is the examination o f the ambivalent relationship o f ethics and 
politics in the context o f twentieth-century literary criticism. The main and most general 
thesis that I put forward is that all moral discourses are directly complicit with the broader 
political and economic realities within which they are articulated. In my case, I attem pt to 
show the validity o f this proposition by examining three instances where literary criticism and 
ethics have converged, each instance belonging to a different national and ideological 
paradigm. In doing so I attem pt to identify those elements that may be said to constitute a 
sort o f  an archaeology, in the Foucaultean sense, o f  the contemporary trend in literary theory7 
that openly espouses a moral/ethical problematic. I do this by looking closely at the critical 
work o f  F. R. Leavis, Jean-Paul Sartre and Lionel Trilling.
In the process o f discussing the work o f  these critics I attem pt to show to what extent 
their moral critical discourse was determined by their own ideological assumptions, on the 
one hand, and the general historical context, on the other. In my view, their critical work, 
with the notable exception o f Sartre’s, betrays a double need. Firstly, the need to distance 
themselves from the denotative language o f politics and secondly, the need to articulate 
desires that are thoroughly political in their nature and consequences. In doing I^eavis and 
Tnlling, in contradistinction to Sartre, only succeeded in mystifying the conditions that 
enabled the articulation o f their literary7 and cultural critiques and thus disassociated 
themselves from social, political and economic interests.
Finally, my work implicitly argues for the need for the rearticulation o f the relation 
btween ethics and material interests not only in the rather confined space o f literary7 criticism 
but in all aspects o f critical endeavour and social practice.
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You gentlemen who think you have a mission 
To purge us o f the seven deadly sins 
Should first sort out the basic food position 
Ihen  start your preaching, that’s where it begins. 
You lot who preach restraint and watch your waist as well 
Should learn, for once, the way the world is run: 
However much you twist or whatever lies you tell 
Food is the first thing. Morals follow on. 
So first make sure that those who are now starving 
G et proper helpings when we all start carving.
W hat keeps mankind alive? Ihe  fact that millions 
Are daily tortured, stifled, punished, silenced and oppressed.
Mankind can keep alive thanks to its brilliance 
In keeping its humanity repressed. 
And for once you must try not to shriek the facts: 
Mankind is kept alive by bestial acts.
Bertolt Brecht, The Threepenny Opera, (Act II, Scene VI, 
Second threepenny Finale: W hat Keeps Mankind Alive?)
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I n t r o d u c t i o n :
E t h i c s , P o l i t i c s  a n d  L it e r a r y  C r i t i c i s m
‘Shall we, then, casually allow our children to listen to any old stones, 
made up by just anyone, and to take into their minds views which, on the 
whole, contradict those we’ll want them to have as adults?’
‘No, we won’t allow that at all.’ 
‘So our first job, apparently, is to oversee the work o f the story-wnters, 
and to accept any good story they write, but reject the others. W e’ll let nurses 
and mothers tell their children the acceptable ones, and w e’ll have them devote 
themselves far more to usmg these stones to form their children’s minds 
than they do to using their hands to form their bodies. 1 lowever, w e’ll have to
disallow most o f  the stones they currently tell.’ 
Plato, ‘ ITie Republic’1
Ever since Plato, to  take a widely accepted starting point in the evolution o f Western 
thought, cultural and more specifically literary’ criticism has been considered and practised as 
an essentially m oral activity. Often instructive, corrective or normative and always engaged 
with a cultural activity’ intimately connected with human lives and the social welfare o f the 
communitv, literary’ criticism articulated as clearly as it was historically possible the concern 
with the moral effect that telling stories had not only on the people who heard or read them 
but most importantly on the society within which those stories were heard, read and regarded 
as sources o f  inspiration. Therefore moral, social, and, as I shall argue later on, ultimately 
political is the concern with whether a certain narrative not only pleases but also instructs in 
such a fashion as to vie with the established social norms o f a certain community. ITus
1 Plato, The Republic, trans. by Robin Waterfield, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 71.
6
political dimension o f the m oral/ethical discourse in literary criticism lies at the very centre 
o f this study.
B a s ic  C o n c e p t s : Kt h i c s  a n d  M o r a l it y
Before I embark on a detailed discussion o f the issues that underlie mv work here, I wish 
to introduce the basic concepts that inform the subsequent discussion by beginning with the 
concepts o f ethics and morality . Although I think that in the context o f mv work the 
rigorous conceptual distinction between ethics and morality is not a sine qua non for the 
strength o f  the particular arguments I put forth, I nevertheless believe that a preliminary 
examination o f w hat exactly these two concepts signify may be constructive for the fact that 
their elucidation makes ethical criticism a far more intelligible endeavour.-
Ethics can be understood in at least two different, yet complementary, ways. Firstly, 
ethics in a narrow sense can, and often does, stand for morality7, or moral beliefs and 
practices. In this narrow sense ethics is not a field o f inquiry, but rather its object: the moral 
life o f  human beings. 'Fhis is an informal usage o f the term ‘ethics’ and it seldom appears in 
an academic context. Secondly, ethics in a wider sense refers to the field o f  inquiry known as 
moral philosophy and this is the standard usage o f  the term in the context that matters to me 
here. A nother way to put this is to reformulate the above distinction as one between morality 
and ethics, very7 much in accordance with m odem  moral philosophy that does indeed make 
such a distinction. In what follows I shall be using the term ‘morality’ as relating to culturally 
endorsed modes o f human conduct, sustained through time by normatiyre judgements and 
positive or negative sanctions. Morality, to use Zygmut Bauman’s apt phrase, will be treated 
as if it signified “a possibly comprehensive inventory o f moral problem s” (Bauman 1993: 1)
- To the best o f  my knowledge a rigorous distinction lie tween ethics and morality or between an ethical theory, 
philosophy, or problematic and a moral one is not always made explicitly especially in current ethical criticism. 
Among the many points o f  entry into this area o f  philosophical inquiry one that is relevant to ethical criticism is 
Nussbaum, 1990: 169n. For a discussion o f  the rather loose way ethical critics use moral concepts see Differ, 
1975 and Buell, 2000. Another useful discussion o f  ethics and morality from a perspective largely influenced by 
the work o f  Michel Foucault see Guillory, 2000.
7
and, I would add, appropriate solutions to those problems. Ethics, on the other hand, will 
primarily signify the investigation o f substantive moral positions, the theorization o f  the 
existent moral codes, the establishing o f criteria for the appropriateness o f particular actions. 
In other words ethics will be regarded as the philosophical systernatisation o f that which is so 
varied and often contradictory in the realm o f  everyday life.
Yet another way o f  putting this could be by emphasizing the difference between ethics 
and its uses. By that I refer to the distance that separates the discursive formation (the 
ethical), on the one hand, and its practical application (the moral), on the other. I do not wish 
to imply that there is any sort o f ontological gap between the two but rather that they are two 
distinct instances o f the same thing. Theorising about morality and the actual practices that 
em anate from such a discourse are inextricably linked and dialectically related.3 The one can 
hardly make any sense (and even if it did how relevant would it be?) without examining the 
o ther as well. I find this distinction useful only to the extent that it aids one in identifying two 
separate but inherendy related levels o f inquiry.
O ne more point regarding the nature o f  the m oral/ethical has to do with the fact that we 
speak o f ethics only when we are primarily dealing with the question o f ‘good’ and 
‘bad /ev il’4, when we, often implicidy, ask the question, which underlies all moral thinking as 
far back as Ancient Greece: “How should a human being live?” A question that also invites 
another one as its complement: “W hat do good and evil really mean and how can we 
distinguish the one from the other?” Yet, once posed, these questions necessitate a certain 
postulate, a necessary presupposition that can make them conceptually valid. Put simply, any 
such questions arise within a more or less structured social framework. A human being, all
' I legel, in his Philosophy of Rigbt, was the first to distinguish among Kecht (abstract nght), Moralitat (morality) and 
Sittlichkeit (ethical life). Siftlichkeit which is the level where the dialectical synthesis o f  the objective good (Kecht) 
with the subjectivity o f  the will (Moralitiit) takes place is to a great extent this socialized space that the 
contemporarv concept o f  morality- alludes to.
4 I do not wish to go into the details o f  the distinction between ‘bad’ and ‘evil’. Suffice to say that I am taking it 
from Nietzsche, in whose On The C,enealogy of Morality (Nietzsche 1994: 21-27) one may find the full exposition 
o f  his views regarding this distinction.
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alone in total isolation would not need ethics; survival and self-preservation would be his sole 
objectives. Ethical inquiry cannot be a part o f an asocial universe. Therefore, I regard the 
concepts o f  ethics and morality as inherendy socio-political and I do not assume that this 
essentially sociopolitical character is merely a contingent feature o f  moral concepts. Any 
ethical or moral discourse cannot but be fundamentally social and therefore profoundly 
political, even when such a discourse is not articulated in direct relation to questions o f 
power. ITiis is then my approach: ethics is to be understood as the discourse on a particular 
mode o f conduct o f human beings vis-a-vis themselves within the framework o f a structured 
community, where the primary code through which this discourse is articulated is the one 
based on the binary opposition o f  ‘good’ vs. ‘bad/evil’.
However, the answers to the questions I posed above constitute the premises o f  other 
discourses as well, apart from those manifesdy ethical, moral, or simply moralising. They 
constitute the often-unacknowledged premises o f all political discourses as well. They are 
also the questions to which ethical criticism seeks pertinent answers, in its case to be found 
not in abstract thought, as in the case o f philosophy, but in literature.
Before I begin my discussion o f the central issues o f my work, I wish to say a few things 
about ethics as a philosophical enterprise. The particular qualities o f  ethics as a discursive 
formation and m ost crucially its current status as a discipline in the humanities are im portant 
for any understanding o f the often unacknowledged conceptual premises o f contemporary 
ethical criticism.
P h i l o s o p h i c a l  E t h ic s : A n  O v e r v i e w  o f  a  P r o b l e m a t ic a l  E n t e r p r i s e
It is extremely difficult to give a comprehensive account o f ethics while at the same time 
doing justice to all the disparate and often contradictory conceptions o f what ethics is 
ultimately about. There are o f  course some widely agreed upon points o f reference in 
evidence in any dictionary o f  philosophical terms. Yet one can hardly deny that the plethora
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o f  definitions o f  moral philosophy makes it increasingly difficult to isolate those fundamental 
concepts that will aid one in delineating a conceptual space for ethics. There is for example a 
wide gap that separates metaethics with its insistence on logical and epistemological 
questions regarding moral arguments and utilitarian ethics which bestows moral value to 
facts according to their favourable or unfavourable consequences on people. A nother huge 
gap separates those who take their inspiration from Kant and his ethics based on the concept 
o f duty and those who are inclined to view Aristotle’s ethics based on the concept o f virtue 
as the better alternative for a viable moral philosophy. In addition to these, one has to work 
his way through a multitude o f distinctly m odem  binary oppositions governing moral 
philosophy, oppositions such as: descriptivism /presaiptivism , reason/em otion, justice or 
duty/care, goodness/value, absolutism/relativism etc. W hat all this conceptual inflation 
signifies is that ethics as a philosophical discipline is crippled by a proliferation o f discourses, 
each o f which is attempting to occupy the centre while at the same time displacing the 
others. But how are we to understand the reasons for such a multiplicity o f  discourses each 
professing to offer the best view o f what is ethical or moral and what is not?
Alasdair M acIntyre has famously answered this question by asserting that we m odem s 
have irretrievably lost the capacity to think cogently in as far as moral questions are 
concerned because we have lost the single m ost im portant capacity for coherent moral 
thinking: the idea o f a common gcx>d, the summum bonum. In his seminal After X 'irtue (1981) 
MacInty re proposes that unless a community’ is bound by shared beliefs and a com mon 
conception o f  what is the telos o f  human life there is little chance that fundamental questions 
about values can be given cogent answers. MacInty re argues that unless a community’ has 
tacitly agreed on what precisely life’s ultimate goal is there can be no way o f  resolving 
differences in moral issues. For any such attem pt will ultimately come up against the fact that 
the first principles o f those engaged in a debate — principles which sustain and guide their 
choices — are radically and irreconcilably different. MacIntyre seeks to show why today moral
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issues are bound to remain unresolved by arguing that we are in fact living in the shadow o f 
one o f  the Enlightenment’s grand failures, namely its inability to reconcile the surface 
contradictions generated by a deep structure which was set in motion with the advent o f  
what we now call modernity. MacIntyre’s extremely im portant argument is that the history o f 
the last five or six centuries shows us that something very basic in the composition o f  our 
societies has been missing ever since the beginning o f  the great historical change that saw 
capitalism substituting feudalism and thus becom ing the dominant economic system o f  the 
West. W hat is missing, he suggests, is a consensus regarding the nature o f hum ankind’s 
essential good. The reason for that is that the gross inequalities generated by the gradual 
dom ination o f  capitalist relations o f  production in conjunction with the gradual loss o f 
pow er o f the Church and the concomitant ineffectiveness o f the Christian dogma have all 
made our societies gradually reach a stage in history when their tensions and antagonisms are 
so strong that it has become increasingly hard to achieve any viable consensus on 
fundamental issues.
MacIntyre goes on to argue for the centrality o f the Enlightenment project in the 
negotiation o f  those crippling tensions in a glorious, but ultimately doomed, effort to 
articulate a set o f arguments that would enable the West to put forward a comprehensive and 
practically viable set o f moral rules. Along with many moral philosophers and cultural 
historians, MacIntyre knows that the Enlightenm ent’s wager on the absolute sovereignty of 
Reason, and particularly K ant’s deontological ethics, did serve determinate interests and 
particularly the interests o f the middle-classes with their corporate and profit-onented 
institutions and practices. In MacIntyre’s view, the Enlightenment has failed in its attem pt to 
reconcile what was structurally irreconcilable: the different worldviews and ideologies that 
were bom  out o f  a society whose economic and ideological organisation pitted one sector o f 
society' against the other in a relation o f constant antagonism. 'Ihe  result, as he sees it, is that 
we have come to regard moral propositions not as propositions with a substantive content,
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but as mere expressions o f  our private and ultimately philosophically unfounded emotions. 
The cmotivist self, as he calls the m odem  individual in as far as ethics is concerned, having lost 
the benefit o f a tighdy-structured organic community similar to the ones prevalent in classical 
times and in Early M odem  Europe and having also lost its faith in the Christian or any other 
theological dogma — traditionally the element that guaranteed a certain degree o f ideological 
and social cohesion -  now finds itself unable to defend its moral choices in any other way 
but bv making implicitly or explicidy an appeal to its own will. For MacIntyre this essentially 
Nietzschean will that we all, in one way or the other, appeal to today is the last resort o f a 
species that has lost its faith in the feasibility o f  grounding its concepts o f good and evil in 
anything outside itself whether this may be the Kingdom o f  Heaven or the body politic. In 
MacIntyre’s words “when shared belief in the summum bonum is lost, the question o f  the point 
and purpose o f morality also becomes one for which answers have to be invented, and to 
which naturally enough rival and incompatible answers are given.” (MacIntyre, 1983: 9). As a 
result, our politically and economically liberal societies are almost perfecdv complemented by 
a plurality o f  values, themselves the unavoidable consequence o f  these very societies 
appearing m ore like aggregates o f monadic individuals than political communities animated 
by a com m on purpose and common ideals.
The reason I have presented MacInty re’s views at this point is not only because I believe 
that thev result in one o f the best accounts o f the evolution o f moral thought from the 
antiquity’ to the present, but also because his unique historical reading o f contemporary moral 
phil osophy provides an excellent introduction to the more specialised issues addressed by 
ethical criticism in the twentieth-century. In After Virtue MacIntyre maintains that every 
“moral philosophy (...) characteristically presupposes a sociology” (MacIntyre, 1985: 23), 
meaning that it is futile to try to fully understand moral concepts as they evolve through time 
if the issue o f  their sociopolitical determination is not even considered. I would also add that 
every moral philosophy also presupposes a political economy although this particular
12
preoccupation is, according to existing bibliographical evidence, no t very high in the interests 
o f specialised researchers5.
P o l it ic s  a n d  E t h i c s : T h e  D ia l e c t ic s  o f  P o w e r  a n d  t h e  Q u e s t  f o r  t h e  G o o d  
I would now like to discuss further the distincdy political nature o f ethical discourse. I 
would like to start by saying that despite the attempts o f  certain contemporary theorists to 
politicise ethics6, I believe that these attempts partially fail to the extent that they all too often 
refuse to acknowledge the fact that ethical discourse has always been political, regardless o f 
the fact that the official, normative discourses o f our recent tradition have consistendv tried 
to conceal this. I do understand that such attempts to politicise ethics may be construed as 
revealing a heightened sensitivity7 to the close relation o f morality7 with politics — politics in its 
traditional guise or in its postmodern version as the politics o f everyday life. Yet, I think that 
the best way to emphasize the political aspect o f  ethics, and ethical criticism in particular, is 
to affirm and foreground that which has always been evident and yet never fully perceived. 
Ethical discourse has always been profoundly political, especially during those m om ents in 
history when it allowed itself the greatest distance from any explicit political discourse. 
Aristotle’s ethics was profoundly political, the philosophical articulation o f a mode of
3 It is however something that literature knows all too well. One o f  most poignant and funny instances o f  this is 
in Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion (1916). In one scene (Act II) where Professor Pickenng and Eliza’s father quarrel 
over her fate we have the following exchange:
Pickenng. 1 lave vou no morals, man?
Doolittle (unabashed) Can’t afford them, Governor. Neither could you if you was as poor as me.
Ihe moral/polltical cntique that is implicit here is echoed in a much more politically explicit fashion in the 
excerpt that serve as the epigraph o f  this study.
6 It has recently Ix'en argued that “one o f  the striking features o f  contemporary literary theory (.. .) is what 
might be termed its so a o  politicisation o f  the ethical” (Coady & Miller, 1998: 201). See also Guillory, 2000 
especially pp. 29 30 and, for a discussion o f  the same issue from a post-colonial perspective, Meffan Ik 
Worthington, 2001.
? One may find a reverse formulation o f  the same thesis, one that vies with postmodernism’s specific 
preoccupation with the primacy o f  the ethical: “Politics has been a way in which, for a number o f  years, 
cnticism has construed its own existence as a crucially ethical program” (Gibson, 1999: 4). My argument is that 
the acknowledgement o f  the non reducibility o f  the political to the ethical is the necessary first step towards their 
dialectical synthesis. The problem is that not everybody gives the same interpretation to the concept o f  ‘politics’ 
and therefore the task o f  having an agreed upon definition o f  the ‘political’ is an issue o f  great importance that 
must be considered in advance o f  every discussion. I hope that what follows will clarify- my conception o f  
‘politics’ in the context o f  this study and what it precisely entails in terms o f  methodology.
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conduct fitting to the privileged members o f  a city-state, mutatis mutandis a proto-bourgeois 
philosophy; K ant’s ethics also was profoundly political, the philosophical articulation o f  the 
sovereignty o f  Reason, the latter being the master-concept behind all the attempts o f 
eighteenth-century bourgeoisie to formulate a coherent philosophical outlook; Hegel’s ethics 
too was inherendy political, reflecting his views on the m odem  state — in his case, 
unsurprisingly, the Germ an state — as the culmination o f Absolute Spirit’s quest for 
perfection; so was the ethics o f  the English Empiricists, an ethics fashioned after the 
mercantilist ideology o f the English ruling classes; the same holds for the Utilitarians and 
their logistics o f  m oral values and for Nietzsche and his profoundly political rejection o f  any 
collectivist ideas along with all established Hews on morality and ethics and his legitimisation 
o f an individualism free o f  all social constraints. O ne will hardly find an instance in the 
history o f moral philosophy when ethics was not closely associated with the politics o f its 
particular epoch.
It must be noted however that politics, as I use it here, is always in the sense o f  the 
politics o f  the dominant social classes; it always signifies the collective enterprise o f 
establishing and maintaining political and economic power. However contradictory they may 
have been these politics have nevertheless been those o f certain political and economic 
regimes. The same holds true for moral philosophy. Indeed one might say that moral 
philosophy has traditionally played the part o f  legitimising and providing a logically coherent 
set o f rights, duties, and motives in the interest o f the dominant ideology, o f which it has 
always been part. This has traditionally been the generic, as it were, Marxist response to all 
issues pertaining to ethics or morality.8 I, by and large, accept this view, but I also think that
* 'I'here is, o f  course, a paradox in the case o f  Marxism which has fuelled a debate that has lasted for quite a 
long time, 'lliis paradox is that no matter how vehemently Marxism, especially in its Leninist variants, wishes to 
argue agamst the political validity o f  (mainly bourgeois) ethics in the form that it was bequeathed to us it often 
cannot avoid pronouncing its arguments in a manner that betrays the making o f  some fundamental moral 
choices (Marx always comes to mind at this point). One possible answer to that is that no one can escape his 
own historical determinations. Within our tradition, the moral code one aims to denounce for its mystificatory 
effect is so integral a part o f  the conceptual matrix o f  one’s own consciousness that to argue against it is almost 
certainly to generate a contradiction. For a detailed discussion o f  the issues raised here see Lukes, 1985, Ash,
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its strong version, i.e. the complete rejection o f  all things m oral/ethical as irrelevant to 
Marxist theory or socialist politics is misguided since it refuses to acknowledge the profound, 
structural interrelatedness o f  ethics and politics in the sphere o f social and political relations. 
So far I have argued for the close relation o f  moral philosophy and ideology, indeed for their 
co-articulation in the cultural matrix o f  history. I now wish to say more about the way in 
which ethics and politics are co-articulated in the social sphere.
If there is one thing that distinguishes moral philosophy from other forms o f human 
inquiry it is its reliance on a specific trope, the ‘good’ vs. ‘evil’ binary opposition. According 
to Fredric Jameson “not metaphysics but ethics is the informing ideology o f  the binary 
opposition” (Jameson 1983: 114). Indeed ethics may be rightfully considered as a grand 
ideological gesture, whose function is to cement the disparate superstructural elements in a 
given o rd er “it is ethics itself which is the ideological vehicle and the legitimization of 
concrete structures o f  power and dom ination”, (ibid, 114) Ethics, in its established form, 
provides the terrain where issues o f power relations are transcodified and then expressed as 
issues o f  morality. Whenever those issues are articulated through the moral code the whole 
outlook undergoes a profound change. Whereas the political code allows for a kind of 
reasoning that may ultimately relate what is perceived as wrong or unjust with the actual 
world to its proper causes, the moral code, in my opinion, allows for no such thing. Instead it 
makes almost inevitable that all that is wrong or unjust will be attributed to either sin or 
moral deficiency. Ethics, as we know it from our Western tradition, certainly allows a certain 
degree o f  insight into the human condition. W hat it does not allow is this insight to  be 
transformed into a knowledge that may eventually support a politics o f effective resistance to 
the existing order. But is that necessary? Is that inherent in the moral code itself? The answer
1998, Peffer, 1990 and McLellan & Sayers, 1990. A forceful justification o f  the Marxist objection to (bourgeois) 
ethics is to be found in Trotsky, 1973.
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I would like to propose is not simple, nor does it exhaust all the possibilities. It is merely a 
first step towards a dialectical understanding o f  the relation between ethics and politics.
T h e  Q u e s t i o n  o f  Id e o l o g y
Before I embark on a detailed discussion o f ethical criticism I wish to turn my attention 
to another concept which is im portant in the framework o f this project, that o f  ideology. 
Since I do not intend to offer a full overview o f all the epistemological and methodological 
problems that a detailed account o f ideology entails, I will only attempt to make clear 
whatever is absolutely necessary for understanding its relevance to the current discussion. By 
ideology I designate any set o f  ideas, meanings, and values that are situated in the intersection 
o f  various discourses, political power, and human interests. This, however, is not enough. To 
make ideology a usable concept one needs to go one step further and draw attention to its 
specific characteristics, its distinctive features. Ideology, therefore, will also signify the social 
determination o f  thought in a manner that ultimately supports, actively or passively, the 
reproduction o f  any existing sociopolitical order. Yet, even this supplementary definition 
leaves certain questions unanswered. Is ideology to be only regarded as a specific mode o f 
thought, one that works for the interests o f  a given social order or is it merely the 
unavoidable mode o f constitution o f all our thoughts? In short, can we escape ideology, and 
if not what is the usefulness o f this concept as an analytical tool? W ithout embarking on an 
in-depth examination o f the notoriously difficult problem o f establishing a plausible and 
workable definition o f truth, I shall nevertheless make an effort to clarify certain issues.
hirst and foremost, I think that the concept o f  ideology' is a valid analytical tool because 
it enables one to make choices regarding the distinct political quality' o f a proposition (the 
thesis o f  ideology' as politically complicit to regimes o f differential power relations). In the 
following chapters where I will discuss the works o f F. R. Leavis, Jean-Paul Sartre, and 
Lionel Trilling I shall have the opportunity to make practical use o f  the concept o f  ‘ideology’
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thus conceived. However, this must not be taken as implying that what is politically suspect 
or unacceptable is necessarily ‘wrong’. It is rather to say that although “much o f what 
ideologies say is true, and would be ineffectual if it were n o t. ..” they also “contain a good 
many propositions which are flagrandy false, and do so less because o f some inherent quality 
than because o f the distortions into which they are commonly forced in their attempts to 
ratify and legitimate unjust, oppressive political systems” (Eagleton 1991: 222). Ideology, as 
an analytical tool, is valid to the extent that one seeks to isolate those elements in any 
particular cultural artefact or discourse that lead to a political critique o f the existing order, be 
it the political order or the order o f theory. In seeing ideology as an essential part o f  literary 
or critical practice I rely on the fundamental Marxist premise that thought, theory, all 
manifestations o f human consciousness are thoroughly historical, and thus deeply enmeshed 
in the politics o f any given era. This means that, to me, no literary work o f art or work o f 
literar\T criticism should be treated as if it were something neutral, the product o f  a 
transcendentally conceived individual consciousness, free from the tensions o f history', since 
only within the framework o f latter eyrervthing takes places and is appropriately signified. It is 
mv y iew that any inquiry' that erases history', either by refusing to acknowledge it or eyren by 
textualizing it ad absurdum makes our understanding o f  human life extremely problematic; 
firsdy because it offers us an inadequate epistemology with which we can make sense o f  the 
wav we com prehend the world; secondly, and more importantly, because it offers us nothing 
but the prospect o f  a very' ineffectual politics.
However, there is still a question that must be answered. If  ideology' is to designate a 
discourse complicit with any form o f power, then does not this entail that any critique o f  the 
latter, in order to be y'alid, must presuppose a somewhat privileged position within a non- 
ideological space, from which one may claim that one’s own discourse is legitimate and true 
where other discourses are not? Is such a space possible? If  such a space is conceived solely 
as a cognitive one then the notorious epistemological aporiae regarding the limits o f human
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cognition will almost certainly invalidate any critical argument unless o f course one has been 
cautious enough to formulate a radically new philosophy that can allow for such a space. 
O ne way to read Western philosophy is precisely as an attem pt to overcome the crippling 
realization that man can never be absolutely capable o f transcending the limits o f  his limited, 
i.e. historically situated, consciousness. But the problem is precisely the positing o f 
consciousness as the one organizing centre around which such problems may be resolved. 
W hat if the space we are looking for is not located in human consciousness but somewhere 
else? W hat if this space m ust be understood purely in relational terms, that is in accordance 
neither with a fundamental ontology o f  immutable presence, nor with a metaphysics o f  the 
incommensurability between the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds but rather in 
accordance with its relative positionality in the multiple discursive and material formations in 
which it appears? In that case this space is best conceived o f as dynamic and relational, an 
effect o f  a particular articulation o f objective social relations and not o f an a priori delimited 
hum an consciousness. But to what kind o f  social relations is one referring in this case? 'ITie 
answer I would like to propose is that it is relations o f  power, relations that presuppose an 
unequal distribution o f (material an d /o r cultural) wealth, relations that those who are in 
possession o f  this wealth are constandv trying to legitimise and also reproduce. Therefore the 
space that one may occupy in order to apply any sort o f Ideologiekritik? is not, I think, 
primarily an epistemologically but a politically defined one.
O ne o f the main arguments put forth in these pages is that any kind o f discourse (be it a 
discourse on ethics or a discourse on literature) is determined by the social, political, and 
material forces that shape its historical present. ITiis determination, it must be said, is not 
something mechanical, not a mere cause that inescapably brings about certain effects, but
9 Raymond Geuss’ The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambndge 
University Press, 1981), pp. 26-44 presents the particular problems any criticism o f  ideology is bound to come 
up against with great lucidity and attention to detail.
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rather something that works in a far m ore sophisticated way, the precise nature o f which is 
not always clear or easily theorizable. Although the precise nature o f this determination is a 
matter o f contention, it will be sufficient to say once more that it is not a question o f  causal 
relations between the different levels o f any given society7, but rather a question o f an 
extremely complex web o f interrelating elements, where each such element is at one and the 
same time constitutive o f and constituted by each other, and all in the last instance mobilised 
according to the logic proper to the dominant mode o f production o f the time.
Ethics, in this sense, is one o f the main constitutive discourses o f the historical societies 
as we know them, along with political economy, aesthetics, and metaphysics among others. 
As a distinct level o f knowledge, ethics has its own features, its own vocabulary, and offers a 
specific view o f human life. It is also — to the extent that it is constantly interacting with all 
the other elements — constantly revising its own concepts, broadening its traditional field o f 
inquiry7, asking new questions. Howevrer, this happens in accordance with a structural logic 
which is not made manifest by the sheer presence o f quantifiable empirical evidence; it is 
rather the outcome o f an interpretive process, I shall call, appropriating Paul Ricoeur’s 
famous phrase, a ‘hermeneutics o f suspicion’; in other w7ords, a politically-motiy'ated 
hermeneutics.
W hat I ha\re tried to do in this section is to establish that every discourse is bound up 
with the ensuing material and cultural inequalities that result from an asymmetrical 
distribution o f power. By virtue o f this very7 characteristic ethics and the discourse on 
morality7 are also ideologically motivated as is the case with any discourse which offers itself 
as a critique o f these. I wish now to discuss in more detail the one discourse which is inspired 
by both ethics and literary7 criticism, namely ethical criticism.
E t h i c a l  C r it ic is m : T h e  R e a d i n g  o f  L i t e r a t u r e  a s  M o r a l  P e d a g o g y
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'ITie appreciation o f  beauty in art or nature is not only 
(for all its difficulties) the easiest available spiritual exercise; 
it is also a completely adequate entry into (and not just analog}' of) 
the good life, since it is the checking o f  selfishness in the interest o f  seeing the real.
Iris Murdoch'"
Ethical criticism is the form that literary criticism takes when its concern for ethics and 
morality becomes prom inent and is more or less explicidy articulated as such. Compared 
with any other concerns that literary criticism may have at any particular time, the concern 
over the ethical or moral quality o f  literature is what motivates the whole enterprise o f ethical 
criticism. ITiis particularly close relation between ethics and literature has occupied an 
im portant place in Western literary criticism, from classical antiquity to modem times. Even, 
in our century, as Tobin Siebers claims, “the character o f the critic in m odem  literary theory 
is only and everywhere presented in ethical terms.” (Siebers 1988: 11).
Ethical criticism, especially in its current form, deals with all aspects o f the literary 
phenom enon. ITiat implies the totality o f  elements that constitute what we commonly refer 
to as literature: the element o f literary production, the literary work itself, its moment(s) o f 
consumption, and additionally, literature as an institution, and everything else that has a 
direct bearing on literature even if it does not properly belong to this field. Ethical criticism’s 
concern is to  isolate those moments in that totality that are directly or indirectly related to 
ethics: the moral status o f the individual work o f art, the assignment o f moral responsibility 
to the author an d /o r the reader", the evaluation o f the moral qualities o f  the fictional 
characters, often considered as entities personifying the dominant moral equalities o f a
111 “On ‘G od’ and ‘G ood’” in Revisions: C.hanping Perspectives in Moral Philosophy, ed. by Stanley Hauerwas Sc 
Alasdair MacIntyre, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University7 o f  Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 83.
11 ITiis is the only aspect that is relatively absent from contemporary academic ethical criticism. Critics engage 
with texts and arc concerned about their moral effects in the context o f  their reception by the reading public. In 
addition to that, there is also the question o f  the tacit acceptance o f  the anti-intentionalist stance inaugurated by 
New  Criticism. The attribution o f  moral worth or ethical responsibility to the producer o f  the text is something 
that risks conflating the categories o f  the critic on the one hand and the censor on the other and few ethical 
critics would want to appear endorsing such a conflation.
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certain work o f fiction, and last but not least the reading o f  literature in such a manner so as 
to support or contradict certain philosophical positions or arguments regarding moral 
conduct, or more generally, the pursuit o f  a moral life. In the latter case, ethical criticism 
seeks to interpret or simply reread literature as predominandy a testimony about the 
particular inscriptions o f  the notions o f ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in the literary works under 
examination.
Ethical criticism, particularly in its recent incarnation, is diverse and its distinctiveness is 
due both to its m ethodology and to its object o f  inquiry. The m ethod may assume the form 
o f a direct approach to what we traditionally regard as the content o f the literary w ork12 (a 
feature o f  m odernist criticism which is evident in the critical works o f both Leavis and 
Trilling) or it may assume the form o f a concern over the moral status o f the act o f reading, 
in the sense o f identifying the moral effects something that potentially opens us to the world 
has on us15. It may also assume the form o f  a metacritical concern over the particular features 
o f  its own critical practice.14
O ne o f the most debated issues in the philosophy o f art and literary7 theory7 is the 
question o f  whether any criticism can be justified in its moral or political pronouncem ents 
given that the specific relation between art and human consciousness or society7 is 
notoriouslv contested. Ethical, as well as political, criticism has traditionally been the target o f 
those who insisted that the artificialitv o f the fictional world precludes any unproblematic 
passage from textual to actual reality. Proponents and followers o f  the aesthetic dogma o f art 
for art’s sake deny that art, and literature in particular, can in any wav serve as vehicles for 
moral truths.15 Their argument is that a purely aesthetic entity, like a literary work o f art, can
12 See for example Nussbaum, 1990.
14 See for example Newton, 1995.
14 Such is the nature o f  the present study. See also Siebers, 1988 and Kaglestone, 1997.
13 For a discussion o f  this view see Possner, 1997 where, among other things, he claims that by “assigning to
literature the function o f  promoting sound moral (including political) values, [the school o f  ethical critics]
associates literature with public functions, such as the inculcation o f  civic virtue. By doing this it makes 
literature an inviting candidate for public regulation and thus contracts the private sphere. It goes far toward 
accepting the radicals' claim that everything is politics” (p. 8). This ultraliberal view seems to forget that literary
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only give us a feeling o f  pleasure or displeasure. It does not give us any kind o f knowledge 
upon which we could base any moral or political readings. The problem with this argument is 
that it assumes that the knowledge one acquires from engaging with a work o f art is what 
philosophers call procedural knowledge, that is knowledge o f how to do certain things. Although 
one cannot legitimately deny that literature may also occasionally provide this kind o f 
knowledge the im portant objection to the above thesis is that the reading o f literature 
provides us with affective knowledge, that is knowledge about feelings, values, and attitudes. ITiis 
kind o f knowledge is precisely what ethical criticism alludes to when its proponents claim 
that books often move us, something that implies moral sense, choice and eventually some 
sort o f action.
From  what I have said so far, it m ust be evident that ethical criticism, solely by its own 
practice, asserts that the literary text definitely relates productively to the extratextual reality, 
part o f which, is, o f course, the reader. Ilie particular hermeneutical endeavour o f ethical 
criticism and its underlying assumptions make the question o f the relation between the 
ethical and the aesthetic a crucial one for its success. 'ITiis inevitably brings me to the 
complex issue o f  the conjunction o f  aesthetics and ethics in literary criticism. As I discuss the 
interrelationship o f the aesthetic and the ethical, I shall have the opportunity to also present 
and examine those aspects o f classical philosophies that still play a decisive role in 
contemporary conceptions o f ethics and literature. I shall attempt to do that by means o f 
trying to establish the historical character, and, more importantly, the philosophical and 
ideological lineage, o f the concepts one is likely to use in arguing persuasiv ely either for or 
against what is currently the dom inant mode o f thinking. For the purposes o f this short
criticism begun its life as an essentially secularised form o f  Christian hermeneutics with the mission o f  
improving the character and the general worldview o f  those disciplined by it (mainly civil servants and public- 
oriented individuals) and was therefore thoroughly and unambiguously associated with ‘public functions’ and 
‘civic virtue’ For a most illuminating discussion o f  this pedagogical aspect o f  literary criticism see Hunter, 1988 
& 1996.
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survey, I shall only deal with those moments, the historical impact o f which is very much in 
evidence in contemporary moral theory and ethical criticism in particular.
F r o m  P l a t o  t o  N i e t z s c h e : E t h ic s  a n d  A e s t h e t ic s  in  W e s t e r n  P h i l o s o p h y
Plato was the first to provide a comprehensive account o f the interrelationship o f the 
two levels, with his insistence on their mutual dependency and the potential harm poets may 
inflict on the innocent souls o f those prone to accepting the mimetic qualities o f art at face 
value. He was the first critic to insist that the moral effect o f any art is to be absolutely more 
crucial for its appreciation than any aesthetic quality' it may possess. In this Plato, by being 
willing to allow entry to his ideal republic to the lyrical poet who would sing in praise o f  the 
gods and o f  the virtues o f heroes and no t to any other poet, is one o f the key figures who 
inspires the sinister version o f the ethical critic, namely the censor. Plato’s open preference 
for propagandistic art is a constant reminder that ethical criticism in its normative guise may 
well be, among other things, the space where literary criticism and censorship converge. His 
pupil Aristode proved far more sensitive to the aesthetic specificity7 o f art. Aristode’s moral 
concept o f  catharsis which was first introduced in his On the A rt o f Poetry as the purgation o f 
fear and pity7 which are the proper goals o f  a tragedy16 is predicated on the ability7 o f the 
playwright to use the most appropriate (aesthetic) means in pursuing this.
Whereas the Platonic conception o f  the connection between literary aesthetics and 
pedagogy is hardly a source o f inspiration, the works o f  Aristotle, on the contrary, still inspire 
a large num ber o f important philosophers especially in the field o f ethics, and more 
particularly in the field o f ethical criticism. 'Hie reason for this is that Aristotle’s ethical 
theory was able to provide, albeit in a modified form, a conceptual and ideological 
framework that corresponded well to certain o f  the fundamental aspirations o f philosophers 
in m odem  times. Aristotle’s immense contribution was that he established a strong link
16 In Aristotle, 1965: 39 (chapter 6).
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between rationality and ethics, a link that has not been irreparably severed even in our own 
time, a time notoriously suspicious, at least in some quarters, o f the idea o f rationality . ITiis 
Aristotelian rationality is an integral part o f  the social fabric o f the ancient polis. It is also a 
particular mode o f thinking and acting, which enables men to reach their goal within the 
framework o f a community. ITiis is a conception o f morality as something entirely 
constituted in a social space in direct and unbreakable relation with the governance o f  the 
polis; it is therefore thoroughly political. The key regulating concept here is eudaemonia: the 
well-being, a good citizen, and not an abstracdv conceived individual, is worthy of. However, 
it is with this concept that Aristode’s conservative political oudook comes to the foreground. 
'Hie good life, the result o f  virtue, o f rational moral choice, is above all the advantage o f  a 
small elite minority, o f  which Aristode considered himself to be a member. This aristocratic 
minority', the only one ultimately capable o f  philosophical contemplation, far away as 
possible from any pressing material necessity, was Aristode’s assumed audience. This feature 
that marks Aristode’s thought, this tension between his conceptual brilliance and his political 
conservatism is also, implicidy or explicidy, a point o f  tension in a great deal o f  neo- 
Aristotelian thought.1
ITiree centuries later Horace, following Aristode’s general moral and aesthetic guidelines, 
claimed that “poets aim at giving either profit or delight, or at combining the giving o f 
pleasure with some useful precepts for life” (Horace, 1965: 90). This principle that 
emphasized the conjunction o f the utile (moral profit) with the duke (aesthetic delight) along 
with his (inherendy ethical) principle o f  decorum (or dramatic propriety) survived, in one 
way or another, to our own times although now the dominant paradigms in art and literary 
criticism are markedly different. O f these the Kantian paradigm is o f singular importance for 
my discussion here.
r  Virtually every liberal conception o f  ethics -  and not only Neo-Aristotelianism -  is greatly indebted to the 
Aristotelian conception o f  morality and therefore the tensions I am alluding to are to found in these 
articulations as well, as I shall have the opportunity to show when I discuss Leavis’s and Trilling’s work.
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Kant is largely responsible for the rigorous separation o f ethics and aesthetics, the former 
being the realm o f practical reason and the latter o f  judgement. However, when he comes to 
the discussion o f the celebrated concept o f  the sublime K ant claims that it has its foundation 
in human nature and more specifically in “ the predisposition to the feeling for (practical) 
ideas, i.e., to moral feeling” (Kant, 1987: 125), thus making it a meeting point o f the aesthetic 
and the ethical where both are mediated by culture. As his following statement clearly 
indicates: “it is a fact that what is called sublime by us, having been prepared through culture, 
comes across as merely repellent to a person who is uncultured and lacking in the 
development o f moral ideas” (ibid, 124). W hat we see here is not only that the aesthetic 
category o f the sublime is culturally determined but also that a consciousness ‘lacking in 
moral ideas’, that is one which is poorly socialised though education, is incapable o f 
appreciating it. Thus Kant, in his Critique of Judgement, with the additional help o f the concept 
o f  sensus communis, relates the ethical and the aesthetic with each other, by binding both to the 
underlying cultural and social structures.
K ant’s influence is more than evident in moral philosophy but less so in contemporary 
ethical criticism. Kantian formalism especially in his formulation o f  the categorical imperative 
— the cornerstone o f Kantian ethics — makes his work rather unsuitable as a conceptual 
foundation to a critical practice which deals with the fictionalised form o f the specifics o f 
human life. Kantian ideas are very much in evidence in nineteenth-century criticism, 
particularly in Hazlitt and Coleridge (through A. W. Schlegel) and later on the Victorian 
critics, but as we move to the next century these ideas seem to be all the more inadequate for 
dealing with the pressing issues that literary criticism came up against, Ihe  modernist 
provocation, the post-World War II situation and other world-historical events all 
contributed greatly to the relative devaluation o f a philosophical approach that gave absolute 
priority to Reason and hardly ever took into account the contingencies o f human life and 
history, not to mention the material necessities underlying these. How could it be different
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since K ant’s ethics was initially articulated as the ideal companion to the exigencies o f the yet 
relatively unstructured capitalist market? It aimed at providing it with a set o f rules and 
restrictions, which would enable it to overcome one o f its most urgent moral paradoxes: the 
search for a viable moral system which could satisfy the need o f providing individuals with a 
strong motive for not allowing their self-interest to overcome certain limits. Ihe  problem, o f 
course, was that this unimpeded self-interest was considered as the main guarantee for the 
non-problematic function o f  the market itself. K ant’s ethics o f duty as dictated by formal 
reason alone was the futile attem pt to provide an answer to a historically justified, but 
politically suspect question, because instead o f  prom oting what the liberal Kant assumed as 
historically feasible it merely served as a “ framework o f justice necessary for [the] commercial 
society” (Poole 1991: 20) o f his own time. His ethics o f  duty, in sharp contradistinction to 
the Aristotelian ethics o f virtue, which I discussed above, attempted to formalize what was 
essential for the newly formed identity o f  the individual in the Western world. Something 
that could no longer be formalized in terms o f an ethics o f virtue, since such an ethics could 
not be pursued in a society that was in the process o f destroying the very foundations this 
particular conception o f ethics depended upon. As a consequence o f this, Kantian ideas 
came to be regarded with hostility by left-wing theorists and postmodernists alike and if they 
survive in ethical criticism they only survive as parts o f the conceptual background o f certain 
critical approaches that seem to find no incompatibility between the ‘thick’ descriptions o f 
life in literature and the ‘thin’ and often overtly formalistic descriptions o f a philosophical 
approach o f which the injunction to comply with the rule o f a transhistorical Reason is the 
fundamental characteristic.
It would be Nietzsche, a century later, who would attempt to debunk this rational ethics 
by arguing that it was nothing more than a variation o f the ethics o f resentm ent which, 
according to him, was the legacy o f Judeo-Christianity. For Nietzsche, Kantian as well as 
other moral theories inherited the whole tradition o f Christian thought and, instead o f  doing
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away completely with the false metaphysical assumptions o f that thought, they merely 
substituted a secular metaphysics o f rational duty for the holy metaphysics o f duty before 
God. Nietzsche’s project was to reach the limits o f this situation and go beyond it: beyond 
good and evil. Ihe  transcendence o f the slave morality, which was the outcome o f the 
particular outlook o f  the weak and the helpless with the sole purpose o f reversing the power 
relations that have kept them  in check throughout history was, for Nietzsche, the sole duty 
o f the Ubermensch, the overman, the gifted, free spirit that would affirm his vitality and natural 
instincts w ithout any moral inhibition or social constraint. In doing so, in going beyond good 
and evil the overman would be constrained not by an ethics but by an aesthetics o f life.
N ietzsche’s views reflected modernity ’s malcontent, the gradual realization o f the limits 
o f Reason, the premonition o f the im minent disaster. His philosophy was indeed in many 
aspects prophetic, and in many others an empty7 excess, but admittedly a most powerful one. 
His ideas may not have influenced a distinct school o f  ethical criticism, but their importance 
lies elsewhere. It lies in their pervasiveness in almost all aspects o f twentieth-century critical 
thought and in the way they influenced positively or negatively anyone who would tackle the 
thorny problem  o f morality7 in the context o f  twentieth-century7 history7. His views about the 
relation o f  language and history, namely that we are only dealing with linguistic or ideological 
(mis)interpretations and not with facts, his emphasis on the question o f power and 
particularly his insistence that morality and ethical systems in general come to exist as social 
phenom ena only as an aspect o f the struggle for the acquisition o f power have left a strong 
mark on contemporary theory and moral philosophy in particular. Much closer to my own 
preoccupations here, his unique conception o f the liberating and often destructive power o f 
the human will would later influence both Sartre and d rilling in the ways they conceived o f 
certain issues essential to ethics and the moral examination o f literature in particular.
W hat I have presented so far are those philosophers who are, without a doubt, among 
the most im portant ones in helping us understand the specific character o f moral philosophy,
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and by extension, o f morally-inflected or ethical criticism during the twentieth century. But 
however im portant and vital to our understanding these thinkers may be, one has to 
acknowledge the fact that their influence in literary criticism was by and large mediated by 
the works o f those who, while not professional philosophers, did nevertheless look to 
phil osophy for either inspiration for their theoretical and critical formulations or, quite often, 
as a means to legitimise post facto their ideas and propositions. This other genealogical line, the 
tradition o f literary criticism, is o f particular importance, one that can hardly be 
underestimated in my discussion here. To this I shall now turn to mv attention.
C o m p l e m e n t i n g  P h i l o s o p h y : T h e  T r a d i t i o n  o f  L it e r a r y  C r it ic is m
Taking as a starting point the fact that literary criticism in its m odem  sense first appears 
as a discursive formation during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries one can 
immediately observe one of its main historical characteristics, namely that it was, among 
other things, the product o f the ideological struggle o f the rising bourgeois class against the 
obscurantist ideology o f the absolutist state. As Terry Eagleton says, during that time “ the 
European bourgeoisie begins to carve out for itself a distinct discursive space, one o f rational 
judgement and enlightened critique rather than o f the brutal ukases o f an authoritarian 
politics” (Eagleton 1984: 9). It is within this discursive space that literary criticism is first 
practised; impressionistic, ad hoc and often belletristic, but nevertheless a novel practical- 
ideological gesture, which asserts the will and intention o f  the bourgeois class in its 
revolutionary' period to produce a new discourse, to participate in a new cultural formation 
that may eventually be shared by all free citizens who are guided by Reason. The moral 
imperative o f  such a discourse was from the m om ent o f its insertion into the fabric o f 
history one o f its m ost distinctive features: in order to be able to participate in this newly- 
formed public sphere one had to be able to share with the other members this new 
interpretive code, which was claimed to be based on Reason and good faith. N ot to be able
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to do so was not merely an inadequacy, but a more deep-rooted deficiency. In other words, it 
signified a more fundamental lack than the ignorance o f a specialized subject did. Those who 
were excluded from such a discourse were to be regarded as lacking something far more vital 
than merely technical information.
We can see this politics o f  sedimentation, on the one hand, and exclusion, on the other, 
to feature again and again in the history o f criticism. From the time o f the Tatler and the 
Spectator in the beginning o f the eighteenth century to the lidinburgh Review and Quarterly 
Review almost a century later literary criticism progresses from being initially a gendem an’s 
worthy pursuit to becoming a recognised and relatively autonomous literary genre. With the 
transition from  the essentially positive critique o f the Augustan period (affirmation o f the 
bourgeois values) to the negative critique o f  the Romantic period (affirmation o f the 
transcendental creative spirit in stark opposition to the professionalization o f literature and 
the philistinism o f  the market) literary criticism finds itself in a situation where its aesthetic 
and moral pronouncements assume an ever more pronounced political inflection. Criticism 
becom es even more explicidy political during this time by engaging with history in a twofold 
manner: by selective engagement with the political situation o f the time, while, at the same 
time, denying any intrinsic relation o f  literature with the ‘impure world’ o f  politics. This act 
o f  isolating the realm o f letters from the realm o f the ever-expanding capitalist market and o f 
real-life politics, this ideological manoeuvre par excellence, has left a lasting effect on the way 
we would from then on deal with literature, particularly as regarding its relation with anything 
that falls outside its own (idealistically conceived) realm.
Later on during the Victorian period we find one of the most im portant cultural critics, 
whose work would have a long lasting effect on Anglo-American criticism from then on: 
Matthew Arnold. In the context o f this study, Arnold is far more im portant that any other 
critic since it is in his work that the relation between morality and politics finds one o f  its 
more exemplary formulations and additionally because, without him, neither Leavis nor
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Trilling would turn out to be the kind o f  critics they eventually became. Arnold’s criticism 
may be characterized by many things but one that stands out is, according to Eagleton18, his 
preoccupation to find a substitute for traditional religion, a new dogma that could contain 
and regulate the sociopolitical tensions, enhance and safeguard the social and ideological 
cohesion o f his society and finally hope to succeed where other traditional ideological 
formations have failed. Arnold gave his new dogma the name o f Culture; an all- 
encompassing concept that not only superseded all previous conceptualisations o f the same 
aspect o f reality , but also initiated a way o f  cultural criticism that used these concepts as 
political weapons in the struggle o f middle-class intellectuals to articulate a socially effective 
discourse both  in relation to their own class and the other classes with which they had uneasy 
or adv ersarial relations. Arnold’s polemical intervention stands out for precisely its political 
nature and for its own peculiar way o f articulating its pronouncements. If  one considers the 
following extract from Culture and Anarchy.
Ilus is the social idea, and the men o f  culture are the true apostles o f equality. The great men ot 
culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, from earning from 
one end to society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas o f  their time; who have 
laboured to divest knowledge o f  all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, 
exclusive; to humanise it, to make it efficient outside the clique o f the cultivated and learned, yet 
still remaining the best knowledge and thought o f  the time, and a true source, therefore o f  
sweetness and light (Arnold 1960: 70).
one may, applying a charitable interpretation, read it as an exemplary idealist text, a typical 
product o f  the British nineteenth century, a text which, although vague and strategically non­
specific, does not so easily allow itself to be read as a biased, ideologically charged, political 
intervention. It is, however, in its own context that its true character is revealed:
18 In Eagleton: 2000 and also in Parrinder 1991: 143-178.
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So whatever brings risk o f  tumult and disorder, multitudinous precessions in the streets o f  our 
crowded towns, multitudinous meetings in their public places and parks, - demonstrations 
perfectly unnecessary in the present course o f  our affairs, - our best self, or right reason, plainly 
enjoins us to set our faces against. It enjoins us to encourage and uphold the occupants o f  the 
executive p o w e r , whoever they may be, in firmly prohibiting them. (Arnold 1960: 97).
Arnold’s class politics become evident whenever his own text fails to contain and resolve 
all the contradictions o f  the society it is referring to  and thus attempts to exorcise this failure 
by means o f a dubious rhetoric: “our best self... ” , and since some might be excused for 
wondering what does this best self really consist of, Arnold adds or right reason” so that 
his readers could be reassured that it is a matter o f  a particular kind o f social order, one that 
is guided by something infinitely more stable and (morally) legitimate than class politics 
alone. So, the humanization o f the masses can happen only as long as they are kept in check 
(in the name o f a suprahistorical Reason), which means as long as the working class keeps 
producing enough surplus value for Arnold, and by extension for his entire class, to be in a 
position to devote their time in discussing the translations o f H om er and the relative cultural 
merits o f Hellenism and Hebraism.
'Ilie  intellectual, at once a public servant and a self-appointed prophet, is the one who 
regulates the distribution o f  cultural goods allocating a fixed am ount to each class, according 
to the latter’s social function and ideologically conceived ‘destiny’. As a consequence o f that, 
the Philistines (the middle-class), Arnold’s own social peers, are to be educated by a state- 
sanctioned elite so that they may secure an ideological hegemony that can guarantee the 
continuation o f  their privileges over the Populace (the working class) which stands against 
them ready to disrupt the imposed order. W hat is novel in such a discourse is not its political 
motivation but its mode o f enunciation. A rnold’s high moralistic tone is, apart from being 
one o f the m ost characteristic features o f  his discourse, a tactical move that attempts to focus
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the reader’s attention not on the real issues in question but on an interpretation based on a 
moral code that is presented in such an elusive manner so as to produce an exceptionally 
vague and circular type o f  argument, one that will initiate a very influential tradition o f  moral 
(or morally-inflected) criticism in the English world such as F. R. and Q. D. Leavis’s, 
Orwell’s, Trilling’s and later on some o f R. Hoggart’s critical works. Arnold’s Victorian 
heritage will be left to the aforementioned critics and to a wider community o f  critics in the 
English-speaking world to negotiate in accordance with the historical logic o f the twentieth 
century and the pressing ideological and political necessities that this century brought with it.
Arnold along with the critics who I have just mentioned have all produced a body o f 
work, within the framework o f which certain ideas and theories regarding ethics and criticism 
still exert a very strong influence on current literary theory. However, this presentation is far 
less than adequate for any proper understanding o f the intellectual heritage that twentieth 
century critics inherited from the past. O ne could legitimately object to the omission o f  many 
philosophers and literary critics like Hegel and Coleridge or Carlyle, not to m ention the 
omission o f the English empiricists, the Utilitarian tradition and J. S. Mill and the other less 
well-known philosophers and thinkers whose historical fate was not that glorious. But, I can 
only defend my choices here by saying that I only wished to present those that have a direct, 
undeniably important influence on contemporary7 ethical criticism at least in the English- 
speaking academia and not to offer a comprehensive survey o f moral philosophy or literary7 
criticism prior to the twentieth century .
T h e  TU rn  T o w a r d s  t h e  Et h ic a l : C ritical  a n d  H istorical  C o n t e x t s
To speak about the relation o f literature with ethics and morality7 is not something 
entirely new, although it is only recently that this particular critical practice has succeeded in 
voicing its concerns in such a manner so as to make itself an identifiable and distinctive wav 
o f  theorising literature. It is only recently that an explicitly self-conscious ethical criticism
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attracted so much attention, so much in fact that it was thought to signify a ‘turn toward the 
ethical’ in literary theory19. This was no accident and there are historical reasons for that. In 
discussing these reasons I would like to present the broader ideological context o f  the last 
forty years and then attem pt to identify the historical specificity o f  the last decade o f the 
twentieth century'.
From the sixties onwards the two main critical schools opposed to the prevalent liberal 
humanist critical practice were a) neo-Marxist literary theory, mainly Althusserian in 
inspiration, on the one hand; and b) post-structuralism, and particularly deconstruction, on 
the other. With a cultural formation such as this the conceptual space necessary for the 
legitimate inclusion o f ethics into literary7 theory was simply not there. W hat is more, in the 
rare cases when there was any mention o f  the ethical in conjunction with the literaiy, the 
verdict was not in favour o f the former. But what exactly was so discredited? Many things, to 
be sure, but it was liberal humanism, the main and most fundamental ideology and basic 
interpretative matrix o f Western bourgeois culture that was to be the primary7 target o f both 
the aforementioned critical practices.
From  a Marxist viewpoint it was increasingly evident that liberal humanism was the ever-
reliable device o f bourgeois ideological mystification, in the sense that what it did in fact do
was to conceal the glaring contradictions o f  the present by continually shifting the emphasis
from the actual problems and their effective causes and effects to the ideological
mystification o f ‘good’ versus ‘evil’, ‘moral responsibility7’ versus ‘moral apathy’ or
viciousness. Instead o f providing an alternative way o f  thinking that would take into account
the material causes o f a disastrous global state o f affairs, insupportable by a growing number
o f  people, what was offered was the escape route o f  conceptualising both the problem and
its effective solution in terms o f a moral struggle to overcome the quasi-metaphysical evil
that has befallen humankind. So instead o f  enabling a higher understanding which might in
19 According to David Parker it is during the nineties that a certain ‘turn to ethics’ in literary criticism became so 
apparent as to merit a consideration as a critical subgenre. For more details see Parker, 1998.
33
turn lead to a transformation o f the situation at hand, liberal humanism persisted in its 
mysdficatory rhetoric at times when there evidendy was a great need for an alternative way o f 
thinking and theorising the present.
A nother response to that came from post-structuralism, a critical practice that was largely 
due to the influence o f Nietzsche and Saussure through a rigorous re-reading o f them  by a 
num ber o f French theorists, who shared, among other things, certain im portant assumptions 
about the nature o f  ‘our’ com mon conceptual and ideological heritage. O ne o f  these 
assumptions was that liberal humanism was, despite its pretensions to the contrary, nothing 
more than an ideological trvmpe I’cril' an arbitrary, though hardly unjustified, attem pt at 
naturalising and universalising a historically specific way o f thinking man and society and 
their interrelationship. By assuming a hard inalienable core o f subjectivity, by attributing 
intentions and holding men accountable for their works and actions, this ‘grand narrative’, to 
use Francois Lyotard’s famous expression, paved the way to a society, which from then on 
would conceive itself along these lines, unable to see, and o f course act upon, any other 
alternative line o f  thinking. To the poststructuralists this accounted for the inability to 
conceptualise anything that would not presuppose an emphatically unitary, sovereign 
individual who stands whole, as it were, facing and dealing with an equally tightly structured 
society.
Another point o f contention was literature itself. In contradistinction to Marxism, which 
by and large considered literature as directly related to the material basis o f society', post­
structuralism regarded literature as a self-enclosed body o f texts in which any reference to 
extratextual reality' did not point or lead us to that reality but rather constituted it within 
literature’s own textual space. In short, literature’s fictionality was considered as exemplifying 
the assumed textual/fictional character o f history'. This feature o f poststructuralist thought, 
archetypically formulated in the critical work o f R. Barthes from the mid-sixties onwards 
marks one o f the m ost fundamental differences between it and Marxism: the different
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epistemologies at work in their respective interpretations. Resolutely realist2*’ in the case o f 
Marxism, ambivalently anti-realist in the case o f  post-structuralism, the respective 
epistemology o f each prevented them from achieving anything more than a problematical co­
existence in the sphere o f  critical and literary theory.
ITiis double rejection o f  liberal humanism and all the values which were associated with it 
left little room for ethics in the more conventional sense, since ethics had come to be 
considered as a very suspect notion, if not an outrageous ideological lie and utterly complicit 
with an increasingly obsolescent humanist discourse. That is not to say that all questions 
about ethics ceased to  be articulated. O n the contrary, what actually did happen was that 
these questions were then asked as part o f  a larger framework o f  reference where the quasi­
metaphysical, almost sacred autonomy o f the ethical (a major feature o f almost all bourgeois 
thought about ethics) simply ceased to exert any normative influence. Within this new 
framework o f reference, where issues o f  epistemological and political validity set the tone for 
a radical re-examination and re-appraisal o f W estern tradition, the ethical question underwent 
an equally radical transformation. The ethical sphere, once the undeniable repository o f 
bourgeois ideological hegemony, became a strongly contested space, fraught with 
discrepancies and insoluble contradictions. Liberal humanism — having persisted in spite o f 
the m ost horrifying historical evidence against it (the ghosts o f the Nazi concentration 
camps, among other things, which once prom pted Theodor Adom o to wonder whether 
there could be any lyrical poetry, and by extension politically naive art, after Auschwitz) -  
ended up, at least in the realm o f theory, having to defend itself. The hermeneutics o f 
suspicion inaugurated by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud became the tools which were used in 
order to extract from their object not the hidden truth but the manifest lie, not an immutable
20 Needless to say realism even within Marxism com es in all sizes and flavours. For my purposes here I shall 
only emphasize the fact that I am talking about a philosophy that accepts that reality is independent o f  our 
understanding o f  it.
35
essence but an index o f concrete historical instances, not personal disinterestedness but 
historical complicity.
Having presented the ideological background, even in such a sketchy manner, it is now 
possible to put the current debate in its wider historical context. The emergence o f ‘ethical 
criticism’ as an identifiable critical subgenre is, as I have indicated above, largely a 
phenom enon o f the last decade (1990s). In my view, the most im portant historical reason for 
this emergence was the new political and ideological configuration o f the world-system after 
the collapse o f the vast majority o f Communist regimes and the seemingly unchallenged 
hegemony o f  liberal democracy and free-market economics. O ne o f the results o f  this world- 
historical shift was a profound change in the tenor o f the ideological warfare between the 
Right and the Left. Whereas the latter was left in the least enviable position o f trying to 
refashion itself in a rapidly changing world while at the same time failing to come up with 
anything even barely resembling a consensual appraisal o f why things turned out the way 
they did, the former felt justified in engaging in a series o f  often self-congratulatory 
assertions about the current hegemonic status o f  liberal ideas. All the arguments pu t forth 
during the first years o f the 1990s shared one com mon theme: the inherent deficiency o f the 
socialist/Marxist paradigm and the seemingly incontestable superiority o f  the liberal 
paradigm, which, in their view, was the one that conformed the best with the needs and 
aspirations o f the vast majority o f  people. In this atmosphere o f  unbridled optimism for the 
prospect o f an unchallenged liberal, capitalist future there appeared the possibility o f 
conceptualising this state o f affairs not simply as the aftermath o f a political and ideological 
victory but as the beginning o f a new period where political and ideological oppositions o f 
any consequence will have no reasons for emerging. 'Ibe argument was that with the 
dominance o f a single political and economic paradigm all opposition would, from then on, 
be confined within the very narrow framework o f deciding for or against specific issues, 
mosdy technical in nature and which would not threaten the system itself. This came to be
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known as the end-of-history thesis since in Francis Fukuyama’s work21 where it first made its 
appearance22 the whole series o f arguments is structured around the rather implausible 
assertion that we have reached the end o f  history, or in other words the end o f  a long era 
during which profound ideological differences could cause wide-scale disruptions in the 
normal working o f  the global (capitalist) system. If, according to this line o f argument, we 
have entered a new period when fundamental ideological differences have become either a 
thing o f the past or a feature o f marginalised and politically neutralised sectors o f Western 
societies then it is understandable why, during the same time, a new discourse made its 
appearance.
This discourse was moral in its form but implicidy political in its content. According to it 
all our fundamental differences are to be dealt with in moral and not political terms, or as 
Fredric Jameson argues, within the framework o f  “systems o f idealism that turn events first 
into ideas before producing what look like iron-clad explanations but what are in fact 
rewarmed rehashings o f our old friends G ood and Evil.” (Jameson, 1991: 262). If, so the 
claim goes, ideologies are dead then any oppositional attitude or practice must find its 
ultimate justification in the realm o f ethics and not politics. It is this wider political and 
ideological context that, in my view, facilitated the emergence o f contemporary ethical 
criticism. From that point onwards, it would be this new critical idiom that ought to 
articulate the critical, oppositional ideas in the place left vacant by the Marxist and 
poststructuralist theories o f  the previous periods.
Contemporary ethical criticism is a critical idiom that has very little o f substance to say 
about the political implications o f the aspects o f literature it examines. All political questions 
are transcodified into ethical or moral questions and the outer conceptual limits o f its critical 
practice are those put in place by ethics in its traditional or postm odern variant. In order to
21 Fukuyama’s ideas first appeared in the article “The End o f  History”, The National Interest, Summer 1989, pp. 
3-118 and then in a more expanded form in Fukuyama, 1992.
22 Or rather its re-appearance. For a detailed and highly informative historical account o f  the school o f  thought 
that found its most recent expression in Fukuyama see Anderson, 1992.
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support these assertions, I wish to examine more closely the two dominant paradigms in 
contemporary ethical criticism. These are Neo-Aristotelianism and Levinasian ethics, the 
former having originated in the English-speaking world and the latter in France.
T h e  N e o -A r ist o t e l ia n s: L iter atu re  a n d  t h e  G o o d  L ife
The work o f the Neo-Aristotelian school, o f  which Martha Nussbaum and MacIntyre are 
two o f the most prom inent members, has been hugely influential and instrumental in 
providing much o f  the theoretical support needed for a certain version o f contemporary 
ethical criticism. This particular ethical criticism, often practised by philosophers themselves, 
is a testimony to a relatively recent trend particularly among Neo-Aristotelians to consider 
literature as the ideal vehicle for a certain ethical conception o f the human adventure, one 
that is qualitatively superior to the established analytical and often dry tone o f  traditional 
philosophy. I h e  characteristics o f this particular neo-Aristotelian outlook, especially in 
ethical criticism, an outlook, which draws its inspiration from the whole o f Aristotelian 
philosophy and not just its ethics, may be summarised as follows: a) the
noncommensurability o f the valuable things, b) the priority o f  perceptions (priority o f  the 
particulars), c) ethical values o f the emotions, and d) ethical relevance o f  uncontrolled 
happenings. This enumeration o f characteristics taken directly from Martha N ussbaum ’s 
book l^ove’s Knowledge (pp. 35-44) is indicative o f the range and the preferred themes o f this 
school o f thought: the emphasis on particularity, the prioritisation o f the affective, and the 
positive valuation o f contingency. Ih u s  literature is seen as something which offers us, as 
Robert Eaglestone claims, the “experience through which our ethical intuitions and moral 
outlines can be tested, explored and modified” (Eaglestone 1997: 39). It is easy to see why 
this type o f criticism is particularly drawn to the examination o f moral issues. Literature, by 
providing a thick description o f human affairs, enables the attentive reader to experience a 
kind o f a simulation o f  life, another life whose intricate particularities the reader ideally treats
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as a form o f moral education, that is a sort o f education which, again ideally, would lead him 
to pursue a better life for himself. In other words, as T. J. Diffey argues: “if a reader's 
concern for literature is serious, he m ust be responsible in action. Otherwise literature is 
merely an indulgence.” (Diffey, 1975: 448).
Ihere is a certain ideological naivety that characterizes such views. The reasons are many 
but one o f them is certainly that they seem to be unaware o f the quite complex problems that 
any passage from a textual world to a real one entails.23 Both analytic philosophers and 
poststructuralists have long claimed, each camp pursuing its own philosophical agenda, that 
the textual structure o f  a literary work o f art prevents it from being the most reliable 
instrum ent in the moral education o f  humankind24. Yet, apart from the epistemological 
problems that arise due to the Neo-Aristotelians conviction o f  the essential transparency o f  
texts25 there is another characteristic o f  Neo-Aristotelian criticism that poses even more 
problems. This is its latent elitism, something that is also thoroughly constitutive o f 
Aristotle’s own political thought. A criticism o f this kind tacidy presupposes a privileged 
status in the community one belongs to, a certain form o f identity that the critic assumes and 
which is accepted rather uncritically without examining the terms o f its existence. N o t many 
Neo-Aristotelians seem to wonder as to whether there are any externally imposed limits to 
the access people have to (great) literature. N ot only that but they also seem to pass in silence 
the thorny issue o f whether the moral training by a rigorous regime o f reading literature is 
applicable in any large scale, given that for the vast majority o f people the reading o f 
literature does not figure very high in their priorities. In other words to assume such a 
beneficent role for literature while remaining blind to the material restrictions that conspire
to exclude the bulk o f humankind o f  such lofty pursuits is something that, in my opinion,
24 A very informative discussion o f the epistemological and other issues that arise when one reads ‘ethically’ or 
in any other fashion is to be found in Diamond, 1983.
24 A comprehensive introduction to the philosophical problems any ethical criticism runs up against is to be
found in Carroll, 2000.
23 A detailed and often interesting discussion o f  this issue form a Neo-Aristotelian perspective is to be found in
Booth, 1988, especially part II.
39
seriously undermines the otherwise constructive propositions o f this kind o f criticism. This 
Aristotelian conception o f ethics and literature which revolves around the organising concept 
o f  ‘virtue’ and which tacidy assumes an ‘organic’, democratically-controlled society26 with a 
clear and unambiguous conception o f the highest good is an often unacknowledged premise 
o f a great deal o f m odernist ethical criticism. "Ihe work o f both F. R Leavis and Lionel 
'Frilling which will be discussed in the next chapters may be read as cases in point.2
L e v i n a s  a n d  t h e  E t h i c s  o f  A l t e r it y
Apart from the Neo-Aristotelians and in contradistinction to them the other most 
decisive influence o f contemporary ethical criticism comes from the work o f Emmanuel 
Levinas. His is a philosophical theory that provides the basis o f much o f contemporary 
research in ethical criticism, especially the kind o f  criticism that focuses on the moral quality 
o f the very act o f reading literature, something that to many critics is essentially an expression 
o f the rapprochement with the Other, a theme Levinas’ philosophy is so much concerned 
about.
Levinas’ work started as an elaboration on Husserlian and Heideggerian themes and was 
gradually transformed to a most uncom prom ising moral philosophy, one whose primary 
concern became the establishing o f ethics as first philosophy. By that I mean that Levinas set 
out to argue for the irreducibility o f the ethical, the “primacy o f an irreducible structure upon 
which all other structures rest” (Levinas 1991: 79). TTiis first structure that underlies our 
being-in-the-world is best described as the mode o f being that is already-there before any 
form o f interaction with others, or indeed any form o f existence, takes place. We are, for 
I Ivinas, in the realm of the ethical before we ever enter the realm of language and
26 I am speaking here o f  an assumption made by the theory. In truth, the concrete historical reality Aristode 
referred to and which he accepted without any scruples or sense o f  self-contradiction was one in which women, 
slaves and metics (resident aliens o f  each city-state) were excluded from the democratic process and were 
deemed unable to pursue the highest forms o f  life. Although that does not invalidate the main tenets o f  his 
theory7 it does show the inability7 o f  any philosophy to transcend the ideological and ultimately material 
conditions o f  its existence.
27 Sartre as well although, at least from the sixties onwards, from the opposite side.
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signification. This is best expressed by the notions o f the ‘face’ and the ‘O ther’. By claiming 
that “ to see the face is to speak to the world” and that “transcendence is not an optics, but 
the first ethical gesture” (Levinas 1991: 174), Levinas dismisses representation as an act o f 
violence directed against the fundamental inviolability o f the Other. One is supposed to 
speak the world but not to represent it, since to represent is at one and the same time to 
dominate, to harm, to disturb, to impose a totalitarian order on it. Levinas’s notion o f the 
other, as radical alterity, is irreducible to whatever our conceptual framework provides for. 
For him, philosophy is called upon to remedy that inadequacy, to salvage the non- 
representability, the sine qua non o f  radical ethicalness o f  the O ther by nevertheless utilising 
the same means that enacted that betrayal: language. This paradox is constitutive o f Levinas’ 
work and it is o f great importance to his philosophy’s application in postmodern ethics and 
ethical criticism.
Levinas’ philosophy is an attempt to formulate an ethical theory', which will be 
conceptually rigid enough in its basic presuppositions to sustain the pressure from the moral 
scepticism that marks out modernity ’s notorious ambiguity' towards the questions o f ethics. 
His demand for an understanding o f the absolute priority and irreducible essence o f the 
ethical has inspired many postmodern intellectuals and literary' theorists. ITiis has led to a 
significant number o f works that attem pt to provide an alternative ethical criticism, one that 
is not a mere reformulation o f the themes prevalent in a more traditional ethical criticism, 
but rather one that reads literary works as expressions o f the fundamental paradox that 
facing the O ther poses for our moral understanding.28
Levinas’ work is not, as I have already pointed out, the only philosophical foundation o f 
current ethical criticism, but it is by far the m ost influential. Postmodern ethical criticism has 
found a powerful ally in its relentless attack against the ‘dubious ontology’ presupposed in
28 In this respect Newton (1995) and Eaglestone (1997) are, from the point o f  view o f literary7 theory7, very 
instructive and informative. For an appraisal from the point o f  view o f  a wider critical framework Critchley 
(1992) and Baumann (1993) are just as good.
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classical criticism, an ontology, which is the essential foundation o f  Western philosophy; in 
Derridean terms, an ontology o f presence, essence, self-sameness, and telos. The 
antifoundationalist, antimetaphysical urge o f  postmodern theory thus finds an ethical 
philosophy to complement it, a philosophy so rigorously opposed to any teleology or 
totalising gestures.29 Yet this philosophy that posits the absolute priority o f  ethics can only 
achieve its aim at the expense o f the social character o f the latter. Despite the avowed 
intention o f many critics influenced by Levinas to touch upon politically sensitive issues, 
ethics in its Levinasean sense is constantly drawn back to the barely intelligible realm o f 
primordial (pre-social and ahistorical) contact with the Other. I have serious doubts as to 
whether such a notion can contribute to any substantial political conception o f ethics, and 
consequently o f any ethical criticism that will not seek to avoid the engagement with the real 
‘other’, both in the micropolitics o f everyday life and the macropolitics o f the global capitalist 
market.30 Levinas’s ethics seems uncomfortable with history and the ethical criticism that 
finds its inspiration in his work is equally uninterested in examining the historical and 
political determinations o f ethical issues. I shall now attempt to give my own views regarding 
these issues.
M o r a l it y  a n d  H is t o r y : A n  A l t e r n a t i v e  W a y  o f  R e a d i n g  E t h ic a l  C r it ic is m
In this concluding section I would like to put forward my own views regarding the 
specific problems that ethical criticism comes up against and additionally propose a possible 
way o f  dealing with these. I shall start by appropriating a phrase, which opens Fredric 
Jameson’s The Political Unconscious', “always historicize!” This “one absolute (...) and 
“transhistorical” imperative o f all dialectical thought” (Jameson 1983: 9) is also the guiding
29 The result is that an ethical criticism inspired by Levinas sees cognition and representation, each relating to 
(modernist) criticism and fiction respectively as “an exertion o f  violence (...) a denial o f  the independence o f  
the existents” (Gibson, 1999: 57). This implicit rejection o f  a modernist criticism has some very worrying 
political implications which I shall have the opportunity to discuss in the following section o f  this chapter.
30 Some o f  the problems that Levinas’s own theory faces when is it is confronted by actual historical events are 
discussed in Caygill (2002).
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imperative o f  my own method. Historicize: return to  history what has been taken away from 
it. Return something not because one has a moral obligation to return a loan but because one 
cannot but accept the necessity to acknowledge the foundation o f one’s thoughts and 
actions, and — and this is m ost crucial — their outer limit. History, as I understand it, gives us 
more than a convenient context: it gives us the ground o f the whole structure o f  the social 
character o f our being, the systemic totality that enables any movement, any change and any 
action. It is the fabric o f  time and the lived experiences o f humankind during this vast, 
historical time. But history is also profoundly material. It is the product not o f  a 
metaphysically conceived time that merely passes by and thus constitutes it, but o f 
productive human labour, o f  human praxis. This latter element o f  praxis is crucial to my 
problematic. I hold that all creative work, all work that transforms inert m atter into 
manageable, usable artefacts is profoundly historical, in the sense that it is history that 
provides the key to unlock its otherwise paradoxical occurrence in time, its stubborn 
existence, its often unjustifiable effects. We make history, yet without history we would not 
be able to make anything. So, since history is the driving force behind everything that finds a 
place, however small, in our culture, it must therefore be best understood as a key element o f 
the political unconscious^1 o f any text or theory.
Yet, I think that the above argument is not enough. Any methodology that draws its 
main inspiration from Marxism, as does mine, should not merely aspire to be an enlightened 
historicism; nor should it be content just with putting forward the thesis that all things are 
structurally interdependent within the all-encompassing system o f human history. For such a 
theory or interpretive model a complementary thesis is essential: all history’ is the history’ o f  a 
constant antagonism between those who have misappropriated the best part o f the others’ 
products o f labour and those who are forced to sell the products o f their labour or
31 I am using Fredrik Jameson’s phrase ‘political unconscious’ in order to designate what he describes as the 
“ground and untranscendable horizon” o f  humankind, one that “needs no particular justification” since “we 
may be sure that its alienating necessities will not forget us, however much we might prefer to ignore them” 
(Jameson, 1983: 102).
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themselves as labour force in order to survive. That is where the space for a political 
consideration o f any practical or theoretical problem opens up. All products o f history 
appear under determinate circumstances, within a framework set by the dominant mode o f 
production at any given time, a mode that is characterized by antagonism, asymmetrical 
power relations, and, one must be constandy reminded especially in the context o f  a 
discussion o f ethics and politics, by immense human suffering. ‘Sweetness and light’, to 
quote again A rnold’s celebrated phrase, is made possible for some only because the 
predicament o f a vast num ber o f people is characterized by neither ‘sweetness’ nor ‘light’.
From what I have said so far, it is perhaps understandable that I have several reasons to 
doubt w hether such the socio-politicization o f ethics I alluded to earlier in this chapter is 
anything more than a rhetorical gesture aiming at concealing the profound unease with which 
politics is dealt with in the context o f  ethical criticism. As I consider my work here as a kind 
o f  intervention into the current discourse on ethics and literature, I would like to offer an 
alternative perspective o f looking at the issue o f the politics o f ethical criticism.
As I have previously argued the current trend in contemporary ethical criticism o f 
politicising ethics, despite its being a partially useful gesture, is, from a certain point o f view, 
an exercise in redundant theorizing. This is because no matter how rigorously one may argue 
for the political effects of moral discourse and the political relevance o f ethical criticism the 
fact remains that a certain fundamental aspect o f  that discourse is constantly at risk o f 
slipping from our sight: that ethics is structurally connected to politics and that despite the 
fact that these ties have often been severed either in misguided practice or in misguided 
theory. The level where ethics and morality7 are relevant, should — at least from my own point 
o f  view -  be considered as a particular instance o f the wider political context, despite the fact 
that the preoccupations proper to the latter tend to be constandy suppressed only to re- 
emerge as concerns over the former. This is also what happens in the case o f ethical criticism 
and o f  literary criticism in general. The aesthetic and in the case o f ethical criticism the aesthetic
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and the ethical tend to substitute the social and the political. The literary work, instead o f being 
examined as the product o f  a conjuncture o f  material and ideological resources in accordance 
with the economic and political interests articulated in the hegemonic discourses o f its time 
o f production, is often exiled in the spiritual, transhistorical world delimited by bourgeois 
aesthetics (and ethics). As a result the main ideological gesture o f  bourgeois ethics, namely 
the abstraction o f individuals from society is reduplicated in the sphere o f critical theory in 
the form o f examining the moral content o f literature apart from its material conditions of 
existence.
W hat moral criticism did in its traditional pre-modernist and modernist version was to 
deal with the moral qualities o f literature as if those qualities were universal and ahistorical, 
emanating from an extra-historical space, a space defined a priori in defiance o f all the 
evidence to its falsity. Both Leavis and Trilling, as I shall attempt to show in the following 
chapters, have each gready relied on this idealist presupposition for their own ideological 
purposes. My view is that it was always wrong to examine literature as a moral testimony 
while at the same time leaving all the basic assumptions o f moral philosophy unexamined, 
considering them as valid only because o f  their sheer givenness. By so doing, ethical, or more 
properly in this case, moral criticism was in fact engaging in an endless act o f reduplication of 
those ideological features o f moral philosophy that it was actually in a privileged position to 
expose and criticize. Privileged, because literature, due to its own peculiar status as a specific 
art form offers the critic the chance o f a more close inspection o f  the human condition, not a 
transparent reading, nor a faithful reproduction o f the actuality’ o f the world, but a more 
intimate relation with the inexhaustible intricacies o f the lived experiences o f fictional, and by 
extension, one could cautiously argue, real others. To engage with literature, even as a critic, 
means to engage also with a particular mode o f  dramatizing the human condition. There is 
nothing sentimental about this; it merely means that in contradistinction with abstract 
philosophical discourse, literature, because o f its specificity as an art form, engages with
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human life in such a way as to enable a seemingly more direct, that is less mediated, 
comprehension o f certain issues; at least a more direct comprehension that philosophy 
traditionally allows for.
Iris Murdoch has argued that “through literature we can re discover a sense o f the 
density o f our lives” (Murdoch, 19831: 49) and my view is that the apprehension o f  this 
density7 o f life through literature does not necessarily imply transparency or any disregard for 
the artifice o f  literature, and it does certainly not imply that literary form or literary content 
can ever be perceived as anything other but essentially mediated features o f a greater totality. 
Sartre’s late work has a lot to teach us about the nature o f both this mediation and the nature 
o f this totality as I shall have the opportunity to show in the chapter dedicated to his work. 
Direct com prehension here means that the mediations involved are more within reach o f 
ordinary human consciousness, that the coded articulation o f literary artefacts can be more 
easily, however deceitful this easiness may be, decoded without resource to a specialized 
metadiscourse as in the case o f philosophy or theory.
O ne o f the things that distinguishes contemporary ethical criticism from its older 
versions is the its heightened awareness o f the issue o f language, that is, o f  the linguistic 
constructedness o f the literary artefact. This awareness o f the crucial role o f language’s status 
as mediator between human consciousness and reality has resulted in a more critical attitude 
toward basic issues in literary criticism like representation and its limits, truth-value, and 
extraliterary reality. However, this awareness, largely due to the impact o f poststructuralist 
theories o f literature, has led to a paradoxical situation. O n the one hand, the literary text is 
often presented as confined within a textual/linguistic space. O n the other hand moral or 
ethical inquiry’ can be relevant as a form o f criticism if its links with the always elusive ‘real’ 
referent o f  literature are not entirely severed. Literature’s alleged confinement in the ‘prison-
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house o f language’32 has been challenged in its basic presuppositions by almost all critics who 
are still inspired by the modernist, liberal humanist tradition.33 The counter-argument to that 
objection is by now well-known: no matter how nostalgic we may be for an age o f  blissful 
ignorance when language was considered a transparent medium o f communication, when 
semantic distortion and indeterminacy were errors to be corrected and not structural features 
o f any form o f representation, the truth is that we can never escape our own creation: 
language.
Yet, it seems to me that both arguments miss an im portant point and that is because 
their basic assumptions are flawed. It may well be that literature’s referent is not an 
unmediated reality, inhabited by fully self-conscious individuals who are masters o f their own 
meanings, social agents in perfect position to engage in rational debate. It may also be that 
literature’s referent is not its own process o f coming into being as a particular mode o f 
artistic representation, its own constructedness as text. Instead it is possible to conceive that 
literature, like art in general, in fact signifies, among many other things, a certain absence; an 
absence o f  the historical conditions that enable it to come into being in the first place.34 This 
absence, which I earlier designated by the term ‘political unconscious’ can be read in what we 
may call the ‘ideology o f the text’.
TTie procedure by which this ideology o f the text works is by constructing a discursive 
space where the material conditions o f  the production o f the text are suppressed, its 
rootedness in the realm o f necessity is never brought into the foreground and consequently 
the text appears as coming from and belonging to the realm o f freedom. Although I do have 
certain doubts as to whether this may be postulated for every text in every historical instance
The reference is to Predric Jameson’s The Prison-House of I jjnguage: A  Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian 
Formalism, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).
w As Siebers argues “a moral philosophy that does not include the self may seem faultless, but its perfection
rests in reality on the enormous void left by its rejection o f  the human. Removing the human from ethics leaves 
it without a basis for existence, since ethics is by definition profoundly anthropocentric” (Siebers, 1988: 110). 
u  Another way to formulate this is to start with the premise that literature (and literary criticism) in similar 
manner with ideology refer not to an objective reality but to the imaginary relations with or configurations o f  
that reality in the individual and/or collective consciousness. The absence o f  any incorporation o f  the objective 
material conditions is a concomitant effect o f  this imaginary dimension.
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I nevertheless believe that literature which is produced in certain type o f  societies, i.e. 
capitalist societies, is in fact constituted by the necessity not to speak o f  its own mode o f 
production. This is not something that happens because o f  certain contingent factors but 
because it is structurally dependent on the conditions o f its own existence. Moreover, it does 
not remain unchanged throughout history since we know that different historical periods 
negotiate their problems and limitations in strikingly different ways. In my opinion, it may be 
better conceived as something inherent in the very structure o f artistic representation in 
societies based on unequal relations o f power. It is the very task o f a Marxist hermeneutics, 
as I understand it, to examine this absence and thereby offer a different context o f 
interpretation. This type o f hermeneutics would not try to extract a ‘true meaning’ out o f the 
texts it examines, but would rather attem pt to articulate what the texts seem to be unable to 
do themselves. In Pierre Macherey’s own words: “knowledge is not the discover)’ or 
reconstruction o f  a latent meaning, forgotten or concealed. It is something newly raised up, 
an addition to the reality" from which it begins” (Macherey 1978, 6). This brings me inevitably 
to the question o f truth and the epistemological implications o f a reading o f  the sort I am 
attem pting to present here.35
To read a text along the lines o f such a hermeneutics means to search and identify this 
absence o f history. In other words, it also means to make manifest what is latent in the 
‘political unconscious’ o f the text. This hermeneutical process would ideally uncover the 
historical determinations o f the text, its limitations regarding the identification o f the 
historical Real, its evasions, its strategies o f concealment. But it will also acknowledge that 
the text is truthful as much as it is deceitful, that it attempts to give plausible answers to 
(perhaps) implausible questions, that it articulates partial truths and not necessarily total lies. 
To accept that as one o f my guiding principles means to avoid the risk o f treating all texts as
35 My indebtedness to the critical practices o f  Pierre Macherey and Terry Eagleton must be abundantly clear by 
now. What I have merely indicated here are fully elaborated in Macherey, 1978: especially pp. 3 — 101 and in 
Eagleton, 1998.
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outright apologies for what happens to be the existing order. It rather means to treat them as 
embodying historical tensions, which they then try to negotiate within certain limits imposed 
on them by their own ideological conditions o f production. The identification o f these limits 
is the task here.
Yet this process has another very im portant implication. A hermeneutic o f the sort I am 
discussing in these pages need not be normative in the narrow sense o f  the word, in the 
sense usually denounced by postmodern critics.v’ Its task would not be to prescribe but to 
elucidate, to reveal, to lay bare so that ultimately a reality exposed for what it really is may be 
radically transformed. Whenever any political critique failed in this respect it was certainly 
not to its benefit. This however does not mean that such a critical practice should be 
considered as pluralistic, in the sense pluralism has acquired in the context o f the liberal 
tradition, either.37 Such a critical procedure cannot allow so readily a space for anything that 
happens to be simply ‘different’. For a certain kind o f criticism, such as the one that I am 
discussing in these pages, a certain mystification o f otherness could potentially obscure its 
(political) priorities. From such a point o f view, otherness, divergence, dissent have political 
value only to the extent that they enable one to understand their conditions o f being and 
then synthesize them productively by the standards laid down by a problematic guided by its 
overriding concern for a total and at the same time radical human emancipation.
But what does this mean in relation to the main task o f the kind o f  criticism I am 
advocating here? It means that nothing is to be achieved by a mere transposition from one
w’ Andrew Gibson, for instance, argues that “one o f  the problems with a literary theory and criticism that seeks 
to identify itself with a grand political project is that the conviction and sense o f  urgency inspired by the latter 
are likely to serve as a seemingly imperious justification - again - for a deontological morality as distinct from an 
ethics” (Gibson, 1999: 182). Karlier on in the same book Gibson wonders whether an ethics can proceed on the 
basis o f  a choice o f  sides, that is an ethico-politically informed choice. He then concludes his argument by 
voicing his doubt whether “a politics can function other than in terms o f  a kind o f  conviction or certitude 
which is the responsibility o f  ethics to hold in abeyance” (ibid, 85). My view is exactly the opposite, namely that 
only such a conviction can save any ethics from the humiliating status o f  its being a mere smokescreen for a 
political order that is profoundly contemptuous o f  any substantive content o f  ethics and morality.
And how could it be otherwise given that the main premise o f  all pluralisms and liberal pluralism in particular 
is that there is no unitary good that may be regarded as more worthy than others. For Marxism, on the other 
hand, the radical emancipation o f the w’orking classes and by extension o f  all humankind is the ultimate 
objective, implicitly therefore the essential presupposition o f  the existence o f  a genuine good.
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interpretive order to another. I f  the text finds a temporary ideological cohesion as a result o f 
the efficacy7 o f  the powers that condition its production then a radical hermeneutics would 
do much better than merely reinterpret this text along an alternative code, although it has to 
be conceded that this may be a necessary step in the right direction. Instead, a better and 
more useful result may be achieved by questioning this very conceptual cohesion o f  the text, 
exposing it, as I said before, to the conditions (material and ideological) o f its production and 
thus enabling a certain kind o f reading that may then bring to the surface what the text was 
unable or unwilling to articulate in the first place, due to historical necessity7 if not due to 
authorial intention; its own complicity with a certain, very often unacknowledged, oppressive 
ideology7. Therefore, a criticism o f the sort I am arguing for here can only be faithful to its 
task by being in a position to survey as fully as possible the totality which conditions both the 
text and its immediate social and political context and which alone endlessly systematizes the 
historically contingent, the allegedly non-reducible historical event.38
I must now return to the initial aim o f my research project. In its narrower context the 
interpretive process I have only sketched so far entails the posing o f  certain questions whose 
answers are barely inscribed in the texts themselves. W hat precisely does the ethical reading 
o f  literature yield? What are the presuppositions, which enable its coherent articulation? 
W hat is the historical ground for these? Why do these presuppositions privilege and, in a 
way, lay down a foundation for only a moral/ethical problematic instead o f a political one? 
Does the former attempt to substitute or complement the latter? ITiese are some o f the 
questions I shall attempt to answer through the careful examination o f three distinct bodies 
o f work. I shall do that by attempting to establish the relation between their specific mode of 
enunciation, their thematics and their wider historical and ideological environment. I shall
w In contradistinction to what I am advocating here a certain kind o f  deconstructive criticism suggests that 
criticism should aim “at a hermeneutics o f  indeterminacy ... a type o f  analysis that has renounced the ambition 
to master or demystify its subject (text, psyche) by technocratic, predictive or authoritarian formulas” (Hartman, 
1980: 41). I do wonder about the consistency o f  this argument regarding the implicit injunction not to 
demystify. What exacdy is deconstruction if  not an attempt to demystify a certain Western philosophical (and 
cultural) tradition?
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also try to read the texts that I have chosen as primarily ideological texts, as texts, which by 
the very specificity o f their form and content, relate to, and indeed presuppose, historically 
specific relations o f power, whatever form the latter may assume. The interpretive 
framework within which such a reading will take place presupposes a certain epistemology 
and a certain methodology o f interpretation. The latter, as I argued before, will attem pt to 
elucidate the text and relate it to (its) history in a critical and politically-informed fashion.
L it e r a r y  C r it ic ism  a n d  t h e  Q u e s t io n  o f  E th ic s  in  t h e  T w e n t i e t h  C e n tu r y :  F. 
R. L ea  v is , J e a n - P a u l  S a r t r e  a n d  L i o n e l  T r i l l i n g
The main object o f  my research is the examination o f three instances o f a convergence o f 
literary criticism and ethics, each belonging to a different national and ideological paradigm. 
In the process o f this study I attem pt to identify those elements that may be said to 
constitute a sort o f an archaeology, in the Foucaultean sense, o f the contemporary trend in 
Literary theory that openly espouses a moral/ethical problematic and which I have discussed 
previously in this chapter. I shall do that by looking closely at the critical work o f  F. R. 
Leavis, Jean-Paul Sartre and Lionel Trilling. In doing so I shall concentrate on those aspects 
o f  their work that deal with the issues I am attempting to examine here. That is not to say 
that other aspects o f their work will be ignored. Those aspects that do not explicidy deal with 
ethical and moral issues will be taken into account provided that they have something 
substantial to say about the issues in question even if they put emphasis on other aspects o f 
the literary phenomenon.
The relation o f  these three critics with current ethical criticism is hardly a straightforward 
one. 'ITiey can hardly be considered precursors o f any specific ethical critical practice and I 
have not treated them as such. Their influence may have been huge but now they are hardly 
ever mentioned in the context o f contemporary ethical criticism. If  I see the re-examination 
o f  their work relevant for the current discussions in ethical criticism it is because they were
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the first m odem  critics to turn their attention to the issues in question here and were the first 
to deal with them in the m ost consistent manner. A re-reading o f their work can help us 
identify the political and ideological undercurrents in any kind o f criticism that is based on 
m oral/ethical principles. Finally, a crucial characteristic o f their work is that it exemplifies the 
very critical models contemporary ethical criticism turned away from, since theirs was a work 
in profound agreement with the modernist paradigm which later critical trends, such as 
postmodernism set out to debunk.
In my choice o f Leavis, Sartre and Trilling I have put emphasis on whether those 
elements that testify to a moral or ethical problematic are manifest in their critical texts. In 
reading their texts I have chosen to concentrate on the way the moral/ethical problematic is 
inscribed in the texts themselves. That entails an interpretive methodology which gives 
epistemological primacy to the text and not to the authorial intention. My arguments will be 
based to a great extent on what is corroborated by the textual and not by biographical or 
other anecdotal evidence. This text-centred approach risks ignoring the external, often 
contingent factors that determine the form and content o f a text (i.e. the essayistic form and 
polemical nature o f such a text) and thereby may result in an even narrower interpretation 
than what is normally expected. However, that should not imply that all extratextual 
information was suppressed. Whatever, in my opinion, merited specific attention was taken 
into account in direct proportion to its importance for the issues under consideration.
Another, equally important factor has been the consistency with which ethical or moral 
issues were dealt during the critic’s entire career. 'Ilie latter criterion, that is consistency 
through time, was the reason why I have chosen to examine the entire critical oeuvre o f three 
major critics instead o f opting for discussing individual works o f many disparate ones. The 
consistency o f  their engagement with ethics and literature through time is what makes their 
work on that subject at least present itself as a system. Although it may be somewhat 
misleading to consider both Leavis and Trilling as exponents o f anything approaching a
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‘system o f thought’ I do believe that a certain systematization o f ideas, beliefs and disparate 
concepts does eventually take shape under the examining eye o f an attentive reader. This 
systematic character o f  their engagement with the issues in question here is what yields the 
most in the interrelation between ethical criticism and politics that I am attempting to 
discuss.
Apart from these criteria I must also acknowledge the existence o f  the already given 
hierarchical categorizations o f critical texts, a cultural fact o f enough force so as to delimit a 
thematic space well in advance o f any individual decisions. By this I mean that all three 
theorists have a prom inent, though not necessarily unambiguous, place in the canon of 
twentieth-century criticism and theory. In many ways they impose themselves as the m ost 
suitable candidates for inclusion in any discussion about ethics and literature, with the 
possible exception o f Sartre as I shall argue later on.
A nother side-effect o f  my chosen primarily text-centred approach will be the neglect o f 
another feature that inevitably characterizes all texts, namely their temporality and the various 
interpretive schemata that we use in order to make sense o f them in our own time. Ih a t is to 
say that my reading will be one bound by the interpretive norms o f the present time, ih a t 
may be too self-evident to merit a m ention but the reason that I am acknowledging it is that I 
think that this also entails a certain risk. This risk is that the method o f ‘close reading’ that I 
alluded to above necessitates a bracketing o f the actual effect any text has on its reader(s). It 
also avoids the issue o f the historically and culturally determined character o f such an effect. 
My reading o f a text that has survived for decades cannot but differ significantly from the 
ones that were attempted at the time when it first appeared. I have chosen to ignore this 
aspect in order to avoid the risk o f inflating the content o f my chapter-length discussions, 
which otherwise would necessitate a radically different form than the one they have here.
The first critic whose work I have chosen to discuss is F. R. Leavis. He was, without a 
doubt, one o f  the most influential critics in the English-speaking world during the last
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century, one whose work has exerted an enormous influence in the conception and teaching 
o f English in the universities and in secondary education in Britain as well as in other parts o f 
the English-speaking world. Leavis’s critical practice — a singular mixture o f empiricism and 
an almost theological belief on the absolute supremacy o f tradition as a regulative ideal -  was 
based on a cluster o f notions that, though not exactly a system, did nevertheless constitute an 
internally consistent theoretical edifice, l l ie  key idea that animated the whole critical 
enterprise was his belief, following Matthew Arnold, that literature was a criticism o f life, 
which means that literature for him was always referring not to itself but to reality7, the reality 
o f  its readers which it always affected for better or for worse. Leavis’s adamant belief was 
that literature’s only legitimate raison d'etre was that it conveyed in a manner unequalled by any 
other artistic medium a sense o f  continuity with the past, a sense o f belonging to the same 
cultural community. W hat is o f the utm ost importance for my discussion here is the way 
Leavis perceived literature fulfilling such a function. He held that the moral quality o f  a work 
was what gave its readers the feeling o f  communality with each other and with their own 
‘race’ {sic) in its historical evolution. For Leavis the distinctive features o f a certain ‘race’ are 
codified in those aspects o f literature that can only be properly studied from a moral and not 
from an aesthetic perspective.
In my view, Leavis is the archetypically petty-bourgeois theorist, the embodiment o f a 
series o f  contradictions that he effaced, at least in the surface, by the sheer force o f  his own 
convictions. I have read his work as symptomatic o f a certain dissatisfaction with what he 
perceived as the decline o f the traditional culture o f his own time, a culture very much the 
product o f a tension between the older, yet still surviving, romantic ideals and the new 
imperatives o f a growing capitalist market. Caught between these two poles Leavis chose to 
deal with the moral qualities o f literature by engaging in a series o f highly influential close 
readings that foregrounded above all the moral and by extension cultural value o f each text. I 
have examined the strong moral inflection o f his work in such a way so as to account for its
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prominent features: its absolute commitment, its polemical character, its anti-theoreticism, 
and m ost importandy, in its substitution o f  tradition and ethics for politics.
For this and his consistendy passionate commitment to a series o f cultural interventions 
in defence o f his strong and more often than not controversial positions I consider Leavis’s 
critical work is absolutely central to the question o f  the interrelation between ethics/politics 
and literature in the context o f  literary criticism.
The second critic whose work I have chosen to discuss is Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre was 
undoubtedly one o f the most im portant minds o f the twentieth-century, a mind that exerted 
a far reaching influence in virtually every field o f the humanities. His catholic interests which 
were complemented by his erudition and intellectual brilliance, his amazingly high rate o f 
productivity which gave us a series o f  texts in a great number o f literary and critical genres, 
along with his high visibility' as a public figure all these make Sartre a theorist who cannot be 
easily classified. That is partly what makes his inclusion in the present study somewhat 
problematic, since he may have been a philosopher, a playwright and a critic o f rare breadth, 
but it is not unreasonable to claim that his long-lasting contribution lies mainly within the 
field o f  philosophy and literature and not in ethical criticism. As a philosopher Sartre dealt 
with issues which, although related with ethics and literature, do not in themselves constitute 
a sufficient reason for his inclusion in the present study. As a playwright he did indeed deal 
with moral and political issues but I have chosen to ignore his literary work as it would 
necessitate a wholly different interpretive methodology and a substantially larger space 
allocated to him than what I could afford in the present study. Consequently, I have chosen 
to focus on only those writings that fall between his purely philosophical and literary work. If 
I have nevertheless chosen to examine Sartre’s work I have done so believing that what he 
had to say about the issues in question here are o f the utm ost importance for my discussion 
even if they do not direcdy relate to literature or literary criticism.
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Sartre has written a great deal on virtually every aspect covered by what we call the 
human sciences: philosophy, literature, political and social criticism, art and literary7 criticism. 
To these we should add his journalistic writings, his published interviews, his 
correspondence, not to m ention all the anecdotal or autobiographical texts written by those 
with whom he had intimate relationships and in which Sartre features as the principal focus 
o f  the narrative. Given such a plethora o f texts and orientations, one is obliged to follow a 
clearly delineated path which in turn will determine the choices that are to be made. Given 
my primary concern which in this case was the relation o f the literary and the ethical in 
Sartre’s critical writings I have chosen to concentrate only on the critical texts that I see as 
m ost pertinent for my discussion. The downside o f this approach is o f course that a 
considerable am ount o f Sartre’s contribution will be either severely diminished or, at best, 
referenced implicidy at the expense o f its distinctiveness and conceptual force. As I consider 
this an unavoidable compromise for what I have wished to achieve in discussing his work I 
can only hope that the main thrust o f my argument has not been severely affected by this 
choice.
With all these in mind, I have chosen to examine Sartre’s critical works as a series o f  texts 
that give expression to a sincere com mitment to using literature and criticism as weapons in 
the cause o f  socialist transformation o f  society and the politics that such a cause entails. At 
the same time I saw these texts as testifying to the ideological tensions inherent in Sartre’s 
thought which have to do with his eminendy problematical attempted fusion o f  radical 
subjectivism (exemplified mainly in Being and Nothingness) with radical socialism (the main 
tenet o f his postwar work). Another characteristic o f Sartre’s work was his ambivalence 
towards ethics, an attitude evidenced by his two failed attempts at formulating a coherent 
moral theory. This ambivalence was, in my opinion, characteristic o f a more general difficulty 
to reconcile the imperatives o f an ethics with the exigencies o f revolutionary7 politics. Sartre 
has admirably never ceased to try to articulate a possible synthesis o f  the two despite the fact
that he always left the respective projects unfinished. Something else that characterized 
Sartre’s work was his early belief in the power o f literature, a belief that he gradually lost in 
his mid-period when his political commitment overshadowed all other preoccupations. Yet, 
during this early period, roughly comprising the period from the beginning o f his career to 
the mid-fifties, Sartre left a series o f text that examined in a most original manner the 
possible space where the ethical, the political and the literary converge. These texts are at the 
centre o f my discussion.
In my view, Sartre exemplified better than almost anyone else the type o f intellectual 
whose ‘conversion’ from an existence o f  social isolation to a commitment to revolutionary 
socialism dramatized in the m ost telling manner the common fate o f all middle-class 
intellectuals who at one time chose to align themselves with the emancipatory demands o f 
the working class. Sartre’s case was also characteristic o f the often painful compromises that 
needed to be made by an intellectual faced with the often conflicting demands o f two 
occasionally incompatible systems: socialist politics and (bourgeois) ethics. In the context o f 
this study, I am primarily interested in Sartre’s unflinching dedication to the project o f 
uniting these two ideological systems by means o f articulating a politically legitimate synthesis 
o f  them.
Ih e  third critic whose work I have chosen to examine is Lionel Trilling. He was one o f 
the most interesting and authoritative voices o f American twentieth-century literary criticism. 
His relevance for this study lies in his consistent commitment to the ethical aspects o f 
literature, a commitment that marked the entirety o f  his work. Trilling shared with I^eavis the 
belief in the normative uses o f literature; yet he, unlike the latter, expressed that in a style that 
was distincdy unpolemical. This style was eminendy suited to his ideological position, his 
belief in the necessity o f the middle-class ideals which he so eagerly espoused. T rilling was 
the theorist o f the American educated middle classes, a critic whose voice articulated the
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malaise o f  a growing number o f middle-class intellectuals with the radical heritage o f  the pre­
war era. As an ideologue o f the cultural and political rehabilitation o f  the old bourgeois 
values Trilling made extensive use o f  the single m ost effective weapon in his critical arsenal. 
A true Amoldean to the end Trilling based his critical m ethod on a number o f  arguments 
that sought to persuade his readership that literature was still able to play the morally edifying 
role that it allegedly played in the nineteenth century. As I shall attempt to argue, the moral, 
and by extension political, value o f  literature and its consequent use as a means o f  cultural 
and political re-education was Trilling’s individual mark on twentieth-century American 
criticism. I have read his work as an instance o f  the concentrated effort which during the 
Cold W ar era attempted to purge American liberalism o f any trace o f external, mainly 
Marxist, influences and thus enable the formation o f  an ideological space where liberalism 
might be expressed without posing a direct threat for the status quo. This political 
interpretation has informed my discussion o f  his work.
In this final part o f my study I have chosen to discuss all the three theorists together in 
an effort to identify any possible convergences or divergences in their critical methods. In 
doing this I have tried to situate their work in an era, roughly from the twenties to the 
seventies, which was marked by cataclysmic changes and which affected some o f the most 
fundamental premises o f Western humanist culture. In this section, I discuss the critical 
projects o f  Leavis, Sartre and Trilling as essentially constituting an articulated reaction to the 
great historical and ideological shifts o f that time.
All the three theorists discussed here are representative, each in his own way, o f many o f 
the fundamental critical attitudes and methodologies that had currency during the best part 
o f  the twentieth century. Their work, antecedent to the era that we may designate as the 
‘advent o f theory’ when theoretical preoccupations came to substitute to a great extent the 
more practical and evaluative considerations o f  the past, is, I believe, still crucial for our
58
understanding o f the foundations o f  our own ideas and methods. The importance o f  their 
work lies not only in what they said but also in what they came to represent for all those who 
came later and who, impliddy or explicidy, accepted, modified or rejected this work. There is 
o f course a more specific reason as to why they merit special attention. My view is that their 
work touches direcdy upon issues which lie at the very centre o f this set o f problems and 
attendant critical methodologies which, as I have already discussed in this chapter, comprise 
the core o f what is currendy known as ethical criticism39.
W hat I have said so far provides the ideological and methodological framework which 
will inform the examination o f the three critics, whose work I aim to discuss in detail in the 
following chapters. For all the reasons I mentioned above I have read their work as a group 
o f  texts, whose primary concern was something not only extremdy vital to our negotiations 
with literature, and consequendy with society and ourselves, but also something very 
im portant in its own right as a particular mode o f  addressing the problems that literature as 
social phenomenon poses for us. This is im portant not only because o f its nature and the 
central place it occupies in our tradition, but also because o f its close relation with politics, its 
centrality to the question o f  ideology and power -  in short because o f its political relevance.
39 With the possible exception o f  Sartre as he seems to have influenced ethical criticism the least. The main 
reason for this neglect o f  Sartrean ‘literary’ ethics is the fact that Sartre was and still is the object o f  scholarly 
attention as mainly a philosopher and a writer. His literary-critical arguments have traditionally been considered 
a subset o f  his more general philosophical preoccupations.
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L i t e r a t u r e  a n d  t h e  M o r a l  D u t y  o f  
E n l i g h t e n e d  M i n o r i t i e s : T h e  C r i t i c i s m  o f  F .  R . L e a v is
. ..  to appreciate Conrad’s ‘form’ is to take stock o f  a process o f  relative 
valuation conducted by him in the face o f  life: what do men live by? what can 
men live by? — these are the questions that animate his theme. His organization 
is devoted to exhibiting in the concrete a representative set o f  radical attitudes, 
so ordered as to bring out the significance o f  each in relation to a total sense o f  
human life. The dramatic imagination at work is an intensely moral 
imagination, the vividness o f  which is inalienably a judging and a valuing.
The Great Tradition
It is commonplace to begin a discussion o f  F. R. Leavis by emphasising both  his 
importance as one o f  the most im portant literary critics o f  the twentieth century and also his 
ambiguous status in the canon o f English criticism. This ambivalence, by now so often 
enacted in criticism as to pass almost unnoticed, is nevertheless easily understandable and 
explicable. Leavis has been a very powerful and m ost uncompromising critic and at the same 
time a very single-minded and persistent individual. His clarity o f vision went hand in hand 
with a narrowness o f  focus. His consistency was admirable to the same extent that his refusal 
to acknowledge certain key aspects o f his object o f study was highly problematic. Yet, what 
becomes clear when one reads his work attentively is that it is precisely because o f  his critical 
and methodological peculiarities which generate so many tensions in his work that his 
criticism retains its power years after its initial appearance. The effect that Leavis’s criticism 
has had over the years is also the product o f  yet another characteristic o f his work, a 
characteristic not so much o f the individual behind the critical work but o f a whole tradition, 
a lineage which includes Samuel Johnson, Coleridge, Carlyle and Arnold among others. This
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tradition is one characterized by dissent, social awareness and strong moral ideas40. It is a 
tradition that has left a clear mark in the intellectual and cultural heritage o f Leavis’s England 
and also, closely examined, a cultural formation which indicates a highly complex and largely 
unconscious process o f transformation and adaptation. This process may be construed as 
one o f  negotiation and eventual coming to terms with a situation that makes both the raison 
d'etre o f the critical practice and also its efficacy {qua cultural activity) problematic in a context 
by and large indifferent, if not openly hostile, to  what this critical activity was ideally 
supposed to represent. That was a process in which all the intellectual figures in this long 
family line took part, in the head o f which Milton may be placed as a symbol o f Protestant 
dissent. This religious and later on mostly secular dissent was coupled with an individualism 
that became all the more obstinate the more Western man found himself drawn away from 
the metaphysical certainties o f religion. Both o f these features are the two main 
characteristics o f  such a line o f  thought. Leavis is the first m odem  critic in this lineage, a 
critic whose moral seriousness and clarity o f intent, marks his criticism from its early years to 
the end.
Leavis started as a critic in the late twenties soon after modernism had begun to assert
itself, a time during which a change o f  large proportions was altering the cultural face o f the
West. This cataclysmic change, with which I shall deal further on, was not only a change o f
modes o f artistic expression, a change o f  cultural tropes, as it were, but a more deep and far-
reaching shift o f  a cultural formation which was by then reaching its own limits. I consider
this cultural formation as roughly extending from the Augustan period in the eighteenth
century to the late Victorian period. During this time capitalism was making inroads into
hitherto unaffected areas o f human life and the class most to profit from such an expansion
was gradually trying to secure its hegemonic status not simply in the financial centres and the
national parliaments but in the cultural centres as well. This process o f legitimising the status
40 A treatment o f  Leavis as essentially a radical reformer in a long line o f  English bourgeois radicalism is to be 
found in Fred Inglis’s Radical YLamestness: E.ng&sh Social Theory 1880-1980, (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982).
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quo which in fact meant the capitalist market and the parliamentary democracy that 
guaranteed its growth and relative stability was never a simple process. It was rather an 
uneven battle between high principles and a reality that was gradually becoming all the more 
bleak; a conflict between a whole new conception o f life in a civilized world and the 
catastrophic effects o f  a system which, as we were approaching the twentieth century, was 
more and more contested by those w ho suffered under it. Leavis’s formative years were 
marked by the historical tensions o f that era and it was to his credit that he produced a body 
o f  work that, in its m ost fortunate instances at least, registers these tensions with a 
heightened realization o f  their urgency.
Leavis became conscious o f the major shifts in the culture o f  the West very early in his 
life. As a result o f  this great cultural and political shift which was registered with such painful 
awareness in the first modernist art and literature, he — like so many middle-class young men 
who saw their ideals shattered in the course o f World War I -  set out to defend with an 
admirable zeal the only thing that, to his judgment, guaranteed a profoundly meaningful life 
and a defence against the ‘technologico-Benthamite’ (as was his own term) tendency o f our 
civilization.
Leavis set out to combat the m ost destructive aspects o f industrial capitalism by 
employing a strategy o f simultaneous attacks on three distinct fronts. The first front was the 
mass-market aspects o f m odem  technology, epitomized by pulp fiction and the movies; the 
second front was the upper-middle-class attitude o f the established intelligentsia, exemplified 
then by the Bloomsbury group; and last but not least the ascending Marxist criticism which 
Leavis perceived and interpreted as part o f  the problem that he and his like-minded peers 
were facing. This strategy, holistic in its essence and grand in its scope, would be totally 
ineffectual if it were not backed up by an equally impressive arsenal o f concepts and ideas to 
enable the enlightened minority, which Leavis wished for and later attempted to create and 
educate with Scrutiny, to  contain as much as possible the effects o f  the established centres o f
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power which were sanctioning complacence, ignorance and vulgarity. In reaction to such a 
state o f  affairs Leavis prom oted certain critical concepts which he believed would challenge 
the prevailing certainties about literature and its role in the world. These concepts — which 
raised many im portant critical issues while being notoriously undertheorised by their 
originator — were life, organic community, cultural continuity, tradition, personal integrity, 
sincerity, and maturity.
Leavis’s criticism constitutes an ensemble, a coherent whole which has proved to be 
immensely influential and pivotal to any discussion o f twentieth-century English criticism. 
His main and long-standing critical achievements are: his insistence on the social function o f 
literature; his re-articulation o f a phenomenology o f reading that ultimately returns the 
individual to  the community that alone can validate both the work and the act o f reading; his 
elaboration o f a new hermeneutic code that is based on moral sensitivity and responsibility. 
Yet these achievements are intricately connected to the deficiencies o f  his criticism, its blind 
spots as it were. The ones most pertinent to my discussion here are: his inability to properly 
diagnose the ills o f  the culture o f  his time and attribute them to their proper causes: namely, 
his inability to see industrial capitalism as generating all kinds o f  potentialities and cancelling 
them at the same time; his unwillingness to re-examine his initial basic assumptions even in 
view o f evidence that would legitimize such a reappraisal, his unwillingness, for instance, to 
see anything particularly worthwhile in post-war culture; and finally his eventual retreat into a 
retrogressive and at times stubbornly conservative mode o f thought. All these testify' to a 
great internal tension in his thought, one o f the most emblematic points o f  which is the 
predominance o f  the moral element in his criticism. This is what I am going to deal with in 
the rest o f this chapter.
In examining certain basic notions in Leavis’s critical work I wish to follow through 
some o f  the implications o f  their usage in his critical practice. I take this to be the first step 
towards a clearer understanding o f  the unacknowledged politics o f  his criticism. However, I
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must emphasize that these notions should not be examined in isolation, although such a step 
may be analytically necessary, but as parts o f  a greater discursive totality which is Leavis’s 
critical and cultural discourse. This discourse is complex, multifaceted and often highly 
idiosyncratic but it is also very much a product o f  its own historical context. It is also — and 
that is most crucial to my endeavour here — a discourse not only about the technical, 
specialised aspects o f  literature but a more far-reaching one about literature-in-the-world, 
about literary works and their interpretations, authors and their appraisal within an 
identifiable historical context. It is one o f Leavis’s great achievements that he always insisted 
on the close relation between literature and life, between ‘significant form’ and objective 
reality. The essentially moral quality o f  his criticism is concomitant with this preoccupation 
with lived experience and with a cultural politics that reaches far beyond the limited scope o f 
the personal and the subjective. Yet this very same quality is also indicative o f  his critical 
shortcomings, his inability to pursue his criticism in those directions that would enable him 
to avoid the rather simplistic generalisations that consequently led him away from the 
intimate and profound understanding that he so passionately advocated in his writings. In 
what follows I shall concentrate on those aspects o f  his work that fall within the object o f  my 
enquiry leaving aside certain other aspects, the relevance o f which I consider less significant 
Needless to say, his work is an integrated whole and my emphasis on certain aspects should 
in no way be inferred as implying a lack o f  importance. It is rather the attempt to establish a 
hierarchy o f relevance.
T h e  In t e r -W ar  Per io d  a n d  t h e  A r tic u la tio n  o f  a N ew  C ultural  Politics
In the 1920s, at a time when Leavis began to explore the themes that would later become 
the cornerstones o f  his critical practice, sweeping changes transformed the face o f  W estern 
Europe and the Britain in particular. W orld War I left its deep marks on every7 aspect o f 
Western societies, social, political and economic. The O ctober Revolution in Russia resulted
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in the formation o f  a new state that represented a serious challenge to the political and 
economic organization o f the West. The Depression showed in a m ost dramatic manner the 
limits o f  capitalism and m ost particularly the immense human suffering the structural 
deficiencies o f such a system could cause. The feeling o f discontent that prevailed during the 
interwar years pushed a great percentage o f the suffering population to either o f  the two 
extremes o f the political spectrum. During those years o f social polarisation and the 
disturbing memory o f  the totally inexcusable atrocities o f the first mass war in human history 
there was the appearance o f another distinctly m odem  phenomenon: the coming o f age o f 
the leisure industry for the masses, whose ideal media were the then still new radio broadcast 
and the Hollywood film. This leisure industry — later on to be called the ‘culture industry’ by 
A dom o and Horkheimer in the their classic Dialectic o f Enlightenment41 — had a great number 
o f  profound and far-reaching effects. However, what caught the attention o f the young 
intellectuals, anxious about the state o f  the world they lived in, were its immediate short-term 
effects. One o f these effects was its predominance as a mass entertainment form and the fact 
that its products gradually but steadily replaced the m ost traditional forms o f both public and 
private entertainment. This cultural transformation, the birth o f the leisure industry and the 
‘culture’ that relates to it and its products, had an overwhelming effect on Leavis. But before 
I go into the details o f this encounter with the then nascent ‘culture industry’ I m ust bring 
into the discussion another aspect o f  the history o f the first decades o f the twentieth century: 
the intensification o f key aspects o f industrial capitalism among which the most relevant to 
my discussion are the technologization and rationalization o f the processes o f production 
and the regulation o f consumption as well.
Advertising, one o f  the major cultural phenom ena o f  the era, was gradually transformed 
into a technique, a process o f  persuading the public to consume products thus boosting 
demand for the greater number o f products that came out o f the factories. In addition to
41 “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception” in Adom o & Horkheimer, 1997, pp. 120-167.
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that, and m ost importandy, advertising was giving birth to a set o f consumer attitudes that 
would facilitate the perpetuation o f  a specific kind o f consumption along the lines o f the new 
trends in industrial output. This purely economic phenom enon, the planned, rationalised 
intensification o f demand, had effects that extended to other levels o f society. One o f  these 
effects was the utilization o f  cultural resources in such a way so as to comply with rules, 
necessities and aspirations that had very litde, if  anything, to do with the traditional role that 
these resources played in the past. O ne o f  the m ost important o f  these cultural resources was 
language. This new technique o f addressing the consumers, o f manipulating their desire for 
fulfilling their real or imaginary needs, made use o f language in ways that were perceived to 
distort the established semantic wealth and legitimate uses o f the words used. Advertising 
was only one o f  the new phenom ena that resulted from the profound changes in the 
organisation o f capitalism during that time. The other was the introduction o f planning and 
rationalisation as technical procedures aiming at perfecting the economic system, thus 
securing more profits and less waste for all the industries involved. These practices soon 
spread well beyond the organisational infrastructure o f Western industry to places that were 
up until then relatively unaffected by them. O ne o f  these places was the academic world and 
particularly the humanities which were until then perceived as being exempted from  the 
Vulgar’ preoccupations characteristic o f  an era obsessed with productivity and effectiveness. 
It was during that time that concepts such as ‘professionalization’ entered the vocabulary o f 
administration in the humanities and particularly in the sensitive area o f ‘English’ where the 
very content o f the discipline as well as the heavy historical and cultural weight o f its object 
o f  study determined to a great extent the formation o f a specific, identifiable academic 
subculture. It was this academic subculture where these new cultural changes were most 
painfully registered. The perceived ‘contamination’ o f an almost sacred place, the university 
along with the ‘levelling down’ o f  culture were both factors that helped shape Leavis’s 
attitude towards the cultural shifts he experienced first-hand during those years.
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But advertising was not the only thing that threatened the inviolability o f the culture o f 
letters. Nor, was professionalization the only negative effect o f a rapidly changing social and 
economic environment. Mass literacy, economic depression and the necessity o f  the system 
to effectively regulate non-productive time all combined to produce yet another effect: mass 
entertainment. This new phenom enon had many forms, which were produced and packaged 
with a single purpose in mind: to be easily and effortlessly consumed by an always increasing 
number o f people whose need for entertainm ent it would satisfy. The cheap novel, the 
cinema, all such forms o f  mass entertainm ent seemed, at least in the minds o f certain 
intellectuals, to threaten the cultural cohesion o f society by a gradual process whereby certain 
new and morally ambiguous cultural practices would displace the virtues typical o f a culture 
pregnant with significance and relevance at every level o f  its structure. I f  that ‘culture’ was in 
danger it was because its main weapon was appropriated by the negative, destructive forces 
o f  ‘civilisation’. Language, the medium which served Shakespeare as well as his epigones was 
now serving those who had other, entirely different, cultural goals. Among the many negative 
aspects o f a growing industrial capitalism Leavis chose to concentrate on the threat posed to 
culture by the increasing pressure it had to endure from the ‘external’ world o f economic 
progress and technological efficiency. His first im portant publication, the pamphlet Mass 
Civilisation and Minority Culture deals precisely with this issue. In it Leavis attempts to deal with 
the negative effects o f  the sweeping changes o f his time by concentrating on the one thing 
that he thinks is capable o f  any effective resistance: culture. It is not easy to find a tight 
definition o f  culture in this work. All we are offered is an approximation o f a definition at the 
beginning o f this essay. After having stated (and not argued for) the importance o f the 
existence o f a small normative elite Leavis concludes that
Upon this minority depends our power o f  profiting by the finest human experience o f  the past;
they keep alive the subtlest and m ost perishable parts o f  tradition. Upon them depend the
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implicit standards that order the fine living o f  an age, the sense that this is worth more than that, 
this rather than that is the direction in which to go, that the centre is here rather than there. In 
their keeping (.. .) is the language, the changing idiom, upon which fine living depends, and 
without which distinction o f  spirit is thwarted and incoherent. By “culture” I mean the use o f  
such a language. (Leavis, 1933: 15) (italics mine)
In this passage we may identify the m ost im portant and recurring themes o f his cultural 
politics; the necessity for a cultural elite, the im portance o f tradition, the key role played by 
language. I believe that by examining these propositions closely we may come to a more 
precise understanding o f the essentially moral inflection o f  his own discourse. The first point 
worth considering is the positing o f  tradition as the outer limit o f  human experience, the 
m ost general context within which any proposition or act is properly signified. W hat is 
significant here, as in all the other o f  Leavis’s works, is the absence o f  history. Tradition is 
seen as what regulates the temporal axis o f  humankind and is perceived in such a way so as 
to exclude alternative concepts such as history. This exclusion is made possible by positing 
tradition as a highly selective process where negativity and contradiction are simply not 
present. True to his Amoldean heritage Leavis posits tradition as the repository o f  the finest 
human experience o f the past. In his view this amassing o f excellence seems to takes place in 
a social space devoid o f conflict. But then why are these ‘fine things’ perishable? If  tradition 
is devoid o f conflicts and contradictions why is it necessary to be overtly cautious about the 
frailty o f  all its finest achievements? Leavis would answer that it is the current state o f  affairs 
that endangers traditional values, the Age o f  Machine that is structurally inimical to the 
vulnerable qualities o f the cultural past. That is precisely why there is a necessity for a 
guardian elite. The members o f  such an elite would be the ones that possess the power and 
the necessary qualities to protect the fragile excellence o f the past against the threat o f 
‘levelling down’ posed by a present appearing to be entirely devoted to material satisfaction. 
In my view, this elite in Leavis’s discourse is supposed to regulate the circulation o f  cultural
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capital by a double process. Firsdy, it functions in a legislative capacity by deciding what is 
worthy o f preservation, full o f relevance and significance; and secondly, by regulating the 
means for the dissemination o f  the cultural values which are approved and thus worthy o f  
entering the public sphere. This makes it at the same time a law-giver and a gate-keeper. It 
institutes and it regulates at the same time. Its currency is not money but something much 
more crucial to a cultural politics: language.
T h e  Q u e st io n  o f  La n g u a g e
Leavis leaves us with no doubt as to where the real importance lies. Language is the one 
thing ‘upon which fine living depends’. This essentially moral conception o f language makes 
him conceive it as the essential regulating centre o f any social formation. It is a centre that 
determines all the other elements; it determines the essential qualities and the ultimate aim o f 
life. It is the space where the axiological dimension o f  any cultural practice is to be found. It 
is interesting to note that Leavis here constructs a two-level explanatory model roughly 
analogous to the Marxian one which posits an ideological and institutional superstructure 
reflecting an underlying economic base.. The crucial difference is o f course that Leavis posits 
language as the base and ‘finer living’ as the superstructure. The result is that the materiality 
o f  human existence is almost completely effaced as a significant factor in the evolution o f 
humankind. The repercussions o f such a conception o f  language will be examined later on. 
W hat is worth emphasizing at this point is that language, as far as Leavis is concerned, is the 
supreme medium through which tradition orients and reproduces itself and, since that 
medium is also used by those inimical to cultural continuity and excellence, it becomes 
almost self-evident that language must be guarded by those who can resist the temptations o f 
a world seemingly devoid o f moral imagination. The necessity o f a cultural elite becomes 
thus a matter in need o f no further justification since the evocation o f the imminent danger
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of a loss o f cultural purity is, seemingly, an effective rhetorical device for the imposition o f 
this view.
In Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture Leavis attempts to make precise what exacdy is this 
imminent danger. In so doing, he concentrates mainly on those cultural phenom ena that 
seem to relate to an increasingly large num ber o f people. He mentions advertising 
techniques, putting emphasis on the fact that they are applied where one would least expect 
them applied, i.e. in literary reviews. He also mentions the effects o f mass entertainment such 
as cinema and cheap novels on the unprepared public. In each case he sees a similar pattern 
in the organisation o f  cultural material. He sees a general devaluation o f  (accepted) meaning, 
a trivialisation o f  values through the reference to unacceptable cultural criteria and finally a 
persistent axiological undermining o f everything that could be considered truly significant. 
But this process o f  discrediting ‘culture’ could easily be regarded as no more than a temporal 
anomaly, something that a generous dose o f ‘the best that has been said and thought in the 
world’, as Arnold famously put it, could cure for good. Yet this is clearly not the case for 
Leavis. If  he is concerned about these social trends it is because he sees all too clearly that 
they have mass appeal, that they ultimately concern all those involved regardless o f  social 
status or education. It is this utterly monologic, mass-directed quality o f their discourse and 
the impact o f such a profusion o f distracting signals on the average public that worries him. 
In his own words:
But the m odem [average cultivated person] is exposed to a concourse o f  signals so bewildering 
in their variety and number that, unless he is especially gifted or especially favoured, he can 
hardly begin to discriminate. Here we have the plight o f  culture in general. The landmarks have 
shifted, multiplied and crowded upon one another, the distinctions and dividing lines have 
blurred away, the boundaries are gone, and the arts and literatures o f  different countries and 
periods have flowed together... (Leavis, 1933: 31)
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Upon reading this passage it becomes immediately evident that the danger lies in the 
confusion caused by the overexposure to conflicting stimuli. W hat holds culture together is 
for Leavis the integrity o f  its whole discursive universe. Everything has its place and 
everything is organically related to everything else. This is evidendy what is at stake in the era 
o f mass information: the loss o f  the determining centre, the absence o f any kind o f 
regulation o f so much information with the consequence o f making the receiving public 
vulnerable to accepting and consuming things not only irrelevant but also hardly conducive 
to its moral well-being. But this is only the obvious part o f the argument. W hat is implicidy 
said here is that any prospect for a stable social and cultural order is put at risk when the 
powers o f discrimination are weakened. We begin to see that it is not only a matter o f regret 
for the loss o f cultural integrity but an implicit formulation o f  a politics in the wide sense o f 
the word, however evasive such a formulation may be.
Leavis has his attention firmly focused on his times and yet manages not to see what is 
essential. He has every reason to feel threatened by capitalism which he constandy refers to 
by way o f metonymical formulations — industrialism, age o f  the machine, techologico- 
Benthamite worldview — but he is unable to explain anything. The dialectics o f capitalist 
expansion and cultural disorientation are registered in his work in rather simplistic terms. 
There is also no consideration o f  the fact that mass entertainment was a decisive step in the 
direction o f effectively containing the social unrest caused by massive unemployment and 
increased hardship by means o f providing an oudet for the potentially destructive energy o f a 
great number o f the suffering population. The political implications o f all such ‘innovations’ 
and ‘devices’ do not find even the slightest acknowledgement in his work. For him it is 
entirely a clash o f  two conflicting worldviews: ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’. Leavis claims that 
these two ‘are coming to be antithetical terms’ and that ‘it is not merely that the power and 
the sense o f  authority are now divorced from culture’ but also ‘some o f  the m ost 
disinterested solicitude for civilisation is apt to be, consciously or unconsciously, inimical to
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culture’ (Leavis, 1933: 39). Once more it is suggested that there is a relation between the lack 
o f  authority and the regrettable state o f  affairs in the present day. We can also identify 
another assumption — a permanent feature in his later criticism — namely, that, no m atter how 
good the intentions may be, working in a context other than that defined by true culture is 
doomed to failure.42 These two points need to  be further discussed.
Leavis is trying to establish a rigid binary opposition between ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’ 
and that has the consequence o f trying to define as unequivocally as possible two distinct, 
separate spaces. The relation between them  is assumed to be a relation o f  real, demonstrable 
differences. Therefore conflict is no t only possible but, under certain conditions, inevitable. 
W hat this means is that Leavis posits his opposition o f culture/non-culture, in such a way as 
to preclude both  the consideration o f any possible affinities between these two seemingly 
incommensurable entities, but also, and m ost importantly for my discussion here, the 
possibility o f  a dialectical relation between the two. This has the effect o f  clearing the path 
for pursuing a strategy o f opposing the one to the other without any concern for the more 
deep and complex relations that determine a continuous interaction between these 
supposedly distinct spheres. Due to this structural limitation o f his thinking Leavis is 
compelled to empty the space o f ‘civilisation’ o f  any possible significance and conversely 
endow the space o f ‘culture’ with more significance than it allows for. Instead o f  exploring 
the contradictions immanent in each, something that would enable him to examine critically 
his own presuppositions as well, Leavis secures in an imaginary level an order and an 
integrity that do not correspond to anything conceptually or empirically verifiable in actual 
reality. Yet his strategy has another implication as well. I f  his own chosen side, the side o f 
‘culture’ is conceived as essentially free from tensions internally it is certainly not protected 
from any pressures that might come from outside. ‘Culture’ is vulnerable because it is the 
property o f a select few. Such vulnerability makes imperative the imposition o f authoritarian
42 In Leavis’s mind this failure is, o f  course, a moral failure not a practical one.
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measures, an almost instinctual response to an outside threat that is demonised in direct 
proportion to the naivety o f  its conception. ‘Culture’ is in constant danger o f succumbing to 
pressure and thus exposing an absence within its very structure. This ‘empty space’ in the 
structure is filled by the concept o f  the ‘minority’. The necessity o f this minority and its 
importance for the preservation o f cultural memory and cohesion is directly linked to both 
the inflationary conception o f ‘culture’ and the imaginary powers that the ‘enemy’ is assumed 
to possess. The more expansionist the ‘civilisation’ is perceived to be the more rigid the 
ideological framework within which this minority chooses to work. Leavis is unable to 
contemplate a culture w ithout some sort o f fixed social and therefore also political 
hierarchies in place. The more he is unable or unwilling to explain the drastic changes o f his 
era the more he is prone to adopting an often conservative approach in his endeavour to 
defend whatever is deemed worthy o f  such defence.
This ideological scheme has another side-effect as well. I f  politics in its more inclusive 
sense is absent from his thought then an alternative space opens up which assumes the 
functions o f  a political critique. This space is the space o f  the moral. Within it all 
considerations about language and culture acquire a distinctive meaning and purpose. They 
become serious in their tone and relevant with respect to the needs they address themselves 
to. But what is m ost important is that they are now predicated upon an explanatory 
conceptual mode that endows them with a graintas essential to their intended function. This 
mode is a permanent feature o f the English critical tradition from the eighteenth century up 
to Leavis’s own time. As a particular mode in literary and cultural criticism it has passed 
through many stages, from the normative, didactic and still Christian attitude o f  Samuel 
Johnson and Coleridge to the secular and more programmatic tone o f Arnold. It has been a 
shifting but essentially unaltered mode o f thought; shifting because o f historical necessity but 
unaltered nevertheless for the same reason. Samuel Johnson might have been confident 
enough in his own society to consider a moral fault as indicative o f a deviation from the
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established norm and not as an internal possibility o f the creative process; Arnold, for his 
part, might have been less confident in his own society so as to consequendy attempt to 
substitute the higher morality o f an ideal culture for a dying and ineffective religion in order 
to achieve social cohesion and avoid ‘anarchy’. What, I believe, must be noted here is that 
these two instances o f cultural politics need not obscure the fact that what was essentially at 
stake was the effacement o f all the contradictions inherent in the social and economic 
systems both these thinkers belonged to and supported. Leavis was no exception. His 
criticism is determined by his ideological allegiance to the core principles characteristic o f this 
school o f  thought and so it is no surprise that his cultural criticism utilizes the one ideological 
resource m ost central to this whole tradition o f cultural politics, namely morality. The moral 
core o f Leavis’s criticism is thus not only the organising centre around which everything in 
his work is structured but also an index o f  the ideological continuity manifested in his 
thought in the context o f English letters. Yet his moral criticism is distinct from what existed 
before in the sense that it is an attem pt to restructure the essential com ponents o f that 
discourse in order to engage with certain distincdy m odem  phenomena in industrial societies. 
I need to emphasise here something that is nevertheless implied by my own treatment o f 
Leavis’s criticism. Leavis’s moral criticism is exemplary in many respects, but the one 
characteristic that mosdy stands out is his admirable restraint when it comes to moralising. 
N o matter how strong his moral ideas are Leavis always tries to show not what we should 
consider good or bad, but what is worthy o f our consideration as a legitimate moral 
concern.4^  For that reason, although it is not the only one, his criticism is absolutely vital to 
the understanding o f the uses o f the moral as a conceptual mode and explanatory code in 
literary and cultural criticism.
43 John Casey has argued, commenting on Leavis’s criticism, that “(0 °  insist that a serious concern with certain 
problems o f  life is a ‘moral’ concern is not the same thing as to say that it is a morally good concern; it rather to 
say that it is the sort o f  concern which is in the province o f  morality, or which is the material o f  moral 
judgements.” (Casey: 1966: 182).
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To even attempt to comprehend the moral texture o f Leavis’s criticism entails a 
concentrated effort to systematize the various elements or, more concretely, conceptual 
points o f reference that animate his whole critical endeavour. This is what I plan to examine 
now by looking more closely at each key concept as each appears in Leavis’s early works.
Se r io u sn e ss , Sin c er ity , V itality  a n d  O r g a n ic  Co m m u n it y : T h e  Co n c e p t u a l  
A r se n a l  o f  a  M oral  P olem icist
Leavis first major critical works are New Bearings in English Poetry (1932) and Revaluation 
(1936). In them he deals exclusively with poetry, a literary form that was, for him, the one 
m ost suited to the preservation o f those cultural values that he, as a critic, was defending. 
These two books, along with the essays collected in For Continuity (1933), are the ones where 
certain concepts which underpin Leavis’s whole critical endeavour appear for the first time. 
Such concepts not only constitute the hard core o f  his critical system but also determine this 
system’s applicability and scope by effectively mapping out a notional terrain and by 
conditioning to a large extent the methodological choices that are made. Leavis’s whole 
critical method is based on a set o f values, the first formulation o f which we find in the pages 
o f these books.
In the prefatory chapter o f New Bearings in English Poetry entided “Poetry and the M odem 
W orld”, Leavis gives us the reason why poetry is what matters most. According to Leavis, it 
matters “because o f the kind o f poet who is more alive than other people, more alive in his 
own age. He is, as it were, at the most conscious point o f the race in his time.” (Leavis, 1959: 
13). Here, the poet is the artist embodying the spirit o f his age, an artist endowed with this 
rare quality o f being alive to the present with such a dedication and clear-sightedness that he 
is able to perceive and consequendy communicate to us the more profound truths o f our 
own time. Further down the same chapter we read that “all that we can fairly ask o f the poet 
is that he shall show himself to have been fully alive in our time.” (ibid, 24) This is the first
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concise formulation o f  Leavis’s moral criticism. Any author and by extension literature are to 
be evaluated by moral standards and not by purely technical ones. A certain belletristic 
attitude towards literature gives way to the high-seriousness o f moral criticism and Leavis is 
very explicit as to which attitude he champions.
The moral criticism that Leavis proposes is not merely a personal preference o f a 
sensitive critic but the only method that can bring about the desired results in the context o f 
contemporary history. Leavis tells us that “urban conditions, a sophisticated civilization, 
rapid change and the mingling o f cultures have destroyed the old rhythms and habits, and 
nothing adequate has taken their place. The result is a sense, apparent in the serious literature 
o f the day, that meaning and direction have vanished.” (ibid, 61) and by that he sets the 
context within the framework o f  which his own criticism eventually makes sense. The 
meaninglessness and directionlessness o f contemporary culture is what Leavis wishes to 
address by means o f talking about poetry and the absolute values it carries from generation 
to generation. It is these values that are mostly endangered in an era when, in “considering 
our present plight” Leavis reminds us “we have also to take account o f  the incessant rapid 
change that characterizes the Machine Age. The result is breach o f  continuity and the 
uprooting o f life.” He then comments on the aptness o f  the m etaphor by saying that “what 
we are witnessing to-day is the final uprooting o f  the immemorial ways o f life, o f life rooted 
in the soil.” (ibid, 91) What we are given here as a context for m odem  literature and criticism 
is the loss o f the organic community, a constant feature o f Leavis’s criticism up until the end 
o f his life.
‘O rg a n ic  Co m m u n it y ’ a n d  t h e  N e e d  for  C ultural  Co n t in u it y
W hat this notion conveys is o f the utm ost importance to my task here. This is so because 
it carries with it all sorts o f connotations, the precise nature o f which is essential for any 
political decoding o f Leavis’s literary and cultural criticism. In Leavis’s world-view ‘organicity’
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is what characterizes any social formation that has not succumbed to the pressures o f the 
technological and ultimately deeply alienating imperatives o f the industrial ethos o f  m odem  
times. In keeping with a long tradition o f  conservative thought Leavis identifies this era o f 
communal bliss as something irrevocably lost44. His fictitious sociological model allows him 
to take his contemporary society to task for being so remote from this ideal. In his Culture and 
Environment, a book he co-authored with Denys lliom pson , Leavis wrote
What we have lost is the organic society with the living culture it embodied (...) an art o f  life, a
way o f  living, ordered and patterned, involving social arts, codes o f  intercourse and a responsive 
adjustment, growing out o f  immemorial experience, to the natural environment and the rhythm 
o f  the year (.. .) It is not merely that life (...) has become urban and industrial. When life was
rooted in the soil town life was not what it is now. (Leavis, 1933:1-2)
This Edenic society embodied a ‘living culture’ growing out o f ‘immemorial experience’ 
which means that history was then essentially natural time which in its mute physicality was 
the foil for the ‘natural environment and the rhythm of the year’. Leavis claims that such a 
society existed up until the seventeenth century during which time there appeared a rift in the 
culture o f the period. The great economic changes that brought about the growth o f big 
industrial and financial centres and the subsequent, equally great, changes in all the non­
material aspects o f  life were also the fundamental causes o f cultural decay. Mechanization, 
the principle o f calculation and efficiency, economics and the whole cult o f production o f 
goods conceived in this case as the crucial defining m om ent o f modem culture, all these are 
for Leavis ills o f a system that promotes a distorted vision o f progress and o f what a good 
life really is. Capitalism is thus criticised for being a system that promotes a hollow 
materiality, the dissociation o f work and leisure, the levelling-down o f standards and
44 See Raymond Williams’s illuminating concluding note after his chapter on Leavis in Culture and Society 1780- 
1950 (Williams, 1963: 256-257).
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ultimately the radical separation o f man from the soil and nature, that is from a state o f grace 
and essential fulfilment.45
Leavis’s views are however qualified — and thus appearing less vulnerable to the charges 
o f naive and reactionary historiography — by claiming that organic society was essentially a 
model which served more as a reminder o f the loss that humanity suffered under the 
conditions o f  the last two centuries than as a real, concretely identifiable historical entity. In 
his infamous “Two Cultures?” talk (1962) Leavis even went so far as to say that he was by no 
means “preaching that we should defy, or try to  reverse, the accelerating movement o f 
external civilization (...) that is determined by advancing technology” (Leavis, 1972: 59). This 
sort o f  corrective argument was to be seen all the more frequendy in Leavis’s last essays from 
the sixties onwards. Yet, what is im portant here is the logic behind his notion o f the ‘organic 
community’. Critics by and large sympathetic to Leavis’s work have tried to interpret his 
references to the ‘organic community’ as an index o f his profound anxiety regarding the 
deterioration o f community, the loss o f  cultural continuity, the gradual degradation o f 
traditional values and last but not least the moral vacuum in which twentieth-century 
Western societies seemed to have been entrapped. Fred Inglis comments that Leavis’s use o f 
the ‘organic community’ is to be understood — in the context o f the specific cultural tradition 
to which Leavis belonged — as the only viable conceptual alternative to historical facts like 
the “placelessness and the helpless mobility o f the labour forces” and the concomitant 
effects o f such an alienating process. In this view “when this deracination is allied to the 
collapse, at least in capitalism’s heartlands, o f a credible theology and to the disappearance of 
Clod” (Inglis, 1982: 105) it is hardly surprising that Leavis armed himself with a secular 
theologyr that substituted literature for dogma in order to defend what was left o f  community 
and tradition in an epoch o f massive and threatening change. I think that such an explanation
45 It must also be noted that, for Leavis, an organic community is also the material basis o f  a truly national 
literature. In his Revaluation, Leavis tells us that “the ideal (...) o f  a civilization in which Art and Nature, Beauty 
and Use, Industry and Decorum, should be reconciled, and humane culture, even in its most refined forms, be 
kept appropriately aware o f  its derivation from and dependence on the culture o f  the soil.” (Leavis, 1936: 80).
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reveals only part o f what is behind I^eavis’s strategic choice o f ‘the organic community’ as a 
critical tool. W hat is left out is a more dialectical consideration o f  the relation between such a 
key concept in his work and its underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions. I 
shall return to this later on in my discussion.
The twentieth century, and more particularly the years after World War I, was for Leavis 
an era marked by the absence o f  meaning and direction. The irretrievable loss o f any sort o f 
‘organic community’ and o f the values which such a community should foster left 
humankind in a state o f bewilderment and confusion. The poet and the critic, whose job was 
to mediate between the art and its public, could only hope to have a positive effect on our 
consciousness by “seriousness, (...) spiritual and moral intensity, and (...) resolute 
intelligence” (Leavis, 1959: 156). In this context, Leavis attributes these virtues to the T. S. 
Eliot o f the Waste Land. This set o f  purely moral virtues was for Leavis what characterized all 
great literature and the critic’s task — magisterially enacted by Leavis himself in those essays — 
was the elaboration o f these moral concepts for the benefit o f the educated public which 
wished, at one and the same time, to resist the banalization o f values and to find a common 
code with the help o f which a project o f  cultural resistance might be initiated.
‘Sin c er ity ’ as Literary  V a lu e
Besides seriousness, moral intensity and intelligence, there is another virtue which 
constitutes the hard core o f Leavis’s early moral criticism. Tliis is the virtue o f sincerity7, 
which Leavis attributes to Hopkins, and for whose genius he tells us that it was “as much a 
matter o f  rare character, intelligence and sincerity as o f technical skill” . 'Hie way in which 
Leavis concludes his appraisal is very illuminating: “indeed, in his great poetry the distinction 
disappears; the technical triumph is a triumph o f spirit, (ibid, 182)” In this sentence we are 
presented with what I think is the m ost central and indispensable element o f  Leavis’s critical
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practice: literature is to be valued if  and only if behind its apparent beauty o f form we are 
able to discern a moral significance that leads directly ‘outside’ literature to life itself.
Some further considerations on ‘sincerity’ are in order here since this concept plays a 
crucial role in Leavis’s moral-critical terminology. ‘Sincerity’ was, for Leavis, the key term for 
the appraisal o f poetic achievement. It was in fact a reworking o f the Victorian term o f the 
same name46 with the emphasis now put not on the evaluable moral qualities o f the 
individual, but on discernible qualities o f  the work itself. As a result it was now the work that 
embodied this virtue in its enactment o f the individual poet’s authentic experience and moral 
vision. Whereas the Victorian usage was always marked by the characteristic moralising tone 
o f the era ‘sincerity’ was used by Leavis as an index o f the virtues o f ‘disinterestedness’ and 
‘impersonality’ as these were inscribed in the poem itself. The shift was from the direct 
attribution o f moral worth to the living author to a more indirect and ultimately always 
contestable relationship between the poet and the poem. If for the Victorians ‘sincerity’ was 
something that the aspiring author must try to achieve in his work by following his inner 
convictions without hesitation and with a noble disregard for the consequences, for Leavis 
‘sincerity’ became a testament o f the poem ’s high status as a privileged form o f expression o f 
the human experience. Now, it was the work that becomes the object o f moral evaluation, 
although Leavis never ceased to insist that what was significant in literature was the fact that 
someone had willed that significance in the first place. Leavis used ‘sincerity’ as a com pound 
term where there has been a fusion o f  the Amoldean concept o f ‘disinterestedness’ with 
Eliot’s concept o f ‘impersonality’, thus making it a more fitting critical tool than the 
historically obsolete Victorian term ever was. Having been infused with a more general and 
far-reaching meaning than its common usage allowed for ‘sincerity’ came to signify both a 
moral virtue and a technical achievement in poetic expression; a moral virtue because it 
indicated the truthful expression o f feeling, personal experience and also, at the same time, a
46 See for example G. H. Lewes, The Principle of Success in Literature (1869).
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technical achievement because it indicated a mastery o f  means, a higher organisation o f the 
materials o f language that produced a poem  capable o f containing this experience.
T h e  V a l u e  o f  ‘E x p e r i e n c e ’
‘Experience’ as a critical concept is absolutely essential to Leavis’s criticism. His view of 
literature is one that is primarily focused on individual experience and the complex processes 
through which such an experience is dramatized and made public by means o f a specific 
literary form. However, ‘experience’ as a concept is notoriously vague and in order to 
understand the very specific inflections it acquires in Leavis’s work we must pay attention to 
the contexts in which it appears. It is these contexts that indicate that what we find at work 
in Leavis’s criticism is not merely a series o f  concepts but a tightly grouped cluster o f certain 
rather loose and very evocative notions that may be characterized as conceptual structures. I 
believe that only as such structures do they lend themselves to any meaningful discussion. 
‘Experience’ is good example as, by itself, it says so many things that it can hardly be called 
an analytical tool. Yet, when we read o f  Keats that he exhibits in his poetry “that strong 
grasp upon actualities — upon things outside himself, that firm sense o f the solid world” 
(Leavis, 1936: 261) we see that the poet’s experience is intimately related to his capacity of 
going beyond himself, that is, o f him being ‘impersonal’ in his art while dealing with the 
‘actualities’ o f  the world, something that evokes a sense o f ‘concreteness’, another key 
concept in Leavis’s criticism which I shall discuss later on. While still discussing Keats, 
Leavis, in a richly-textured and highly evocative passage, has this to say about the specific 
moral quality o f Keats’s poetry within the context o f a Romanticism inimical to moral 
seriousness:
There is no afflatus here, no generous emotionality. The facts, the objects o f  contemplation, 
absorb the poet's attention completely; he has none left for his feelings as such. As a result, his 
response, his attitude, seems to us to inhere in the facts, and to have itself the autonomy o f  fact.
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The strength that makes the sensuous Keats's Ode to a Nightingale so different from the spiritual 
Shelley's To a Skylark - the grasp o f  the object, the firm sense o f  actuality, the character and 
critical intelligence implied (we have seen) in the artist's touch and his related command o f  total 
effect - now manifests itself in the field o f  tragic experience. His own acute and inescapable 
distresses, including the pain o f  watching helplessly the suffering o f  persons dear to him, he can, 
without feeling them the less, contemplate at the same time from (as it were) the outside, as 
objects, as facts and the contemplation o f  the inevitable and endless human suffering to which 
his more immediately personal expenence leads him has a like impersonal strength. (Leavis, 1936:
270-71)
A great poet is one who gives his experience a poetic form that testifies to the his clear­
sighted, principled, unsentimental and ultimately, although Leavis never uses that particular 
qualifying adjective, brave attitude towards life in general. In Leavis’s reformed canon o f 
English poetry — the novel would follow in the next decade — only a resolutely unsentimental, 
morally intelligent, anti-aestheticist attitude towards life makes any work qualify for inclusion 
in such a canon. Only a strong grasp o f  the objective and at the same time a respect for the 
irreducibility o f the individual and the subjective can enable the poet to capture the elusive 
moral quality o f life which, according to Leavis, inheres in that precise dialectical relationship. 
Finally, the ‘impersonal strength’ o f the poetic utterance in dealing with ‘the inevitable and 
endless human suffering’, this moral wisdom that the poem communicated to us, is, as a 
critical observation, quite indicative, I think, o f a quasi-theological quality o f Leavis’s critical 
practice. In this passage all the crucial elements o f  Leavis’s moral criticism fall into place and 
evoke a critical intention which is programmatically trying to establish the ethical criticism o f 
literature, in this case o f poetry, as the only ‘legitimate’ form o f culturally significant criticism.
‘M a t u r i t y ’ a s  a  M o r a l  C o n c e p t
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‘Experience’ as a constituent part o f  Leavis’s conceptual arsenal is closely related to the 
concept o f life’, often referred to by Leavis through the evaluative usage o f ‘vitality7’ and 
other cognate words. Before I enter into the discussion o f ‘life’, I would like to draw 
attention to another value-laden concept that Leavis makes use of: that o f ‘maturity ’. The 
context within which such a concept is employed is mainly the Great Tradition and the other 
works o f Leavis’s middle period such as D. H. I ^ awe nee: Novelist. ‘Maturity’ came to fulfil the 
function that ‘sincerity’ fulfilled in his criticism o f poetry in the earlier years o f his career. 
Although both these terms retain a great deal in common between them there is shift in the 
emphasis implied by each. If  ‘sincerity’ in its usage in Leavis’s criticism is a feature that 
combines the formal aspect with the moral one then ‘maturity’, the term that Leavis used for 
his criticism o f the novel, is evidence o f  a shift o f  focus. ‘Maturity’, for Leavis, is the state 
that a certain writer reaches when he is able to present us with all the complexities o f real life 
without hesitation and without any unnecessary embellishments. It is worth remembering 
that, in this case also, Leavis is not so much interested in appraising the individual ‘behind’ 
the text, but in confirming a quality that is exhibited by the text itself. The importance now is 
that this new term is conceived purely in terms o f the moral quality o f the text. The technical 
aspect o f novelistic composition is now o f secondary importance; it exists not autonomously, 
but only in virtue o f its close affinity with, and structural dependence on, the moral aspect. 
Commenting on Jane Austin’s Yimma, Leavis formulates his argument in the following way:
As a matter o f  fact, when we examine the formal perfection o f  Emma, we find that it can be 
appreciated only in terms o f  the moral preoccupations that characterize the novelist's peculiar 
interest in life. Those who suppose it to be an ‘aesthetic matter’, a beauty o f ‘composition’ that is 
combined, miraculously, with ‘truth to life’, give no adequate reason for the view that Emma is a 
great novel, no intelligent account o f  its perfection o f  form. It is in the same way true o f  the 
other great English novelists that their interest in their art gives them the opposite o f  an affinity 
with Pater and George Moore; it is, brought to an intense focus, an unusually developed life. For,
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far from having anything o f  Flaubert’s disgust or disdain or boredom, they are all distinguished 
by a vital capacity for experience, a kind o f  reverent openness before life, and a marked moral 
intensity. (Leavis, 1962: 17)
‘Maturity’ also signifies a move away from the consensus that a term like ‘sincerity’ could 
be predicated upon. In other words if the semantic content o f ‘sincerity’ can still be agreed 
upon, even with all the qualifications that such a charged term obviously entails, the case 
with a term like ‘maturity’ is rather different. The problematic connotations o f its common 
usage haunt its more specialised application in Leavis’s literary criticism. As Michael Bell has 
noted, the term in question is deliberately circular, a fact that makes it problematic as a 
critical term because “it is at once too empty o f specific meaning while being ideologically 
loaded. It carries, we might say, the maximum evaluative charge with the minimum agreed, 
identifiable reference” (Bell, 1998: 98) And yet, as I shall argue later on, by virtue o f his 
specific approach to literature and culture, this is exacdy what Leavis is compelled to do in 
every instance o f  his critical practice.
Leavis first uses ‘maturity’ in his Great Tradition, the book that signals his shift both from 
a criticism o f poetry to a criticism o f the novel47 and his attempt to propose a new canon for 
the study o f English literature. It is by following closely the deployment o f this concept in 
this book that we may clearly identify its specificity. Speaking o f Jane Austin, the first in a 
series o f great masters o f English literature, Leavis says that “what she brought from her 
Evangelical background was a radically reverent attitude towards life, a profound seriousness 
o f the kind that is a first condition o f any real intelligence...” The phrase ‘profound 
seriousness’ is o f  particular interest to my discussion here and the key to understanding the
47 A shift that was not accidental but rather an almost desperate attempt o f  Leavis to find a ‘total sense o f  life’ in 
a genre and during a period, after World War II, when such an integral totality was manifestly absent from the 
real world. As long as he believed that a ‘public sphere’ could make its appearance even in the confined space o f  
the university and therefore a ‘total sense o f  life’ could be communicated within it poetry, a genre notoriously 
hard to decode morally, could play its role. However, after the disillusionment the turn to such an inclusive 
genre such as the novel marks the desire to find an art form that can manage to preserve the idea o f  wholeness 
and moral imagination.
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distinctive quality o f the concept o f  ‘maturity’ as a value-judgement. In itself such an 
expression may appear the least equipped to offer any real advantages to anyone wishing to 
decipher ‘maturity’s’ real meaning since ‘seriousness’ is hardly an easily identifiable quality. 
Yet, later on in the book, in his discussion o f George Elliot Leavis tells us that she “has too 
full and strong sense o f the reality, she sees too clearly and understandingly, sees with a 
judging vision that relates everything to her profoundest moral experience: her full living 
sense o f value is engaged, and sensitively responsive” (Leavis, 1962: 102). Now ‘maturity’ 
becomes a more clearly delineated quality, more like a virtue, that is something perceivable 
and therefore potentially attributable to others. This virtue, the empathy with the world, the 
clear, earnest and uncompromising perception o f life is now exemplified by the specific 
quality o f a ‘judging vision’, a vision that relates world and inner experience, the phenomenal 
world with human significance: it is a vision that not only sees life but invests in life as well. 
Such a vision is mature because it can embrace a totality and not a series o f  fragments. It is 
also an intelligent vision “precisely because [Eliot] cares for the ‘reason’ o f things (...) she 
can render the aspect [of them] so vividly; her intelligence informs her perception and her 
visual imagination” (ibid, 130). The ‘reason’ o f things is a crucial aspect o f this totality7, it is in 
fact the prerequisite for such a conception o f the world. Leavis concludes this comment by 
declaring that “ (t)he vividness o f  the rendering is significance” (ibid, 130). Virtue lies in both 
the formal aspect and the content o f an author’s work. In fact the formal aspect is worthy o f 
praise only because it conveys a significant content and a content is significant if it deals with 
certain aspects o f life without any hesitation or evasive manoeuvres.
Referring to Henry James’s ITie Portrait o f a Lady Leavis comments that “James’s lack o f 
specificity favours an evasiveness, and the evasiveness, if at all closely questioned, yields 
inconsistency o f a kind that partly empties the theme o f The Portrait o f a Lady o f  moral 
substance” (ibid, 127). A clear vision can only be praiseworthy if it is direct as well. It can lift 
a work o f art to higher levels o f moral worthiness only in as far as it does not allow itself to
85
settle for the obviousness o f the immediately perceptible but rather probe what is there in 
front o f it with an engaged and yet disinterested seriousness o f intent. ‘Maturity’ then comes 
to imply both engagement and disinterestedness, an opening up to the world and at the same 
an attitude to life untainted by any sectarian interest.
This double gesture which reconfirms Leavis’s debt to Matthew Arnold is also an index 
o f his intention to preserve the critical quality inherent in great art while at the same time 
disabling this very art to fulfil other functions that would enable it to play the role not o f a 
sanctuary but o f a battleground. Leavis in fact wished for the cultural education o f an 
enlightened minority which would eventually educate a wider public so that sectarian 
interests and conflict would eventually wither away. In his opinion, in order for that to 
happen one would need a training in good literature and by extension in good life, an 
education sentimentale that, taking one possible cue from George Elliot, would engage with “ the 
weakness and ordinariness o f human nature” and would not find it “contemptible, or show 
either animus or self-deceiving indulgence towards it” (ibid, 139).
‘Maturity’ then becomes an even more rich concept by virtue o f its implying a higher 
conception o f life, a worldview devoid o f the pettiness and the one-sidedness which 
characterize those unaffected by ‘culture’ and therefore incapable o f a finer living. It is also 
an infallible sign o f a generous response to life and most crucially to life as represented or 
rather enacted in the literary text. If  great literature is, almost by definition, mature then great 
criticism is mature as well since its main function is to respond as fully as possible to the text. 
This full response, one that entails a great degree o f independence and responsibility by the 
critic, is a sign o f  life, a life that asserts itself in the relationship between the text and critic 
and ultimately in all those who will allow themselves to be educated by that criticism. It is 
‘maturity’ as exemplified in great literature that will, among other things to be sure, enable its 
readers to reach the consensus that Leavis tacidy accepted as the basis o f any true act o f 
criticism.
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‘Maturity’ in common with ‘sincerity’ both take shape in Leavis’s early critical work in an 
era when modernism, weary o f the “sentimentality, moral rhetoric and the cult o f 
personality” as “possible corruptions o f clear thinking and true feeling” (Bell, 1988: 66) 
attempts a grand reformulation o f the first principles as it were o f any real art and criticism. 
Among these first principles it is ‘impersonality’ that is the most important for my discussion. 
It is the concept o f impersonality, presented in Eliot’s seminal essay “Tradition and the 
Individual Talent” as something that is not a “turning loose o f emotions” but rather an 
“escape from emotions”, not the “expression o f personality but an escape from personality” 
(Eliot, 1950: 10-11) that makes ‘sincerity’ first and then ‘maturity’ such potent critical tools. 
Whereas the Victorians would relate literary value and moral integrity in such a way as to 
regard the character o f  the individual author as the sole determinant o f the attributable value, 
Leavis and the other modernists dissociate the individual from the text only to invest the 
latter with all the metaphysical ambiguities that were, in earlier times, attributed to the 
former. Now, the individual author is almost entirely an aspect o f  the work, in the sense that 
it is o f importance because o f his works and the amount o f fine, concentrated effort that he 
has put into those works. Ultimately it is the texts that matter since it is only with them that 
we engage; it is they which stand in front in front o f us, material traces o f a human intellect 
and bearers o f meanings that may affect us and future readers as well. As a consequence o f 
this literature assumes responsibilities that were until that point scarcely if at all attributed to 
it. If  ‘maturity’ is what distinguishes the great literary works o f art from all the others, and if 
literature is, by virtue o f its specificity the only art that can be so full o f significance for us 
then it follows that literature — in Leavis’s case invariably great literature — may now be 
regarded as a great educating force, the exemplification o f what is best in a long tradition o f 
thought and life. If  ‘maturity’ is now a virtue o f texts and not only o f human beings then it 
follows that literature may fulfil its educating function by assuming the role o f the keeper o f 
the tradition, o f truth and value in an era when the industry o f mass entertainment seemed
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capable o f colonizing both the free time and the psyche o f the masses. Leavis wishes 
literature to play a defensive role, against what he perceives as the main obstacle to human 
realization: mass civilisation. Therefore, he endows literature and criticism with powers so 
great so as to be able to guarantee success in the face o f a great adversary. ‘Maturity’ is one o f 
those powers, in fact it is the index o f  their efficacy. For if literature, in its great moments, 
cannot carry within it the possibility o f another, better future by being at one and the same 
time an index o f both the missed opportunities and the possible alternatives, then its positing 
as a great oppositional force to mass civilisation will prove to be nothing more than a 
narcissistic posture. ‘M ature’ literature rescues life from oblivion and creates the possibilities 
o f life in the present. It focuses on what is im portant by leaving out all that can distract the 
reader. It encourages informed choice and a discerning eye for real significance. It promises 
so much because, qua great literature, it is never evasive, never frivolous, never merely 
charming; the perfect antithesis o f  Hollywood romance and populist journalism, two 
archetypical betes noires for Leavis and the Scrutiny group.
There are many possible objections to such bold pronouncements. The more common 
objection is directed against the lack o f specificity that a term like ‘maturity’ implies. My view 
is that this is true but also not very illuminating. I believe that this lack o f specificity, as a I 
shall argue later on, is an integral and unavoidable feature o f such a conception o f culture 
and society. What I find more interesting is the specificity o f  such a notion in Leavis’s work. 
I have tried to throw some light on what I believe is the semantic content and the 
connotations o f  that term yet its function in Leavis’s critical system will only be understood 
in close relation with the other key concepts that inform his thinking.
T h e  I m p o r t a n c e  o f  ‘C o n c r e t e n e s s ’
One o f these concepts that we find in all his critical works is the concept of 
‘concreteness’. ‘Concreteness’ is, for Leavis, the other main virtue o f all good literature and
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o f all criticism worthy o f  its name. Its application is different in each case in that in literature 
‘concreteness’ is exemplified by the focus on the identifiable and clearly distinguishable 
complexities o f the adventures o f a human soul thrown into the world. In criticism, it is 
exemplified by the insistence on the individual and not the generic qualities o f a certain work. 
Most importandy, it is exemplified by the unwillingness o f the critic to paraphrase the literary 
work o f art by employing a certain language and a certain methodology that come as it were 
from outside the proper domain o f literary studies48. ‘Concreteness’ is in many ways a 
concept complementary to ‘maturity’. I f  the latter signifies a higher level o f both literature 
and life the former makes this virtue even more specific. It is not anymore just a question o f 
a comprehensive oudook but rather a question o f attending closely to detail, to what makes 
something distinct, different and ultimately significant per se. In “Under which King, 
Bezonian?”, one o f his seminal articles in the thirties and one o f his most serious attempts to 
deal with Marxism, Leavis writes: “To be concerned as Scrutiny is, for literary criticism is to be 
vigilant and scrupulous about the relation between words and the concrete” (Leavis, 1933: 
171). The ‘concrete’ is here put forward in a programmatic fashion as an index o f an 
attentive critical practice, one that is sensitive to the specificity o f its object, one that refrains 
from ‘translating’ the literary work into something that it does not and cannot allow for. To 
be attentive to what makes a poem or novel a distinct piece o f work is to be sensitive to the 
most fundamental quality o f literature, namely its capacity to affect, inspire, and educate by 
means o f presenting in a particular way a particular instance o f the greater totality that is life. 
Kach work demands o f us an openness not dissimilar to the openness we ought to have 
towards other human beings. For Leavis each work comes to us as a stranger that asks, if not 
for a wholehearted acceptance, then at least for respect for its being what it is. Yet this is still
48 His exchange with Rene Wellek, the renowned literary critic, in the pages o f  Scrutiny in the thirties and his 
much later exchange with the philosopher Michael Tanner in the seventies both show to what extent his 
empiricist, anti-theoretical approach remained unaltered through the years.
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not the whole story. W hat remains for it to be complete is to establish also ‘concreteness’ as 
a virtue o f texts, as well as o f critics. Referring to Conrad’s Nostromo Leavis writes:
The impressiveness is not a matter o f  any profundity o f  search into human experience, or any 
explorative subtlety in the analysis o f  human behaviour. It is matter rather o f the firm and vivid 
concreteness with which the representative attitudes and motives are realized, and the rich 
economy o f  the pattern that plays them o ff against one another. (Leavis, 1962: 215-216)
What makes Conrad’s work great is the author’s attendance to the particular and not its 
adherence to any grand analytical scheme or over-arching ideology. Leavis does not seem too 
concerned by the fact that any ‘rich economy o f pattern’ that plays one element o ff against 
another seems to imply something more complex, something that his empiricist attitude 
towards narrativity fails to perceive. Leavis valorises the attendance to detail, to the 
specificity o f  human experience and life because he is ideologically predisposed to attribute 
value primarily to the individual, conceived here as the centre from which life emanates and 
to which life ultimately returns in the form o f moral gratification. Leavis sees value neither in 
the grand ‘sociological’ gesture o f depicting reality in broad strokes in order to focus on its 
structural characteristics nor in the ‘psychological’ gesture o f depicting reality through the 
sensitive probing o f the inner secrets o f the human soul. W hen it comes to the crucial 
question o f motives Leavis explains:
(dearly, Conrad’s study o f  motives, and o f  the relation between the material and the spiritual, 
doesn’t depend for its impressiveness on any sustained analytic exhibition o f the inner 
complexities o f  the individual psyche. The impressiveness lies in the vivid reality o f the things we 
are made to see and hear, and the significance they get from their relations in a highly organized 
and vividly realized whole, (ibid, 217).
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Again it is a question o f a totality that comes as a result o f  being sensitive to the concrete 
particulars. It is a totality — not a term Leavis uses — that we apprehend as ultimate 
knowledge, a kind o f epiphany brought about by the masterful organization o f fictional 
materials in the work o f art. To be mature in literature is to be attentive to the differentia 
specified o f concrete human experience, it is to be truthful to life and respectful o f real value. 
It is also — I might add — to be somewhat perversely ignorant o f the fact that there are deeper 
structures which are not only discemable and potentially identifiable in any narrative but, 
more importandy, that their foregrounding and elucidation is a legitimate concern for literary 
criticism.
However, what Leavis tries to achieve is not merely to draw our attention to what 
empiricists have always claimed. Leavis wishes to make a point relevant to literature and not 
philosophy and that point is the question o f judgement. It is critical judgement that needs to 
be rethought and reformulated and to that end the notion o f ‘concreteness’ is put to use in 
order to put forward the idea that “judgement is not a matter o f abstractions”, but that “it 
involves particular immediate acts o f choice” and that these acts “do not advance the 
business o f judgement in any serious sense unless there has been a real and appropriate 
responsiveness to the thing offered”. W ithout such responsiveness one is presumably 
vulnerable to either intellectualism or over-simplification. Leavis concludes by stating that 
“without a free and delicate receptivity to fresh experience, whatever the criterion alleged, 
there is no judging, but merely negation” (Leavis, 1986: 47). It is negation that the critic 
needs to protect himself from. If  history, in Leavis’s eyes, generates despair and nihilism 
seems a concomitant evil o f such a human failure then it is in literature and in the proper way 
o f dealing with it that we may lay our hopes for a better alternative. If capitalism debases 
experience by commodifying it then it is the attentiveness to true human experience as
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depicted in literature — and not even the whole o f literature but only a very small part o f it — 
that will constitute the strategic defence o f those who are receptive to the new gospel49.
The shift from poetry to prose that is manifested by the publication o f the canon-setting 
The Great Tradition has the effect o f introducing into the work o f Leavis certain new concepts 
which are called upon to provide the critical functions that other concepts provided earlier. I 
have already discussed one o f the these concepts, namely ‘maturity’ and it is now time to 
discuss what is, in my view at least, one o f the m ost central and at the same time one o f the 
most unspecifiable concepts in Leavis’s criticism.
T h e  M o r a l  S i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  ‘L i f e ’
‘Life’ is a concept which has a dual application: a literary and an extraliterary one. As a 
distincdy literary quality ‘life’ is the positive index o f  a literary work’s achievement. It 
connotes the ‘disinterested’ expression o f ‘concrete experience’ o f a ‘mature’ poet or writer in 
the literary work o f art. As such it entails the lack o f emotionalism, the presence o f spiritual 
and intellectual integrity and the affirmation o f the complex specificity o f  objective reality7. 
‘Life’, in this sense in Leavis’s criticism, is the mark o f a felicitous encounter between the 
consciousness o f the poet/w riter and the external world. The direct and unsentimental 
articulation o f ‘experience’ by means o f a specifically literary use o f language is, for Leavis, 
what ‘animates’ a literary work, it is in other words what gives it life. Commenting on 
W ordsworth’s poetry Leavis says that it makes us aware o f a certain human naturalness by its 
being “realized in a mode central and compelling enough to enforce the bearing o f poetry 
upon life, the significance o f this poetry for actual living” (Leavis, 1936: 170). In Leavis’s 
critical scheme bad poetry is a lifeless and irrelevant poetry. When there is no truth, integrity
49 I use the word ‘gospel’ because the clerical fervour o f  Leavis’s pronouncements, especially on language and 
culture, all too evident. In support o f  my view I may enlist Bernard Bergonzi who has argued that “(f)or Leavis, 
the values on which civilization depended were far too important to be called literary’. They were not to be 
called unqualifiedly ‘religious’ either, but they had a religious weight and seriousness. Literature, the right 
literature, was indeed a form o f  sacred scripture, and the critic and teacher was a hierophantic interpreter.” 
(Bergonzi, 1990: 51-52)
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and intellectual seriousness life cannot flourish. In its place we have rhetoric, emotionalism 
and ultimately a sensationalist attitude towards the world that negates any positive moral 
qualities literature may have.
‘Life’ in Leavis’s criticism was what enabled him to pursue his moral criticism more fully 
although not always more convincingly. If ‘life’ is assumed to be what is celebrated by the 
positivity o f any artistic expression and if such positivity is only attestable where there is 
emotional and spiritual wholeness and intellectual integrity then a justified conclusion may be 
that the moral value o f literature is the integration o f all the disparate and often antithetical 
elements (emotional, spiritual, intellectual — and social) into one finely organised totality51' 
which restructures them in such a way as to enable us to see clearly and ultimately 
understand the world referred to by this totality, the literary work o f art. In discussing the art 
o f Lawrence, Leavis, who by this time had come to consider him as the epitome o f all things 
positive and life-affirming, announces that:
... the dramatic poem unfolds -  or builds up -  with an astonishing fertility o f  life. This life, so 
much o f  which commands the imagination at the first encounter, is all significant life; not a 
scene, episode, image or touch but forwards the organized development o f  the themes. (Leavis,
1955: 25)
The phrase ‘significant life’ in an indication that ‘life’, for Leavis, is not merely an 
affirmation o f the obvious fact o f mere physical existence, but an affirmation o f an ideal state 
o f existence, both physical and spiritual, o f living consciously in a world full o f meaning, in 
short o f living well, TTiere is o f course a more restricted usage o f the term in his literary 
criticism where ‘life’ is used in order to convey not only the meanings o f both ‘fullness’ and
5(1 This is also Vincent Buckley’s view: “[According to Leavis, poetry’s] moral value resides in the ‘emotional 
quality’ which, when integrated with the workings o f  intelligence, is the index o f  spiritual vitality” (Buckley, 
1959: 176).
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‘positivity’ but also, more implicitly, a state o f  moral health. In one o f his less than flattering 
remarks about Henry James, Leavis comments:
The obvious constatation to start from, when the diagnosis o f  his queer development is in 
question, is that he suffered from being too much a professional novelist: being a novelist 
came to be too large a part o f  his living; that is, he did not live enough. His failure in this 
respect suggests, no doubt, some initial deficiency7 in him. (I^eavis, 1962: 189)
In this passage we are given certain clues that may lead us to a more precise 
understanding o f Tife\ ‘Professionalism’, for Leavis a perversion o f the social organisation 
o f human labour, is obviously not something that enhances ‘life’ since it focuses on the 
technical aspect o f the process o f labour thus neglecting what is o f essence to it. In Leavis’s 
view the work ought to be an integral part o f a greater totality; part o f an organic whole 
within the context o f which human labour can be endowed with human value and 
significance. The manifest absence o f anything that relates work with man in a context o f a 
commonly shared system o f values is thus considered a symptom o f a fundamental lack: a 
moral deficiency. In a slightly different context Leavis remarks on the importance o f “the 
trained non-specialist mind that, while qualified by its training to represent humane tradition 
as a living force” would, at the same time, possess “enough understanding o f the modem  
world and the complexities o f civilization to act as a kind o f co-ordinating consciousness” 
(Leavis, 1986A: 176). Again we see the binary opposition between ‘humane tradition as a 
living force’ and a ‘specialism’ which was, for Leavis, unable to fulfil the function o f the ‘co­
ordinating consciousness’. For him, whatever belonged to the technologico-industrial 
universe, be it material or ideological, o f contemporary capitalism was constitutionally ill- 
fitted for anything even remotely connected with ‘life’.
In certain other o f its uses ‘life’ became an all-encompassing notion that covered 
everything that was pre-legitimised as positive and culturally desirable. Remaining faithful to
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the Amoldean position that equated literary criticism with criticism o f life Leavis attempts to 
re-articulate the relations between literature and life at a time when all that was taken for 
granted during Arnold’s lifetime was threatened by profound changes both political and 
cultural. Faced with the increasing pressure for specialization in the Humanities and the 
effects o f the then new welfare state, one o f  the most important for our discussion here 
being the widening o f  access to tertiary education, Leavis resorts to a mystification o f what, 
in his mind, was the ultimate counter-measure to the increasingly fierce attacks o f 
‘civilization’: the life-affirming qualities o f  literature. In order to understand the particular 
qualities o f the notion o f ‘life’ in Leavis’s critical work we must consider it as being 
structurally related to two other concepts: ‘minority’ and ‘culture’. It is as part o f this cluster 
o f  terms that ‘life’ begins to appear as something more specific that it initially appears.
C u l t u r a l  M i n o r i t i e s  a n d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  F i n e  L i v i n g
In the beginning o f  “Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture” we reads that
In any period it is upon a very small minority that the discerning appreciation o f  art and literature 
depends: it is (apart from cases o f  the simple and familiar) only a few who are capable o f  
unprompted, first-hand judgment. They are still a small minority, though a larger one, who are 
capable o f  endorsing such first-hand judgment by genuine personal response. The accepted 
valuations are a kind o f paper currency based upon a very small proportion o f  gold. To the state of 
such a currency the possibilities of fine Hiring at any time bear a close relation. (I^eavis 1933: 13-14) (italics 
mine)
It is in this passage that the Leavisian conception o f ‘life’ and more specifically ‘finer 
living’ becomes explicit. ‘Life’ is not merely a passive state o f affairs but the active 
reorganisation o f elements, according to a specific cultural and ultimately political process. 
The economic metaphor used by Leavis cannot conceal that it is essentially a question about
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a desired political order. If  ‘civilisation’ — for Leavis merely another word for industrial 
capitalism -  is threatening ‘culture’ then the only defence, for lack o f  any other alternative, is 
the return to a sociocultural order where a select minority, a clerisy in other words, is 
responsible for the preservation o f the ‘fine life’. Precisely what Leavis had in mind is hard to 
tell. If ‘fine life’ is to be taken as a present-day version o f the alleged way o f life o f the 
organic community, then we could easily object to the non-feasibility o f any such proposal. 
Leavis anticipated that objection so he construed this ‘fine life’ as a potentiality, in other 
words, as an object o f desire feasible to the extent that culture will be regulated by those 
m ost suitable for that function. Yet, given the absence o f any such trained elite it is very hard 
to specify what ‘fine life’ will look like as both its content and its form can only be agreed 
upon by those who have the necessary (educational and moral) qualifications. Leaving aside 
for the moment the question o f  whether such a social order is ethically or politically 
justifiable we can, for the time being, concentrate on the issue o f  determining the kind o f 
individual that possesses such qualities as to be eligible for inclusion in the regulating elite. 
For Leavis these are the individuals who are “capable o f unprompted, first-hand judgment”. 
These gifted individuals seem to just appear in the world, their capacities and acquired 
aptitudes never questioned as to their provenance. It seems that they are more a product o f 
good fortune than class privilege. Leavis seems unwilling to accept that this might be a 
legitimate objection to his proposition since his whole cultural theory is structurally 
dependent on the repression o f such a paradox. Where do the individuals capable o f  deciding 
what culture should be for the rest o f the world come from? Leavis is embarrassingly silent 
when it comes to specifying the details o f  the social characteristics o f the ‘conscious 
minority’. I shall return to this issue later on in this chapter.
The more Leavis refuses to assume an explicit — both theoretical and political — position 
vis-a-vis the historical reality o f  his time the more he is compelled by the logic o f  his own 
world-view to construct a mythic notional universe where ‘vitality’ substitutes all other
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notions. Such a conception o f life is devoid o f  any concern about the material 
presuppositions o f (actual) life. Its sole function is to provide an open-ended set o f qualities 
that are supposedly the indicators o f  any culture worthy o f distinction: truthfulness, a sense 
o f cultural memory, sensitivity to the concreteness o f human experience, fine-tuned moral 
intuition. This litany o f high ideals provides us with some indication o f  the semantic 
complexity o f the notion o f ‘life’ in Leavis’s work. It also gives us an indication o f  what is 
missing from that notion: an awareness o f the historical and psychological complexity, a 
more positive attitude towards abstraction and theoretical reasoning, a sensitivity to the 
material necessities and not only to the spiritual or intellectual ones; all these are persistendy 
absent from any combination o f things valorised by the term life’ in its long history in 
Leavis’s work. Although Leavis makes abundantly clear that, in his view, literature in its best 
instances is an affirmation o f life, the precise content o f that notion seems to depend on 
already accepted definitions and evaluative judgements and at a deeper level on certain 
ideologically-charged cultural and political convictions which are never explicidy 
acknowledged.
T h e  P o l it ic s  o f  t h e  M o r a l  Im a g i n a t i o n
All these concepts I have just examined constitute only certain focal points through 
which the articulation o f a moral problematic is made possible. But these concepts and their 
ideological attributes do not exhaust all the possibilities that this problematic engenders. 
They are, in Leavis’s own work, simply the most convenient and historically pertinent tools 
in the process o f articulating a discourse, that due to its structural limitations, can do little 
else but choose these concepts instead o f other perhaps more effective ones. But what did 
these structural limitations really consist of? The answer lies, I believe, in the historical 
conditions that determined their existence and also in the reworking o f these conditions at 
the level o f ideology. I referred earlier to the absolute dichotomy that came to characterize
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the relation between ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’ in Leavis’s conception o f these two terms. 
This assumed irreconcilable difference, both essential and radical, led to a substantial 
modification o f the notion o f ‘culture’ and o f everything that was considered to properly 
belong to it. This modification mainly consisted in the conceptualization o f ‘culture’ as a 
place o f resistance and defence against the dehumanising process o f ‘civilisation’. Needless to 
say, that was not an entirely new approach to cultural politics51, but it was an im portant one 
because it marked the first consistent application o f  the culture vs. civilization argument in 
Britain in m odem  times. In addition to that, the determinants of those human values 
sanctioned by tradition were to be found in a particular aspect o f culture whose name was 
English literature. The question that first arises from any such considerations is the exact 
im port o f all the terms used in the discussion.
One o f  the characteristics o f Leavis’s cultural politics was the existence o f a circular 
problematic. One o f the instances o f  such a problematic is to be found in “The Idea o f a 
University” where Leavis asserted that
‘Humane tradition’ may seem a vague concept. I don’t think that an attempt to define it by 
enumeration o f  its contents would help. It seems to me better to point to English literature, 
which is unquestionably and producibly ‘there’, and to suggest that the ‘literary tradition’ that this 
unquestionable existence justifies us in speaking o f  might also be called a vague concept. (Leavis,
1948: 17)
Although this is from an essay written during the forties, it is indicative o f a conceptual 
strategy that marked Leavis’s thought from the start. This strategy consisted o f referring one 
basic concept to another thus creating a vicious circle that left all the urgent questions 
unanswered (English literature being ‘there’ but where exacdy? for whom? and to what
d1 An excellent introduction to the cultural politics o f  the culture vs. civilization thesis is to be found in 
Mulhem, 2000, especially the first chapter entided “Against Mass Civilization”.
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purpose?) and yet at the same time producing a discourse that seemed to be demanding not
any rational argumentation but the necessity o f a certain leap o f faith. This had the effect of
presenting ‘culture’ as an organic whole where everything acquires substance by its implicit
association with the other elements which in turn acquire substance from their association
with other elements and so forth. O f  course there are other more charitable interpretations
o f Leavis’s methodology. Michael Bell commenting primarily on Leavis’s specifically literary
critical methodology says that “in sum, the openness o f Leavis's central terms is a way o f
pointing up such significances in literary texts without translating them into another,
inappropriate discourse. It is an attempt to preserve the integrity o f the text while analysing
it.” (Bell, 1988: 10). The same could just as easily be said regarding his more general terms.
Yet the fact remains that any such ‘openness’ does little to conceal the critic’s unwillingness
to account for some o f his fundamental presuppositions. The integrity o f a text or a more
inclusive cultural formation is not compromised by conceptual analysis unless the latter is
somehow presented as a substitute for the former. This was Leavis’s own often stated reason
for not attempting to theorise. However, this persistent lack o f a second-order theoretical
elaboration not only betrays an uneasiness about the ‘hidden truths’ as it were o f his own
discourse, but is also responsible for the impression that is often left after reading some o f
his critical works that the force o f the argument lays more in the insistent repetition o f the
argument itself and the use o f the lengthy quotation than in the persuasive theoretical
elaboration o f that argument.52 This is a space closed to all outsiders, since anyone not willing
to read literature or interpret it along the lines o f  a self-referential explanatory code is
evidendy not a member o f the minority which can do so; and therefore this person is by
definition an outsider. So ‘culture’ in Leavis’s account becomes a seemingly self-enclosed,
self-determined space where membership is determined by the fact that you are 15001’ into it
in the first place. If  there are any questions about the matter they can only be raised inside
32 A point made by virtually all his critics. One instance where this particular point is discussed in detail is 
Bernard Heyl’s "The Absolutism o f  F. R. Leavis", The Journal of Aesthetics and A r t Criticism, 13:2 (1954), 249-255.
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this community, based on a pre-existing consensus as to the main principles and values at 
stake.
I referred earlier in this chapter to the implicit consensus that Leavis’s criticism is 
predicated upon. Leavis believed that all successful criticism should always imply the 
feasibility o f a seemingly simple statement: ‘This is so, is it not?’ To such a statement one 
should ideally respond along the lines o f ‘yes, b u t...’; with this qualified response a 
meaningful conversation could then take place and, consequently, a society o f equals could 
assert itself in the process.53 Perry Anderson has remarked that “the central idea o f this 
epistemology (...) demands, however, one crucial precondition: a shared, stable system of 
beliefs and values” , since in their absence “no loyal exchange or report is possible” 
(Anderson, 1968: 52). It is this shared system o f  beliefs and values that Leavis tries to 
establish, if  not as a historically demonstrable reality then as an ideal, a guiding principle. This 
is one reason why he needs the concept o f ‘organic society’ in order to support his critical 
practice by constituting the latter as an enactment o f the special character o f  human 
interaction in the former. Thus criticism becomes a practice o f salvaging value and 
perpetuating the hope for a better life. For that Leavis had to presuppose a culturally and 
also morally unified group o f people that alone could — by virtue o f their ‘conversation’ — 
preserve the essential qualities o f  a long lost way o f life. Anderson has also remarked that 
Leavis’s method “presupposes, in fact, a morally and culturally unified audience” in whose 
absence “his epistemology disintegrates” (Anderson, 1968: 52).
This desire for an implicit consensus is what animates the notion o f the “organic 
community” so often used as an illustration o f what is culturally and socially desirable. This 
validating reference to the ‘organic community’ is essential to his project since it fulfils a
53 In “Valuation in Criticism” (1986) Leavis writes: “What, o f  its nature, the critical activity aims at, in fact, is an 
exchange, a collaborative exchange, a corrective and creative interplay o f  judgments. For though my judgment 
asks to be confirmed appeals for concurrence in a recognition that the thing is so, the response I expect at best 
will be o f  the form, T es, but -, the but' standing for qualifications, corrections, shifts o f  emphasis, refinements, 
additions. The process o f  personal judgment from its very outset, o f  course, is in subtle ways essentially 
collaborative, as any thinking is - as any use o f  the language in which one thinks and expresses one's thoughts 
must be. But the functioning o f criticism demands a fully overt kind o f  collaboration.” (Leavis, 1974: 277-278).
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function that is o f the highest importance. This function is dual in the sense that it provides 
his criticism with a specific historical narrative and also gives it a moral centre, a moral 
imperative that conditions by its centrality and importance the other more peripheral 
elements. This moral centre is the valorisation o f a society in which there was no division 
between ‘low’ or popular and ‘high’ or sophisticated culture. Although the existence o f any 
such society is not a matter that is so unequivocally demonstrable the importance o f  such an 
evidendy ideological construct is that it functions so as to provide Leavis’s cultural discourse 
with a certain degree o f ideological cohesion.
It is also the ideal — and highly idealistic — philosophy o f  history for any cultural politics 
that refuses to acknowledge the importance o f  politics and the immanent contradictions in 
all social formations. This refusal is what creates the necessity o f a strong moral centre. It is 
‘morality’ that is traditionally the most effective substitute for politics and therefore it is the 
one conceptual resource that one is almost instinctively driven to utilise in the absence o f any 
real political problematic. Thus ‘culture’ is conceived as being part o f  the domain o f the moral 
which now effectively substitutes almost entirely the domain o f  the political. In other words, 
when the positing o f  ‘culture’ and ‘civilisation’ is such as to preclude any political 
consideration for action the only viable alternative is to polarise the two terms in such a way 
as to have the positive one — ‘culture’ — full o f moral significance and potential while having 
the negative term — ‘civilisation’ signifying the exact opposite.
For Leavis, literature is the bearer o f all significant cultural values, and where the true 
locus o f  resistance lies. Francis Mulhem has noted that this conviction in the power o f 
literature “was a distinctive com pound discourse whose relation to politics was peculiarly 
intangible: the ‘claims o f politics’ seemed almost obsolete in the case o f  a discourse on 
literature that was by its nature exclusively competent to determine certain fundamental 
social needs and realities, which performed a unique and indispensable political function 
simply by being itself.” (Mulhem, 1979: 217) Literature then becomes the sacred word and by
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logical necessity the university the only place that is capable o f reproducing the conditions o f 
its existence. This again creates a series o f  paradoxes. The animosity with which Leavis was 
treated during his career is well documented54 as is his acute disillusionment towards the end 
o f his career with the state o f affairs in British academia. Therefore it becomes, at least on 
the surface, even more difficult to understand Leavis’s desire to invest with such significance 
the one place that proved to be so hostile to his views and practices. Yet, there are reasons 
other than those related to Leavis’s biography that make his choice seem strange. Certain, 
mainly historical, reasons are far more important. Universities were one o f the institutions 
that were — like so many others — severely affected by the great changes that took place 
during the first three decades o f the twentieth century. Vulnerable to external pressures 
mainly for financial reasons and ideologically complicit with the status quo, universities 
would hardly be seen as the most strategically sound choice in order to organize a cultural 
resistance. But Leavis had no other alternative. Having cancelled politics out and 
consequendy having deprived himself o f  any space where politics could be carried out, he 
could not organize his cultural resistance anywhere else but the academia. For him, 
universities represented the only remaining institutions that could be both effective because 
o f their still widely accepted importance as cultural centres and also for being congenial to a 
cultural politics devoid o f any explicit political consideration. It comes as no surprise then 
that Leavis asserted that the aim o f the university conceived as the organising centre o f 
‘culture’ is “to produce the ‘educated man’ — the man o f humane culture who is equipped to 
be intelligent and responsible about the problems o f contemporary civilization.” (Leavis, 
1948: 29-30)
To produce the ‘educated m an’ can hardly be considered the remedy for the ills o f
‘civilisation’ and Leavis certainly did not believe so. He did though believe in the paramount
importance o f education — essentially conceived as moral and cultural education — in
54 The entirety o f  his biographies, for instance, literary or otherwise. The most detailed in terms o f  contextual 
information is Ian MacKiBop’s F.R. Learn: A. Life in Criticism, (London: Penguin, 1995).
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effecting any change in the world outside, a world external to the proper preoccupations o f 
‘culture’ and yet unavoidably there in all its stubborn materiality. The perceived externality o f 
this world and everything that pertained to it -  administration, policy-making, etc. -  was a 
direct result o f the conceptual strategy I discussed earlier. There are many places in his 
writings where Leavis’s attitude towards the world and the relationship o f the individual with 
it is explicitly formulated. One o f the m ost illustrative is to be found in the article “Literature 
and Society”, later collected in The Common Pursuit (1952), where Leavis elucidates some o f 
the fundamental difference between his m ethod and the Marxist one by asserting that
The ways in which it [Eliot’s and by implication Leavis’s own way o f  thinking] is at odds with 
Marxist theories o f  culture are obvious. It stresses, not economic and material determinants, but 
intellectual and spiritual, so implying a different conception from the Marxist o f  the relation 
between the present o f  society and the past, and a different conception o f  society. It assumes 
that, enormously — no one will deny it — as material conditions count, there is a certain measure 
o f  spiritual autonomy in human affairs, and that human intelligence, choice and will do really and 
effectively operate, expressing an inherent human nature. There is a human nature — that is how, 
from the present point o f  view, we take the stress as falling; a human nature, o f  which an 
understanding is o f  primary importance to students o f  society and politics. (Leavis, 1952: 184)
There may be little disagreement as to the importance o f a precise definition o f the 
concept o f ‘human nature’, a task still very much urgent today as it was in the 1930s when 
this article first appeared in Scrutiny. But what concerns us here is the phrase ‘a certain 
measure o f spiritual autonomy’ which is another way o f saying that in the absence o f any 
dialectical understanding o f the relations between the human soul and material reality, that is 
between the individual and the world, ‘spiritual autonomy’ is the only thing that can 
legitimize a moral as opposed to a political problematic. In another earlier article under the 
tide “Restatement for Critics” , later collected in For Continuity (1933), Leavis made the point
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even more explicit by focusing on the ontological presuppositions o f his method: “ (w)e [The 
contributors to Scrutiny] assume an ‘inner human nature’ and our recognition that it may be 
profoundly affected by the ‘economic process’ persuades us it must rally, gather its resources 
and start training itself for its ultimate responsibility at once.” (Leavis, 1933: 188). This 
essentialist ontology is the ideal basis o f  an idealistic method which is exemplified somewhat 
ambivalendy in the phrase ‘ultimate responsibility’. This idealistic method results in the 
dissolution o f  politics as a practical, ends-and-means-oriented activity thus producing the 
effect first at the level o f theory and consequendy at the level o f  practice o f a split in the 
conceptual grasp o f  the political. This split makes Leavis, as well as the rest o f the Scrutiny 
group, regard politics as essentially consisting o f two aspects. The first aspect is the technical 
one and this is the realm o f professional politicians and administrators and as such it belongs 
to ‘civilization’ rather than ‘culture’. The other aspect is the moral one and this is the realm of 
culture and therefore the only legitimate concern for Leavis.55 This moral aspect o f  politics is 
what Leavis pursues as a complementary end in his writings. Being compelled by his own 
initial assumptions to engage always with the social aspect o f cultural phenomena, and being 
equally compelled by the very same assumptions to keep a safe distance from a politics o f 
revolutionary theory and praxis Leavis was bound to reinvent politics as moral activity. 
According to Mulhem
First, politics was now fractured into administration — the technical business o f  government — 
and ethics: political analysis now turned on the moral evaluation o f  individual political agents. At 
the same time, the moral development o f  the individual became the supreme ‘political’ question, 
and accordingly, education and its central discipline, literary criticism, were confirmed as the 
privileged vantage-points from which to identify and promote the ‘essential interests’ o f  society. 
(Mulhem, 1979:188).
55 A similar point is made by Fred Inglis who argues that Leavis “dissolved the category o f  politics” and that 
this was effected “in order to insist upon die domain o f  morality as coterminous with that o f  both politics and 
aesthetics, and further as conceptually superordinate to both.” (Inglis, 1982: 104).
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Although this was written about D. W. Harding and his article “The Custom o f War and 
the Notion o f  Peace” which appeared in Scrutiny in 1940 it accurately highlights the dominant 
features o f Leavis’s criticism in which the centrality o f the moral development o f the 
individual through education is undisputable. It also foregrounds a very important point that 
needs to be brought into my discussion at this point. This point is that the ‘moral 
development o f the individual’ was considered the supreme “political’ question’. Since this 
development could only take place within a cultural space where moral ideas could flourish 
and be properly articulated, the university as conceived by Leavis assumed that role. 
Consequently, what was achieved here was not only the ‘ethicalisation’ o f actual politics but 
the ‘politicisation’ o f the university as well. However, this ‘politicisation’ was merely the 
effect o f a kind o f  meta-politics. As Mulhem has intimated, that may be internally coherent 
and morally earnest but in terms o f the real problems that it sought to solve it was 
nevertheless highly ineffective. Leavis’s idealism made him hypostatise ethics and conceive o f 
education as the only really effective political act. By positing two distinct aspects o f politics, 
the moral and the technical and by regarding the technical-administrative aspect and 
everything that it entails — organisation, planning, policy-making — as merely a necessary evil, 
Leavis, in order to be consistent, had no other choice but to prioritise the moral-educational 
aspect o f his own practice leaving aside any other consideration. In this he was radical in the 
sense that he honesdy believed that the moral-educational quality o f his criticism and o f 
literary and cultural criticism in general was what enabled him to address the problems at the 
root, in other words to address the problematical conditions that according to him gave birth 
to the social and cultural problems he so accurately diagnosed. But the moral problematic 
pushed his criticism even further away from the real political and social issues that he wished 
to address. He acknowledged the extreme economic inequalities in his society as he also 
acknowledged the existence o f a class system that effectively (re)produced these inequalities
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but he never took the step o f treating these considerations as serious analytical tools. Instead 
he treated them as mere epiphenomena, secondary effects o f a deeper set o f problems.56 
These problems had litde to do with the material conditions o f  life but a lot to do with a 
fundamental cultural trauma: the loss o f  cultural stability and continuity57. This led him to 
declare in “Under Which King, Bezonian?” that the process o f ‘civilisation7 with which, in his 
view, Marxism was also complicit
has made the cultural difference between the ‘classes’ inessential. The essential differences are 
indeed now definable in economic terms, and to aim at solving the problems o f  civilization in 
terms o f  the ‘class war’ is to aim, whether wittingly or not, at completing the work o f  capitalism 
and its products, the cheap car, the wireless and the cinema. (Leavis, 1933: 172)
This provocative but easily understandable thesis came at a time when a particularly 
British Marxism was attempting in its own way to engage critically with the problems o f the 
era and also at the same time challenge those assumptions that underlay Leavis’s work. 
Leavis accepted the challenge mainly because the claims o f left-wing criticism were too 
strong — and, during the thirties, too urgent — to be ignored. However, he never made any 
real effort to understand Marxism nor did he feel that the elusive points o f contact between 
his thought and Marxism could ever make him adopt a more self-critical attitude regarding 
his work. Instead he chose to treat the body o f work that was produced by the Left as 
essentially a variation o f the dominant discourse o f ‘civilisation’ or, as he explicidy puts it in 
the text above, o f ‘capitalism’. By confusing these two discourses, for him only superficially 
antithetical, Leavis made a strategic choice that was as ideologically conditioned as it was
56 A relatively brief discussion o f  Leavis’s class-blindness can be found in Paul Lawford’s “Conservative 
Empiricism in Literary Theory: A Scrutiny o f  the Work o f  F. R. Leavis”, pt. 1, Red Letters, 1 (1976), 12-15.
37 Michael Bell, a critic sympathetic to Leavis, has aptly remarked that “his fLeavis’s] concern for continuity was 
complemented, as part o f  its inner logic, by an equally strong, indeed iconoclastic, perception o f  the need for 
radical change. But his sense o f  what mattered for the quality o f  communal Hfe left him agnostic with respect to 
specific political models. His concern was with the conditions in which any political activity could be significant. 
His position was far from a-political and could perhaps best be described as ‘pre-political’. (Bell, 1988: 54)
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inevitable. This strategic choice resulted like all similar discursive choices in a conceptual 
fusion o f opposite terms and repressed elements, in other words in a conflation o f  what is 
left out with what is merely antithetical to the main terms58. As a consequence o f this, the 
negative aspects o f contemporary civilization were demonized to the point where any 
ideologically coherent criticism became impossible. Even worse, these aspects begun to 
appear suspiciously similar to what Leavis’s discourse never really managed to come to terms 
with and subsequendy repressed altogether. This was o f course the alternative o f socialism 
and the challenge it posed to the prevailing forms o f thought and political organization in the 
thirties. That this was so, given that Leavis was the only major cultural critic o f the era (the 
thirties) to take Marxism seriously59 as an ideological challenge, makes this missed 
opportunity even more regrettable.
These tensions that characterize Leavis’s thought should be more closely examined in an 
the hope o f bringing to the surface some o f the less pronounced characteristics o f  his work. 
These characteristics are structurally connected with three choices: a) the substitution o f 
morality for politics; b) the substitution o f a culturally-defined minority for any political 
organisation in general; and c) the substitution o f an idealist conception o f history for a 
materialistic one. I have already presented my arguments regarding the first two choices and 
now I must turn my attention to the third one. This is, in my opinion, the m ost im portant 
one since it concerns the underlying set o f  principles o f  Leavis’s whole critical project. In 
what follows I shall attempt to show that it is this philosophy o f history, determined, to a
38 A similar point is made by Chris Baldick in The Social Mission of English Criticism-. “(w)here Leavis appears most 
to agree with Marxism (...) he formulates most exactly, by an apparent paradox, his fundamental divergence 
from it. For the repeated specification o f  Marxism's proper realm (he refers again in "Under Which King, 
Bezonian?" to communism as the solution to the economic problem1) effectively quarantines it in a way which 
leaves the problem o f  'Power' in its other sense quite untouched. Leavis's ready agreement with a purely 
economist caricature o f  'Marxism' smothers the essential Marxist assertion that class differences extend beyond 
the economic and into the political realm, i.e. that one class wields the power o f  the state 'machine' while the 
others do not. With the concept o f  power confined in this way to an economic and technological reference, 
Leavis's concession amounts to a kiss o f  death for his Marxist opponents. I f  the focus o f  power in society is the 
machine and not the state, there can be no essential conflict between the Marxist and the bourgeois, committed 
as they are to the extension o f  an identical power. Politics, as such therefore ceases to exist for Leavis; there 
remain only the realm o f  economics and the realm o f  culture.” (Baldick, 1983: 171)
59 This is Perry Anderson’s contention in his seminal “Components o f  the National Culture” in New Left Review, 
50, May/June 1968.
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great extent, by Leavis’s class position and ideological affiliations, that preconditioned not 
only his tactical (theoretical) moves but the entire field with which he chose to engage. It is 
also the main determinant factor that may account for his inability or unwillingness to 
consider alternatives other than his own chosen course o f action. I have already indicated the 
debt o f Leavis’s thought to a specific tradition o f English social and cultural criticism. This 
tradition is undoubtedly a bourgeois tradition and as a such it shares certain fundamental, 
structural features with other competing bourgeois discourses. These features are: the 
concealment o f economic inequalities, the complicity with the underlying aims o f the 
dominant order, the narrativisation o f  history and philosophy so as to comply with the 
interests o f the dominant class; all these and other characteristics make this tradition a part o f 
a wider discursive formation that begun to take shape during the eighteenth century. But 
there are important divergences that need to be noted as well.
The tradition that mostly inspired Leavis’s critical undertaking was mainly a tradition o f  
dissent, a tradition that was marked by the tensions generated by the painful realisation that 
its own existence was at times at odds with the economic system that supported it. As the 
‘public sphere’ — the first cultural formation to define explicidy the ‘rules o f the game’, in 
terms determined exclusively by the ascending bourgeois class — was beginning to transform 
into something different than it was originally intended, the first signs o f discontent begun to 
appear and criticism, itself a product o f  the ‘public sphere’, was the site where those signs 
were most visibly registered. As Terry Eagleton has noted, regarding the period from the end 
o f  the eighteenth century to the beginning o f  the nineteenth, the realm o f ‘culture’, the 
notional space which the ‘public sphere’ paradigmatically served, proved “unable to 
withstand (...) the inruption into it o f  social and political interests in palpable conflict with its 
own ‘universal’ rational norms.” (Eagleton, 1984: 35). As a result criticism was forced to 
engage for the first time with cultural and political processes which were viewed as totally 
external to it and some even threatening the very conditions o f its own privileged status.
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Thus “criticism [becomes] a locus o f political contention rather than a terrain o f  cultural 
consensus” (ibid, 39) and critics like Carlyle, the late Coleridge and later on Arnold began to 
voice the anxieties o f a privileged community which was slowly but steadily seeing that the 
reality it lived was in a state o f constant decline, a state o f  slow decay that effectively 
cancelled out the cultural function o f any such enlightened minority.60
Leavis inherited this whole set o f attitudes and since he began to form his critical views at 
a time during which the myth o f  catastrophe was in wide circulation61 it is understandable 
that he adopted an intensely defensive attitude towards the cultural phenomena o f his own 
era. This attitude, a product o f  both a heightened sensitivity and deep-rooted prejudice, 
forced Leavis to attempt to rescue morality from its aimless existence in a profoundly amoral 
world and to provide it with shelter inside the idealised realm o f literature which then 
becomes its natural habitat and the ideal vehicle for its articulation. The more ‘culture’ is on 
the defensive the more it internalises the only one principle that it may ‘rightfully’ claim as its 
own62. In addition to that, this defensive attitude, which in itself is not necessarily 
reproachable, is at each step complemented by an idealistic conception o f  history that forced 
him to dissociate history from both necessity and struggle. These two are the absent elements 
in Leavis’s philosophy o f  history. In fact they are only absent because they have been 
repressed by an ideology which could only succeed if  it concealed the most contradictory 
elements within it. It was a process that generated tension at the same time it attempted to 
resolve it.
60 Eagleton eloquently summarises the position o f  this ‘secular clerisy o f  letters’ at the end o f  the nineteenth 
century by saying that due to the gradual disappearance o f  the social and cultural conditions which guaranteed 
the effectiveness o f  a discourse predicated on social cohesion and consensus the critic is forced to speak “not in 
class accents but in human tones, which tums scornfully from an actual ‘mass’ public and addresses itself 
instead to the People, to the future, to some potential mass political movement, to the Poetic Genius buried in 
every breast, to a community o f  transcendental subjects spectrally inscribed within the given social order.” 
(Eagleton, 1984: 43).
61 See for instance Anne Samson’s account o f  the cultural context o f  Leavis’s own criticism in F.R. Leavis, (New  
York & London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) pp. 36-52
62 Bernard Bergonzi has remarked that “(t)he concept o f  morality involved [in Leavis’s criticism] would have 
been unintelligible to a great moral critic o f  the past, that earlier Doctor, Samuel Johnson, for whom the ethical 
values which governed life were not immanent in literature but external to it in Christian tradition; one did not 
draw such values from literature, one judged it by them” (Bergonzi, 1990: 52).
109
In the early 1930s, at a time when Leavis was still seriously debating with the Marxists the 
notions o f culture and politics he wrote in “Marxism and Cultural Continuity” something 
that I believe is one o f the most telling signs o f  the classical idealist methodology which 
works more by leaps o f faith than by rational argument. Leavis responded to an article 
written by the famous American left-wing critic Edm und Wilson under the tide “Art, the 
Proletariat and Marx”63 and most particularly to a point made by Wilson that Marx and 
Engels “were aiming at a point o f  view and a culture beyond those o f  their bourgeois 
education” and that this “was a point o f view above classes, not a proletarian point o f view” 
which evidendy entailed the development “o f an intellectual discipline which should lay the 
foundations for the ‘first truly human culture”’. Leavis seized the opportunity presented by 
this somewhat simplistic presentation o f  Marx’s and Engels’s cultural politics to assert that
(t)here is, then, a point o f  view above classes; there can be intellectual, aesthetic and moral activity 
that is not merely an expression o f  class origin and economic circumstances; there is a “human 
culture” to be aimed at that must be achieved by cultivating a certain autonomy o f  the human 
spirit” (Leavis, 1933: 9)
What is striking here is that the assertion o f the possibility o f  a culture beyond classes 
and class conflict is predicated upon an abstract possibility. Even if  we leave aside all 
considerations regarding the initial comment o f Wilson we must still try to read Leavis’s 
conclusion for what it wishes to convey, namely that it is not only a question o f abstract 
possibility but also a question o f a (Leavisian) categorical imperative. There must be a ‘view 
above classes’, there must be some activity which is ‘not merely an expression o f class origins 
and economic circumstances’ because this is the only way for Leavis to fuse his idealistic 
conception o f  history and culture with his own particular brand o f cultural politics. W hat we 
have here is a double mistake. The first is that the assumption o f a culture ‘beyond classes’ is
63 N ew  Republic, 1933.
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taken at face value from a commentator and not from the initial source. If  this were not the 
case Leavis might have been able to see that for both Marx and Engels a classless society and 
culture is the ultimate end, the desideratum after a long and arduous revolutionary process and 
certainly not something that is immediately realisable under the present conditions. The 
purely ‘human culture’ that is essential to the Marxist conception o f politics is the end 
product o f a successful transformation o f society on a global scale after the eradication o f all 
the factors that deny the majority o f human beings the right to create and participate in that 
‘human culture’. The future, in other words, is always the product o f  the dialectical tension 
between real hum an possibilities and a system, much more complex than what Leavis 
believed, which by structural necessity frustrates them.
Leavis, on his part, could not see a future mediated by political struggle; he only saw the 
possibility, with some qualifications, o f a right hen and now which was predicated, as I said 
above, on the assumption o f the ‘eternal presence’ o f an essential humanity in all the past, 
present and future instances o f human praxis. This assumption might not have been so 
misleading were it not complemented by the constant effacement o f contradictions. Because 
it was precisely these contradictions o f a class-based system that Leavis’s criticism attempted 
to conceal or — if  concealment was not possible — misconstrue so that his own criticism 
might still fulfil its function without ever coming to terms with the conditions that 
determined its existence, namely the class-system that enabled him to assume the role o f the 
enlightened prophet o f a lost culture and humanity. Leavis remained convinced until the end 
o f  his life that this role was assumed when one felt a strong sense o f responsibility for the 
unbearable loss o f traditional values. Yet he never attempted to theorise or even describe the 
social conditions that enabled one to feel and consequently assume responsibility in the first 
place. Thus he could say thirty years after his work in the 1930s, that
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.. .as for the actual woiking-class people who can be regarded as characteristic, it*s not anything in 
the nature o f  moral indignation one feels towards them, but shame, concern and apprehension at 
the way our civilization has let them dow n... (F. R. Leavis & Q. D. Leavis, 1969: 5)
Anne Samson has rightly commented that the distinctions made by Leavis between the 
‘actual working-class people5 and 'our civilization5 which has ‘let them down5 “are revealing, 
the more so for being unconscious55. They also serve as an oblique reference to the real 
objectives o f  his cultural intervention since they indicate that “to Leavis the working class 
seems to belong to a significantly different species from himself55 (Samson: 1992: 66). I 
believe that this distance so intensely dramatised in this passage by the word ‘shame5 is 
indicative o f  two aspects o f his thought each in contradiction to the other.
Firsdy it is the humanity o f  the observer that compels him to feel shame and concern 
towards those who are righdy perceived as victims o f an unjust social process. Secondly a 
fissure in this very humanity draws the observer apart from the other human beings he feels 
for, and he consequendy can refer to as ‘them 5. Leavis was at the same so far and so close to 
others, so sensitive to a fundamental lack o f  justice and yet so unwilling to engage with the 
real causes o f this injustice that could transform his ‘apprehension5 into constructive 
engagement. This contradiction at the core o f his cultural criticism is the effect o f his idealist 
conception o f history which made him conceive o f  technological progress and 
industrialisation as an irrevocable loss o f human values while at the same time ignoring the 
contradictory nature o f  the cultural formations or models that he so clearly wished to 
idealise. By consistendy confusing the detail — often observed with a sensitivity and accuracy 
worthy o f  admiration — with the whole structure and also by refusing to conceive this 
structure in terms other than those o f his post-Romantic, naively anti-capitalist sensibilities 
Leavis5s thought was bound by the limitations o f  a mythological narrative that took the place 
o f a detailed, rationally argued historical account.
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Raymond Williams righdy took Leavis to task for confusing two distinct, although 
related, aspects o f the life o f the people who are part o f the ‘organic society’. Williams argued 
that although certain aspects o f  this life did give people the opportunity to find meaning and 
satisfaction in their daily productive activities we should not infer, as Leavis did, that this was 
‘right and inevitable’. Williams then concluded that “it is foolish and dangerous to exclude 
from the so-called organic society the penury, the petty tyranny, the disease and mortality, 
the ignorance and frustrated intelligence which were also among its ingredients” (Williams, 
1963: 253). Leavis was unable to see the whole complex o f  relations because his belief was 
adamant that certain things are ‘right and inevitable’.64 Therefore he was quick to see 
alienation but not any intellectual or spiritual progress. He never ceased to hold that an 
alleged moral impoverishment outweighed any material im provement in the conditions o f 
life. Moreover, the changes he could see he interpreted as the tragic outcome o f a process 
that dissociated language from ordinary sensibility and culture as a shared set o f  values from 
the ordinary life o f people. His history was one o f ideas, o f feelings that only come in contact 
with the material world to either configure it from a position o f authority, or to be 
contaminated by it.
This idealism made him very sensitive to the decline o f  Western civilisation but 
paradigmatically insensitive to the material causes o f this transformation. The 
proletarianization o f  a great number o f  the rural population, the alienation o f the modem 
worker, the intensification o f social and cultural conditioning, the commodification o f 
literature, the gradual absorption o f all social areas into the capitalist mode o f production 
were all for Leavis moral rather material and political issues. For him what has suffered 
defeat was the moral essence o f an entire race and not the majority o f working people who
64 To be fair to Leavis, it must be noted that in his later works he seemed more willing to make the concession 
that the material conditions o f  life have indeed improved with the advent o f  industrial technology. He would 
also attempt to communicate to his audience that he was not in any way a reactionary who wished a radical 
return to a past mode o f  life but one who used ‘organic community’ more as an ideal-typical example for what 
he was trying to draw attention to: the loss o f  both cultural continuity in the diachronic level and cultural 
cohesion in the synchronic one.
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had to sell their labour under conditions that, it m ust be said, traditional morality was totally 
unprepared to take into account or comprehend. If  the concept o f class was not allowed to 
enter into his problematic then the social formation where this moral essence was best 
articulated was the ‘community’. The problem with this concept is that it is hard to conceive 
o f an understanding which claims to transcend the merely empirical and which falls back on 
something so elusive and so underspecified. Even if we accept the notion o f the ‘community’ 
as a conceptual tool, it is hard to see its relevance in any contemporary emancipatory project 
unless we are content with a concept that has strong, if  historically disputable, moral 
connotations but very litde explanatory power. This is, I believe, due to the fact that 
‘community’ alludes not so much to a sociologically and historically accurate formation, but 
rather to a moral imperative inherent in the very concept o f  the social formation qua human 
formation. ‘Community’ and ‘morality’ complement each other and both substitute ‘class’ 
and ‘politics’. This substitution has also other more particular effects: ‘literature’ takes its turn 
and can then substitute a wide network o f cultural practices, ‘education’ consequently 
substitutes ‘political practice’ and although it must be noted that this process o f substitution 
is never completed in such a way so as to  efface completely the substituted term it 
nevertheless succeeds in marginalising it effectively enough so as to render it temporarily 
ineffectual This is the one crucial characteristic o f the discursive formation, one instance o f 
which is Leavis’s criticism, that I may designate as ‘moral ideology’.65 I shall conclude this 
essay by examining more closely the relation o f this moral ideology with Leavis’s criticism.
L it e r a t u r e  a s  M o r a l  P e d a g o g y : A n  A p p r a is a l  o f  L e a v i s ’s C r it ic a l  T h o u g h t
65 Terry Eagleton has aptly remarked that in the work o f  critics like Arnold, James and Leavis “Morality is no 
longer to be grasped as a formulated code or explicit ethical system: it is rather a sensitive preoccupation with 
the whole quality o f  life itself, with the oblique, nuanced particulars o f  human experience. Somewhat rephrased, 
this can be taken as meaning that the old religious ideologies have lost their force, and that a more subde 
communication o f  moral values, one which works by ‘dramatic enactment’ rather than rebarbative abstraction, 
is thus in order. Since such values are nowhere more vividly dramatized than in literature, brought home to ‘felt 
experience’ with all the unquestionable reality o f  a blow on the head, literature becomes more than just a 
handmaiden o f  moral ideology: it is moral ideology for the m odem  age . . . ” (Eagleton, 1983: 27).
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I have already argued for the centrality o f certain notions in Leavis’s criticism. To this I 
must add that their prominence in his critical practice can only be the object o f a 
constructive political critique if  these notions are viewed as the key elements in a structure 
which is, in all aspects, more complex than a simple aggregate o f various characteristics could 
ever be. This structure is o f  course the entire work o f Leavis but for my purposes here I shall 
concentrate on the one aspect o f it that often eludes the more descriptive approaches to 
Leavis’s criticism. This aspect is the ideology o f his criticism which I shall treat as essentially 
designating the whole complex o f meanings generated by the texts that comprise Leavis’s 
oeuvre in a dialectical relation to the historical circumstances that determined their 
production. I have already referred to the general historical context o f Leavis’s early work 
and the effect it had on his criticism. Yet, there is another process, much more wide in scope 
and general in character that occurs at the same time and which runs parallel to what I have 
been discussing so far. This profoundly ideological process is the transformation o f both 
political thought and practice in the aftermath o f  the First Wold War. The fact that such a 
war was allowed to happen in the first place had enormously crippling effects on the liberal- 
humanist ideology which consisted the foundation o f Western democracies. This crisis was 
registered not only at the level o f culture but also at the level o f politics and political 
reasoning as well. Its effects were felt both in practice and in the dominant ideology. 
Regarding the ascendance o f the various strands o f the Right after World War I Eric 
Hobsbawm has argued that
A second strand o f  the Right produced what has been called ‘organic statism’ (Linz, 1975, pp.
277, 306-13) or conservative regimes, not so much defending a traditional order, but deliberately 
recreating its principles as a way o f  resisting both Liberal individualism and the challenge o f  
labour and socialism. Behind it stood an ideological nostalgia for an imagined Middle Ages or 
feudal society, in which the existence o f  classes or economic groups was recognized but the 
awful prospect o f  class struggle was kept at bay by the willing acceptance o f  social hierarchy, by a
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recognition that each social group or ‘estate* had its part to play in an organic society composed 
o f  all, and should be recognized as a collective entity. This produced various brands o f  
‘corpora tivist’ theories which replaced liberal democracy by the representation o f economic and 
occupational interest groups. This was sometimes described as ‘organic’ participation or 
democracy and therefore better than the real kind, but in fact was invariably combined with 
authoritarian regimes and strong states ruled from above, largely by bureaucrats and technocrats. 
(Hobsbaum, 1994: 113-4).
What is remarkable about this account is the uncanny resemblance o f  this right-wing 
ideology with Leavis’s own historical and cultural assumptions. This is not to imply in any 
way that Leavis’s ideology did belong to the traditional Right.66 W hat I wish to suggest is that 
his whole ideological view o f the world is formed and articulated in close affinity with an 
ideology that was in its essence incompatible with what Leavis wished to be associated with. 
Nevertheless, the observable affinities between his politics and the ‘organicist’, corporativist 
Right indicate something important, namely that his class-position and his ideological 
presuppositions created the possibility o f  his criticism adopting a reactionary attitude, which 
was often at odds with the more radical aspects o f his whole critical practice. W hat is 
important here is the tension between these two tendencies. His insistence on the 
importance o f literature as a repository o f human values, his committed moral interpretations 
o f literary works in conjunction with his belief in the social relevance o f such an 
interpretation, his injunction for a full, uninhibited response to the literary work in order to 
achieve a more intimate knowledge o f  human experience are all things we would not 
normally associate with any rightist ideology, traditional or modem. However, in his criticism 
they form an unholy alliance with his ideas on the exclusionary character o f the ‘true’
66 In fact, Leavis had little time, if  any, for Conservative thought. Himself a Liberal, he espoused those values 
that are traditionally associated with classical liberalism.
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university67, the necessity o f an ‘armed and conscious minority* and finally with his tacit 
assumption regarding the unavoidability o f  a hierarchical stratification o f society even if  the 
latter is often qualified by means o f  a more rational argumentation which is put forward as a 
pragmatic consideration o f the present conditions. I believe that this problematical co­
existence o f competing ideas is often the reason behind his notorious circular arguments. I 
also hold that this is a paradigmatic instance o f his class ideology which makes him adopt an 
extremely ambivalent position regarding the essential problems o f his time. His typical petty- 
bourgeois synthesis o f  “Romantic metaphysics, Kantian ethics, and liberal politics” (Inglis, 
1982: 101) betrays this ambivalence in the sense that uninhibited vitality, deontological 
morality and pluralism are all exemplary ideological expressions o f bourgeois ideology and 
the points where the internal contradictions o f  this ideology are m ost graphically illustrated 
His inability to acknowledge these contradictions led him to the formulation o f a critical 
method which was theological in essence. But since this covert theology was no t based on 
dogma, as was the case o f T. S. Elliot for instance, it could acquire coherence only by 
utilising morality, which in this case effectively substituted dogma in the same way it 
substituted politics at another level. This double function o f the moral in Leavis’s criticism, as 
a substitute for politics and as a substitute for religion is what I consider the m ost crucial 
characteristic o f his thought from the perspective o f a political critique. I do so because this 
double function not only illustrates the political implications o f his criticism but also 
foregrounds the particular character o f a petty-bourgeois criticism which is by necessity tom  
between two conflicting priorities. O n the one hand, the desire to construct a space where 
isonomy and the ensuing ‘civilised conversation’ among those who would rightfully inhabit 
such a space would guarantee the preservation o f the essential human values and on the
67 The irony is that Leavis himself was never really accepted by Cambridge. For him, that came to signify 
something he could claim as an honour so that he could declare that he and the Scrutineers were the ‘essential 
Cambridge, in spite o f  Cambridge’. For more details from the point o f  view o f  Leavis himself see “Scrutiny: A  
Retrospect” in Valuation in Criticism and Other Essays, ed. by G. Singh, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986).
117
other hand the need to resist any theoretical consideration that may challenge the complicity 
o f those human values with the very system that mostly endangers them.
Despite Leavis’s unquestionable sincerity in his quest for a significance removed from 
the ready-made truths o f contemporary consumer-oriented capitalism his criticism leaves a 
contradictory impression. Leavis’s vision was an admirably consistent one and yet one certain 
to make a critical reader o f his work feel disappointed that he who once wrote that a serious 
educational movement must “inevitably, and as far as I am concerned, explicidy, aim at 
fostering in schools and in education generally, an anti-acquisitive and anti-competitive moral 
bent, on the ground (there are others) that the inherited code is disastrously and obviously 
inappropriate to m odem  conditions” (Leavis, 1933: 185) was not, in the end, able or willing 
to carry the implications o f  his moral beliefs to their logical conclusion and articulate a truly 
radical critique o f the existing cultural and political order.
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T h e  M o r a l  S i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  R a d ic a l  F r e e d o m : 
T h e  C r i t i c i s m  o f  J e a n - P a u l  Sa r t r e
And if  I am given this world with its injustices, it is not so that I 
may contemplate them coldly, but that I may animate them with 
my indignation, that I may disclose them and create them with their 
nature as injustices, that is, as abuses to be suppressed.
What is Literature?
Jean-Paul Sartre is widely considered to be one o f the m ost prom inent intellectuals o f the 
twentieth century. In his case this is most certainly not an exaggerated title o f honour. Sartre 
has not only been central to almost all the major intellectual and political events o f the best 
part o f  the past century but also tried with an admirable honesty and dedication to 
comprehend, analyze and ultimately influence both intellectually and practically the outcome 
o f  these events. Bom in 1905 his life spanned seventy five years, during which the historical 
complexity that characterised the twentieth century was, at every moment, dialectically 
related to the personal complexity o f his own life. If  I use the word ‘dialectically’ it is not 
only because it designates, in my view, the true nature o f the relation between history and 
subjectivity, but also because it is so befitting a man that has made this relation one o f his
most enduring intellectual and political concerns. From the German occupation and the
Resistance, which is the turning point for Sartre’s serious engagement with the socio-political 
aspect o f historical reality, through his active involvement in politics in the post-war period 
(his instrumental role in the formation o f the RDR (Kassemblement Democratique BJvolutionnaire) 
as a non-Stalinist alternative to the official Left; his rapprochement in 1952 with the French 
Communist Party; his eventual split with them in 1956 on the occasion o f the Soviet invasion 
o f Hungary; his active involvement with the Algerian question taking sides with the FLN
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(Front de Liberation National) and their cause; his immediate support for the students in the 
events o f May 68) to his last decade where even in poor health he never ceased to participate 
in and engage with everything that he considered urgent. These events, situations and 
debates are an integral part o f the French history o f the twentieth century. It is however this 
very biography, so intimately connected with the history o f  its era and, consequently, so 
much mythologized, that occasionally obscures the critical appraisal o f Sartre. Being, to all 
intents and purposes, a cultural and intellectual icon o f his century, Sartre, as part o f our 
tradition, is often considered more as one o f the most valued items in the imaginary museum 
o f Western modernity than as a present force still pertinent and worthy o f  our serious 
attention. The discussion that follows is based on an implicit acceptance o f Sartre’s 
continuing relevance for many o f  the theoretical debates o f the present. In other words, 
Sartre is important not only for what he has been, but also for what he may still be for us 
now a quarter o f a century after his death.
S u b j e c t iv it y  a n d  F r e e d o m : T h e  Im p e r a t iv e s  o f  a  N e w  R a d i c a l  P h il o s o p h y
In attempting to trace the evolution o f Sartre’s moral thought it is imperative that one 
should start with Being and Nothingness which is his first major philosophical work. In this 
work Sartre attempts to produce an ontology o f Being under the decisive influence o f 
Husserl and Heidegger. From these premises (the intentionality o f human consciousness in 
Husserl and the consideration o f being as Dasein or being-in-the-world in Heidegger) Sartre 
presents his ontology o f the human situation as based on the radical distinction between 
being-in-itself (inert matter) and being-for-itself (human beings). What is o f interest to me 
here is the definition o f the being-for-itself which is the ontological status of man. According 
to Sartre being-for-itself is devoid o f  any essence that exists independently o f it, waiting as it 
were for this being to incarnate it. The being-for-itself does not have any essence as is the 
case o f the being-in-itself, but instead it is in a constant state o f becoming. Given this
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premise Sartre considers being-for-itself not a stable, immutable entity but a process. In this 
process being-for-itself creates its world by constant transformation o f external matter or, in 
Sartre’s terms, by nihilating the facticity o f the being-in-itself that constitutes both the origin 
(and, more ominously, an always open possibility) o f the for-itself and the internal structure 
o f  the material world. This being-for-itself can thus “found its nothingness but not its being. 
In its decompression it nihilates itself in a for-itself, which becomes qua for-itself its own 
foundation” (Sartre, 1993: 84). Man, or the being-for-itself can and will, by necessity, become 
but he can never just be in the same manner as, for instance, a stone can. Man cannot resort, 
even in times o f the most dire need, to an essence which will consequently legitimize his 
actions or his life in general. He cannot but choose himself since “nothing comes to [him] 
either from the outside or from within which [he] can receive or accept’ (ibid, 440). This lack o f 
essence is predicated on the impossibility o f a divine or any other external authority that 
might determine what man is and this in turn reinforces the argument that man is radically 
(one is tempted to say painfully) free to determine his own being. In Sartre’s early philosophy 
man is “condemned to exist forever beyond [his] essence, beyond the causes and motives o f 
[his] act” (ibid, 439). In short, and this is one the m ost radical points o f Being and Nothingness, 
man is “condemned to be free” (ibid, 439). W hat that entails is that man’s freedom is an 
absolute given which cannot be denied even if man wishes to. Sartre makes abundandy clear 
that “we are not free to cease being free” (ibid, 439).
In the absence o f God or any higher legitimizing authority man is alone in becoming 
what he chooses by projecting himself onto the future, shaping himself and the world 
according to the choices which, despite what various deterministic philosophies have 
attempted to argue, are -  according to Sartre — his and his own only. As a result man is solely 
responsible for his actions and the burden, that he carries however heavy it may be is 
nevertheless his fate in the sphere o f  being that he inhabits. Man’s freedom, which for Sartre 
is not “a quality added on or a property o f [man’s] nature” but “the stuff o f [man’s] being”
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(ibid, 439) is the constant surpassing, the never-ending transformation o f the present into the 
future, a continuous act o f negation in view o f a future positivity which in turn will be itself 
negated and transformed and so on ad infinitum. In Sartre’s ontology “freedom can be 
nothing other than this nihilation” (ibid, 439).
Given such a radical ontology o f inalienable freedom one is left with the question o f  the 
possibility o f ethics in a human world devoid o f any metaphysical certainties. If  man is 
assumed to be a subjectivity that is, by sheer ontological necessity, so radically distinct from 
anything else that it comes into contact with (that is with other equally inalienable freedoms), 
the question o f morality must be reformulated in terms o f  this situation o f  untranscendable 
solitude. In Being and Nothingness, this reformulation takes the form o f the positing o f yet 
another form o f  being, that o f being-for-others. This mode o f  being, characteristic o f the 
being-for-itself is predicated on the latter’s quality as the “foundation o f  all relation” (ibid, 
362). It is also based on the unavoidable conclusion that however singular a human being 
may be it still exists in a world populated by a multitude o f other beings who share the same 
ontological structure o f the being-for-itself. As a result o f  this man is engaged in a twofold 
process o f becoming. O n the one hand there is the struggle o f  his own existence in the world 
which he transforms through his own projects and on the other there is his co-existence with 
other subjectivities who in turn attempt to transform the very same world through their own 
projects. This new mode o f being may allow Sartre to avoid solipsism but it also poses a new 
set o f problems regarding the intersubjective relationships that Sartre clearly wishes to 
account for. The main new problem is that o f the subject/object dichotomy. Within the 
framework o f  my own project I am the subject which objectifies what is external to me in my 
attempt to work on it, to transform it to something meaningful for me. But within the 
framework o f the totality o f human projects I find myself constituted as an object by the 
others’ attempt to do precisely what I did in my case. Therefore, in my existence in the world 
I find myself constandy alternating between these two ontological positions: an objectifying
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subject and an object. Even the mere contingency o f an unintended glance risks alienating 
me (even if  it is only for an instant) from my own subjectivity. In a world inhabited by others 
“my freedom is alienated in the presence o f  the Other's pure subjectivity which founds my 
objectivity” (ibid, 375). Even in the most intimate and involving o f relations, that is in love 
one always finds himself in the contradictory situation o f  being at the same time a subject 
that wills the submission o f the other as the object o f  one’s love and himself as the object o f  the 
other’s love. Yet, even as an object the lover “wants to be the object in which the Other's 
freedom consents to lose itse lf’ thus wishing not so much “to act on the O ther’s freedom 
but to exist a priori as the objective limit o f this freedom” (ibid, 367). It seems that this 
perpetually cancelled reciprocity o f ontological integrity (a gluing down o f the O ther’s 
freedom, in Sartre’s words) is a vicious circle in which the constant alternation of 
subject/object positions condemns even love to re-enacting the drama o f  ontological 
uncertainty and struggle that characterises man throughout his entire life. It is no surprise 
then that Sartre begins his discussion o f m an’s first attitudes towards others by stating that 
“conflict is the original meaning o f being-for-others” (ibid, 364).
If love and by extension fraternity and the possibility o f collectives founded on principles 
other than self-interest prove to be always cancelled out by the restrictions our being-in-the- 
world poses to us then the possibility o f  grounding an ethics m ust be based on something 
other than the unstable — from an ontological point o f view — foundations o f intersubjective 
relations. So, man’s subjectivity thrown into the world and at the same time always at risk of 
having its freedom compromised faces the task o f asserting itself as radical freedom by 
assuming full responsibility for its situation. This is where Sartre’s famous notions of 
authenticity and bad faith come into play. A man is authentic when he asserts by his choices 
and actions the freedom that conditions the very structure o f his being while at the same 
time acknowledging the impossibility o f  negating or falsifying this freedom by attempting to 
be something which he is not, in which case Sartre claims that he only acts in bad faith.
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Sartre has formulated the problem in terms o f  man’s ability to resist the temptation o f 
identifying the other’s perception o f him as the sole criterion by which he is to conduct his 
life. In Sartre’s ontology the moral implication o f  the notion o f  authenticity is that man 
makes himself what he is or, more accurately, that man is under constant obligation to assert 
that his mode o f being is that o f the being-for-itself, that o f constandy becoming what he is 
not. In bad faith man, willingly objectified by the (individual or collective) other, opts for a 
mode o f being very much akin to being-in-itself, that is a mode o f being o f someone who 
presents himself to the world as though he is an essence (chosen or imposed, it makes no 
difference) and not merely a stage in his becoming-himself.
Authenticity and bad faith both are important moral concepts in Being and Nothingness. 
The former68 points to the conscious exercise o f man’s fundamental freedom while the latter 
is a constant reminder o f the state that awaits him in case he chooses to actively negate the 
imperatives o f this freedom and consequendy avoid responsibility for his actions. 
Authenticity is inherendy connected with this responsibility and the two heavily charged 
terms are in fact the nucleus o f  early Sartrean ethics. They both lead to a moral conception o f 
the human situation, a conception still rather vague and underspecified. This moral 
conception rejects an a priori absolute system o f values that would determine the attribution 
o f moral value to an individual’s actions. Morality is what man actively proposes even in the 
most implicit manner by the exercise o f  his free choice. I f  that morality, situated in a 
historical world but still too metaphysically conceived is at pains to reconcile itself with a 
dialectical conception o f individual action and history it is nevertheless true that the first 
seeds o f a radical ethical problematic are there in the pages o f  a book whose purpose is -  as 
its author admits — the presentation o f  what is and not what ought to be. The closing o f the 
gap between his ontology and a radical, non-bourgeois ethics will be one o f Sartre’s future 
tasks.
68 It must be noted that Being and Nothingness is not about ‘authenticity’ which only appears in footnotes. This 
concept will find a more expansive treatment in Sartre’s later work and particularly in his literary texts.
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At the end o f Being and Nothingness Sartre announces his forthcoming examination o f  the 
ethical implications o f his ontology. This work would never be completed but instead 
subsequendy went through a series o f  impressive transformations and changes o f direction. 
The first attempt took place in the mid-forties when Sartre was preparing a book on ethics 
that would rework and effectively transform his earlier position. This book never materialised 
but the notes that survived, and were published under the tide Notebooks for an Ethics after his 
death, constitute a body o f  work which, although fragmentary in form, contains enough 
information to allow us to see the directions that Sartre’s thought was taking at that time. 
Before however turning my attention to this work I wish to engage with another text that 
appeared at about the same time the Notebooks were being written.
Existentialism is a Humanism (1946) was originally a public lecture given as a response to 
the huge controversy the “existentialist movement” was causing at that time, especially 
among the Christian Right and the Communist Left. This small text, which — to Sartre’s 
dismay -  came to be considered as a kind o f existentialist manifesto, is in fact a concise 
introduction to all the major themes o f  existentialist (a term which, by that time, Sartre had 
grudgingly accepted) philosophy, a sort o f primer for the interested layman who would never 
dare to open, let alone read, Being and Nothingness from start to finish. Yet, apart from its 
introductory function this text is also a defence o f existentialist philosophy against the 
accusations o f its opponents. It is this quality o f the text that compels Sartre to be explicit 
about certain points which, in Being and Nothingness, were either implicidy referred to or 
virtually obscured due to the esoteric terminology o f  this text. These points were 
unsurprisingly related to the question o f morality. Given the received opinion that 
existentialism was (for the Christians) an amoral and dangerously nihilistic philosophy and 
(for the Communists) the last spasms o f a decaying petit-bourgeois ideology o f subjectivism 
Sartre attempts to establish that neither is true and moreover that existentialism is bo th  moral 
(in the wide sense o f the word) and politically progressive.
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W hat strikes us immediately in this text is the focus on the universal aspect o f  this new 
existentialist morality. If  Being and Nothingness left a lot to be desired when it came to the 
question o f societal structures and the possibility o f a viable progressive politics Yixistentialism 
is a Humanism provided a somewhat simplistic but nevertheless urgently needed corrective. In 
it Sartre argues for a universalizable morality according to which man “is responsible for 
[himself] and for all m en” and while he fashions himself through his exercise o f freedom he 
“fashionfs] man” (Sartre, 1973: 30). In addition to that Sartre refuses the accusation that his 
philosophy leads man to inaction and passivity by asserting that “what we are considering is 
an ethic o f action and self-commitment” (ibid: 44). W hat we have here is the introduction o f 
the criteria o f action and universalizability, that is precisely those elements that were lacking 
explicit formulation in his earlier work. Between a God-given, absolute morality and a 
relativism refuted on the basis not only o f  factual evidence but furthermore by its sheer 
logical inconsistency Sartre establishes a moral imperative that focuses on both the 
inalienable freedom o f the individual agent and the demand that m an’s free choices no t only 
assert the existence o f  others by holding him answerable to their judgement but at the same 
time that they provide a template for any human action. Sartre declares that “ [w]hat is at the 
very heart and centre o f existentialism, is the absolute character o f the free commitment, by 
which every man realises himself in realising a type o f humanity” (ibid, 47). Yet this 
expansion o f one o f the main theses o f  Being and Nothingness is still susceptible to its 
interpretation as nothing more than a modified form o f radical subjectivism. Sartre was 
aware o f that so, later in the text, after repeating that in committing oneself one is in fact 
committing the whole o f humanity — not exacdy a novel idea since that was in fact the 
guiding principle o f the Kantian categorical imperative — he defends his moral theory by 
stating that “ the moral choice is comparable to a work o f  art” (ibid, 48) which means that 
both have to do with “invention and creation” (ibid, 49). This statement failed to persuade 
the majority o f  Sartre’s critics and understandably so since the recourse to the free invention
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and creativity reminded them o f  the shaky ontological ground o f  being and Nothingness. Sartre 
made clear that, in his view, society was not simply the absent centre o f the individual agent’s 
existence. Yet in Existentialism is a Humanism the process o f  reciprocal conditioning remains 
undertheorised. W hat is more, when an attem pt o f theorization is finally made his idealist 
metaphysical assumptions about the absolute primacy o f  (abstract) subjectivity work against 
any satisfactory resolution. If in his earlier work conflict was the inescapable condition o f 
human relations due to the fact that each agent’s freedom necessarily negated the other’s 
freedom, thus making any sort o f radical social theory impossible,69 in Existentialism is a 
Humanism this aspect was played down. However, when it came to the relation between 
individual and society the issue was barely resolved by the claim that the “man who discovers 
him self directly in the cogito also discovers all the others, and discovers them as the 
condition o f his own existence” (bid, 45). That might be acceptable as a normative statement 
but we are not presented with a persuasive argument as to why this is so. How does a 
singular consciousness open up to the world in a positive — that is morally acceptable — 
m anner simply by apprehending itself? W hat is in fact evidenced here is the willingness o f  a 
philosopher always sensitive to the shortcomings o f  his own theory to engage in a more 
profound level with the dialectics o f  subjectivity and objectivity. Yet, at that stage o f  his life 
Sartre, still working within the framework o f Cartesian subjectivism, is unable to offer a 
satisfactory solution. A renewed attem pt would be made more than a decade later with the 
Critique o f Dialectical Reason.
T o w a r d s  a  N e w  C o n c e p t i o n  o f  E t h i c s  a n d  P o l it ic s
If  Existentialism is a Humanism was only hinting at the foundation o f a moral theory, based 
on Sartre’s ontology, his Notebooks for an Ethics were proven a far more committed attem pt at
69 Thomas R. Flynn has argued that for Sartre in Being and Nothingness “the source o f  the difficulty and the 
obstacle to a more satisfactory social theory is ontological, not historical: his lookind/looked-at model for 
interpersonal relations” (Flynn, 1994: 85).
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establishing an ethics situated at the intersection o f  subjectivity and history. The problem  is 
o f course that this attempt only remained at the level o f a preparatory work and did not 
constitute a rigorous elaboration o f  the issue in question. ITie Notebooks attempts to offer a 
theoretical solution to the problem o f morality evidenced in one o f the main assumptions o f 
Being and Nothingness, namely that being-for-itself includes ethics as only a possibility o f its 
social mode o f  being-with-others. This possibility was much in need o f a stable philosophical 
foundation so as to avoid being regarded as just another manifestation o f  the anguish- 
inducing contingency o f  being. Sartre starts his notebooks with a bold statement: “Morality 
has to transcend itself toward an end that is not itse lf’ (Sartre, 1992: 3). What this means is 
that morality m ust be object-oriented and not subject-centred. It must affirm the ontological 
leap that Sartre clearly sees as its true movement: from the subject to another subject, society, 
history. Morality in this new conception m ust be “a choice o f a world, not o f a se lf’ (ibid, 3). 
The universalizability o f moral action, implied in Being and Nothingness and made explicit in 
Existentialism is a Humanism, becomes now the stepping stone for a new ethics. This opening 
up to  the world is specifically related to history later on in another pronouncem ent that truly 
marks the beginning o f a dialectical problematic on ethics: “Ethics must be historical: that is, 
it m ust find the universal in History and must grasp it in History” (ibid, 6). This bold move 
allows Sartre to revisit his ontology and reformulate the existence o f man in the world, o f the 
for-itself thus: “The appearance o f the For-itself is properly speaking the irruption o f  History 
in the world” (ibid, 11). A little later after this reminder o f  the historical character o f his m ost 
im portant ontological category Sartre writes: [t]he world resists ethics just as Nature resists 
science. O ne should speak o f a hidden immorality o f the world just as one speaks o f a hidden 
irrationality o f  nature” (ibid, 13). This seems a strange argument implying that ethics is totally 
impossible not only in this world but in any other conceivable world as well and yet the 
closing part o f this statem ent offers the possibility o f a more charitable interpretation: 
“invention o f  an ethical solution as o f  a scientific hypothesis [only serve to] put o ff  the
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outbreak o f conflict until later” (ibid, 13). It seems then that ethics is impossible and yet 
when it appears as a guiding framework for our actions its main purpose is none other but to 
prevent conflict. But what kind o f  conflict? Could it be the kind implied by the always- 
doomed-to-failure reciprocity described in Part III o f Being and Nothingness or another more 
historically specific kind? Sartre does not elaborate this point, but instead completes his 
argument by stating that “ethics today must be revolutionary socialist ethics” (ibid, 12). W hat 
is im portant in this statement is the emphasis (Sartre’s) on ‘today’. N o matter what 
foundation we may or may not give to ethics abstractly, what is im portant is that in our own 
time, in the concrete temporality o f our history, we must assert the rights o f the oppressed o f 
all kinds against their oppressors. We have travelled a long way from Being and Nothingness but 
the end o f  our journey is nowhere near. Sartre does not explain why ethics must be 
revolutionary socialist.7" He simply reaffirms in a more specific manner what he said in Being 
and Nothingness, namely that one always chooses the good only this time this good is given a 
historical specificity that was lacking from the previous work.
'Ilie best parts o f the Notebooks are indeed a meditation on the dialectic o f history and
ethics under the guiding principle that “ [e]very man at every m om ent escapes History (...)
yet it is at the mom ent he escapes it (...) he is m ost inside History) (ibid, 45). This
transcendence toward an absolute future — still in a state o f immanence with regard to the
total m ovem ent o f  history — should be considered as the proper level at which ethics should
intervene (ibid, 47). What emerges from his scattered thoughts is the refutation o f abstract
Kantian ethics, Hegelian idealism and also the refutation o f  determinism in all its (idealistic
or materialistic) varieties. Sartre tries to establish an alternative way o f regarding morality as
completely subordinated to pre-existing determining factors and at the same time tries to
undermine the classic bourgeois conception o f  a formal ethics insensitive to social difference
and the fact o f  legitimised oppression. 'Hie dialectic o f individual freedom and political ends
7° Thomas C. Anderson provides a lucid and informed analysis o f  the Notebooks’ shortcomings in the 5th chapter 
o f  his Sartre’s Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity, pp. 65-86.
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is the main preoccupation o f  Sartre in his attem pt to theorize a viable ethics beyond both 
(Stalinist) indifference and (bourgeois) complacency. W hat he also tries to do is establish a 
starting point from which the subjective/objectivity dichotomy could be adequately theorised 
and possibly surpassed altogether. I say starting point as Sartre was already aware that this 
dichotomy was extremely difficult to resolve, an awareness that was in fact the reason why 
this first attempt at such a resolution was ultimately abandoned by him. Sartre set himself a 
m ost difficult task, namely to argue for his main thesis that any conception o f  the good is 
vital to our understanding o f the human situation not in terms o f an ontology o f good — 
what or whether the good is — but in terms o f its emanating through us, through our 
concrete actions in a historically specific world (ibid, 556). It is again the being-for-itself that 
‘produces’ morality through its action only this time history is constituting it through and 
through, inside as well as outside being the ultimate horizon beyond which man is unable not 
only to act but even exist qua being-for-itself. If  we accept that the Notebooks represents this 
agonising attem pt to establish the possibility o f  ethics within the totalising force o f  history 
then one o f  Sartre’s remarks is particularly im portant in our evaluation o f his thought on this 
subject. Following a remark about the revolutionary’s ethics, according to Lenin, Sartre 
makes a statem ent that I believe is representative not only o f  the tenor o f the entirety o f his 
work at that time but also o f the directions his thought would take in subsequent years.
Kthics is by definition an abstract fact. It is the goal one gives oneself when there is no goal. It is 
a certain way o f  treating others when one has no other relation to others except the purely 
ontological relationship. It appears therefore, when my relation to the other is defined by the 
purely formal recognition o f  his universal personhood. But his universal personhood is itself 
defined by his freedom, it is abstract recognition o f  his freedom as potential, not as actual. In 
other words, it obliges respect for freedom in general as a pure potentiality and it leaves 
undetermined the relation we ought to have with the content o f  his freedom. (.. .) In this sense, 
ethics, not having any real content, can only be conceived o f  in terms o f  some status quo. (.. .) It
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is just a purely formal game between juridical persons. It appears where political action, religious 
life, history have been stopped. That is, in periods where abstract law defines the ethical person 
and when real History falls outside this definition. Hence it seems useless. Yet, in turn, the 
concrete goal that the historical agent proposes for himself presupposes a certain conception o f  
man and o f  values. It is impossible to be a pure agent o f  History without some ideal goal (realism 
is pure passivity or valuing History per se). So it is suddenly no longer true that one may use any 
means whatsoever to realize the goal: they run the risk o f  destroying it. In this way we catch sight 
of, beyond the antinomy o f  ethics and History, a concrete ethics that is like the logic of effective 
action, (ibid, 103-104)
I have quoted the Sartre’s note almost in its entirety because I think that it encapsulates 
all the main themes o f Sartre’s ethical though t Also, and more importandy, it foregrounds all 
the specific problems that a Sartrean ethics would eventually need to confront and ultimately 
solve. Leaving aside the daring but somewhat problematic conflation o f  ethics in general with 
bourgeois ethics what is most telling is the perceived antinomy o f ethics and History and the 
proposed alternative o f a radical reformulation o f  the problem o f concrete morality in terms 
o f  a logic of effective action. At this stage the path has been adequately cleared so that both a 
political ethics and an ethical politics can be articulated in a new language far removed for the 
ideologically laden tropes o f bourgeois liberalism and Stalinist Realpolitik.
Notebooks for an Ethics marks a starting point for Sartrean ethics by simultaneously 
reformulating many o f the basic themes o f his earlier work and engaging with the 
problematic o f  history and progressive political action. T*hey would be eventually abandoned 
but they would also lead Sartre to come to terms with dialectics and history, a task that he 
would undertake in his subsequent work. This text, due to its fragmentary form, only offered 
an investigation into a general philosophical problematic; two other texts from roughly the 
same period dealt with more specific problems by applying many o f the ideas and themes 
that were predom inant in Sartre’s thought during the immediate post-war era. What is 
lJterature? and Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr are among the m ost im portant critical texts o f
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Sartre, each representing a sort o f  a template for his later critical texts on literature and the 
creative process.
L i t e r a t u r e  a s  Berm M o r a l  a n d  S o c i a l  F a c t : T h e  D l\ l e c t ic s  o f  P e r s o n a l  
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a n d  P o l it ic a l  Im p e r a t i v e s
What is Literature? is a collection o f  articles which first appeared in the Temps Modemes 
between February and July 1947. I shall attem pt to discuss this work in conjunction with 
three other thematically similar texts: the articles “ Introducing lues Temps Modemei’ (1945), 
“The Nationalization o f  Literature” (1945), and “Black Orpheus” (1948), the last being the 
preface to an anthology o f  works by African and W est Indian poets edited by Leopold Sedar- 
Senghor71. This ensemble o f  texts shape com mon themes and critical concerns. They 
constitute the first major attem pt by Sartre to formulate a literary critical theory that would 
do justice to the complex articulation o f history and subjectivity. These are also the texts in 
which a key term that points to this very articulation appears for the first time: 
com m itm ent'2. Yet commitment is not the only new idea presented in these texts; it is 
com plemented by that o f freedom in its specific application to the reciprocal relation 
between writer and reader. Commitment and freedom form a pair o f concepts that enable 
Sartre to reconcile his radical ontological subjectivism with the political and historical milieu 
o f  his time, a milieu from which the abstract cogito presented in Being and Nothingness had to 
emerge so that it could successfully negotiate the tension between its irreducible freedom and 
its new-found faith in the political imperative o f  a socialist transformation o f  society.
In the first essay in What is Literature? under the tide “W hat is Writing?” Sartre makes his 
famous and highly controversial distinction between poetry and prose. He argues that 
whereas the poet treats language as an object in order to convey his most personal feelings
Anthohgje de la nouvellepoesie negre et malgube de langue francais, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948).
72 I have opted for this translation o f  the French term engagement instead o f  its literal equivalent ‘engagement’ 
because it is the one most widely accepted.
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and attitudes with scant regard for communication, the prose writer treats language as a 
vehicle for communication, as a means for action towards a specific audience that he wishes 
to inform and guide. The poet in Sartre’s view takes advantage o f  the self-referential aspect 
o f  the language which allows him to produce verbal artefacts that only have a very indirect 
relation to the reality o f the world. Poems are personal, affective, use-less (in the sense o f  not 
having any immediate practical value), they crystallize the poet’s subjectivity which finds in 
the word-objects he puts on paper its own image reflected back to it. In other words, poetry 
is a quasi-mystical use o f  language more akin to painting or music. It uses language much the 
same way painting uses colour and music sounds. In contrast prose communicates. It acts on 
words transcending language-as-matter towards language-as-medium. Its aim is not to project 
an image o f oneself (although that does happen as well) but rather to say something specific 
to its readership in general. Sartre claims that the function o f the prose-writer is to write so 
that “nobody can be ignorant o f the world and that nobody may say that he is innocent o f 
what it's all about.” (Sartre, 1988: 38). The prose-writer is not expressing himself, he lets the 
truth be known. His commitment is precisely this demand to expose the truth. That however 
does not mean he is committed to an essentially epistemological undertaking. It is ethics and, 
as I shall argue later on, politics that distinguish his vocation.
'ITie polemical disjunction o f prose and poetry that is inaugurated in this text would 
eventually becom e one o f the most controversial aspects o f Sartre’s literary theory. Sartre’s 
identification o f  poetry with a certain affective use o f language very much in the manner o f 
narcissistic play-acting is predicated on his conviction that prose is, in some ways, a 
performative use o f language. This is o f course an untenable position but I think that what 
Sartre meant above all to say is that prose engages with the (historical) present in a way that 
poetry cannot. It must be noted at this point that whenever Sartre speaks o f poetry7 he is 
almost invariably referring to the poetry which came slowly into being through the Romantic 
period and emerged fully with Baudelaire and his generation; modem(ist) poetry is not
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considered. If it were it would have been more difficult for Sartre to claim that poetry 
operates at such a distance from the actuality o f  the present that it is o f no practical use for 
the politically progressive uses he has in mind for literature. However in “Black O rpheus”, a 
brave and inspiring text written only a couple o f  years after “W hat is Writing?”, apart from 
its manifest intention which is to prom ote solidarity with the revolutionary struggle o f  the 
colonial people Sartre departs significantly from his negative view o f the politically 
progressive efficacy o f poetry. Whereas in “W hat is Writing?” Sartre effectively displaces 
poetry considering it as too self-serving a literary form to really contribute to a literature o f 
praxis, in “Black O rpheus” poetry is by sheer necessity elevated to the status o f a literary 
medium quite capable o f being the vehicle o f  a critical, politically engaged consciousness. 
Sartre attempts to  show how the poet using a language not his own strives to express his 
feelings against the colonial reality which — and this is the paradox Sartre tries to address — is 
articulated in precisely this foreign language. The poet having realised that this language that 
he was taught in school is a poor instrum ent in his quest for authentic meaning and the 
liberation o f his race utilizes it in an oblique, indirect and highly symbolic way. In order to 
convey his own meanings he takes advantage o f the one aspect o f this foreign language that 
his colonial masters cannot control: its elusiveness, its wealth o f  connotations, its capabilities 
for symbolisation. In his attem pt to articulate his despair and give an outlet to his 
revolutionary desire, the Negro poet practically invents poetry as the only means o f  literary 
expression that cannot be easily appropriated by the white man. 'This poet is the one who 
m ost acutely realises that “language is in essence prose, and that prose is in essence failure” 
(ibid, 303). As a result the poet reappropriates the language o f the colonial master and by 
turning it into poetry throws it back at him in the hope o f thus communicating the feelings 
and desires o f  his people. Since, Sartre says, “the oppressor is present in the very language” 
the poet “will speak this language in order to destroy it” (ibid, 303). This poetry bom  out o f 
indignation, despair and the need to find a way through the constraints o f a medium already
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worked upon by one’s enemies is for Sartre a truly revolutionary poetry that not only gives 
voice to the O ther (in this case the colonial Other) but also carries forth his irreducible 
specificity and human dignity in all its variety and complexity.
In “Black O rpheus” Sartre elevates poetry to the status o f  a literary form which is well 
suited to the expression o f the particularities o f  the colonial experience and the desire for 
emancipation. Paradoxically, Sartre, when confronted with a situation outside mainland 
France, found the idea o f poetry articulating the deepest desires o f  a consciousness inspired 
by the possibility o f  human liberation more plausible.
In another article under the tide “Why Write?” , Sartre presents his famous argument 
about the reciprocity o f free actions which the literary work o f art inscribes in its very 
essence as a gift intended by one human being for another. Sartre makes the claim that “it is 
the joint effort o f  author and reader which brings upon the scene that concrete and 
imaginary object which is the work o f the mind” (ibid, 51-52) and concludes by stating that 
“ |t]here is no art except for and by others” (ibid, 52). The ontological constraints, imposed 
on man qua being-for-others, are now severely tested by a free will that discovers in its 
reciprocated act a bond that relates it intimately with another freedom. The writer by 
com mitting him self to writing makes an appeal to  the freedom o f  another human being who 
in turn “collaborate^] in the production o f the work” (ibid, 54) by exercising that very 
freedom. This freedom is not any m ore the blind force that pushes man forward in his quest 
for an authentic existence but a more qualified, dialectical concept since it is “experienced 
not in the enjoyment o f free subjective functioning, but in a creative act required by an 
imperative” (ibid, 56). 'Ihe pessimistic assertions about the impossibility o f maintaining a free 
existence in an essentially antagonistic world, which was partly the reason why Being and 
Nothingness was so violently criticised, have now given their place to a conception o f  human 
freedom bom  and maintained by another human freedom. The writer and the reader are now 
assigned the task o f  enacting the positive dimension o f  sociality and freedom that was absent
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in the previous work. Instead o f  two antagonistic beings trying to negate each other’s 
freedom even in a relation based on love we now have two partners who — as in all acts o f 
love, sexual or otherwise — find their feelings o f  pleasure, joy or satisfaction intensified in 
direct proportion with the intensification o f  the respective feelings o f the other. So, in 
literature, according to Sartre:
... the author writes in order to address himself to the freedom o f others, and he requires it in 
order to make his work exist. But he does not stop there; he also requires that they return this 
confidence which he has given them, that they recognize his creative freedom, and that they in 
turn solicit it by a symmetrical and inverse appeal. Here there appears the other dialectical 
paradox o f  reading; the more we experience our freedom, the more we recognise that o f  the 
other, the more he demands o f us, the more we demand o f  him. (ibid, 58).
Such an exchange reaffirms the essential freedom that constitutes human beings and yet 
it is still a formal — from a moral point o f  view — exchange. W hat is missing is the teleological 
dimension which is given to us later on in the text by one o f  Sartre’s most impressive 
statements. Sartre is acutely aware that leaving literature in its aesthetic dimension alone does 
nothing to secure the validity o f the argument in favour o f  committed writing. For that one 
would need a further elaboration o f  the idea o f reciprocated freedom. To this extent Sartre 
adds that although we must accept the fact that literature and morality are two distinct things 
we must at the same time understand that “at the heart o f the aesthetic imperative we discern 
the moral imperative” (ibid, 67). This is presented as the logical conclusion o f  the previous 
statements. The act o f appealing to the other’s freedom is a moral act even it appears in a 
situation where the main object o f interest is an aesthetic one (the literary work o f art). It is 
the im portance o f  the fact that there are human agents involved in this situation that gives it 
its moral quality but also — and here we observe the application o f the criterion o f 
universalizability that we mentioned earlier on — that freedom can only be an appeal o f  an
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agent whose generosity must be, by virtue o f  its content, towards all men. Thus the 
immediate situation is transcended and the whole humanity appears on the horizon. For 
Sartre
It would be inconceivable that this unleashing o f  generosity provoked by the writer could be used to 
authorize an injustice, and that the reader could enjoy his freedom while reading a work which 
approves or accepts or simply abstains from condemning the subjection o f  man by man. (ibid, 67).
It could be argued that history has proved that literature can and has indeed been used 
for precisely these reasons, yet one m ust bear in mind that what Sartre is essentially saying 
here is that literature ought not to be like that, or in other words, that such a literature is simply 
tainted by bad faith and ultimately unworthy o f its name. Literature, being an exercise in 
human freedom within the framework o f  a specific situation has, by virtue o f this essential 
quality, universal human freedom as its m ost profound subject. Simply put, the writer is “a 
free man addressing free men, has only one subject — freedom” (ibid, 68). Sartre concludes 
his argument by stating that as literature -  in its form as prose — is not only founded upon 
but ultimately also refers to human freedom it is thus “bound up with the only regime in 
which [it] has meaning, democracy” (ibid, 69). From the moral imperative o f subjective 
generosity to the political imperative o f  a generalised practical freedom, from ontology and 
ethics to the ethico-political, such is the conceptual space covered here. ITiis will lead us to 
Sartre’s next consideration which is the question o f  audience.
In “ For W hom  Does One Write?” , Sartre attempts to define the proper audience o f 
writers in various historical periods and their function in relation to both the existing political 
order o f each period and the audience for the benefit o f  which they produced their work. 
Sartre begins by acknowledging that what he has said so far describes an ideal rather than an 
actual situation. He claims that although writers implicitly call forth the universal humanity" o f
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man in actual fact by virtue o f  the fact that they are situated in their time they only address 
specific audiences for specific reasons. For Sartre being situated “is an essential and necessary 
characteristic o f freedom” (ibid, 133). As a consequence when one talks o f freedom one 
should always bear in mind that this freedom only takes an intelligible form in concrete 
historical situations often against the forms sanctioned by the dominant ideology o f the time 
under consideration. To engage with this precarious state o f freedom, its formal 
universalizability and at the same time its historically-conditioned absence as an 
untranscendable end is one o f the main features o f  committed writing. Another feature, and 
arguably m ore im portant from a political point o f  view, is the effort o f  the writer “to achieve 
the m ost lucid and the m ost complete consciousness o f  being embarked”, that is when he 
“causes the com m itm ent o f effective spontaneity to advance, for himself and others, to the 
reflective” (ibid, 77). The committed writer must then start with freedom as potentially 
applicable to all but at the same time do all he can to throw light on the fact that this 
freedom is as yet only realized by the few. With this in mind the writer must resist alienation 
by submitting to  either temporal powers or to an ideology (ibid, 134). In order to achieve this 
the com m itted writer must always consider his work not as a means but as an unconditioned 
end (ibid, 134). This line o f thought betrays more than a hint o f  classical Kantian idealism 
and Sartre is careful to distance himself somewhat by stating that this should be considered 
more as an ideal situation than as a normative statement regarding the present situation. In 
support o f  this corrective judgement he later on states that “actual literature can only realize 
its full essence in a classless society” (ibid, 137). Still dangerously close to the idealist 
conception o f  literature as something belonging to the kingdom o f ends and not to the one 
o f  means, Sartre at least manages to avoid blatant inconsistency between his obvious political 
motives and his argumentation by admitting that this kingdom o f ends is far from being 
realized anytime soon. He concludes his article by admitting exacdy this discrepancy between 
literature’s essence and the historical conjuncture he and others are forced to work within.
138
The impression that we are left with is that true literature is impossible and at the same time 
necessary and inevitable. As we will see later in our discussion o f Saint Genet this same 
argument will be used in relation to morality and ethics.
In another article entided “Situation o f  the Writer in 1947” Sartre goes on to examine the 
situation o f  the committed writer in the immediate post-war period. In this article, by and 
large, the m ost ‘historically situated’ o f all, Sartre attempts a thoroughgoing examination of 
the constraints imposed on the writers o f  his generation by the exigencies o f the era. The 
question o f  audience is again dealt with greater urgency, since it is now considered the most 
im portant aspect o f  the committed writer’s function in society. Having posited that “only in 
a socialist collectivity would literature (...) deserve the name o f total literature’ (ibid, 195), that 
is a literature that has “finally understood its essence” and has made “ the synthesis o f  praxis 
and exts, o f  negativity and construction, o f doing, having, and being” (ibid, 195) Sartre 
attempts to  show how it is possible for those writing then (the mid-forties) to  address the 
only public that would make their effort worthwhile from a political perspective. That public 
is, o f course, the proletariat and Sartre makes a formidable effort to establish the viability o f 
adopting such a perspective. For Sartre, writing for the bourgeoisie essentially amounts to 
condemning the writer and his work to reflect a partial image o f  the world and at the same 
time legitimize the oppression o f the underprivileged classes. Therefore, the proper audience 
for a politically progressive writer ought to be part o f the only class that has the power to 
bring about the total transformation o f society. Yet this class, as Sartre admits, is, to a large 
extent, organised around the PCF73 having entrusted its hopes to the party’s policies. Sartre, 
at that time, had no intention o f even indirecdy supporting the PCF so he was faced with the 
difficult task o f  proposing a third way between adherence to bourgeois values and 
subscribing to a Stalinist orthodoxy. The answer to the question whether a writer in his 
willingness to give voice to a socialist alternative should become a communist and still
73 Parti Communiste Fran^ais.
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remain a writer is negative. Sartre is quite explicit about that. He holds that the PCF, 
although “progressive and revolutionary in its doctrine and in its avowed ends”, has 
nevertheless “becom e conservative in its means” (ibid, 207). For Sartre, the PCF, by virtue o f 
its specific political function in the French society o f the post-war era, cannot accommodate 
anyone who wishes to address others by affirming both his and their freedom at the same 
time. 'Ilie writer must create his own audience through his work alone and if that audience 
ought to be the working class then its consciousness must be raised and its unity effected by 
the work itself. For Sartre the committed writers o f  his day “do not want their public (...) to 
be reduced to  the juxtaposition o f individual readers nor to have its unity conferred upon it 
by the transcendent action o f a Party or a Church” (ibid, 221).
Between these two equally inadmissible alternatives the genuinely committed writer must, 
according to Sartre, “militate (...) in favour o f the freedom o f the person and the socialist 
revolution” (ibid, 223). He must achieve this by fulfilling a twofold function. In as far as his 
work addresses (enlightened) members o f the bourgeoisie he must make them understand 
that “ the reign o f  ends cannot be realized without revolution” (ibid, 222). In as far as his 
work addresses the proletariat he must make it understand that “revolution is conceivable 
only if it prepares the reign o f ends” (ibid, 223). Thus at one stroke Kantianism is finally 
radicalized and Marxism is reminded o f its vulgar past in order to  reorient itself towards a 
more enlightened future. Sartre is still too much indebted to the subjectivist conception o f 
freedom to allow himself a truly dialectical understanding between means and ends. His 
integrity and com mitment make him all too aware o f  the essentially self-defeating character 
o f Kantian ethics and his insistence on freedom as predicated upon the individual agent 
makes him treat the question o f means and ends in the context o f  revolutionary socialism in 
a way more suitable to a left-libertarian view than a properly Marxist one. His allusions to  the 
hypocrisy inherent in all bourgeois conceptions o f  morality are always nothing less than 
inspiring and his refutation o f bourgeois idealism on grounds o f both ideological consistency
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and political effectiveness is excellent and yet the dialectics o f  revolutionary struggle and 
ethics seems to be still in a nascent state. His pronouncem ent that the committed writer 
“must judge the means not from the point o f view o f  an abstract morality” , but “in the 
perspectives o f a precise goal which is the realization o f a socialist democracy”, is an 
admirably honest self-criticism o f Sartre himself, the apolitical writer and philosophe o f  the pre- 
W ar period; it is also a heart-felt appeal to the writers o f  his generation to realise the means 
o f  transcending their class-affiliations. His statement that man is always a value regardless o f 
what else he might also be is to be understood in the context o f his existential-political thesis 
that the “present situation, by virtue o f  the fact that it is unbearable, remains in a state o f 
stagnation because men have dispossessed themselves o f their own destiny” (ibid, 234). It 
seems that in this sorry state o f affairs the writer is and must be assuming the responsibility 
o f changing this in favour o f the dispossessed.
In ‘‘W riting for O ne’s Age” Sartre reiterates his argument on the historical specificity or 
situatedness o f  the writer. But this situatedness should not be considered as an 
untranscendable given. The writer must constandy attempt to go beyond it on the basis o f 
the understanding that “real transcendence requires one to want to change certain specific 
aspects o f  the world” and that his practice must be “coloured and particularized by the 
concrete situation it aims to modify” (ibid, 243). This imperative to concern oneself with the 
present and not lose oneself in a seemingly noble but ultimately misguided and false 
contemplation o f  an atemporal world is what Sartre has in mind in proclaiming that he and 
others like him “stand for an ethics and art o f the finite” (ibid, 245). In the article that 
introduced Lxs Temps Modemes Sartre had used this same argument only this time with a 
strong metaphysical undercurrent. Risking yet another lapse into idealism, he asserted there 
that the writer, having committed himself to the singularity o f his era and all that this entails, 
was in fact making “contact with the eternal” , and that his task as writer was “to allow the 
eternal values implicit in such and such social or political debates to be perceived” (ibid, 254).
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He quickly added that these values are “o f  interest only in their contemporary guise” (ibid, 
254). Is it possible to regard something as eternal and yet take interest only in its historically 
specific form? If something is only pertinent to us because o f its specificity, and if  moreover 
this specificity is the only thing that we are able to verify, why should we allow the 
postulation o f  an atemporal essence? Sartre answers these questions by revisiting his 
favoured ontological themes. Man, he insists, is not an atemporal essence but an absolute in a 
certain historical time, in a certain context. Man is absolute in his irreducible specificity, in his 
ability to choose his world within the larger framework o f history. Man is not reducible to 
anything other than himself, he remains, even after all is said and done, an original project 
that has only one meaning: freedom, m an’s ultimate justification as being-in-the-world. This 
is the one aspect o f  the human condition that literature must bring to the foreground. It 
must always, according to Sartre, elucidate the conditions o f possibility o f  this freedom, while 
at the same time safeguarding its radical irreducibility. Sartre clearly wishes that freedom 
should be understood as something valid absolutely and not relatively and for this reason he 
turns against those who, while admitting the injustices present in their time, do precious little 
to effectively abolish these injustices. Freedom may inhere in man being essentially 
coterminous with his very existence, and yet it is conspicuous by its absence in a great part o f  
the human population either because o f  the colour o f  their skin or because o f  their relation 
to the means o f  production. For that reason alone the existential postulate o f the primacy o f 
freedom necessitates the moral condemnation o f  whatever negates this freedom. 
Consequendy, given the imperative to always turn one’s attention to the specific, concrete 
situations in history this moral condemnation leads to a political problematic and ultimately 
to the assumption o f  political responsibility. At the end when one sees that those who are 
mosdy affected by this lack o f freedom are the proletariat the only sound conclusion is the 
commitment to the socialist transformation o f society.
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This ensemble o f texts all written in the mid to late forties provides us with the main 
theoretical concepts o f  Sartre’s early literary criticism. These are o f course the concepts o f 
commitment, reciprocated freedom as the foundation o f  the literary phenom enon, and 
historical situatedness o f the writer, l*hey all signify a transition from the rather gloomy 
ontology o f Being and Nothingness to a political awareness that necessitates a literature — and by 
extension a critical practice -  based on the concept o f  praxis. Sartre would eventually base his 
entire work on this concept I shall deal with the specificity o f  this concept in the context o f 
Sartre’s work later in my discussion but what I would like to emphasize here is that praxis not 
only marks a transition from a theoretical to  a political philosophy but, more crucially, it also 
functions as a master-concept in which all the disparate elements o f Sartre’s thought are 
fused: subjectivity and objectivity, freedom and historically imposed constraints, ontological 
uncertainty and the ethico-political surpassing o f  this uncertainty. W hat is initiated here is not 
a merely conceptual accomplishment but a meeting between consciousness and history, an 
attem pt to reconcile the demands o f personal freedom with a political cause that transcends 
this freedom. It is this transcendence inherent in the notion o f praxis that animates and gives 
substance to Sartrean commitment. Individual freedom does not cancel itself out by clashing 
with the freedom o f the other but transcends itself towards something far greater than it and 
thus affirms and justifies itself in precisely that transcendence. This transcendence is not 
towards an ideal, ahistorical end but towards a concrete solution to pressing present 
problems. It is to Sartre’s merit that he avoided as best as he could the lapse into an idealistic 
and thus ineffective solution to the problems he identified in the social and political reality o f 
his time. Sartrean commitment predicated upon the free non-alienated praxis o f  the 
individual is pointing to one direction: the socialist transformation o f  society. This is to come 
about through practical activity and it is the emphasis on ‘practical’ that makes his whole 
critical practice so important. There are o f  course questions that are raised and need to be 
answered. Why is the writer, given Sartre’s misgivings about P C P s political ethos, deemed as
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the privileged one who will take it upon him to spread the revolutionary word to the masses? 
Would the insistence on the irreducible freedom o f the individual not eventually clash with 
the exigencies o f  organised political action? Sartre was still too much indebted to the 
individualism o f  his early philosophy to seriously contemplate an ethics or more specifically a 
radical critical practice that would not be based on individuals but on collectivities. Before 
addressing these issues in detail I wish to proceed with the examination o f some o f the 
critical works Sartre wrote in the years following the publication o f  the texts I discussed 
above. My main focus will be his three early literary biographies, namely the ones o f 
Baudelaire, MaDarme and Genet.
L i t e r a r y  B i o g r a p h y  a s  E x i s t e n t i a l  P s y c h o a n a l y s i s
Sartre’s first literary biography was his book on Baudelaire published in 1947. In writing 
this book Sartre attempted for the first time to apply some sort o f a revised psychoanalytic 
method which he called ‘existential psychoanalysis’. By that he meant a m ethod that would 
engage with the fundamental choices o f  a person in the context o f his ‘freedom’ to think and 
pursue his own projects. In his examination o f  Baudelaire Sartre tries to identify and discuss 
the strategies the former has chosen in becoming what he eventually became most famous 
fo r  a poet. Sartre examines Baudelaire as a man who “pursued the impossible life o f self­
creation” (Sartre, 1949: 151) and that phrase gives us a pretty clear indication o f the 
fundamental premise o f this biography, namely that a man creates his own destiny merely by 
willing his own particular mode o f living. This essentially idealistic form o f understanding 
another subjectivity testifies to the fact that Sartre was still very much thinking in accordance 
with his earlier subjectivist philosophy. But Baudelaire testifies to something else too: Sartre’s 
main preoccupation was to (reconstruct in biographical form the struggle for authenticity, an 
essential moral struggle not because it is oriented towards the G ood but because at every 
stage it involves choices and acts that have to do with the accepted moral codes o f  the era
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under examination. The moral element implied in such treatment is o f great importance for 
my discussion here. Baudelaire is the first o f  Sartre’s works in which the biographical 
treatment o f  a literary figure attempts to elucidate the moral problematic o f the itinerary o f 
the whole life under scrutiny. By moral problematic I mean the specific ideas, or in some 
cases, the concepts which animate what in Sartre’s terminology we would call the individual 
life-projects o f the biographees. This moral element in Baudelaire is made apparent every time 
Sartre discusses the particular incidents o f  Baudelaire’s life that eventually lead the latter in 
adopting a specific aesthetics and artistic practice which will produce the Fleurs du mal. In 
Baudelaire Sartre seems to insist on his belief that “the free choice which a man makes o f 
himself is completely identified with what is called his destiny” (Sartre, 1949: 185). Although 
Sartre acknowledges the defining force o f  the environment, his Baudelaire is without a doubt a 
typically existentialist biography, in the sense that individual freedom is still viewed as 
essentially inalienable and, in some sense, as the main m otor o f  individual history.
After Baudelaire Sartre began to work on Mallarme but unfortunately the bulk o f his
notes were either destroyed or lost. W hat remained was a handful o f them that were
published after Sartre’s death. Mallarme does not differ significandy from Baudelaire in its
tenor and argument. The individual life-project o f Mallarme the poet is presented to us as a
series o f  choices that are essentially reactions to given situations, both personal and
political74. Sartre attempts here, as he did in Baudelaire, to account for the life-process o f his
subject by applying a phenomenological reading o f  the biographical data he has at hand. He
clearly wishes not only to understand his subject but to be also able to account for the
specificity o f  his life-choices in an effort to bestow a certain meaning to the life and work o f
Mallarme. ITie meaning I am alluding to is the one conferred to every series o f actions or
reactions that can be viewed as a ‘project. By that I mean that in attempting “to recover the
resdess inner movements o f a reflexive consciousness” (Sartre, 1988: 8) Sartre is also
74 The first chapter under the tide “The Atheist Heritage” provides the wider historical context within which we 
are to situate Mallarme, his life and his poetry.
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attempting to re-construct a life, as a series o f  conscious choices that all lead to an 
identifiable end which is none other than this very life seen as ‘necessary’ and not 
‘contingent’. In these biographies he puts to the test the latent imperative o f  Being and 
Nothingness, namely that one should act as though one’s life is endowed with meaning which 
one alone can give i t  By keeping a certain (crude) Marxist problematic at arm’s length Sartre 
still attempts to account for the force exerted by society and more generally history. Yet, his 
essentially subjectivist and idealistic premise o f the individual endowed with a pre-reflective 
consciousness o f  his own fundamental life-choices did not go very well together with his 
newly acquired sensitivity to the external, non-ontological restraints imposed on man. 
Malarme was Sartre’s first attempt to negotiate a relation between the sovereign subjectivity o f 
man and its crippling environment but the fragmentary nature o f this work means that we 
have to turn to the Family Idiot to find a thorough treatment o f  this relation. But before I turn 
my attention to the this last o f Sartre’s works I m ust discuss his other literary biography o f 
the period which takes as its subject the controversial author Jean Genet.
In 1952 Sartre publishes Saint Genet: Actor and Martyr, where he attempts to interpret Jean 
G enet’s work in terms o f the latter’s ‘original project’; that is his choice to embody the 
conception that his society (through his foster parents) had o f him. G enet chose to be what 
others thought him to be and since what the others thought was that he was ‘bad’ G enet 
chose evil as his only option to pursue his freedom and thus ‘became’ his own singular 
personality. Yet through that process G enet realised that his chosen path lead him not only 
to the necessity o f  realizing absolute evil but also to the gradual realization that this evil was 
intimately connected with an aesthetics o f the ugly and the vile. Which is to say: transposition 
into poetry o f  his own imaginary that was haunted by negativity (Sartre, 1971: 160). This 
complicity o f evil and a certain aesthetics gave G enet the chance to narrate his life and thus 
elucidate the specificity o f his own destiny. The reader75, an integral part o f the society that
731 am o f  course referring to the reader who is contemporaneous to the work.
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stigmatised Genet, ultimately comes face-to-face with this narrativised evil and sees in it the 
reflected image o f his own mean-spiritedness and hypocrisy because this evil is his, it 
originated in his bourgeois bad faith and is now returned to him enhanced and crystallised.
W hat is strikingly original in Saint Genet is that for the first time Sartre seems to 
acknowledge the decisive role o f the environm ent and the defining influence o f the family in 
the development o f  the individual. For the first time we are made to understand that what an 
individual does is as much the product o f  his initial ‘existential’ project as it is the product o f 
a myriad o f  actions, o f  situations and o f  social, political, economic and ideological structures. 
Consequently, one, following Sartre in Saint Genet, is less likely to treat the individual in the 
absolutist terms Sartre himself treated it in his previous works. W hat is brought to the 
surface in Saint Genet is the complex dialectics o f  individuality and social structures. W hat is 
o f  particular interest in that foregrounding is the extensive use o f  ethical language that Sartre 
uses throughout the work. This emphasis makes Saint Genet a prototypical piece o f  ethical 
criticism, one that engages with the ethical level o f the narrative under examination without 
being guided by the sort o f short-sighted normative principles that so often transform similar 
critiques into moralising platitudes. Sartre investigates the ethical repercussions o f G enet’s 
fundamental choice o f life and his narrative allows the original text to reveal the underlying 
moral battles, dilemmas, and failures that animate it. This process presents Genet as a figure 
trying to resolve the inherent (unsurpassable) difficulties o f  opting for evil as the modality o f 
his being-in-the-world by consistently striving to enact the most disturbing aspects o f that 
evil. Since for Sartre evil is non-Being, complete nothingness given that good is complete 
plenitude, G enet is presented as attempting to assert being by non-being, to attain a singular 
freedom through the nihilation o f  being, which means transforming “acts into gestures, 
being into imaginary', the world into phantasmagoria and himself into an appearance” (ibid, 
161). The poetic resolution o f  the problems that his freedom has posed for him is now 
appearing as a viable alternative. G enet’s literature is bom  out o f  the impossibility to find
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shelter even in the m ost remote areas o f  evil since this evil ultimately destroys even itself qua 
absolute evil76. By writing G enet manages to rescue and finally assert his existence and 
incorporate his whole life into his original project. His value is his singularity, his refusal to 
be consumed by evil, his determination to come back and haunt us by using one o f the most 
effective weapons in our arsenal, namely bourgeois morality; precisely what haunted his 
entire life. At the end Genet manages to emerge victorious even if that victory is only 
verbal.77
Saint Genet is a unique book in many respects. O n the one hand it offers us a formidable 
application o f  the peculiarly Sartrean methodology o f existential biography announcing The 
Family Idiot some twenty years later. This brilliantly applied phenomenological criticism, 
which implicidy criticizes the two methodologies that cast their shadow in virtually every 
work o f  Sartre, namely Marxism and psychoanalysis78, interprets everything from the point o f 
view o f the subjectivity79 behind artistic creation. O n the other hand Saint Genet is a polemical 
text o f ethical criticism since its subject matter is a writer who, as a person, is in many ways 
the exact antithesis o f the sort o f writer that is guaranteed a place in the (bourgeois) canon of 
French letters. G enet was a thief and a homosexual and his chosen life had pushed him to 
the outer margins o f the ‘civilized society’ o f his time. By so closely attending to G enet’s 
(moral and aesthetic) choices Sartre makes a radical gesture that is in itself even more 
im portant than the content o f the book through which it is made. This sympathetic yet 
critical80 reading o f a marginal and even menacing subjectivity puts the radical, anti-systemic
76 Sartre expresses much the same when his says that “it was the impossibility o f  living that made Genet” (ibid, 
570) meaning Genet the writer, the artist.
77 The penultimate chapter o f  the book is entitled “My Victory is Verbal and I Owe It to the Sumptuousness o f  
the Terms”.
78 In the last chapter o f  the book entitled “Please Use Genet Properly” Sartre states his intention in writing this 
book by making a specific negative reference to both Marxism and psychoanalysis right at the beginning o f  the 
first paragraph.
79 The extent to which this subjectivity is fully transparent to itself is not absolutely clear. Sartre, the Romantic 
often, even in Saint Genet, seems to imply that it is. Later on in his life Sartre will be more hesistant is asserting 
that consciousness is fully conscious o f  itself.
80 Sartre is never duped into glorifying the exotic other-wordliness o f  Genet5s life-style. More specifically, when 
it comes to the fitter’s implicit moral choices Sartre makes clear that Genet’s evil is the negative complement o f  
the bourgeois good that ostracized him in the first place. Many years fitter he will mention Genet in The ¥  amity
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orientation o f the intellectual Sartre into relief and will eventually inspire others to pursue 
this critical ethos even further.81
Saint Genet is far more interesting and rewarding than Baudelaire and Mallarme, as it shows 
Sartre at his best trying to reconstruct and justify the whole complex o f events that make up 
another human being’s life. Even if the dialectical relation o f  history and subjectivity is still 
only schematically theorised the first step towards a totalising, unitary conception has been 
put firmly in place. Later on, a more dialectical approach to the relation between history and 
individual destiny will emerge as a result o f  Sartre’s more serious engagement with Marxism.
A n  A p p r a is a l  o f  Sa r t r e ’s M i d -P e r i o d  W r i t i n g s
One cannot be [morally] converted alone. In other words, 
ethics is not possible unless everyone is ethicaL 
Notebooks for an Ethics
Sartre’s early literary theory and criticism is made intelligible through the concepts 
elaborated during the early phase o f his philosophical career. What is Literature? may be 
conceptually founded on the concepts o f  radical freedom and responsibility and yet another 
dimension begins to appear in this work, one that will eventually lead Sartre to address the 
question o f  history which is so conspicuously absent from his early work. This dimension is 
the product o f  the further elaboration o f the concept o f ‘situation’, the gradual transition 
from a purely phenomenological description and understanding o f ‘events’ and ‘situations’ to 
one which acknowledges explicidy the framework o f history and its determining role in the 
articulation o f  individual projects. Sartre’s abrupt awakening from his earlier state o f political
Idiot and he will have this to say: "...by declaring that he was the Thief and pledging himself to evil, Genet did 
nothing more than recognize the absolute primacy o f  the values in whose name he was condemned." (Sartre 
1987: 175).
81 The founding text o f  the anti-psychiatry movement (Roland Laing and David Cooper’s Reason and Violence: A  
Decade of Sartre’s Philosophy 1950-1960) deals extensively (the whole second chapter) with Scant Genet.
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quietism in the years before the war had profound effects in his subsequent formulation o f 
the fundamental questions regarding human life. O ne such first attempt to rethink and adjust 
his conception o f  freedom82 is his concept o f  ‘situation’ which allowed Sartre to see m an’s 
actions as always happening in concrete, historically determined circumstances with a 
particular, historically determined, aim as their inherent finality. By allowing such a generous 
concession to historical forces Sartre could address some specific ethical issues in a manner 
that his earlier ontological work could n o t
O ne o f  these specific ethical issues is the relation o f  the writer and his public through the 
mediation o f the literary work.. I have already described this relation as it was envisioned by 
Sartre but what I wish to emphasize here is the essentially moral quality o f this reciprocal 
bond between writer and reader. It is this moral conception o f two ‘absolutely’ free agents, 
taking part in a process o f mutual recognition and justification that marks Sartre’s early 
theory; and it is precisely this moral outlook that proves to be the most problematic element 
in this otherwise brave and occasionally brilliant book, that is What is Literature?. I say 
problematic because although it was Sartre’s intention to propose a political, as well as an 
aesthetic, alternative to the hitherto prevalent forms o f writing what he offered in the end 
only partially succeeded in developing a fully fledged political theory o f literature. The reason 
is that, in agreement with his main philosophical premises, Sartre posited the absolute and 
irreducible freedom of the individual agents involved in the production-consumption process 
o f  literature. It was this continually affirmed ontological status o f a free subjectivity 
addressing another free subjectivity that not only denied the psychological complexities o f 
any situated consciousness (his adamant refusal o f  any unconscious determining factor such 
as repressed desire, the correlation o f  such a desire with power etc.) but also denied or rather
82 It has to be said at this point that a lot o f  the controversy caused by the early Sartrean notion o f  ‘freedom’ is 
due to the specific content o f  that notion in Being and Nothingness which more or less equates it with absolute 
transcendence, and more specifically the movement from what is (the domain o f  ontology) to what is not (the 
domain o f  (a normative) ethics). For a critical discussion o f  Sartrean ‘freedom’ see Thomas Anderson, 1979 & 
1993, Detmer, 1988 & Stone 1985.
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evaded the social complexities o f the interaction o f agents within the framework o f  
collectivities ridden with power struggles. That is not to say that Sartre fell prey to a 
mystificatory idealism nor that he wished to keep silent about the pressing political issues 
that his literary theory clearly wished to address. It is rather to say that he was — due to the 
fact that his philosophy was still being very much dominated by the idea o f the Cartesian 
cogito -  compelled to think o f both writer and reader in an ambivalent fashion 
paradigmatically expressed when he treated the former as thoroughly situated in history and 
thus structurally dependent on it and at the same time as someone who by writing a book 
appeals to the freedom o f other men who in turn must, by accepting his offering, affirm his 
and their freedom as well. While in Being and Nothingness such an insistence on inalienable 
freedom might have seemed consistent with his ahistorical treatment o f  being in What is 
Literature? the relation that was established between history and individual freedom seemed 
somewhat forced and certainly underspecified. The thrust o f  the argument then was not a 
clear exposition o f  how this purely ontological freedom can co-exist with the exigencies o f 
history but rather a formulation o f  a new categorical imperative only this time in ethico- 
aesthetic terms. W hat this entailed was that the politically progressive elements in Sartre’s 
thought, manifest and beyond doubt though they might have been, they sprung from a 
conception o f  the human that was ^>nr-historical and which never really dealt with the messy 
nature o f  actual history. Being an ontological feature human freedom was inassimilable to 
history, unmodifiable and always there even if its practical, actual manifestation was nowhere 
to be seen or experienced. The consequence o f such a view was that Sartre’s unflinching 
dedication to socialism seemed to emanate not so much from the actuality o f  human 
existence but rather from its potentiality, that is the (abstract) possibility o f freedom inherent 
in it. This uneasy relationship between an idealist premise and its politically charged
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consequences in Sartre’s early critical practice is, I think, what gives his work its distinctive 
moral tone.83
A nother problematical element in Sartre’s thought during this period was the role o f the 
writer in society. In What is Literature?, one may read Sartre attributing more importance to 
the political efficacy o f the writer than a historically informed dialectical analysis would allow 
for. Mark Poster has argued that Sartre was at that time “assuming for literature (...) the 
mande o f social change” and by implication “assuming for him self the role o f revolutionary 
leader” (Poster, 1975: 137). This Romantic notion o f the liberative function o f the writer was 
still a feature o f  a bourgeois woridview, radical perhaps but idealist nevertheless. Sartre was, 
during the forties, clearly unable to detect the strong idealist current in his work that 
jeopardised the effectiveness o f his overall argument in favour o f a socialist politics. Some 
twenty years later Sartre would reconsider the role o f  the intellectual in society and propose a 
radically different view on the subject, one that would avoid much o f the idealist overtones 
o f  his earlier thought. In his “A Plea for Intellectuals” (1965)84 Sartre still asserted that the 
intellectual85, by virtue o f the nature o f the contradictions inherent in his class position, is 
obliged
to commit himself in every one o f  the conflicts o f  our time, because all o f  them - class, national, 
and racial conflicts - are particular effects o f  the oppression o f  the under-privileged and because, 
in each o f  these conflicts, he finds himself, as a man conscious o f his own oppression, on the 
side o f  the oppressed. (Sartre, 1972: 254)
W hat we have here is the re-affirmation o f the radical role which the intellectual is called to 
play and in fact the whole text follows the same line o f  argument as the texts in W hat is
83 Fredic Jameson has also argued that Sartrean commitment is “an ethical category long before it is a political 
one” (Jameson, 1971: 279).
84 A series o f  three lectures delivered by Sartre at Tokyo and Kyoto in September-October 1965.
85 For Sartre, by definition petit-bourgeois and potentially radical.
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Literature? only this time with a Marxist terminology and a far more explicit acknowledgement 
o f  the contradictory nature o f the intellectual’s role. W hat is particularly im portant though is 
that in the late sixties Sartre is too conscious (to the point o f presenting a rather pessimistic 
picture) o f the impossibility o f the intellectual unequivocally offering himself to the struggle 
o f  the working class as the gap that divides the two is unbridgeable and no moral or political 
‘good intentions’ are sufficient for such a crossing over. In a statement that is m ost 
illuminating as well as painfully autobiographical Sartre asserts that
if  petty-bourgeois intellectuals are led by their own contradictions to align themselves with the 
working class, they will serve it at their risk and peril; they may act as theorists but never as 
organic intellectuals o f  the proletariat, and this contradiction, no matter how well it may be 
understood, will never be resolved, (ibid, 159).
W hat appeared in What is Literature? as too much indebted to the Romantic revolutionism 
o f  the nineteenth century was now presented in full acknowledgement o f  the political 
exigencies o f  the class struggle. The intellectual and by extension theory and literature are still 
‘condem ned’ to assert, promote and safeguard freedom from all kinds o f oppression but they 
can no longer take the place o f a proper political action organized by those most affected by 
injustice.
B e y o n d  L it er a t u r e: T o w a r d s  a D ialectical  Sy n t h e sis  o f  In d iv id u a l  a n d  
H istory
Eight years after the publication o f Saint Genet Sartre published his second major 
philosophical work under the tide Critique o f Dialectical Reason. In fact only the first volume o f 
the work — Theory o f Practical Ensembles — was published while the second — The Intelligibility o f 
History — was effectively abandoned by Sartre and was published after his death. This work 
was the product o f a decade-long close relationship with Marxism not only in its
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institutionalised form, the PCF but also with Marxist theory itself. Following his spectacular 
and controversial public support for the PCF with the publication o f The Communists and the 
Peace in 1952 and his equally spectacular, yet less controversial, condemnation o f  USSR policy 
and eventual distantiation form the PCF with the publication o f The Ghost oj Stalin in 1957 
the Critique is a major attempt to reconceptualise the relation o f  subject and history through 
an extremely rigorous application o f the dialectical m ethod to the issues under consideration. 
These are philosophical issues such as, for example, the relation o f analytical with dialectical 
reason and the relation o f dialectics with history; political and historical issues such as the 
structure o f  mass-movements and their eventual decline, the structure o f collectives such as 
the series, the fused, and the institutionalised group. Yet the main task o f this work is above 
all to develop a critical method that would eventually make history intelligible. Intelligible in 
the sense o f  being transparent to dialectical reason, which alone, according to Sartre, can help 
us com prehend the process o f never-ending totalisations and retotalisations o f  both 
individual and collective actions. In this process o f constant dialectical transformation the 
individual as agent on the one hand and history on the other are at all times worked upon by 
each other in a continuous process which, in its entirety, is nothing but the movement o f 
human history itself. This human history is still founded on the individual which, through his 
inalienable and irreducible subjectivity, is still considered the primal element which sets 
everything else in motion. However, this individual is now presented in a manner quite 
different from the way it was conceived and presented in Sartre’s earlier works. Whereas 
earlier the ('artesian cogito apprehends itself as being-for-itself, thrown into a world which is 
devoid o f meaning and thus essentially hostile and unstable now the individual, as previously 
conceived
disappears from historical categories: alienation, the practico-inert, series, groups, classes, the
components o f  History, labour, individual and communal praxis — the individual has lived, and he
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still lives, all o f  these in interiority. But if  there is a movement o f  dialectical Reason, it is this 
movement which produces his life, this membership o f  a particular class, o f  certain milieux and 
o f  certain groups. (Sartre, 1976: 51)
Since it is the movement o f history that effectively ‘produces’ the individual he must 
proceed in his understanding o f his whole situation “so as to deny its distinctiveness” and 
“to seek its dialectical intelligibility within human development as a whole” (ibid, 51). History 
becomes the outer limit o f intelligibility o f the human situation and the being-for-itself is 
now by virtue o f  its historicity a component, albeit an active and im portant one, o f 
something infinitely larger that itself. Yet history itself is not self-produced but created 
through the ever-repeated totalisations o f  individual actions. It is still men who make history 
even with the crucial qualification — itself borrowed from Marx — that what they make is 
under circumstances that they have not chosen. I f  history has triumphandy entered Sartre’s 
political philosophy it is for one reason only: to show that the individual makes no sense 
without history and that history itself is unintelligible if  it is not predicated on the actions o f 
living men. The repercussions o f such a dialectical conception o f  subjectivity and history will 
be — as we shall see later on in The Family Idiot — far reaching for Sartre’s literary criticism.
The whole breadth o f the Critique is enormous and therefore I shall examine only what is 
relevant to the questions I wish to address. For that I shall turn my attention to the question 
o f ethics as this is dealt with in this work. 'Hie Critique is not a treatise on ethics nor does it 
specifically address problems on the ethical level. It is an attem pt to establish, on a grand 
scale, a philosophical basis for any future anthropology86 providing a unique vocabulary, a 
well-defined aim and a methodology that — as Sartre himself claimed87 — would place 
existential philosophy firmly in place within a broader Marxist framework. Because o f that
86 In the non-technical, general sense o f  ‘science o f  man’.
S7 “I regard Marxism as the untranscendable philosophy for our time, and I believe that the ideology o f  
existence, along with its ’comprehensive' method, is an enclave within Marxism itself, both produced and 
rejected by Marxism” (ibid, 822).
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the moral problematic o f the Critique is to a large extent implicit in the statements about 
human collectivities and the telos o f  history. Yet, there are certain explicit statements about 
ethics and morality that provide the general framework within which one should understand 
the ethical m om ent in human history. The first appearance o f ethics in the Critique is in a 
chapter about matter and more particularly at the point when Sartre introduces one o f  his 
very im portant new concepts, namely scarcity. According to Sartre ethics is constituted as a 
discreet level o f  human life only in situations where scarcity prevails, and as scarcity in 
Sartre’s admittedly controversial anthropology is the founding relation o f man and matter 
ethics is presented as a futile attempt to rationalize and consequendy handle a situation o f 
global insecurity and intense antagonism. It is worth quoting Sartre at some length here:
The first movement o f  ethics, (...) is the constitution o f  radical evil and o f  Maruchaeism; it 
values and evaluates the breaking o f  the reciprocity o f  immanence by interiorised scarcity (.. .)  
but only by conceiving it as a product o f  the praxis o f  the Other. The anti-human (le contre-homme) 
in fact tries to destroy men by sharing their ends and adopting their means. The break occurs the 
moment this deceptive reciprocity reveals the deadly danger which it contains, or, in other words, 
when it reveals that it is impossible for all those bound by reciprocal links to stay on the soil 
which supports and feeds them. And let us not make the mistake o f  thinking that this interiorised 
impossibility characterises individuals subjectively; on the contrary it makes everyone objectively 
dangerous for the Other and makes the concrete existence o f  each individual endanger that o f  the 
Other. Thus man is objectively constituted as non-human, and this non-humanity is expressed in 
praxis by the perception o f evil as the structure o f  the Other, (ibid, 132).
Sidestepping for the moment the question regarding the validity o f postulating such a 
human condition what immediately strikes us here is the fact that human beings are, by 
virtue o f  their inhabiting an earth with scarce resources, objectively dangerous for each other. 
That means that whatever the feelings towards others may be from a subjective point o f view 
the condition o f  alterity is found not in the dark recesses o f  the human soul or in the
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ontological nature o f  our being as he claimed in Being and Nothingness but in the very structure 
o f  material existence. The path to a materialistic conception o f ethics is now wide open, and 
unavoidably the initial question is posed even m ore urgently. Why is it that the initial state o f 
man is only conceivable within the context o f  scarcity? Surely the alternative o f plenitude 
would equally make sense especially when one is implicitly referring to a primal state o f 
h u m an k in d  and no t necessarily to a state in recent recorded history. Also, one could argue 
with equal conviction that what in fact happened was that an original state contained both 
possibilities at once. Both plenitude and scarcity could be then conceived as the two basic 
modalities o f  a chosen way o f life depending on a combination o f  other factors which 
although ultimately related to matter would not be direcdy attributable to one o f  its perceived 
aspects. In other words one could argue that nature is neither governed by the laws o f 
scarcity nor does it conversely offer everything in abundance, but rather enters into the 
sphere o f  human interest (always) under very specific conditions. Scarcity need no t be 
considered inescapable but this issue falls beyond the scope o f my discussion88. Sartre himself 
gives no justification for his axiomatic positing o f  scarcity89 as ultimately determining human 
relations but he does give us some extremely evocative sentences about the relation between 
man and his worst enemy: himself-as-other. Nothing, he declares, “could be more terrifying 
for man than a species which is intelligent, carnivorous and cruel, and which can understand 
and outwit hum an intelligence, and whose aim is precisely the destruction o f  man” (ibid, 
132). This species is o f course none other than the human species in the context o f scarcity. 
Such a relation only results in conflict and the imperative to fight for survival. For Sartre, this 
imperative to engage in deadly combat with the other is the manifest form o f any ethics
88 For a wider discussion o f  this and other related concepts see Lukes (1985) especially ch. 3. The footnote in 
page 32 is especially informative in its attempt to remind us o f  the possible meanings o f  scarcity in the context 
o f  political economy.
Sartre does make certain allowances regarding the possibility o f  scarcity not being a basic feature o f  all 
possible human existence but he insists that our history is one determined by scarcity, (pp. 123-124). However, 
the question that still remains unanswered is, as Christina Howells formulates it, whether scarcity “reflects need 
or greed?” (Howells, 1988: 104). For a more detailed discussion see also Aronson, 1980 and Poster, 1979.
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functioning under the law o f scarcity. Ethics is now conceived not as the general abstract 
form o f a categorical imperative but as “the form o f the destructive imperative” (ibid, 133); 
evil in this situation is conceived only so that it may be destroyed. In contradistinction to the 
greater number o f  moral theories that either explicidy or implicitly start from a conception o f 
good in order to arrive at a conception o f bad or evil Sartre maintains that ethics in a 
condition o f scarcity can only and does indeed start from a conception o f evil as radical (and 
threatening) alterity. This is, according to him, an ideological trap o f  gigantic proportions. It 
is nothing more than the transformation o f natural constraints into inescapable natural facts 
and it presupposes “a suffered distance, a lived impotence, and, in a way, the discovery o f 
scarcity as destiny -  in short, a veritable domination o f man by the interiorised material 
environm ent” (ibid, 134). This last sentence holds the key for Sartre’s new conception o f 
ethics as the result — a kind o f defence mechanism — that is produced by the sheer 
incapability o f  man to rationally administer and control his natural resources. The more man 
is mystified by matter the more the latter comes back to haunt him as the inescapable fate of 
relative or absolute deprivation and the need to fight in order to survive. The more man 
allows himself to be dominated by matter the more he considers his own species as potential 
enemies and not as potential allies. This transition from an idealistic conception o f  ethics 
based on the irreducibility o f human freedom to a materialistic one based on the structure of 
matter is the one most decisive advance in Sartre’s long engagement with the problem o f 
morality. Yet it must be noted that freedom in its Sartrean conception is still operative as a 
concept in all his statements about ethics. Through a series o f  extremely detailed arguments 
he states that the violence I alluded to earlier, “is always both a reciprocal recognition o f 
freedom and a negation (either reciprocal or u m v o ca l)  o f this freedom through the 
intermediary o f  the inertia o f exteriority” (ibid, 736). I b e  reciprocal violence o f  man in a 
context o f  scarcity is still postulated on them  being essentially free, as, according to Sartre, 
only free men can choose to destroy or oppress one another. Speaking about the particular
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violence suffered by the proletariat Sartre reaffirms this by stating that even this “does not 
eliminate freedom (•••)> it makes freedom its accomplice while allowing it no option but 
obedience” (ibid, 737). This allows for an even m ore nuanced conception o f ethics according 
to which not only need and scarcity but also freedom, perpetually affirmed and negated at 
the same time, are the main defining elements o f  worldly morality.
'Ifiis still general, anthropological view o f  ethics is often restated, in the course o f the 
book, with regard to specific aspects or periods o f  human history. In one o f these instances 
Sartre claims that ethics in its most basic form as a system o f values alienates human praxis 
itself and not merely the aims or the objective results o f  that praxis. As a result
(.. .) freedom as a human relation reveals itself, in the world o f  exploitation and oppression, in 
opposition to this world and as a negation o f  the inhuman through values, and (.. .) it reveals itself 
there as alienated and loses itself in it and (.. .) by means of values, it realises nevertheless the 
untranscendable exigency imposed on it by practico-inert being, while still contributing to an 
organisation which carries within it the possibilities o f  reorganising the practico-inert field (ibid,
249n)
W hat is said here is that ethics, despite the fact that it alienates the m ost precious 
resource o f  humankind, praxis itself, is by virtue o f  the structure o f  our world the only means 
through which man is able to articulate his desire for a transcendence o f that particular 
structure. The thing that enslaves man is the one thing that he uses to deliver himself from 
that slavery. This is a vicious circle where two antithetical but complementary aspects o f  the 
ethical m om ent work both against and with him in the process o f transforming matter into 
goods and nature into culture. What is o f  the utm ost importance here is the allusion to the 
inevitability o f  ethics in a world which has not yet managed to radically transform itself as 
well as matter in such a way as to allow praxis, that is free, constructive, uninhibited human 
activity to “be revealed as the sole ethical relation between people in so far as together they
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dominate matter” (ibid, 249n). In the absence o f such a world, at this point in Sartre’s 
thought given explicitly in the form o f a communist collectivity, the system o f moral values 
that we come to recognize as our morality is bound to found new systems and at the same 
time transcend them towards other systems in a never-ending process.
Every system o f  values rests on exploitation and oppression; every system o f  values effectively 
negates exploitation and oppression (...); every system o f  values confirms exploitation and 
oppression (...); every system o f values, in so far as it is based on a social practice, contributes 
directly or indirectly to establishing devices and apparatuses which, when the time comes (...) 
will allow this particular oppression and exploitation to be negated; every system o f  values, at the 
moment o f  its revolutionary efficacity, ceases to be a system, and values cease to be values: their 
character was due to the fact that they could not be transcended; and circumstances, 
overthrowing structures, institutions and exigencies, transform them into transcended 
significations: systems are reabsorbed into the organisations which they have created and the 
organisations transformed by the overthrow o f  the social field, integrate themselves into new  
collective actions, carried out in the context o f  the new exigencies; and they disclose new values.
(ibid, 249n)
I f  that is what actually happens then it seems that there is no reason not to accept the 
possibility — as Sartre clearly does -  o f  putting an end to this vicious circle by reaffirming the 
essential unity between praxis and value. But would that effectively break the vicious circle or 
would it found a new radically different system o f values from the ones we have known thus 
far? Would that finally free man from the tyranny o f  various ethical systems always tacidy 
complicit with the dominant order?
By the time he was writing the Critique, Sartre was well aware o f  the necessity to 
distinguish between ethics in general and bourgeois ethics. Given his still active faith in the 
centrality o f  the individual in the process o f history, it was natural that the ethical problem 
would be high in his priorities even if  the current dominant form o f moral thought
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emanating from capitalist relations o f  production and bourgeois ideology is rejected. By 
identifying bourgeois humanism “as solidified ideological violence” (ibid, 753) Sartre was 
pointing to the impossibility o f adopting this ideology and this ethics as a starting point for 
the elaboration o f  any revolutionary theory. However, he was also well aware that until this 
revolutionary theory is put into practice, and until this practice has the desired results, we 
should never shy away from the major ethical issues that are part and parcel o f our being-in- 
the-world. His scattered statements in the Critique regarding all these questions do not lead to 
a comprehensive moral theory nor do they enable us to say what would be the precise nature 
o f  an ethics based on the free, non-alienated praxis o f all men. W hat they do enable us to see 
is that any questions about existing ethical systems must always — if they claim to be pointing 
towards a dialectical understanding o f  our world — take into consideration the existing power 
relations, the fact o f the unequal distribution o f  wealth, and the alienated character o f ever)7 
human praxis under condition o f domination and oppression. They also enable us to 
understand that any questions about future ethical systems are — at the present time at least -  
essentially philosophical questions and not practical ones. To become practical, the various 
structures (ideological, economic, political and social) that are the foundation and ultimate 
justification o f those systems need to be radically transformed prior to any normative 
consideration o f ethics.
I f  the Critique gave us only the general philosophical problematic and did not offer 
anything specific about ethics and revolutionary morality in particular his subsequent work 
showed a renewed interest in the question o f ethics and its relation to Marxism. His lecture 
on ethics at the Instituto G ram sd (1964)90 and his planned but bever actually delivered 
lecture at Cornell University (1965)91 are exemplary in this respect for they clearly show the
90 Lecture given at The Instituto Gramsd in Rome on May 23, 1964 at a conference on “Ethics and Sodety” 
under the auspices o f  the Italian Communist Party. My sources for this text are Jeanson, 1966: 137-138, the 
extract “Determination et liberte” in Contat and Rybalka, 1970: 735-745, Stone and Bowman, 1986 and 
Anderson, 1993: ch. 7.
91 My sources for this text are Sartre, 2005 and Stone and Bowman, 1991.
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transformation o f  Sartre’s earlier thought into a more dialectical and materialist account o f 
issues such as the question o f the possibility o f  a socialist morality and the role o f the 
intellectual. In these texts Sartre attempts, while using the conceptual arsenal o f the Critique, 
to link ethics with doing, a very significant passage from the conception o f ‘freedom’ to the 
new thoroughly dialectical concept o f praxis. This transition allows Sartre to ground ethics in 
the materiality o f the world, as this is evidenced by the concept o f ‘need’ first elaborated in 
the Critique. Sartre argues that need is the ultimate foundation o f ethics because need 
represents a lack whose object can only be retrieved in the future, a positive future which is 
what all praxis inherently points to. Everything that we do regardless o f the counterfinality 
introduced by history aims at the fulfilment o f  a felt need. Therefore it inherently posits the 
self-realization o f  man as a norm. This linking o f  ethics and need allows Sartre to develop a 
more materialist account o f ethics than the ones he had attempted in his earlier work. For 
Sartre in the mid-sixties ethics is not so much a structure o f values o f  the being-for-itself as 
an axiological structure inherent in the m ost basic o f human acts. The mere fact o f  doing 
something is, by virtue o f  its intention to transform the material world in order to fulfil a 
need, an ethical act as it bears within it the promise o f future plenitude and o f universal 
satisfaction. W hat is more, it is ethical because it posits humanity as a yet unrealized but 
potentially realizable project It is very unfortunate that this second attempt to elaborate an 
ethical theory was also left unfinished and therefore we are left with a series o f arguments but 
not an overall comprehensive theory.
T h e  Fam ily  Id io t : H istory  a n d  Su bjectivity  in  a  D ialectical  Sy n t h e sis
The Critique o f Dialectical Reason was the last major philosophical work o f Sartre. In the 
years that followed Sartre would write occasional pieces, give innumerable interviews, and 
generally lend his genius to a great num ber o f  progressive political causes around the world. 
His only major work which would occupy him for the rest o f  his life and which like the
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Critique remained unfinished would be The Family Idiot, his monumental study o f Gustave 
Flaubert. This work, based almost entirely on the theoretical work undertaken in the Critique, 
attempted to examine Flaubert’s life and work within the framework o f a very specific 
interpretive methodology. According to it the individual (the author under scrutiny), his body 
o f  work and history would be shown to constitute a multilayered structure whose every level 
(the personal, the historical, and their mutual objectification which was the work itself) found 
its ultimate signification in its particular relation to and co-articulation with the other levels. 
This task, which in the hands o f  Sartre becomes a real tour de force o f critical writing, is carried 
out on three levels. Firsdy, there is the attentive examination o f  the personal, subjective level: 
Flaubert, as a child bom  into a petit-bourgeois family, interiorizes the particular quality o f his 
own family life, the aspirations o f  his parents, his problematic relation with his older bother, 
his inability to comply successfully with the demands imposed on him, his neurotic escape 
from his responsibilities as a future bourgeois man. Secondly, there is the examination o f the 
historical level: France during the greatest part o f  the nineteenth century, the rise o f 
capitalism, the ever changing political situations during the Second Empire, the pauperization 
o f  the new industrial proletariat, the crucial, contradictory role o f the petite-bourgeoisie 
during these years. Finally, there is the level o f the literary works themselves: each articulating 
the felt reality o f Flaubert, each in its own way a means o f transcending his situation towards 
something else, each providing an instance o f  the process o f  history and its subjective 
interiorization by Flaubert himself.
Ib e se  levels are processed, as it were, in Sartre’s analysis with the use o f the progressive- 
regressive method. According to this m ethod the critic passes from the general analysis o f  
history (the progressive stage) to the concrete situation o f  the individual (the regressive 
stage). In other words, through this back and forth movement he attempts to establish both: 
a) the determining function o f macro-phenomena such as the mode o f production, the 
political history and the socio-economic stratification, and b) the irreducible specificity o f
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micro-phenomena, such as the psychology o f the individual, his choices and consequent 
actions, in other words his project. This last notion is crucial to the problematic o f The Family 
Idiot. According to Sartre it is the project that best encapsulates the dialectical relation of 
subjectivity and objectivity, the one thing that allows us to identify the essential unity and 
also the tension between the exteriority o f  the world and the interiority o f the individual life. 
In the Search fo r a Method Sartre defines the project
as the subjective surpassing o f  objectivity toward objectivity, and stretched between the 
objective conditions o f  the environment and the objective structures o f  the field o f  possibles, 
represents in itself the moving unity o f  subjectivity and objectivity7, those cardinal determinants o f  
activity. (Sartre, 1968: 97)
The subjective appears then “as a necessary m om ent in the objective process” (ibid, 97) 
and consequently the material conditions which govern human relations in order “to become 
real conditions o f praxis, they must be lived in the particularity o f  particular relations” (ibid, 
97). Thus, Flaubert’s genius was the product o f the determining forces o f his time. Flaubert 
the man was able to become Flaubert the great writer, because he found himself in certain 
historically conditioned situations which he in turn attempted to transcend, avoid or come to 
terms with in his own particular manner, a manner which owes as much to him as to the vast 
field o f history surrounding him.
Everything in The Family Idiot revolves around Sartre’s attem pt to elucidate the movement 
o f  history through the individual interiorization o f it and the subsequent re-exteriorization o f 
the transformed subjectivity in the form o f  praxis. Through his projects man, in our case 
Flaubert, moves outward towards history which he, in turn, partly produces through his acts 
and his works. Consequently these acts, as part o f  the objective field o f  history, partly 
determine him and others in a continuous process o f  transformation o f all the sides involved 
in this process. However, it must be noted that Sartre does not want to imply that either side
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can exist independently o f  each other. The project that effectively binds both o f  them 
together had already been defined, in the Search fo r a Method’ as man’s “peculiar structure” and 
also his “immediate relation with the O ther than oneself, beyond the given and constituted 
elements, this perpetual production o f  oneself by work and p ra x ii’ (ibid, 150-151). O ur 
existence then is “neither a will nor a need nor a passion” yet all these elements participate in 
the structure we call man’s existence, one which is not “a stable substance which rests in 
itself, but rather a perpetual disequilibrium, a wrenching away from itself with all its body” 
(ibid, 151). This wrenching away is towards history and in it this flight from oneself acquires 
its significance. In writing Madame Eovary Flaubert attempts to present in fictional form a 
totalisation that he was unable to attain in his real life. His project involves him in a process 
whereby he must try to substitute ideafced beauty (the density o f being, according to Sartre) 
for a life embarrassingly devoid o f  such beauty. Transcending his petit-bourgeois origins in 
an imaginary form Flaubert nevertheless preserves it in this work by means o f his particular 
style thus producing something that objectively is a testimony o f both his individual reaction 
to his situation and to the situation itself. It is by inscribing Flaubert’s subjectivity that 
Madame Bovary becomes an index o f  an entire historical period.
W hat is striking about The Tamity Idiot is that the references to Flaubert’s choices during 
his transition from childhood to adolescence and finally to adulthood are always related to 
his immediate surrounding (his family) and his own way o f living this relation (Flaubert’s 
neuroses). Flaubert’s moral and aesthetic choices are examined in the light o f this set o f 
relations with his familial and social background and come to give shape to Flaubert’s 
essential aim which was to invent literature as a way out o f  the m ost obviously negative 
aspects o f  his life. This examination o f  the moral aspects o f Flaubert’s life in relation to his 
life-project effectively negate the metaphysical quality o f  traditional moral criticism by 
identifying the ethical as a m om ent o f  the larger totalisation that is the project itself; and 
since the project is the mediating link between subjectivity and history the ethical is further
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transformed up to the point where it virtually vanishes. W hat is left is the m ovem ent o f 
history through the mediating presence o f  the family and the individual’s strategies in coping 
with the exigencies o f that movement. Sartre clearly wishes to apply a hermeneutics that will 
eventually allow the individual to acquire significance as a historical agent, thus appearing 
through his project(s) as both  constituting and constituted. The gap that separates ontology 
and ethics is still wide only this time the ontology is social, and history as the ultimate 
totalisation o f  everything m an thinks or makes is there to transform moral choices into 
specifically individual strategies for negotiating an alienated existence in an alienated world. 
In Flaubert’s case, his morality is an invention, a neurosis, a constitutive element o f  an 
alienated existence o f  a petit-bourgeois individual during the Second Empire. This neurosis, 
which is his personal reaction to a broader historical situation, corresponds with another 
objective neurosis which in Sartre’s analysis is the ideology o f  the art for art’s sake dogma 
and which is objective because it forms part o f  the culture o f  the period, or in Sartre’s 
terminology, o f the practico-inert, that is o f culture as inert materiality, as structure.
I^et me consider m ore closely the way Sartre treats Flaubert’s transition from a neurotic 
young man, hateful o f  his imposed fate (a career in law), spiteful o f his over-achieving older 
brother Achille, suffering from the lack o f  love from both his parents (an unloving m other 
and a father who was simply not interested) to a writer committed to present the inherent 
unworthiness o f  man, the futility o f both love and political change (two deeply engaging 
projects), the absolute validity o f evil as our shared destiny. Flaubert conceives art as his 
refuge from a woefully imperfect world, chooses a pessimistic and misanthropic attitude 
towards his society, ignores the possibilities inherent in his own time only to insist on the 
inevitability o f  a succession o f petty acts and unfulfilled intentions and finally, through his 
work, serves the function o f  a grand demoralizer. Sartre traces Flaubert’s m ovement through 
history — from his unfortunate beginnings in the hostile environm ent o f  his family to his 
eventual recognition by a bourgeois public that Flaubert himself despised — in a manner that
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consistently avoids facile moral categorizations, trying instead to elucidate the raison-d’itre o f  
each o f  Flaubert’s acts, choices, or psychological transformations through a dialectical 
interposing o f  personal biography and social and political history. The Flaubert that emerges 
is still an individual, ultimately irreducible to anything else but himself, but in such a relation 
to history (often unacknowledged or unconscious) so as to become a singular-universal, that 
is a man, essentially the same as all the other men with whom he shares his humanity but also 
a specific man, with a specific history, and a specific fate, different from any other, in the 
global history that ultimately provides the significance proper to his existence. Flaubert, the 
self-elect K night o f  N othingness as Sartre dubs him, becomes an (im)moral agent in his will 
to confront and ultimately sublimate to the point o f  non-existence both his failed individual 
history and, m ore crucially, the historical failures o f  his era: the failure o f  1848, the eventual 
solidification o f  bourgeois hegemony, the increasingly troubling contradictions in a society 
tom  between bourgeois oppression and the organized reaction o f  the working class. 
Flaubert’s entirely negative morality is then presented not as emanating from a distorted soul, 
seduced by sin and evil but rather as an agonising attempt to secure a notional space o f 
resolution in the imaginary field o f  art far removed from the bourgeois stupidity that he 
abhorred. It is ironic then that Flaubert, himself a well-off petit-bourgeois, internalizes this 
stupidity’ at the very m om ent he renounces it m ost vigorously, thus exhibiting in his literary 
practice qua social practice the hypocrisy and cynicism that he identified as the cardinal sins 
o f  his own class. Maubert, as presented by Sartre, is not the kind o f subject one would see 
emerging in the first case studies o f Freud; nor is he a moral agent in the tradition o f 
Aristotelian or post-Aristotelian moral philosophy. He is at once himself and other-than- 
himself, immersed in history and always in the process o f  transcending history. Therefore his 
morality is one o f  the possible modalities o f  his existence in the world. Through both  his 
immersion in history’ and his project’s totalising force this morality becomes, in Sartre’s 
narrative, an alienated politics in the form o f  refused participation in history, o f  willed
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demoralisation and more importandy, from  an aesthetic, as well as moral point o f  view, it is 
exemplified in Flaubert’s conception o f art as a privileged space o f (moral) negativity and 
(political) passivity. Finally the ethical m om ent is shown to be an instance o f negotiating the 
abrupt and unexpected incursion o f historicity into the existential subjectively totalised space 
we call an individual life.
The Family Idiot is particularly im portant for my discussion here because it shows the 
extent to  which Sartre came to acknowledge the ideological and social constraints that curtail 
the freedom o f  the individual in any given historical period. Whereas in the thirties and the 
forties Sartre would subscribe to an abstract, rather formal notion o f freedom, by the sixties 
he would recognize that individual freedom only makes sense (for a radical thinker) if  it is 
conceived as freedom  within a given, pre-determined framework. Thus he would be able to 
say, during the time that he was writing The Family Idiot that the limit he would accord to 
freedom was “ the small m ovem ent which makes o f a totally conditioned social being 
som eone w ho does no t render back completely what his conditioning has given him.” 
(Sartre, 1972: 35). It is this realization that is made evident in his work on Flaubert. His 
subject is mobilized no t by freedom as conceived by the early Sartre but by need, the new 
regulatory concept that Sartre announced in the Critique and his ‘second ethics’. Need, as a 
concept, allows Sartre to relate Flaubert with his physical and historical environm ent in such 
a way as to imply a conditioning, mainly through the family, that thoroughly determines 
Flaubert’s ostensibly ‘free’ choices. As David A. jopling has argued, in The Family Idiot it is 
clear that Sartre conceives self-determination “not as a function o f  a choice that is ultimately 
underived (...) as if we are possessed o f the power to sculpt ourselves from the ground up” 
but as “a function o f  reworking and integrating an already sculpted material.” (Jopling, 1992: 
129). ITiis acknowledgement o f  the pre-conditioning o f  the individual and therefore the tacit 
rejection o f  an absolute freedom is, along with the specific dialectic o f  history and
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subjectivity, one o f  the reasons why The Family Idiot is so crucial to our understanding o f  
Sartre’s thought on ethics and morality.
Fr e e d o m  as b o t h  P e r so n a l  a n d  P o litic a l  Pro jec t: A n  A ppraisal  o f  Sa r t r e ’s 
C ritical  T h o u g h t
In order to identify and consequendy discuss Sartre’s critical oeuvre from the viewpoint 
o f  its relation with ethics and literature one must firsdy identify the basic, foundational 
concepts o f his critical practice. From what I have said so far, it becomes evident that the 
basic concept o f  Sartre’s entire critical practice is ‘freedom ’. Freedom is a rather vague term 
meaning so many things to so many people, therefore, it is appropriate to start by identifying 
what precisely is the nature o f  such a term in Sartre’s conceptual frame. Conventional 
concepts o f  freedom  usually fall under two categories: positive and negative freedom. 
Positive freedom is the elimination o f  obstacles that hinder m an’s action whereas negative 
freedom is expressed in m an’s right to refuse to suffer the consequences o f  the exercise o f 
the freedom o f  o ther men. This binary conception o f  freedom is typical o f  liberal thought 
and to a large extent it colours the ordinary conception o f freedom as well. Sartre’s notion o f 
freedom is quite different; firsdy it is not so much concerned with m an’s actions as it is with 
m an’s ontological status, and secondly, being ontological rather than practical, it determines 
m an’s every consequent thought or act in the m ost profound manner. According to the 
liberal tradition o f  thought man should be considered free as a social m onad in his 
interaction with o ther equally free social monads. This has been the dom inant way o f  
conceiving m an’s freedom in relation to other men from the time when the bourgeoisie was 
a rising political force to the present day. It m attered litde w hether that freedom was made 
possible because o f  G od or, conversely, postulated on his non-existence. W hat really 
m attered was that freedom was conceived externally to the individual or, to put it another 
way, the ontological status o f  the individual had absolute primacy over his consequent, and
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largely contingent, status o f being free or not. In Sartre, such a conception o f  freedom is 
shown to be w rong and misguided. According to him freedom is the very structure o f  man 
not one o f  the possibilities o f his actual existence. It is the foundation o f  his being but, it 
m ust be emphasised, under a certain condition which effectively distinguishes it from  any 
other form o f  freedom. Man is bom , according to Sartre, in a world w ithout Clod and 
therefore a world in which nothing is determined a priori. Consequently, man finds himself 
literally throw n away in the world w ithout any external support for his deep-rooted 
(ontologically determined) insecurity and vulnerability. Freedom is precisely the internal 
structure o f  this accident that, according Sartre, is m an’s existence in a world devoid o f  (a 
metaphysically secured) meaning. This conception o f  freedom which characterises Sartre’s 
early work is fundam ental to our understanding o f his early ‘existential’ ethics. With G od 
absent man is facing the challenge to provide meaning to his own life by his own acts. Since, 
in Sartre’s view, no  factor has a determining force strong enough to effectively neutralize 
m an’s freedom he effectively has no other choice than to assume full responsibility for his 
actions. The ethics that resulted from such a view o f  the human situation was bound to be an 
ethics primarily concerned not with the specifics o f human life but with its very possibility: 
radical freedom as foundation o f  any human act. Such an ethics was not so much concerned 
with the precise nature o f  interaction with others, since this was perceived as rather alien and 
potentially dangerous, as with the self itself. In other words, it was to be an individualist 
ethics whose single imperative was for man to act in full awareness o f  his precarious nature 
o f  his being-in-the-world, and at the same time it was an ethics that dem anded from man to 
resist the bad faith that results from the negation o f his own responsibility for his actions, as 
these are founded on his own freedom and on that freedom alone. ITus radical elaboration 
o f the hum an situation is at the core o f Sartre’s early philosophy, casting its shadow even on 
his later dialectical works inspired by his encounter with Marxism.
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I f  his early period was marked by an ambivalent position in as far as morality and politics 
were concerned this was largely due to the peculiar social position o f  Sartre. Bom  into a 
middle-class family Sartre would be up until the break o f  W orld W ar II a more or less 
typically educated petit-bourgeois, literate, sensitive to the world but not too eager to com mit 
or unduly expose himself.1,2 After his experience during the war, his capture by the Nazis and 
his eventual realization o f  the grim facts regarding the Occupation he came to  rethink 
radically his previous social and political stance. This sudden eruption o f  history into Sartre’s 
life is, am ong o ther things, one o f the major influences on his early philosophy. Yet, if 
history, by proving to be inescapable and all-pervading, marked Sartre’s thought so did his 
class-position. As a lower middle-class intellectual Sartre in many ways epitomized the 
ideological ambiguities o f  this polymorphous, inherently ambivalent social formation that is 
the petite-bourgeoisie. Situated between classes in fierce antagonism, it is, by virtue o f  its 
relationship with each one o f  these classes, in a highly fluctuating state. Close to the interests 
o f  the working class and at the same time complicit with the established social order which 
guarantees its survival the m ost gifted members o f  this class typify and indeed in some way 
embody the contradictions o f  liberal ideology. Sartre, for a long time, was caught in this 
tension between an opening-up to the real world o f  insufferable injustice and a profound 
hesitation to elaborate a truly radical philosophy. It is for this reason that his early philosophy 
bears the traces o f  an idealism equally inspired by both his class-origin and, in direct relation 
with that, by his philosophical lineage. 'ITiis idealism determines all his early work and is 
exemplified in the typically Sartrean concept o f  ‘radical freedom ’. O ne o f  the more consistent 
accusations directed against Being and Nothingness after its publication was that Sartre 
hypostasized his own class outlook o f life and turned it into an ontology thereby effectively 
neutralizing his own radical intentions. As H erbert Marcuse remarked in 1948
92 As he himself admits in his 1975 interview to Michel Contat where he says that “before the war I thought o f  
myself simply as an individual. I was not aware o f  any ties between my individual existence and the society I was 
living in”. (Sartre, 1978: 45).
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In the concrete historical reality, the freedom o f  the “Pour-soi” (.. .) is thus nothing but one o f  
the preconditions for the possibility o f  freedom -  it is not freedom itself. Moreover isolated 
from the specific historical context in which alone the “transcendence” o f  the subject may 
become a precondition o f  freedom, and hypostatised into the ontological form o f  the subject as 
such, this transcendental liberty becomes the very token o f  enslavement. (Marcuse, 1948: 330- 
331).
Indeed one could say that what Sartre effectively hypostasized was not only his class 
oudook or the transcendence o f  the subject but something m ore vital, namely the reified 
relations o f  production o f  the capitalist world within which the Sartrean subject experiences 
his alienated and alienating freedom. Authenticity thus became the refusal to be duped by a 
world devoid o f  any agreed upon values or conception o f  a telos o f  human life. Conversely, 
bad faith was considered to  be the naive and self-destructive, from an existential point o f 
view, faith in the identity7 o f  one’s own life with the social functions in which this life 
manifests itself. ITiis fallacious reasoning led Sartre into believing that he was dealing with an 
ontological question whereas he was in fact dealing with something that makes sense, at least 
from a socialist po in t o f  view, when viewed and discussed as a symptom o f  the gradual decay 
o f  the moral and existential content o f human relations in the long history7 o f capitalism. It 
would not be long before Sartre would move in that direction and consequendy attem pt to 
radically rethink the whole issue o f individual freedom.
In the forties Sartre committed himself to achieving a reconciliation o f his existential 
ontology and his socialist aspirations, and thus to reformulating his earlier theory7 in terms o f 
a more acute awareness o f  the objective conditions that severely limit human freedom. This 
was evident in all the works o f this period and especially in W hat is Literature?. Yet, traces o f 
idealism were still present. Subjectivity as the starting point o f  philosophical inquiry, freedom 
as the ontological structure o f man, all these premises created a tension between Sartre’s
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theory and his politics. One instance o f  this tension was made apparent in his treatm ent o f 
the role o f  the writer and by extension o f  literature in general. Although Sartre was careful to 
present the writer as a historically situated, politically engaged individual, the problem  was 
essentially in the way he perceived the social and political role o f  the writer in the context o f 
France in the late forties. 'Hie contemporary writer might differ from his predecessors in that 
his vocation was now  the demonstration o f the necessity o f  the kingdom o f ends in which 
hum an freedom w ould really flourish yet he still remained the self-elected agent who was 
som ehow destined to make profound truths about human life public. It was he who had 
both the right and the capacity to disclose the truth, which in Sartre’s case, was the kind o f 
truth that would eventually lead to a socialist revolution. Sartre’s intentions were beyond 
reproach but his conception o f  the privileged role o f  the writer as the mediator between a 
fundamental truth — literature being in essence “the subjectivity o f  a society in perm anent 
revolution” (Sartre, 1988: 139) — and the reading public was too close to an idealistic 
conception o f  literature. It seems that his views on the relative unsuitability o f the PCF for a 
truly radical politics, on the one hand, and his faith in the relative superiority o f literature 
com pared with o ther artistic (or political) means on the other imply what Sartre himself 
never explicidy said as such, namely that in situations o f  political urgency and in the absence 
o f a viable political force literature can substitute politics as the only means o f  prom oting the 
idea o f  a more just society. Sartre was still caught in a contradictory situation where his 
politics seemed to be connected with his philosophy in a somewhat forced and occasionally 
artificial manner. O ne reason for that, among others, was his early rejection o f the materialist 
problematic o f  history and his refusal to acknowledge the overdetermined situation o f  the 
individual and m ore specifically o f the writer in contemporary capitalist society. Sartre’s 
insistence in substituting the ontological (extra- or ahistorical) level for the political 
(historical) one made him treat the problem s that he addressed in a manner that ultimately 
left little space for a truly effective political intervention. His almost voluntaristic theory o f
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literaryT com m itm ent was directly correlated with the unbridgeable gap between his 
ontologically conceived individual freedom and a concrete historical situation where the 
promise o f  this freedom was little more than hollow rhetoric. Yet Sartre constandy 
attem pted to bridge this gap not by renouncing the idealist premises o f  his philosophy but by 
implicitly positing an ethics; in other words by utilising the only resources that his idealist 
philosophical premises allowed for. This ethics was constandy pointing towards a socialist 
future but there still remained an unresolved problem: how could an ethical attitude prom ote 
a large-scale, radical political change when traditionally it was this very attitude that had come 
to either im pliddy o r explicitly legitimize the oppressive order o f things whose radical 
transform ation was in question here? Later on in his life Sartre would come to consider this 
problem  as one o f  the key issues in his philosophy and, as his later texts testify, he never 
ceased to question his entire philosophy in search o f an ethics truly fit for revolutionary 
politics. Yet, in the late forties the time had no t yet come for such a re-appraisaL Am ong his 
numerous texts o f  that period one particularly evocative footnote in Saint Genet succeeds in 
articulating the problem  o f  ethics in a way that I believe most faithfully captures both the 
intensity’ and the ambivalence o f  his engagement with it.
Either morality is stuff-and-nonsense or it is a concrete totality which achieves a synthesis o f  
G ood and Evil. For G ood without F2vil is Parmenidean Being, that is, Death, and Evil without 
Good is pure Nonbeing. To this objective synthesis there corresponds, as a subjective synthesis, 
the recover)' o f  negative freedom and its integration into absolute freedom or freedom properly 
so-called. 'ITie reader will understand, I hope, that what is involved here is not a Nietzschean 
"beyond" G ood and Evil, but rather a Hegelian "Auflxbung." The abstract separation o f  these two 
concepts expresses simply the alienation o f  man. The fact remains that, in the historical situation, 
this synthesis cannot be achieved. Thus, any Ethic which does not explicitly profess that it is 
impossible today contributes to the bamboozling and alienation o f  men. The ethical "problem” 
arises from the fact that Ethics is for us inevitable and at the same time impossible. (Sartre, 1963,
168n).
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It is certainly tempting to consider the last two sentences o f  this passage as the m ost 
appropriate description o f  Sartre’s long struggle with the question o f  morality and there is a 
very good reason for that as the consequent development o f  his thought shows.
In the fifties Sartre begun to explore the possibilities o f a rapprochement between his own 
philosophy and Marxism. This resulted in a deep transformation o f his earlier thought as is 
evidenced in the Critique o f Dialectical Reason. O ne o f the most im portant features o f  this 
transformation was that the ethical question gave way to a purely political problematic which 
was m ost openly articulated in his polemical writings in the late fifties and the sixties. This 
political problem atic sought to provide the foundation for any knowledge that may 
effectively lead to  a revolutionary transformation o f society. The key word here is the word 
‘revolutionary’ and it is therefore logical to assume that the relegation o f  ethics to a 
secondary (from a practical-political point o f  view) status points to Sartre’s implicit 
acceptance o f  Lenin’s dictum that the revolutionary has no ethics, since his aim, and his aim 
alone, provides all the justification needed. This is not to say that Sartre adopted a purely 
pragmatic attitude during that period despite the facts that his The Communists and the Peace 
clearly shows that Sartre was not adverse to making decisions solely on the basis o f what he 
perceived as the practical demands o f the present situation. It is rather to say that during that 
period Sartre interiorized, as it were, the fundamental contradiction inherent in all forms o f 
radical socialist thought, namely that ethics and socialist politics make strange bedfellows and 
yet the latter already presupposes a definite conception o f  the former. The problem o f  course 
is to  define what kind o f  ethics is compatible with such a politics and Sartre was, by the end 
o f that period, ready to tackle this thorny problem  but the specifics o f  such an attem pt are 
beyond the scope o f  this discussion. For Sartre, in the sixties, literature no longer held a 
privileged position in the cultural field. Hence all specific questions about its relation with 
ethics were to be partially answered in texts that dealt with m ore general and more politically
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urgent matters. The tension between the ethical and the political was still evidenced in his 
writings and interviews but for Sartre the political was by then o f param ount importance. But 
the reasons for the relegation o f  ethics to an issue o f  secondary importance are more 
complex than any consideration o f the practical demands imposed on a com m itted 
intellectual might allow us to grasp. The reasons are to also found in the philosophical 
trajectory o f  Sartre in the fifties and the sixties.
His ‘conversion’ to Marxism did not only enable him to take more fully into account the 
materiality o f  history, bu t also imposed on him certain limits as to what counts as effective 
intervention in the intellectual field. The notoriously problematical relation o f Marxism and 
ethics has been to a large extent interiorized by Sartre and thus came to constitute an internal 
limit in his philosophical elaboration o f  ethics. Ethics in its widely accepted and still very 
traditional forms requires a theory o f  the individual and it is true that within the framework 
o f  Marxist thought at the time such a theory was still underdeveloped. Furthermore, when it 
did present itself in a m ore or less elaborated form it was to a large extent a modified version 
o f  traditional liberal hum anism .93 Sartre was most intensely experiencing this tension between 
the political im perative o f  Marxism and the ethical imperative implicit in his own thought. 
O pting for the form er resulted in a period o f intense theoretical and political activity where 
the ethical com ponent in his thought came to constitute the absent centre o f  his whole 
theoretical and political project. In the late seventies when due to illness and old age Sartre 
was forced to remain away from the active politics o f  his earlier years the question o f ethics 
came once m ore to the fore. Yet this re-affirmation o f  the importance o f  the elaboration o f  a 
moral problematic regarding history, politics and individual consciousness was only partially 
due to  the practical constraints imposed on his life. There is some evidence, however 
controversial it may be, that Sartre underwent a second ‘conversion’ this time leading him
9} Louis Althusser’s “Marxism and Humanism” in For Mane, (Verso, 1982), pp. 221-247 offers a very interesting 
as well as controversial discussion o f  the place o f  humanist conceptions o f  subjectivity within the framework o f  
Marxism.
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back to  his pre-Marxist, early humanist premises. I am o f  course referring to Sartre’s attem pt 
to found a new ethics o f  solidarity and reciprocity not based on the T  o f the Cartesian 
tradition but on the ‘W e’ o f  the community o f  human beings who recognize one another on 
the basis o f  their shared and inalienable humanity. I shall not go into the specifics o f  this 
project — itself a collaboration between Sartre and Benny L e v y  — as what is left from it is only 
a series o f m uch contested interviews**4 which at best offer only a possible direction o f 
thought and no t anything more substantial. W hat I wish to  emphasize is the im portance o f  
Sartre’s engagement with Marxism to the understanding o f  the ambiguous status o f the 
question o f  ethics in his thought and work during almost two decades. As soon as practical 
as well as ideological changes took place the ethical problematic resurfaced again, although in 
a form hardly com patible with Sartre’s own previous development.
Sartre’s im portance as a moral thinker is huge and despite the rather hostile reception o f  
his work by poststructuralism  (a reception which arguably shows more than a hint o f  an 
‘anxiety' o f influence’) his work is still capable o f  provoking questions and leading to 
unexpected directions. This, I believe, is due to the fact that Sartre never chose to evade or 
suppress the questions that history posed in the vain hope o f  articulating a purely formal 
philosophy. Instead he encountered history and the political problems that were posed in its 
course with the intention o f  articulating a theory that would do justice to both the lived 
experience o f  the individual and to the objective conditions o f  his existence. I believe that in 
order to properly assess his present relevance it matters little if  Sartre’s thought is considered 
to be as nothing m ore that a radical version o f  petit-bourgeois oppositionism, although 1 
would concede that there are textual and biographical evidence that support this view. The 
same holds for the questions regarding his thought’s compatibility with Marxism o f  any
** Published in English as “The Last Words o f  Jean-Paul Sartre” in Dissent, 27 (Fall 1980), 397-422. Although 
they represent an intriguing testimony o f  Sartre’s late thought they are treated with scepticism by a number o f  
Sartrean scholars.
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variety. ITiat which, in my opinion, distinguishes his entire work was his ability to pose 
certain crucial questions, to foreground specific issues and themes and finally to be always 
willing to engage in self-criticism and revise or reject his previous work whenever he thought 
it necessary. By that I do not wish to lay any particular emphasis on the intellectual integrity 
o f  Sartre the intellectual as this is not my subject here. Instead I wish to point out that the 
value o f  his work lies in the fact that in it we witness the mise en relief o f  all the problems that 
a radical middle-class intellectual is inevitably about to face provided that he steadfasdy 
refuses to resort to a mystificatory idealism which practically effaces history and struggle and 
only solves problem s by abstracting them  from their real conditions o f  existence.
Regarding the specific question o f  ethics and literature his im portance lies not only in his 
texts in the forties and the early fifties but in the whole trajectory o f  his thought. W hat is 
more im portant than his polemical essays in What is Literature? and his existential biographies 
is his gradual realization o f  the extreme difficulty a radical leftist intellectual faces when he 
tries to reconcile the often contradictory demands o f  politics and ethics. W hen Sartre 
virtually abandoned literature he did so believing that its efficacy as a weapon in the struggle 
o f  human em ancipation has long been overestimated and that it was time for a more 
practical intervention. There is always the possibility7 that this may be construed as itself 
implying a latent idealism, the exclusive focus on the political even at the risk o f  ignoring the 
dialectical determ inations that condition the m ovem ent o f all levels (political, economic, 
ideological). Yet, his disappointment with the actual role o f  literature in a capitalist society7 
also marks a transition from his earlier subjectivist-rationalist view to a m ore nuanced 
objectivist view o f  the literary phenomenon. A key to the understanding o f his attitude 
during the later part o f  his life is his philosophy o f  the Critique. N o m atter how noble or 
politically progressive are the intentions o f  the writer his work, as part o f the totalisations 
effected by all other agents who are engaged with it either direcdy or indirecdy, is caught in 
the web o f  counter-finality, which is an aim that the work itself did not initially codify in its
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form and content. Thus, objectively, even the m ost politically progressive works risk being 
effectively neutralized simply by being parts o f infinitely larger (cultural, ideological, and 
political) networks. This realization has far-reaching consequences for the intellectual and 
Sartre him self chose to devote his energies to practical political causes believing that radical 
politics was better served by practical action than by cultural interventions. But his long 
engagement with Flaubert shows another dimension o f his later thought, namely that the 
middle-class intellectual can only contribute to a radical politics through the only means 
available to him even at the risk o f political irrelevance. At the end Sartre’s whole itinerary 
shows that the w riter/intellectual ought to  recognize the objective limits o f  his actions, while 
still trying to offer the best he can for the cause that he has aligned himself with. This 
contradiction animates his last major project, The Family Idiot and makes it such a unique 
work o f  criticism.
It is very difficult to identify something like an essence in Sartre’s entire oeuvre, although, 
as I have already said, freedom is admittedly the concept that is central in all his thought. 
W hat I think is even m ore im portant, from the point o f view adopted here, is his early view 
o f literature as a liberating force in the struggle for radical human emancipation. I do not 
wish for a m om ent to underestimate the importance o f Sartre’s philosophy, but what I think 
makes his work distinctive is his eagerness to transcend his own condition in view o f a goal 
far greater than his own individual projects. It is this generous opening up to history with a 
political aim that justifies such a move that makes Sartre’s work strike a chord with anyone 
not utterly com placent with the function o f art in our societies. Statements like the 
following95 may betray an idealistic enthusiasm but they still convey a sense o f urgency that is 
still much needed today.
95 From the “The Purpose o f  Writing” an interview given to Madeleine Chapsal in 1959 and published in her 
volume entitled l^ s Hcrivains en personne.
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If literature is not everything, it is worth nothing, This is what I mean by 'commitment'. It wilts if  
it is reduced to innocence or to songs. If a written sentence does not reverberate at every level o f  
man and society, then it makes no sense. What is the literature o f  an epoch but the epoch  
appropriated by its literature? (Sartre, 1974: 13-14).
It is this urgency coupled with an unfailing sense o f justice that made Sartre say in the same 
interview from  which the previous extract is taken something that sums up his own 
engagement and his continued relevance today: “ (...) writers can no longer describe. They 
m ust take sides” (ibid, 26).
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L i t e r a t u r e  a n d  t h e  M o r a l  V a l u e  o f  L i b e r a l i s m : 
T h e  C r i t i c i s m  o f  L i o n e l  T r i l l i n g
... it is upon the degree and quality o f  moral intensity 
that all aesthetic considerations o f  the novel depend.
A  Gathering of Fugitives
Lionel Trilling was undoubtedly one o f  the major American literary critics o f  the 
twentieth century, renow ned not only for his critical work but also for his wide-ranging 
influence in the humanities in post-war America. His critical authority established itself with 
the publication o f  the Uberal Imagination, a collection o f critical essays that dealt with issues 
beyond the rather narrow  confines o f  a traditionally conceived literary criticism. This was 
indeed what enabled Trilling to gradually acquire the unofficial status o f the spokesman o f a 
whole generation o f  liberal intellectuals who, shortly after the end o f Second W orld War, 
were searching for a new articulation o f liberalism, at a safe distance from both the -  
discredited -  radicalism o f  the thirties and the emerging political and cultural conservatism o f 
that era. Trilling’s qualities, his peculiar elusive style, his emphatically undogmatic thought, 
his grasp o f  the essential qualities and modulations o f  the Zeitgeist, all these made his work the 
ideal vehicle o f  the transformative cultural process which consisted in restoring the validity 
and ‘dignity’ o f  liberal ideas in an era haunted by the memory o f  concentration camps and 
the prospect o f  global nuclear war. Trilling’s achievement is that he managed to articulate the 
tensions o f  this process in a manner that was both historically pertinent at least to its 
assumed target audience and also far-reaching in its effects. His work is marked by the rare 
distinction o f  being read and discussed by people not only outside the narrow circle o f  
academics in English or American literature departments, but also outside the academic 
world in general, a feature that partly accounts for the centrality o f  his work in the wider
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context o f  the ideological transformations that took place in America from the thirties to the 
seventies. However, another feature o f  his thought is o f greater importance to me here. 
Trilling’s critical work is one o f  the m ost potent and persuasive explorations o f  the 
connection between ethics and literature, between the social, and by extension ethical and 
political context o f  literature, and the literary quality o f  individual works or authors. This is 
w hat marks his criticism more than anything else and this is what I intend to concentrate on 
in the discussion that follows.
L it e r a t u r e  a n d  M oral  V a l u e s : Re fo r m u l a t in g  M id d l e -Class Liberalism
Trilling started his career in the early twenties, first writing for the Jewish journal The 
Menorab Journal' and later for the Partisan Review. The latter was a journal mainly identified 
with the group o f  intellectuals that later became known as the New York Intellectuals. It is 
this relatively tight and culturally homogeneous group that was to be Trilling’s extended 
family. W ithin this community o f like-minded peers, mosdy secular Jews with a strong sense 
o f  the connection between the cultural and the political, Trilling begun elaborating his own 
critical ideas, his main themes -  politics and culture -  and his strong sense o f  the (almost 
messianic) mission o f  the intellectual amidst a world almost completely devoid o f  (real) 
meaning and w ithout any (real) sense o f  purpose. The world Trilling was experiencing first 
hand could find both  meaning and a sense o f  purpose, but apparendy not the kind that an 
intellectual like him  could possibly endorse. Ihe  word ‘world’ might lead one to think that a 
reference is m ade to the wider imaginable collectivity but, in Trilling’s case, it is simply 
referring to the American middle class.96. TTiis class — one could easily contend — was the 
only audience Trilling ever addressed and the only class that had, as far as he was concerned, 
the capability’ o f  re-educating itself so as to fulfil its social and political functions in a way that
96 Delmore Schwartz has made the definitive statement about Trilling’s relation with the American middle class. 
According to Schwartz "Mr. Trilling is interested in the ideas and attitudes and interests o f  the educated class, 
such as it is and such as it may become: it is o f  this class that he is, at heart, the guardian and the critic." 
(Schwartz, 1970: 212).
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would do justice to its main founding ideals: individual freedom, justice, imaginative 
curiosity, tolerance, open-mindedness and magnanimity. To the interests o f  this class and the 
ideological formations that sustained its existence Trilling devoted the bulk o f  his intellectual 
energy and talent.
W hen Trilling begun his career the liberal intelligentsia was, or so it seemed, in an 
agonizing close contact with Marxist ideas and a political radicalism that demanded solutions 
to actual problem s with a sense o f urgency that a mind like Trilling’s could only regard as too 
close to fanaticism and intellectual and moral retrogression. His own rapprochement with 
Marxism97 in the thirties only served to  im print in his consciousness the dangers that a well- 
meaning liberal runs into when his sense o f  justice is allowed to be contaminated by dogmas, 
directives, inflexible situations and an overpowering sense o f  (self-)righteousness and 
uninhibited militancy. With the end o f World War II and the moral (if not yet political) 
bankruptcy o f  the Stalinist model Trilling set himself the task o f  addressing the new situation 
o f  post-war America which was entering an era o f economic growth and political stability. 
These two factors made some Americans believe that the passions o f the turbulent past 
decades could no  longer pose any serious threat to the new situation. Yet unlike those who 
were content with self-congratulatory accounts o f the new status o f America as a new 
empire, asserting its dominance not only in the economic sphere but also in the cultural one, 
Trilling set him self the task o f  interrogating the liberal ideal so as to enable it to distance itself 
even more radically from the left-wing ideological and political excesses o f the past, and to 
make full use o f  its rich cultural resources in order to lead the way for a more enlightened 
future. Trilling o f  course was doing more than that even if he never explicitly acknowledged 
as much. In fact, he was also trying to establish a new status for the intellectual in post-war
97 It must be noted that Trilling’s relation to Marxist politics was both short-lived and according to all his 
biographers certainly half-hearted. In the early thirties Trilling followed many o f  his radical colleagues in the 
Aienonth Journal to  the N C D PP (National Committee for the D efence o f  Political Prisoners) an organization set 
up by the Communist Party. More information can be found in Krupnick, 1986, pp. 35-46 and in Trilling’s 
‘Whitaker Chamber’s Journey” published in 1975 in the Times Saturday Review and reprinted in The hast Decade.
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America, the intellectual not only as scholar, educator or even prophet, but above all the 
intellectual as someone who has the ability to influence or even change things by his use o f 
ideas. In short the intellectual as man o f  power. In this, as in many other respects, Trilling is 
indeed, as he has been often described98, the intellectual most closely related to Matthew 
Arnold in term s o f  the specific social and political inflection o f  his writings and more 
crucially in terms o f  his whole cultural/educational program o f substituting literature for 
other metaphysical o r secular religions that are deemed ideologically exhausted or historically 
ineffective. Trilling, working closely within this Amoldean paradigm, set out to probe the 
inner centre o f  the liberal world-view, to identify its weaknesses, its failings, its ideological 
mystifications and above all its perpetual tendency towards moral ambiguity. It is this moral 
ambiguity that puzzles him above all: the liberal inability not to allow itself to be seduced by 
forms o f  belief that endanger its very purity and eventually even its own existence.
Trilling thus attem pts to articulate a new ideological space where this liberal world-view 
could express and assert itself without fear o f violating its own m ost incontestable founding 
ideals. In this attem pt he uses literature as the privileged point o f  departure from which one 
can survey the whole o f  the human situation in all its variousness and complexity. He also 
uses literature for its social and political relevance, its own unbreakable ties with the actual 
world o f  human beings, its rootedness in history and ultimately its moral significance. This is 
precisely what animates Trilling’s own project and sets it apart from either New Criticism or 
the projects o f  o ther more politically-oriented critics. Trilling’s view and perception o f 
literature is one dom inated by the moral power o f  the written word, its ability no t only to 
identify the place where morality comes into being but also to influence people in their own 
moral choices. It is this imprint that the ethical leaves in the literary work that is Trilling’s 
main point o f  reference throughout his long career. Through that he attempts to re-read 
many o f the canonical works o f English and American literature in a way that foregrounds
98 See for instance Chase, 1980 & Krupnick, 1986.
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their status as great inventories o f  moral virtues and unsurpassable examples o f  great moral 
vision; in other words repositories o f cultural values that the keen and well-guided reader 
could find and make full use of.
F irst A t t e m p t s  a t  D e f in in g  t h e  L iber al  Spirit
From  what I have said so far it seems fitting that Trilling’s first published book (1939) 
was a biography o f  Matthew Arnold. This choice was not without its significance. In the 
thirties, Trilling was actively searching for an alternative to what he considered as mere 
pieties o f  the middle classes and the ideological mystification that resulted from a purely 
aesthetic conception o f  literature on the one hand and a politically committed one on the 
other. Arnold’s w ork would provide such an alternative for the young Trilling for w hom  the 
famous A m oldean dictum  that literature is a criticism o f  life would become one o f  his m ost 
unshakable beliefs. A rnold’s idea o f disinterestedness, his appreciation o f  the moral tension 
in art, his valuation o f  the free play o f  the mind and o f  the imagination in an era that was 
more keen on social order and the idea o f  material progress provided Trilling with a suitable 
foundation for his highly charged idealistic conception o f  the connection between literature 
and society. A rnold’s romantic ideas -  especially his strong belief in the absolute supremacy 
o f  moral and spiritual values over any materially determined ones, whether these appear in 
the sphere o f  politics or o f  society at large — are taken by Trilling as the means for the 
construction o f  an ideological space, where one could successfully transcend the 
contradictory' and equally damaging prevalent conceptions o f literature and criticism, and 
where one could establish a new conception that effectively leads out o f politics while 
pretending to be political itself.
Trilling read A rnold and by extension the whole Victorian culture with the intellectual 
curiosity o f som eone who was clearly intensely dissatisfied with his own contemporary7 
world. Trilling, w ho in many ways was him self a twentieth-century Victorian, found in
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Arnold the key critical concepts which he would later adapt to his own critical ends. Critical 
disinterestedness, as was mentioned earlier, was certainly one o f  these concepts; culture as a 
regulative ideal another. Yet, what left the greatest impression on Trilling was Arnold’s 
conception o f  the pedagogical role o f the humanist intellectual vis-a-vis his own class and the 
social and political situation o f  his day. This would become the ground on which Trilling 
would later on build his own critical-pedagogical project with The Liberal Imagination and his 
subsequent work.
Matthew Arnold  is an intellectual biography which shows not only the intellectual, artistic 
and moral qualities o f  its subject matter but also the talent and the intellectual distinction o f  
its writer. Yet, being Trilling’s first book, in fact a reworking o f  his PhD thesis, it gives us 
only a glimpse o f  the direction that his thought would take in later years. W hat it does give us 
is a young intellectual who, in the middle o f  a turbulent period, filled with highly charged 
political debates and painful personal decisions, so close to the pro-com m unist segment o f  
the liberal intelligentsia and yet so far away from it in his mind and heart, chooses to deal 
with a critic that showed through his work that true intelligence consists in pragmatically 
accepting the ‘conditioned’ aspects o f life, submitting to them if necessary7 for the sake o f the 
edification o f  the classes he has appointed him self to instruct and guide. Trilling’s work on 
Arnold may be read as the chronicle o f  an intellectual and moral apprenticeship with a 
master to be matched- Arnold was representative o f a certain type o f  intellectual that Trilling 
was trying to em ulate at a time when m ost o f those around him were either flirting or 
seriously engaged with the Communist Left. According to him, Arnold’s mind was 
responsive to historical, cultural, and moral complexity, and it was therefore a model for the 
truly7 great mind o r self. Trilling would subsequendy insist that such a mind can and should 
function within contradictions, never attem pting premature resolutions, always allowing for 
the secondary consideration o f the pragmatic imperatives o f any given moment. So Arnold 
would come to represent the em bodiment o f  a critical consciousness that resists formulaic
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thought and systematization and thus prom otes true intelligence (‘imaginative reason’ in 
Amoldean parlance) and openness o f mind, two features that Trilling would later celebrate in 
the Liberal Imagination. Trilling’s book on Arnold may then be said to represent for him  the 
perfect foil for his own dissatisfaction with Marxist politics, which Trilling always designated 
with the term Stalinism", and a timely reminder for him that there is wisdom in sticking with 
one’s own class interests and ideas since ultimately these are the ones one intuitively knows 
best and considers best as well.
In 1943, T rilling published his second book, a critical study o f  E. M. Forster. His choice 
o f  Forster has its own peculiar significance for the evolution o f  Trilling’s thought on the 
subjects o f  literary ethics and liberal ideology. Trilling reads Forster’s work as exemplary in 
two crucial aspects. The first is the attitude o f the intellect in its attem pt to come to terms 
with the m odem  w orld and the second is the limitations o f  liberal ideology in dealing with 
this world. This reading enables Trilling to articulate for the first time the themes o f  moral 
realism, o f  the dangers posed by the human will when left unchecked, o f  the tragic 
dimension o f life and finally o f  the inability o f m odem  liberalism to accept this tragic nature 
o f  fate and the inextricable mixture o f good and evil.
Trilling starts his study with an introductory chapter entided “Forster and the Liberal 
Imagination” which would eventually give its name to his most famous book some years 
later. In this introduction we read that Forster’s manner “is the agent o f a moral intention 
which can only be carried out by the mind ondoyant et divers o f  which Montaigne spoke” 
('Frilling, 1982: 5). In this sentence we find two o f the most central themes o f  Trilling’s work: 
authorial m anner as an agent o f  ‘moral intention’ and the ideal (liberal) mind which is flexible 
and open enough so as to accommodate itself to the great moral paradox that is reality. This
"  Stalinism, a recurrent term in Trilling’s writings, should not be confused with the actual political system o f  the 
Soviet Union from the early thirties until the mid-fifties. Although closely related with it Trilling’s version o f  
Stalinism was more a kind o f  Weltanschauung, an intellectual m ood, even a style o f  self than something that had 
anything substantial to do with the world o f  actual politics. Only in his late years did Trilling explicitly make a 
distinction between Marxism and Stalinism calling the latter a species o f  the former (Trilling, 1982: 240).
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ideal liberal mind is what makes a novelist produce a body o f work that does justice to the 
moral ambiguities o f the actual world. Trilling writes:
All novelists deal with morality, but not all novelists, or even all good novelists, are concerned 
with moral realism, which is not the awareness o f  morality itself but o f  the contradictions, 
paradoxes and dangers o f  living the moral life (ibid, 6).
This is what literature, and more specifically good literature, is all about according to 
Trilling. An inventory’ o f  all the possible encounters between moral principles and 
conditioned lives, between the ideal and the actual, between the imperialistic drive o f  the 
human will and reason and the resistance offered by the thick, inherendy contradictory7 
substance o f  actual society. Moral realism, which is the name o f  such a realization, is for 
Trilling the yardstick by which all literature is to be examined and evraluated. Yet, this is only 
a part o f  Trilling’s view on literature and the essentially moral mind that produces it. The
other part has to do  with the social and political determinants o f  literature and it is vTery
crucial for any political reading o f his work. Further in the introduction and while discussing 
the shortcomings o f  the liberal mind when it is faced with the realities o f the m odem  world 
Trilling writes:
... in Houunfs /;W [Forster] shows the conflicting truths o f  the idea - that on the one hand class is 
character, soul and destiny, and on the other hand class is not finally determining. He knows that
class may be truly represented only by struggle and contradiction, not by description, and
preferably by moral struggle in the heart o f  a single person, (ibid, 11).
In these words Trilling articulates his own increasingly apparent distance from his quasi­
radical youth and the m indset o f  left-wing liberals w ho kept on insisting that class determines 
(real or literary) characters far more than he was willing to accept. It is worth noting how
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Trilling makes the passage from a still largely dialectical perspective (...represented by 
struggle and contradiction) to a moral and idealistic one (... moral struggle in the heart o f  a 
single person). The key word for this transition is ‘preferably’, a word resonant with Trilling’s 
wish to advance to a stage where the political (all that is related to class and class struggle) is 
finally banned from  criticism only to survive as a moral discourse preferably dealing with the 
moral trials and tribulations o f that mythical entity o f liberal bourgeois ideology, the 
individual, the single person. Yet, there were many liberals who, enraged by the social 
injustices they saw around them, cared for something more radical and effective than merely 
acknowledging the m oral complexity o f  the human souL To those, Trilling, has an answer, 
not a direct, explicitly stated one, but an answer articulated indirectly through his reading o f 
Forster. Trilling says o f  him that although he is not satisfied by the way people act “he does 
not believe there are any new virtues to be discovered” and he adds that “not by becoming 
better but by ordering and distributing his native goodness can man live as befits him” (ibid, 
15). The liberal, driven by his tendency to prematurely adopt radical positions, finds himself 
and his most sacred principles compromised. He loses his flexibility and openness and ends 
up endorsing a new barbarism (so Trilling held) that has nothing to do with the original 
intention o f  the liberal mind. To counterbalance this tendency, Trilling enlists Forster as a 
powerful ally, a mind truly sensitive to the dangers o f  commitment, that shows through his 
fiction that a conservative attitude towards change (especially political change) can be a wiser 
alternative to a progressive will ignorant o f the m ost profound truths o f  the human situation. 
Forster distrusts reason and Trilling is bound to agree with him. Sovereign Reason, this 
ambiguous product o f  modernity, is gradually transformed, in Trilling’s mind, into a disease 
rather than a cure. But, instead o f  attempting to probe deeper into the (apparent) deficiencies 
o f  Reason in the context o f  contemporary capitalism and the relation o f  the former to the 
latter, Trilling chooses to idealistically treat these problems outside any real historical 
framework thus discussing them as if  they were tragic qualities inherent in the human
189
situation. For all these reasons Trilling reads Forster’s work as if  it constituted, its 
shortcomings notwithstanding, an ideal expression.
M o r a l  Im a g in a t io n  a n d  t h e  N e c e ssity  o f  L iberalism
In 1950 Trilling published a collection o f  essays under the tide The Liberal Imagination, a 
book that proved to  be one his most successful and certainly the m ost influential. These 
essays, written during the forties, deal with all the major themes o f Trilling’s work and, 
particularly, as the tide indicates, with the role o f  the liberal mind in post-war America. The 
historical context o f  these essays is the beginning o f  the Cold War era, the political and 
ideological retreat o f  the American Left and the first glimpses o f  a new global geopolitical 
force that was to  deal with worid affairs with an increasingly arrogant and self-serving 
manner. In the U nited States, however, other things became slowly apparent Cold War 
propaganda did nothing to invigorate the political debates o f  the previous decades. 
Conservative thought, as Trilling was quick to  see, seemed dry, ideologically unproductive 
and o f  no real cultural force. Finally liberals, confused as they were by the contradictory 
impulses generated by their own ideas, seemed unable to move forward towards the 
elaboration o f new ideas and a new ideological synthesis. As a result they did not allow 
themselves to go beyond freedom, itself the ultimate fetish o f  the liberal mind, toward a state 
o f  imaginative curiosity and heightened moral realization. Trilling takes it upon himself to 
provide the foundations for exactly such a transition.
O ne o f the first things that must be noted in relation to this collection o f essays is 
Trilling’s style. Trilling is famous, and to some infamous, for his elusive, indirect style, his 
way o f  putting on paper his own mind’s movements, from a thesis to its antithesis stopping 
just short o f  reaching a final synthesis. Trilling’s dialectics, which in fact -  for reasons that 
will hopefully becom e clear in the following discussion — lacks the third term o f  the Hegelian 
dialectics, is one that accepts conflicts bu t has no room  for resolutions. It is a pseudo­
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dialectics that sees historical and intellectual movement as happening between two mutually 
exclusive poles without any real prospect o f  transcendence. In “Reality in America”, the first 
essay o f  The Liberal Imagination, Trilling speaks o f  certain nineteenth-century writers as 
“repositories o f the dialectic o f their culture” because “ they contained both the yes and the 
no o f  their culture” (Trilling, 1961: 9). Such is also Trilling’s style at least on the surface: a 
judiciously paced prose that reflects his deeper conviction that moral gravitas exists only 
where two contradictory ideas are held in a state o f  perpetual irresolution thus creating a 
space where tensions, contradictions and paradoxes all contribute to a certain world outlook, 
m ore a sense and an intuition than a philosophy or a system. This outlook is o f  course the 
liberal one and Trilling tries to textualize, as it were, the specific qualities o f an intellect 
capable o f  seeing the world that way. In “The Meaning o f  a Literary Idea”, the last essay o f 
the book, Trilling gives a name to this capability calling it a “negative” one by which he 
means the “willingness to remain in uncertainties, mysteries, and doubts”, something that 
does not imply, “as one tendency o f  m odem  feeling would suppose, an abdication o f 
intellectual activity” (ibid, 299). Later on I shall examine whether such a claim is justified or 
n o t
The Liberal Imagination was a groundbreaking event in its time. Much more than merely a 
collection o f  literary essays it was an attem pt to enlist literature as a major ally in the fight 
against the ideological confusion o f the American liberal middle class. Trilling’s purpose is 
obliquely codified in “Reality in America” in a phrase that would eventually come to be 
regarded as the trademark o f his critical method. In his discussion o f  Nathaniel Hawthorne, 
he expresses his admiration for the nineteenth-century writer by characterizing him as 
someone w ho “could dissent from the orthodoxies o f  dissent” (ibid, 9). In the same way, 
Trilling, dissenting from the orthodoxies o f  liberal dissent, offers a series o f  readings o f 
mainly literary works that emphasize the centrality o f literary imagination and its status as a 
corrective to  the naive and occasionally vulgar beliefs o f  his own audience. He believed that
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the liberal mind, affected from its close proximity to  left ideas and always in danger o f  being 
obliterated by the ever-spreading cynicism o f  a crassly materialistic society, needed a new set 
o f  ideas or, even better, a new faith. As Trilling was a secular critic, religion was out o f  the 
question and in true Amoldean fashion he opted for literature. The result is one o f  the m ost 
impressive attem pts to  institute literature as the only true and reliable guide for human 
conduct and, as I shall attem pt to argue, the only thing that may protect the human spirit and 
ultimately hum an culture from the pernicious effects o f  actual politics. In one o f  the most 
cryptic passages o f  his book, in the essay “The Function o f the Little Magazine”, T rilling 
writes
our fate, for better or worse, is political. It is therefore not a happy fate, even if  it has an heroic 
sound, but there is no escape from it, and the only possibility o f  enduring it is to force into our 
definition o f  politics every human activity and every subtlety o f  every human activity. There are 
manifest dangers in doing this, but greater dangers in not doing it. Unless we insist that politics is 
imagination and mind, we will learn that imagination and mind an politics, and of a kind that we will not like.
(ibid, 100). (emphasis mine)
Why is it that a politically conscious imagination may prove to be not such a good thing? 
I believe that the answer to this question sheds light on the main problem, which is Trilling’s 
relation to history' and politics. Trilling is undoubtedly very much conscious o f history' and 
the historical situatedness o f literature. In the “Sense o f  the Past” his main argument against 
the New Critics revolves around precisely such a realization. He states - and few o f us now 
would want to argue with him — that “ the literary work is ineluctably a historical fact” and, 
more im portandy, “its historicity is a fact in our aesthetic experience” (ibid, 184). But T rilling 
is also conscious o f  another fact which is that “ the refinement o f  our historical sense chiefly 
means that we keep it properly complicated” (ibid, 188). N ot any history but only a properly 
complicated sense o f  the past will do. Needless to say this complexity is no t so much a
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feature o f  history but a mark o f  the superiority o f  the critical mind that sees and appreciates 
it. This critical mind, aided by his liberal imagination, must make sure that its proper domain, 
literature and culture, is kept apart from politics. It is this same mind, always to be 
understood as a collective agent, that must ‘read’ history and politics in such a way as to 
make sure that the proper distinctions among the various domains are always respected. But 
the question I posed before remains unanswered. Why does politics need imagination and 
mind, and why do the latter become so menacing if allowed to become politics? The answer 
may be given obliquely through another passage in the “The Function o f the Little 
Magazine” . In discussing contemporary literature inspired by liberal ideas Trilling writes:
And if  on the other hand we name those writers who, by the general consent o f  the m ost serious 
criticism, by consent too o f  the very class o f  educated people o f  which we speak, are to be 
thought o f  as monumental figures o f  our time, we see that to these writers the liberal ideology 
has been at least a matter o f  indifference. Proust, Joyce, I^awrence, Eliot, Yeats, Mann (in his 
creative work), Kafka, Rilke, Gide -  all have their own love o f  justice and the good life, but in 
not one o f  them does it take the form o f  a love o f  the ideas and emotions which liberal 
democracy, as known by our educated class, has declared respectable (ibid, 98).
'ITiis is the imagination and mind that should not be allowed to turned into politics. The 
great m odernist minds who launched an unprecedented assault against the basic principles o f  
W estern civilisation -  traditional humanism being an easy target and one o f  the most 
lamented casualties o f  this cultural offensive — might now inspire, if left unsupervised, a new 
politics that could potentially destroy the very foundations o f liberal society. This politics 
would be a politics o f extremes, left or right, and it is against this ominous possibility that 
Trilling warns his audience. If  American liberals are to avoid a politics o f  extremes they must 
learn to appreciate the variousness {sic) and complexity o f  literature and thus make it capable 
o f  gradually enriching conventional politics no m atter how unintelligent this politics may be.
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The main aim is to  prevent the worst from happening, a fiercely oppositional culture 
informing a politics where ‘real’ interests are at stake. It is hard not to see the conservative 
implications o f  such a belief. Unless liberal intellectuals are in a position to exert some 
considerable influence on all things cultural a sinister politics (Stalinism or Fascism no doubt) 
will come to the foreground and threaten to destroy the very foundations o f  liberal America.
Yet, Trilling’s problem  remained unresolved. Literature could aid political liberalism in 
becoming m ore refined and thus adequate for the exigencies o f  the time, yet m ost o f  our 
great literature is evidently ill-fitted for fulfilling such a function. Could this entail the 
negation o f  m odernism  and thus initiate a search for an alternative that would take its place? 
In the forties, T rilling would not seriously entertain any such ideas. He would however find 
solace and some very powerful literary examples in the work o f  nineteenth-century writers 
such as H aw thorn and Henry James who would enable him to forcefully articulate his views 
on literature as m oral lesson. In other words, what Trilling cannot find in modernist writing 
he is bound to find it in the older narrative form, the classic realist novel. W hat he 
rediscovers there is the notion o f moral realism, arguably one o f the m ost central and 
politically significant notions in Trilling’s work. For him the classic novel is a medium o f 
moral enlightenm ent more privileged than any other form, literary or extraliterary. In 
“Manners, Morals, and the Novel”, he clearly states his preferences thus: “ for our time the 
m ost effective agent o f  the moral imagination has been the novel o f  the last two hundred 
years” (ibid, 222). He goes on by reminding us that “its greatness and its practical usefulness 
lay in its unremitting work o f  involving the reader himself in the moral life, inviting him to 
put his own motives under examination, suggesting that reality is not as his conventional 
education has led him to see it.” (ibid, 222).
This brings us to the centre o f  Trilling’s conception about ethics and literature. The 
moral realism that Trilling so much admires is the capacity to acknowledge that every human 
being and every situation is so overdetermined that no clear cut distinction between good
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and evil is possible, or as Trilling would probably add, desirable. This awareness o f  the 
essential tragic quality o f life is what makes a certain author or a certain work worthy o f  our 
admiration since it teaches us to be tolerant, open-minded and more appreciative o f  the 
ironies o f  the hum an situation. In short, moral realism educates us in the m ost profound 
sense o f  the word. Being the ideal counterpart o f  the liberal mind, moral realism instructs 
this mind to value patience or even passivity when it is required and to abstain from making 
rush judgments. Otherwise, there is always the risk o f engaging in activities that may prove 
far m ore harmful than originally anticipated. In the forties, when Trilling writes these essays, 
the object o f  his criticism is hardly concealed. Left-wing liberals and the literature they value, 
the socialist novels o f  Theodore Dreiser and John Steinbeck, the criticism o f  V. L. 
Partington, all these instances o f an imagination and sensitivity enthralled, so Trilling 
believed, by its ow n self-righteousness are what constitutes his primary target in The Liberal 
Imagination. But Trilling is not content merely to show the shortcomings o f  the aesthetic and 
intellectual culture o f  a large part o f the left-leaning liberal middle class. He wishes to offer 
this class an alternative way o f  thinking and dealing with the world that would appreciate 
virtues quite unlike any o f  those held in esteem among them.
In The Princess Casamassima, one o f  the most powerful essays that Trilling ever published, 
we are given a reading o f James’s eponymous novel that focuses on the moral force o f the 
narrative. W hat Trilling admires in James’ novel is the masterful way in which his narrative 
unfolds, the construction o f  the main characters and the moral weight each one o f  them is 
given by the twists and turns o f the narrative itself. A t the end o f  the fifth part o f  the essay, 
after Trilling has presented his own reading o f  the novel’s plot and narrative structure, we are 
given a concise account o f his interpretation o f  the decisive act that marks the fate o f 
Hyacinth, one o f  the novel’s main characters. A fter discussing how Hyacinth finds himself 
tom  between two contradictory worlds, the world o f  art and culture and the world o f  
underground revolutionary activity, and after he emphasizes how Hyacinth becomes aware o f
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the irreconcilability o f  the principles that he has to adhere to due to his divided loyalties, 
Trilling concludes:
Hyacinth’s death, then, is not his way o f  escaping from irresolution. It is truly a sacrifice, an act 
o f  heroism. H e is a hero o f  civilization because he dares do more than civilization does: 
embodying two ideals at once, he takes upon himself, in full consciousness, the guilt o f  each, fie  
acknowledges both his parents. By his death he instructs us in the nature o f  civilized life and by 
his consciousness he transcends it (ibid, 86).
It matters little for my discussion here whether this is the m ost persuasive interpretation 
o f  Hyacinth’s fate in Jam es’s novel W hat does m atter is the way in which this paragraph 
codifies all that Trilling believed about the proper role o f  the liberal imagination in the 
m odem  world. It also matters a great deal if  we accept, following certain o f  Trilling’s 
critics,(lu, that this paragraph is not so much a literary interpretation o f  a fictional character 
but a projection o f  Trilling’s ideal self into his own criticism. W hat we see here is the 
glorification o f  a certain sensitivity which, unable to resolve what in fact is always, according 
to Trilling, irresolvable, chooses to sacrifice itself instead o f  taking a position for or against 
what is presented to it as an alternative. That is why this exquisite mind does “more than 
civilization does” . Instead o f  moving forward no m atter what the consequences Hyacinth 
takes the tragic paradox o f his life to its extreme by negating this very life.
In so doing, Hyacinth becomes for Trilling the poetic symbol o f  a certain kind o f 
m odem  liberal intellectual who must “acknowledge both his parents”, right and left, good 
and evil, and must, by virtue o f his work, transcend the messy, unpredictable and morally 
ambiguous world he lives in. Again, the political implications o f  such an interpretation are 
quite clear. W hen it comes to the injustices o f the world, no m atter how tight the liberal
100 See for example, Mark Krupmck, Lionel Trilling and the Fate of Cultural Criticism, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1986), p. 72.
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middle-class is in its verdict, its prom ptness in taking a position betrays its ignorance o f the 
contradictory nature o f the world and its naive belief that things can be either good or evil. 
I*his lack o f  imagination must be addressed by the liberal critic who must teach and if 
possible em body the example o f  a consciousness fully aware o f the tragic element o f the 
human adventure. Such a mind is Sigmund Freud in whose work Trilling finds a powerful 
expression o f  such a problematic and who will serve more than any other intellectual figure 
o f  our time to justify Trilling’s pessimistic and often conservative views on the limits o f 
hum an will.
In “Freud and Literature” T rilling undertakes to offer at one and the same time a critical 
but also corrective reading o f Freud, one that emphasizes the latter’s importance as a great 
humanist thinker w ho knew best the limits o f  the human mind and the extent to which this 
very mind tries to  deny their existence. It is im portant to make clear though that Trilling does 
no t read Freud in order to find in his psychoanalytical m ethod the hermeneutical keys that 
would enable him  to bring to the surface the latent content o f  literary works. Instead he 
reads his work, particularly his ‘metapsychological’ work, as one that best illustrates the tragic 
character o f  hum an life. So it is Freud the tragic humanist, and not Freud the psychoanalyst, 
that interests and inspires Trilling most o f alL It is the great humanist who says, at least as 
T rilling interprets him, that man “is not simply good” and that he has “a kind o f  hell within 
him from which rise everlastingly the impulses which threaten civilization” (ibid, 57). This 
idea o f man confirms Trilling’s own reservations about the practical efficacy o f the human 
will and the necessity to  acknowledge certain aspects o f  human life as essentially unalterable 
and forever beyond our control. The pessimistic tone o f  Freud’s last work is easily 
accom m odated within Trilling’s own view about the naivety o f  liberal intellectuals who 
believe that under the guidance o f reason and with a healthy dose o f  earnest sentiments all 
things unworthy o f  m an’s dignity can be changed for the better. For Trilling, such a view 
betrays an intellect embarrassed by the tragic, opting instead to adopt a heroic position,
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which strives for change and betterm ent where a wiser mind would prefer acceptance and 
patrician contemplation. Trilling finds in Freud someone who believes that m an’s “best 
qualities are the result o f  a struggle whose outcome is tragic” (ibid, 57) and so he considers 
such pseudo-heroism  as an abnegation o f the responsibility to be intelligent. W hat Trilling 
has in mind is o f  course the concept o f  political effectiveness o f The Left and the latter’s 
optimism in the potential efficacy o f its own plans. For Trilling, however, when such an 
instrumentalist conception o f  politics is allowed to be a substitute for the sensitivity o f  the 
tragic and the appreciation o f the variousness o f  the human condition, then the liberal mind, 
and m ore specifically the literature that springs from it, runs the risk o f coming dangerously 
close to being unintelligent and vulgar, which, for him, are the characteristics o f  the mode o f 
thinking o f  the Stalinist Left.
T rilling’s reading o f  Freud may not be the only way o f approaching the great 
psychoanalyst’s w ork bu t is certainly indicative o f  the attraction that Trilling felt towards a 
thinker who exhibited a heightened awareness o f  the impossibility o f  any transcendence o f 
human limits. The conservative implications o f  such a view found an echo in Trilling’s own 
view o f the futility or even the stupidity o f  any intellectual or political project that promises 
to do away once and for all with all the ills that plague mankind. For Trilling when 
intelligence falters barbarism becomes a real possibility. Moral realism, the sense o f the tragic, 
a finely m odulated consciousness, and the acknowledgment o f  complexity all preclude easy 
answers, and by implication o f course, any radical, organized political action. W hat matters 
m ost is the preservation o f a certain spirit, a vague, yet identifiable, sense o f  a rich historical 
past that teaches us by making us realize the limits o f  our imperious will. O f  equal 
im portance is that which makes us suspicious o f  any ideologies that may have catastrophic 
effects in case such a will is let free w ithout the counterbalance provided by the realization o f 
the true nature o f  morality which only great literature can give us. It is this literature that is
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m ost im portant in our moral education and the taming o f  our often impetuous will since as 
Trilling notes in “A rt and Fortune”:
Ih e  novel has had a long dream o f virtue in which the will, while never abating its strength and 
activity, learns to refuse to exercise itself upon the unworthy objects with which the social world 
tempts it, and either conceives its own right objects or becomes content with its own sense o f  its 
potential force - which is why so many novels give us, before their end, some representation, 
often crude enough, o f  the will unbroken but in stasis, (ibid, 269).
This powerful example o f  a will that refuses to violate the existing order, while 
contemplating its ow n unfulfilled possibilities, “unbroken but in stasis”, is evidendy a 
reminder to Trilling’s fellow liberals o f  the shortcomings o f  the committed literature they so 
admire. True literature, and more specifically the classic novel, is about class and, by 
extension, politics, says Trilling, but not o f the materialist, radical kind. For him, the classical 
realist novel’s main interest is, not simply the “interest in illusion and reality as generated by 
class and m oney” , but the “unabashed interest in ideas” (ibid, 259). This idealistic 
interpretation o f  the novel is paralleled in a characteristically oblique fashion by another 
statem ent regarding the role o f social class as depicted in literature. He writes that “in fiction, 
as perhaps in life, the conscious realization o f  social class, which is an idea o f  great power 
and complexity, easily and quickly produces intention, passion, thought, and what I am 
calling substantiality” (ibid, 262) . Referring to the American situation, he notes that “the 
diminution o f class, however socially desirable in many respects, seems to have the practical 
effect o f  diminishing our ability to see people in their difference and specialness” (ibid, 262). 
H ow  are we to interpret this statement? First o f  all is “ the conscious realization o f  social 
class”, good only for making literary characters, and by extension literature, more substantial, 
more real? Trilling does not elaborate further in the remainder o f  his essay and, I believe, one 
is entided to  read him as implying that class-distinctions have no other function to fulfil than
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providing a key narrative element in a properly conceived and executed novel. In other 
words, if class is a feature o f the real world it becomes relevant to us through its 
fictionalization in literature, preferably in a great realist novel. Secondly, it is certainly very 
strange that a critic so sensitive to the complexity o f the human situation can say that the 
“diminution o f  class” makes us see people as more uniform and undifferentiated. This is a 
preposterous claim, but it does seem adequate in the context o f  his criticism if we remind 
ourselves that Trilling consents to  any preoccupation regarding social class or status in the 
novel provided that it is there for enhancing the author’s comprehensive view o f the 
complex social w hole and consequendy our own reception o f  it. Class makes fictional 
characters interesting and real since Trilling believes that their (fictional) manners are “class 
traits modified by personality” . I would tend to agree with this statement. Manners may very 
well be class traits modified by our personality. Yet the problem is that, for T rilling, these 
manners are the only object o f literature worthy o f  our attention. Manners and ideas are, for 
Trilling, w hat literature is “o f its nature involved with”, because “it deals with man in society, 
which is to say that it deals with formulations, valuations, and decisions, some o f  them 
implicit, others explicit” (ibid, 282). l l i is  is one way to look at literature, one which makes 
sense especially w hen considered in the context o f Trilling’s critical energy partly spent on 
establishing the essentially fictive character o f real, observable, and already comprehensively 
theorised social entities. Because that is what he attempts to do here, although nowhere does 
he say that in a straightforward manner.
Politics in the wider sense and politics o f  class in particular should be confined to the 
domain o f  literature so as to provide us -  for our edification, to be sure -  with the spectacle 
o f  m an’s battle against his tragic fate. 'ITius, having become aestheticised as integral elements 
o f  any fiction worthy o f  itself, they can then become effective as instruments o f  moral 
awareness. They can become essentially moral concepts as their locus will be the individual 
soul represented by the classic hero o f  the realist novel which, Trilling never tires to  remind
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us, is “a perpetual quest for reality, the field o f  its research being always the social world, the 
material o f  the analysis being always manners as the indication o f  m an’s soul” (ibid, 212). 
Trilling’s own highly idealistic conception o f morality, social class and their relation within 
the context o f  literature leads us from ‘reality’ to a ‘m an’s soul’, with the obligatory, for a 
liberal mind at least, passage from the ‘social world’. Thus, at one stroke, he condem ns 
literature to effectively becoming depoliticized while wishing for it to play a crucial role in 
informing the politics o f  the future.
The Liberal Imagination is a book that can hardly conceal its polemical character and its 
author’s strong faith in the possibility o f  a rebirth o f  liberal thought It is also a project that 
clearly situates its author at the centre o f  this set o f  principles, ideas and beliefs that make up 
the liberal world-view. Trilling’s role is, if  I may use this term loosely, deconstructive. He 
attempts to interrogate liberal thought from within its own framework o f reference, so as to 
enable it to  identify its own blind spots, its uncritically accepted ideological foundations. But 
at no point does he deny the legitimacy o f  what he criticizes. His faith in liberalism as the 
only viable ideological solution for the American middle class, which he often refers to  as the 
‘educated class’, is unshakeable. Whatever is discussed in the essays included in The Liberal 
Imagination has been chosen for its potentially educational function regarding the liberal 
attitudes towards literature, morality and politics. As we move forward in time this faith will 
diminish and some o f  the certainties implied in these essays will seem less tenable.
T o w a r d s  a St o ic  Co n c e p t io n  o f  L ife
In the years following the publication o f  The Liberal Imagination Trilling published two 
other collection o f essays, The Opposing Self (1955) and A  Gathering of Fugitives (1956). These 
essays are mostly occasional pieces disparate in their themes, but interconnected, as Trilling 
him self admits in his preface to The Opposing Self, by the preoccupation, always central to his 
thought, with the idea o f  self. W hat he attempts to establish in these essays is the kind o f
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selfhood that is most suited to a liberal intelligence, that is the kind o f  person that could 
possibly be offered as a model for the liberal audience that he had in mind. The formation o f 
the self is a problem  that had always preoccupied him ever since he, at a very early stage in 
his life, had to negotiate the tensions between his Jewishness and his gentile ambitions, his 
youthful radicalism and the respectability o f  Columbia University, and most crucially, his 
ambition to be an adventurous and great novelist and his often stifling respectability as an 
academic.
Trilling knows very well that the idea o f  self he is so eager to prom ote as exemplary is 
determined by m oral and political ideas and the respective systems based on those ideas. He 
also knows his contem poraries hold moral and political ideas that do not go very well with 
the sensitivity' and awareness that he believes are the prerequisites o f  an intelligent, morally 
enlightened life. Trilling knows all too well that modernism has exerted a great influence on 
the moral education o f  his audience. Issues that would be privy to a small over-refined elite 
are now available to  a great number o f  educated middle-class readers. As a result o f  this the 
human experience is now totally different from what it used to be. Armed with a new kind o f 
knowledge, re-educated so as to adapt to the new moral exigencies o f a fast-moving and 
contradictory world the human mind, and especially the liberal mind has taken it upon itself 
to expand further and explore hitherto uncharted territories. Trilling, given his already 
docum ented aversion to such instances o f the impetuousness o f the human will, is more than 
cautious and in “William Dean Howells” he warns that when
we yield to our contemporary impulse to enlarge all experience, to involve it as soon as possible 
in history, myth, and the oneness o f  spirit - an impulse with which, I ought to say, I have 
considerable sympathy - we are in danger o f  making experience merely typical, formal, and 
representative, and thus o f losing one term o f  the dialectic that goes on between spirit and the 
conditioned, which is, I suppose, what we mean when we speak o f  man’s tragic fate. We lose, 
that is to say, the actuality o f  the conditioned, the literality o f  matter, the peculiar authenticity and
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authority o f  the merely denotative. To lose this is to lose not a material fact but a spiritual one, 
for it is a fact o f  spirit that it must exist in a world which requires it to engage in so dispiriting an 
occupation as hunting for a house (Trilling, 1955: 93).
TLis passage may well be read as a token o f  Trilling’s transition from a cautious, yet 
positive, liberalism to a more conservative version o f it. It is true that what we read here is, to 
a large extent, a statem ent o f  a conservative critic but that is not all. W hat is even more 
worrying is that this conservatism, so evidendy concerned with the imaginative leap toward 
history and myth, finds no cause for concern in its own reductive representation o f  reality. 
‘Hunting for a house’ is not merely a ‘dispiriting occupation’ that we must learn to 
acknowledge, like all well-mannered, stoic, middle-class men do, but also something that is 
qualitatively different and certainly not something that can easily qualify as a ‘spiritual fact’. 
Trilling fails to  consider, even for the sake o f  argument, whether any society that is structured 
in a such a way so as to make people ‘hunt for a house’ should actually elicit our consent. It 
seems that despite his often vocal disagreements regarding the liberals’ tendency7 to the Left, 
what annoyed him m ost was when certain among them seemed to take their own liberal 
ideals quite literally. The other, more unimaginative and certainly more passive segment o f 
the American middle-class, seems to provide an instance o f a way o f life far more congenial 
to Trilling’s increasingly melancholic stoicism.
The unbound will that is totally oblivious to the actuality o f human life is one o f the 
things that Trilling’s criticism attempts to deal with. Tlie other is the problem o f  evil and 
m ore particularly the question o f morality in relation to the great modernist tradition. T rilling 
is very much aware that modernism has uncovered and dealt with a great deal o f  what was 
previously carefully concealed and virtually unspoken of. In other words, it exposed, in its 
own highly controversial way, much o f  what was wrong with contemporary society. Trilling 
hardly ever mentions capitalism as the specific economic form o f that society, but instead he
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focuses on the changes o f the mode o f  moral awareness that accompanied such a profound 
cultural change. His main preoccupation is ethics and his framework o f  reference is 
modernism. In the context o f the new sensitivity, ethics is being understood as the problem 
o f evil. Trilling is aware o f the seductiveness o f evil and so he acknowledges that
a proper sense o f  evil is surely an attribute o f  a great writer, and nowadays we have been drawn
to make it almost a touchstone o f  greatness, drawn to do so in part by our revived religious 
feelings or nostalgia for religious feelings, but o f  course also in part by our desire that literature 
should be in accord with reality as we now know it (ibid, 98-99).
This is o f  course w hat happens, but Trilling feels that he needs to warn his readers o f  the 
potential dangers o f  any infatuation with the idea o f  evil. In so doing, he offers a distinction 
“between the relation to evil o f the creator o f  the literary work and that o f  the reader” 
believing that “ the active confrontation o f  the fact o f evil is likelier to be healthy than is the 
passive confrontation” as “ there is something suspect in making evil the object of, as it were, 
aesthetic contem plation” (ibid, 99). In other words, modernism is too good for its own good. 
W hat is initially regarded as the expression o f the great minds that produced the revelatory 
work according to which we judge and measure our own sensitivities, now proves, upon 
close inspection, to be something potentially dangerous and certainly something that must be 
treated with caution. 'Iliis andmodemist turn o f his thought should not be regarded as 
merely accidental or idiosyncratic. O n the contrary, it vies with the main tenets o f his 
increasing retrogressive thought at that time. ITie moral chasm that modernism opens and 
which threatens by its sheer magnitude to engulf all other moral considerations or 
alternatives is, for Trilling, one o f the m ost pressing questions. The truth is that behind these 
moral considerations there is the affluent American society o f the Eisenhower era, the 
integration o f  a large part o f American intellectuals to a system that they traditionally viewed
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with great suspicion, and finally Trilling’s own ideological consent to the traditional middle- 
class values and a tacit, although never explicidy pronounced, acceptance o f the status quo.
In “G eorge Orwell and the Politics o f  T ruth” , in The Opposing Self, Trilling makes his 
increasingly conservative views public by offering us George Orwell as an example o f a 
writer who shows considerable sympathy towards the simple virtues and necessities o f  life. 
Trilling applauds Orwell’s acceptance o f the ‘simple man’ by noting that the latter “does not 
dream o f a new kind o f  m an”, but “ is content with the old kind, and what moves him is the 
desire that this old kind o f  man should have freedom, bacon, and proper work (ibid, 160)” . 
This populist sentim ent is provisionally accepted by Trilling despite its socialist overtones, 
since it implies the realization o f the limits o f  any m odem  ideas regarding total transcendence 
o f  the current hum an situation. This simple and relatively uncomplicated view may no t offer 
a great deal to the liberal cause, but at least it instructs us in a more accepting and less 
invasive m ode o f  thinking. Trilling however is aware that what is read into Orwell’s work 
“the love o f  personal privacy, o f order, o f  manners, the ideal o f  fairness and responsibility ” 
are “very simple virtues indeed and they scarcely constitute perfection o f  either the personal 
or the future life” . Their importance lies in that “ they might serve to judge the present and 
control the future (ibid, 162). The implication is that Orwell’s denunciation o f  orthodox 
Com m unist politics “brought about by more than sufficient causes (ibid, 153)” must be seen 
as a benevolent alternative to the latent radicalism o f certain members o f the liberal 
American middle class. W hat Trilling tries to argue here is that an overtly radical ideology, 
which almost by definition denies the possibility o f occupying the middle ground, is to be 
rejected in favour o f  a more accommodating view, even if that entails less imagination and 
intellectual interest. 'Iliis new emphasis on the ordinariness o f  human existence and the 
virtue o f  no t allowing ourselves to exclude it from our systems o f  reference is a crucial aspect 
o f  T rilling’s thought during that stage o f  his career. A statement, such as the following which 
instructs us that the “very stupidity o f  things has something human about it, something
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meliorative, something even liberating. Together with the stupidity o f  the old unthinking 
virtues it stands against the ultimate and absolute power which the unconditioned idea can 
develop (ibid, 166)”, only makes sense if we understand the extent to which Trilling came to 
distrust the influence that Modernism continued to exert on educated liberals. Only a 
heightened realization o f  the resistance o f the ordinary and a complementary realization o f 
the benefits o f  respecting the limits imposed by this resistance can save us from the collective 
delusion o f  seeing the human world as an open space ready for us to build the gigantic 
monum ents o f  our uninhibited will. It is the force o f this will — bequeathed to us by 
modernity in the form  o f  the sovereign Reason and made more uncontrollable by its 
dramatization within the framework o f  Modernist art — that Tolling fears will finally risk 
bringing the entire hum anist culture to an abrupt end. In his case, this fear is just another 
expression o f the fear o f  politics, and especially radical politics. A strong will, untroubled by 
any respect o f  the sanctity o f  the ordinary or o f the conditioned can lead to political turmoil, 
civic unrest and even revolution. T rilling wishes to make sure that such an outcome is never 
to be realised. As far as he is concerned, literature is there to provide plenty o f examples o f  a 
more enlightened view o f human affairs, and morality as inscribed in literature stands close 
by ready to instruct us that moral realism is far more rewarding than political adventurism.
In “Mansfield Park”, the last essay o f The Opposing Self, Trilling turns his attention to Jane 
Austin and offers us a reading that, I believe, sustains my view that his conception o f 
morality is such that repels any political consideration. Trilling discusses Mansfield Park as an 
exemplary work which deals with insincerity as a particularly m odem  moral vice by 
highlighting the extent to which society and culture play a part in the moral life. At one point, 
while he discusses Austin’s subtle elaboration o f  the themes o f  personal style and moral 
seriousness Trilling notes
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'I*he idea o f  morality as achieved style, as grace o f  ease, is not likely ever to be relinquished, not 
merely because some writers will always assert it anew, but also because morality itself will always 
insist on it - at a certain point m its development, morality seeks to express its independence o f  
the grinding necessity by which it is engendered, and to claim for itself the autonomy and 
gratuitousness o f  art (ibid, 223).
Trilling is perfectly aware that style can reveal as much as it can conceal and therefore he 
refuses to fully accept style as something self-evident. Yet, he is prepared to imply that 
morality is bound by practical considerations and therefore it always seeks to express itself in 
the m anner o f  aesthetic judgements. But by approaching the gratuitousness o f art morality 
not only finds its own perfection, but also severs any possible ties it may have with politics 
and the actuality o f  hum an existence. A purely aestheticised morality, a prospect to be sure 
Trilling never fully accepted, is hardly vital to the understanding o f  literature as criticism o f 
life. Given Trilling’s unflinching belief that literature is o f  value only as a sociohistorical fact, 
this apparent contradiction speaks volumes about the tensions in Trilling’s thought. O n the 
one hand literature as moral lesson is conceived as a weapon against the intellectual 
vulgarization o f  the masses and on the other hand this morality inscribed in the pages o f the 
great works seems to  long for its self-transcendence and its eventual reincarnation as art.
In “W ordsw orth and the Rabbis” Trilling articulates yet another view on morality7 that 
would prove to be one o f  the most controversial pronouncem ents in his whole career, 
'frilling argues that “every tragic literature owes its power to the high esteem in which it 
holds the com m on routine, and the sentiment o f  being which arises from it, the elemental 
given o f  biology ” (ibid, 148). This highly significant statement marks Trilling’s decisive turn 
towards the conservative views I hinted at earlier on. This “morality o f inertia” which he 
praises as one o f  the great discoveries o f W ordsworth is the “dull, unblinking round o f 
duties” (Trilling, 1957: 40), it is the moral universe o f  the simple soul. Trilling is o f  course 
sensitive to the more sinister aspects o f  such a morality and in the A  Gathering of Fugitives he
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wisely notes that this type o f  morality “may, and often does, yield the immorality o f  inertia” 
and he gives the example “o f the good simple people, so true to their family responsibilities, 
who gave no thought to the concentration camps in whose shadow they lived (ibid, 40). 
Despite this cautionary note, his essay on W ordsworth shows Trilling ready to consider the 
‘morality o f inertia’ as a powerful reminder o f the ‘conditioned’ element in human life. He 
thinks that any attem pt to sidestep it constitutes a moral error. This turn to ‘biological 
intelligence’, as D aniel O ’Hara has forcefully argued, “leaves Trilling open to the accusation 
(...) that in the guise o f  m odem  literary ethics our cold-war liberal proposes an essentially 
conservative aesthetic o f  acceptance that is, perhaps unwittingly, ideologically motivated” 
(O’Hara, 1988: 147). This ideological motivation is brought to the foreground when one 
considers the m anner in which Trilling pursues his defence o f  the acceptance o f  the 
‘biological given’. By his refusal to discriminate among various degrees o f ‘biological facts’, 
their respective m ode o f  acceptance, and the ramifications o f  such acts o f acceptance in the 
cultural and political sphere, Trilling leads the way to the indirect articulation o f a political 
quietism which, in principle, “must embrace all established institutions and values as if they 
were not hum an creations subject to conscious alteration but facts o f nature to be masterfully 
suffered in virtually sublime silence” (ibid, 147).
From  what I have discussed so far it becomes clear that by the mid-fifties Trilling has 
lost a great deal o f  the optimism that marked The Uberal Imagination. He would now be more 
concerned with persuading his readers to the virtues o f attending closely to what is there as 
opposed to w hat should be there. Trilling would gradually become painfully aware o f  the 
discrepancy between, on one hand, the apparent stability o f the status quo and all the 
concom itant positive effects this has for institutional intellectuals like him and, on the other 
hand, the inherent tendency o f the American left-liberal world-view to question this very 
stability and dream o f a more energetic re-arrangement o f  the social order. T rilling  wishes to 
instruct his fellow liberals in the virtues o f accommodation and the necessity to finally and
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unequivocally renounce radicalism in all its variants. In this he may be seen as indirectly 
complicit, w ithout being aware o f it, with the ideological mutations behind the anti­
communist hysteria o f  the McCarthy era although, as his one publicly recorded reaction 
shows101, his own attitude was never one o f unconditioned capitulation.
Re -a p pr a isin g  M o d e r n is m  a n d  T h e  Fear  o f  a  N ew  Ra dicalism
Almost a decade after the publication o f these two collections o f essays Trilling 
published Beyond Culture (1965), itself another collection o f essays, that shows the ever 
increasing tension between him and the cultural situation o f his time. In the mid-fifties 
Trilling sought to articulate the fears o f  a num ber o f  liberal intellectuals who regarded 
modernism as a little too  aggressive for our own moral good. By so doing he assumed the 
role o f  an ‘opposing se lf who works against the grain o f  the prevalent liberal beliefs. A 
decade later he saw an enemy far more concrete and potentially far more dangerous. The 
name o f  that enemy was the New Left and its public and highly publicised image was the 
rebellious, anti-authoritarian American students, some o f whom dutifully attending Trilling’s 
graduate seminars at Columbia. For Trilling these bright young men and women with their 
refined minds, their awkward manners and their excessive demands epitomized the dangers 
that he had so eloquently warned against in his previous work. This was modernism in the 
streets, Joyce and Kafka as intellectual accessories to a generation which had little time for 
the more profound truths revealed by the Modernist canon. Trilling saw his deepest fears 
come true and the social, cultural and political unrest as another indication o f the liberals’ 
fundamental inability to stop flirting with the excessively radical ideas o f the Left. To be sure, 
'frilling knew well that the American New Left, especially in the forms that he would
101 As a response to a McCarthyite investigation into the existence o f  communists holding positions in 
American universities Trilling along with three other Columbia professors wrote that such an investigation is 
unnecessary as it would create an “atmosphere o f  apprehension and distrust that [would] jeopardize the cause 
o f  free inquiry’ and [threaten] the right to dissent, which is the foundation o f  civil liberties in a free society.” 
This reply appeared in The New York Times, N ov. 18 and 26,1953. Quoted in Chase, 1980, p. 99.
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primarily deal with, was nothing but a historically determined outburst o f  anti-systemic 
sentiments, which hardly vied with the main tenets o f the traditionally conceived Left. 
Trilling never really cared about clarity and precision in political matters and therefore it is no 
surprise that during that time he often dealt with the situation at hand in a m anner that 
betrayed his own inability or unwillingness to make the proper distinctions and the necessary 
clarifications, especially when that entailed a fundamental reappraisal o f his own 
preconceptions.
In the introduction to Beyond Culture, Trilling attempts to discuss the thorny problem of 
art and cultural determination. Although, in accordance with his expressed views, he does 
not deny the great force with which culture conditions our thoughts and minds, he does 
believe -  despite the fact that he expresses that belief in his own characteristically indirect 
m anner — that “a primary function o f art and thought is to liberate the individual from the 
tyranny o f his culture in the environmental sense and to permit him to stand beyond it in an 
autonomy o f perception and judgment” (Trilling, 1966: xiii). This passage is indicative o f 
many o f Trilling’s views about the relation between art, culture and the individual mind. Art 
can ‘liberate’ from a certain ‘tyranny’ and enable one to ‘stand beyond’ it. The very process o f 
liberation, the form  in which tyranny is overcome will be his main concern in the essays that 
make up the rest o f  the volume. In the first essay o f  the collection “O n the Teaching o f 
M odem  lite ra tu re” , one o f the most celebrated and painfully honest pieces Trilling ever 
published, he discusses his own ambivalence towards m odem  literature in his capacity as a 
teacher at Columbia. Speaking as he rarely did in the first person singular, he tells us that his 
interests led him
. .. to see literary situations as cultural situations, and cultural situations as great elaborate fights 
about moral issues, and moral issues as having something to do with gratuitously chosen images 
o f  personal being, and images o f  personal being as having something to do with literary style...
(ibid, 13).
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This is an extraordinary self-description. In a few lines Trilling gives us the means to 
understand his own particular mixture o f  social-mindedness, moral sensitivity, and idealism. 
ITie key is, I think, the phrase ‘gratuitously chosen images o f  personal being”. Could he 
seriously believe that the choice o f self-identity7 is gratuitous? Could he — who at one time 
was almost denied a permanent job at Columbia for being described as a Marxist, a Freudian 
and a Jew — really hold that the painful process o f constructing an identity7 is based on factors 
that are beyond any rational explanation? We must also take note o f the sheer audacity with 
which, despite the powerful rhetorical effect o f  the paratactic syntax, ‘cultural situations’ are 
equated with ‘fights about moral issues’, as if  the entire human history is nothing more than a 
battleground for the forces o f good versus the forces o f  evil. We may also ask how a critic so 
sensitive to the trivial materiality o f human existence could fail to see the far more decisive 
forces at play behind any ‘cultural’ situation. Instead o f the acknowledgement o f  the micro- 
and macro-politics that affect human lives we are told that ultimately everything comes down 
to style and therefore is at a seemingly safe distance from any real content that might make 
us doubt the absolute sovereignty o f style. W hat is at issue here is the acknowledgment o f the 
objectivity7 o f  the world and the critic’s duty7 to understand and re-articulate it so that others 
may understand it as well. The objective aspect o f  reality that T rilling wishes to play down is 
the new oppositional voices that threaten to cohere into a comprehensive anti-systemic 
discourse. He thinks he can achieve that by attributing to them the status o f ‘gratuitous’ act, 
an act more akin to aesthetics than to politics.
Trilling was troubled by the oppositional (sub)culture which seemed to threaten his own 
liberal aspirations. His students, who apparently had more in common with this oppositional 
culture than with Trilling’s own high-minded cultural ideas, seemed to him uncomfortably 
akin to the old left-wing liberals that he had so publicly denounced in the previous decades.
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In discussing his students response to the Modernist works they were given as reading 
assignments, Trilling writes:
I have asked them to look into the Abyss, and both dutifully and gladly, they have looked into 
the Abyss, and the Abyss has greeted them with the grave courtesy o f  all objects o f  serious study, 
saying: “Interesting, am I Not? And exciting, if you consider how deep I am and what dread 
beasts he at my bottom. Have it well in mind that a knowledge o f  me contributes materially to 
your being whole, or well-rounded men (ibid, 27).
This beautiful but cryptic passage shows us that whereas in the fifties Trilling was only 
voicing his concerns about the highly ambivalent role modernism played in the cultural 
formations o f  his era and the moral attitudes towards them, in the mid-sixties he was 
witnessing his w orst fears come true. A whole new generation was been seduced by 
negativity; a new sensitivity" alien to the traditional liberal attitudes seemed to be totally 
comfortable with w hat Trilling always regarded as great repositories o f the dark truths o f  our 
era, that is, with works, which should be approached, as he always believed, with a certain 
reverence and caution. Yet, before his own bewildered eyes and with complete lack o f  any 
awareness o f  the dangers that this entails, his students seemed to absorb what they read 
seemingly unaffected by the sheer magnitude o f  what was written. To Trilling, this was not 
merely a pedagogical issue but a deeply moral one since, for him, the main function o f 
modernist literature was the moral instruction o f  any m odem  mind that wished to come to 
terms with the often unbearable realities o f the twentieth century'. It was also a political issue 
o f  great im portance as Trilling feared that his students’ readings only had as an effect “ the 
socialization o f the anti-social, or the acculturation o f the anti-cultural, or the legitimization 
o f  the subversive” (ibid, 27). The seriousness o f  ‘High Modernism’ and the respect that it 
com manded from its readers were now seriously challenged. This was a potential cultural 
loss, an intellectual and moral im poverishment that T rilling lamented although at the end o f
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his essay he did go as far as acknowledging the great seductiveness o f  this dark inverted 
morality o f  m odernism 102. By so doing he betrayed his own ambivalent situation as a 
defender o f traditional humanism and at the same time as someone still sensitive and 
perceptive enough to see that this humanism may be precisely the problem and not the 
solution.
If the ‘adversary culture’ -  to borrow Trilling’s own famous term — o f  the sixties 
appeared menacing then the liberal intellectual ought to find a new morality or even a new 
politics that could counterbalance it. Trilling did not attem pt to offer a political solution, but 
he did try to reform ulate the basic presuppositions o f a new world-view that could resist the 
great waves o f  cultural change. In so doing he would again come back to Freud offering yet 
another reading o f  his work. Yet, this time the issue at stake was not the tragic quality o f 
human life, but biology. When Trilling referred to the place o f  biology in Feud’s thought he 
was not o f  course referring to what a biologist would most readily identify as a legitimate 
subject o f scientific enquiry. What interested Trilling was not the scientific aspects o f  Freud’s 
biologism but the moral significance o f the biological fact. He was acutely conscious o f the 
dangers o f  this, but still he believed that “we must stop to consider whether this emphasis on 
biology, correct or incorrect, is not so far from being a reactionary idea that it is actually a 
liberating idea (ibid, 113)”. The reason why this might be a liberating idea was given by him 
shortly after. 'Frilling believed that the idea o f  biological determination
proposes to us that culture is not all-powerful. It suggests that there is a residue o f  human quality 
beyond the reach o f  cultural control, and that this residue o f  human quality, elemental as it may 
be, serves to bring culture under criticism and keeps it from being absolute (ibid, 113).
102 “I venture to say that the idea o f  losing oneself up to the point o f  self-destruction, o f  surrendering oneself to 
experience without regard to self-interest or conventional morality, o f  escaping wholly from the societal bonds, 
is an "element" somewhere in the mind o f  every m odem  person who dares to think o f  what Arnold in his 
unaffected Victorian way called "the fullness o f  spiritual perfection (ibid, 30)."
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This passage is somewhat paradoxical for a critic o f  Trilling’s social and cultural 
sensitivity. It seems that when culture is perceived to be inimical to the moral good then the 
only solution is for the individual mind to somehow extricate itself from society and thus 
save itself from the latter’s bad influence. But the argument here goes even further. The 
implication is that there is something immutable in human nature, something that should be 
cherished because o f  its intransigence and its resistance to change. It is true that the problem 
o f the interrelation o f  biology and history, or in a more general way, o f culture and nature, is 
a huge one as it raises all kinds o f ontological, epistemological and ultimately political 
questions about the limits o f man. Yet, Trilling did not seem to realize the complexity o f  this 
line o f argument. H e was adamant that biology m ust come to the rescue o f man in times o f 
great cultural and social fluidity. Biology m ust resist change and ultimately provide man with 
a vantage point from  which to pass judgment on society. Biology is, as he put it, “a resistance 
to and a modification o f the cultural omnipotence”. Trilling was convinced that:
somewhere in the child, somewhere in the adult, there is a hard, irreducible, stubborn core o f  
biological urgency, and biological necessity, and biological reason, that culture cannot reach and 
that reserves the right, which sooner or later will exercise, to judge the culture and resist and 
revise it (ibid, 115).
It is this judgement and potential revision o f culture that Trilling wanted from 
biology. He wanted the body to be a locus o f  resistance not in any postmodernist sense but 
in the rather uninspired sense o f it being endowed with am elemental and atemporal Truth 
that no whim o f  History could alter or destroy altogether.
Idealist and conservative in equal measure, Trilling’s thought needs to be placed in 
context for us to realize why at this point in his life he chose to turn to a metaphysically 
conceived ‘biological fact’ and not to something more congenial to his own past ideas and 
convictions. I have already discussed the influence Freud exerted on Trilling’s thought over
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the years and how Trilling has often tried to found his moral criticism on certain readings o f 
the Freudian canon. Yet, Trilling was not the only intellectual to be influenced by Freud. A 
whole generation o f post-Freudians was attempting to re-interpret the great master’s work in 
accordance to their own specific political beliefs. Two o f the most prominent members o f 
this generation were Norm an O ’Brown and H erbert Marcuse, 'Hie former published his Life 
Against Death in 1959 and the latter his Eros and Thanatos in 1955. Both these books, each in 
its own way, privilege a reading o f  Freud that clearly values the instinct o f life against the 
death-instinct. They both argue for a m ore liberated sexuality and they also note the 
correlation between death-instinct (Brown) or oppressed sexuality (Marcuse) and capitalism. 
They both start from the body conceived as a materiality o f  potentially revolutionary 
proportions and end with a sustained and far-reaching critique o f  capitalism’s demands on 
human beings and o f  the effects that the satisfaction o f such demands has on the human 
soul. The body, pleasure and human desire are for them, as they would soon be for a whole 
generation o f  young dissatisfied middle-class rebels, weapons that could be used for the 
overthrow o f an oppressive status quo. There was no way one could not see the huge 
political implications o f  such interpretations nor could one ignore — and certainly not Trilling 
— the impact o f  such theorizations on the literature o f  the era, most notably on the Beat 
G eneration and others, like Norman Mailer. Against these left-wing, ultra-progressive 
interpretations 'Frilling offered his own conservative one. For him, the Freudian death- 
instinct was there to remind us o f the ultimate limit o f  our human experience and we should 
see it as something that far from prom oting pessimism or negation instructs us in that we 
humans wish to die “only through the fullness o f [our] appropriate life” (ibid, 87). The 
‘biological fact’ that Trilling refers to is a response to the progressivism o f  post-war neo- 
Freudian thought. As William Chase argues this school o f  thought “adhered to Marxist 
notions o f  social determination and social engineering” and therefore “it sought to argue for 
the ‘social’ as the real area o f human liberation” (Chase, 1980: 137). Trilling knew all too well
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that this old liberal dream o f human reason emerging victorious after his battle with the 
irrationality o f  human existence is nothing more than a thinly disguised delusion o f grandeur. 
There is a limit to the gratifications we can at each time demand from the world around us 
and a moral realist like Trilling found in biology a concept o f great oppositional strength in 
relation to the hedonistic progressivism o f  his time.
F ea r  o f  E x c ess: T h e  Co n s e r v a t iv e  Sid e  o f  a  Liberal  M in d
Seven years after the publication o f  Beyond Culture Trilling publishes his Charles Eliot 
N orton Lectures given at Harvard under the title Sincerity and Authenticity. This book, which 
was to be the last one published in his lifetime, traces the historical evolution o f  the two 
concepts o f ‘sincerity’ and ‘authenticity’ in an attempt to construct a kind o f moral 
historiography o f modernity. T rilling's main thesis is that early modernity starts with 
‘sincerity’, in other words the compliance to standards which are to be found outside the 
individual and which are inscribed in the social and cultural fabric o f history. At a certain 
point in time — roughly near the end o f  the eighteenth and the beginning o f the nineteenth 
century — this key foundational ideal is substituted by ‘authenticity’, in other words the 
compliance to the demands o f  one’s inner nature or ‘essence’. This is, o f course, an 
undertaking o f  considerable proportions and Trilling does manage to offer a vivid, informed 
and often very seductive overview o f this gradual mutation o f the ‘sincere’ into the 
‘authentic’. In his endeavour 'Frilling uses as main points o f reference many o f the authors 
and philosophers that, during his career, have offered him the best examples o f a morally 
conscious literature and philosophy. Among the most im portant works he draws upon are 
Denis D iderot’s Rameau's Nephew, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, G oethe’s The Sorrows o f Young 
Werther, and Jane Austin’s Mansfield Park. Through his readings o f these works T rilling 
attempts to identify the historical, and m ore specifically the cultural evolution o f  Western 
morality from its initial state as an ideological system based on public discourse to its gradual
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transformation into another system based on the idea o f  authenticity. In the latter system the 
main criterion o f judgement is to be found in the depths o f the individual soul and not in the 
socially sanctioned moral norm s o f  any society. This is a transition, or so Trilling presents it, 
from a state where objective standards guide the individuals in their moral behaviour and 
beliefs to a state where purely subjective standards, emanating from a human soul schooled 
in Romantic ideals, now dictate the moral course the individual must choose. The last two 
centuries are, for Trilling, m arked by the regulatory idea o f authenticity. In so far as the 
present time is concerned, the time-frame that matters to him most, he clearly states that the 
dream o f  being authentic has undergone such radical transformation that it poses a visible 
threat to the foundations o f  W estern civilization as we know it. Trilling mentions certain 
names which embody all that has gone wrong with the principle o f  authenticity as it has been 
carelessly applied to all kinds o f human practice. His main targets are Herbert Marcuse, 
N orm an O ’ Brown and R. D. Laing, along with others like Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel 
Foucault who only make a passing appearance in the last pages o f his book. Before I examine 
Trilling’s quarrel with the New Left I must first look more closely at the main argument o f 
his book.
Trilling starts by attempting to account for the high status ‘sincerity’ enjoyed as a moral 
quality from the beginning o f what we now call ‘modernity’ to the end o f  the eighteenth 
century. Using mainly literary sources, he argues that sincerity is a historically determined 
moral ideal proper to those societies that first developed after the demise o f  feudalism. In 
other words sincerity is a typically bourgeois moral ideal that is bom  out o f the necessity to 
establish certain rules o f conduct fit for a rational management o f these societies. It is 
interesting that Trilling notes that the very idea o f ‘society’ as opposed to, e.g., ‘kingdom’ is in 
very close dialectical relation with the idea o f  ‘sincerity’. There can be no understanding o f 
one unless there is a complementary understanding o f the other. Sincerity acts like an 
ideological bond for these kinds o f  societies. It guarantees that there is correspondence
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between the avowed intentions o f  the citizens and the moral principles o f the societies in 
which they live. Yet, sincerity as regulative moral ideal does more than that. It constructs a 
new kind o f  subjectivity which is characterized by its internalization o f a certain moral 
imperative. To be sincere as this moral imperative commands means to will truthfully what is 
objectively considered as acceptable or right. It means to conform with the prevailing societal 
norm s and serve the interest o f  the com m on good and not one’s individual inner wishes. 
Sincerity is squarely on the side o f  society and its effects are predicated on the capacity o f 
society to elicit a strong moral com m itm ent from  its individual members. However, after two 
centuries o f unchallenged supremacy, sincerity seems to subside and another moral attitude 
takes its place. This attitude is authenticity7 and for Trilling the work that dramatizes this 
profound ideological and moral shift is Rameaus Nephew. Trilling discusses this work in 
conjunction with The Sorrows o f Young Werther and the Phenomenology of Spirit attempting to 
survey this crucial era and so identify the precise content o f the transition from sincerity to 
authenticity. In so doing, T rilling reads Hegel as the philosopher who contributed more than 
anyone else to the legitimization o f  ‘authenticity’ for our contemporary sensibilities. Hegel, 
according to T rilling, saw that the spirit’s alienation from itself is a precondition o f progress, 
o f the forward movement towards self-realization. The ‘honest soul’ that embodies the ideal 
o f  sincerity is to be rejected as it does nothing to prom ote the true interests o f the spirit. 
W hat is to be valued is the Rousseauean ame dechiree, or ‘disintegrated consciousness’, that is 
the soul proper to the m odem  man. This consciousness is not anymore concerned with the 
objective morality o f  society, but with the subjective morality that is poetically expressed in 
the sleepless nights and the despair o f  the young W erther and in a more extreme manner in 
the clownish phantasmagoria o f Jean-Fran^ois Rameau, the hero o f D iderot’s book.
T rilling follows his survey by examining Man field  Park., reading it as a corrective to 
Hegel’s enthusiastic acceptance o f m odem  spiritual alienation. For Trilling, Jane Austen is 
preoccupied by her desire to establish the moral supremacy o f  the ‘sentiment o f  being’, a
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sentiment also central to W ordsworth’s poetry which Trilling often presents as exemplary in 
this regard. Jane Austen’s novel is read as one o f the most serious objections to the 
tendencies that threaten “the ‘noble’ mode o f  life and the ‘honest soul’” (Tnlling, 1974: 76). 
In contrast with Hegel’s dialectical refinement her work is ‘categorical’. It goes against the 
typically m odem  idea that “the enlightened and generous mind can discern right and wrong 
and good and bad only under the aspect o f  process and development, o f futurity' and the 
interplay and resolution o f contradictions” (ibid, 79). Trilling knows that this is hardly an 
imperative that can find a place in our m odem  sensibilities and yet at the end o f his 
discussion he frankly acknowledges that “when its first unease has been accommodated, it 
can be seen to have in it a curious power o f  com fort” (ibid, 80). So Trilling, tom  between his 
status as a m odem  critic and his pre- and even anti-modem sensibilities, asserts his own 
contradictory feelings about modernity and its discontents.
The book continues with an examination o f several canonical works o f Western literature 
like Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and C onrad’s In the Heart o f Darkness and Trilling also discusses 
— as is always the case with him — Freud, especially the later Freud o f Civilisation and Its 
Discontents. His treatment o f Freud is very much a recapitulation o f what Trilling saw in the 
Freudian work from the fifties onwards. It focuses on the ability o f Freud’s work to show us 
the unsurpassable limits o f  our human situation. There are o f  course certain new and highly 
suggestive inflections that establish analogies between Freud’s work and the Book o f  Job as 
when Trilling asserts that Freud “propounds and accepts the mystery and the naturalness -  
the natural mystery, the mysterious naturalness -  o f suffering” (ibid, 157). Interestingly 
enough, Tnlling goes even further by finding parallels between Freudian thought and 
Chnstian religion. In this parallelism, the implication is that the latter has become historically 
obsolete, so the former rightfully comes to take its place since they are both firmly grounded 
on the ultimate realization o f the tragicalness o f  human life and, like all religions or their
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substitutes, give us a reason to believe that life has a meaning. It is to this belief that Trilling 
refers when he notes that
however harsh and seemingly gratuitous a fate may be, the authenticity o f its implicit significance 
is not to be denied, confirmed as it is by the recognition o f  some imperative which has both 
brought it into being and prescribed its acceptance, and in doing so affirmed the authenticity o f  
him to whom the fate is assigned” (ibid., 158).
It is easy to ridicule this quasi-mystic and utterly conservative view by merely noting that 
not many victims o f  the current state o f  affairs seem to be — in any commonly intelligible 
m anner — content with their own fate just because it is theirs and theirs only. Yet, Trilling’s 
statement must be taken seriously, not because it is tight, but because it eventually leads us to 
understand the profound unease with which Trilling, this self-professed liberal, feared 
change, especially radical change and how m uch he valued a kind o f stoic passivity and tacit 
acceptance o f the existing order o f things. It is interesting to note that in the above statement 
the significance o f fate is confirmed by the recognition o f some imperative which Trilling 
never specifies. This may be a religious imperative, although Trilling does not have anything 
like that in mind. W hat he does have in mind though is what he read in Arnold, Forster, 
W ordsworth and Freud: the acceptance o f  the fact that certain things in our world have 
certain limits which men should not attempt to cross since such a violation would lead to a 
life unbearably light and without substance, a life in which there is no realization o f 
complexity, variousness and the omnipresence o f the tragic. To Trilling such a life would 
ultimately prove to be an inauthentic life, diminished in quality due to the ‘weightlessness o f 
all things’ that Nietzsche, Trilling reminds us103, feared would prevail in a godless universe. In 
his last published discussion o f  Freud’s work Trilling attempts a reading that is meant to 
provide a more profound justification to his increasingly conservative views regarding social
103 In the last chapter o f  Sincerity and Authenticity, entitled “The Authentic Unconscious”.
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change. His argument is that given Freud’s contention that the super-ego maintains its 
hegemony over the ego even after its services are no longer needed and since this 
‘imperialism’ o f  the super-ego cannot be reduced or explained away by recourse to the nature 
o f society7 there must follow the sober realization that the human situation is much more 
resistant to fundamental, radical change that the progressive liberals believe it to be. Freud’s 
topology o f human consciousness provides Trilling with an incentive for articulating his own 
brand o f cultural and mainly political pessimism. Reading into Freud’s work an argument 
against any ‘melioristic schemes o f social reconstruction’104 T rilling lays out the ideological 
foundation for his advocacy o f the wisdom o f  acceptance in contradistinction to the desire 
for change characteristic o f  the New Left.
The rest o f the book and the main cause o f  its notoriety among certain critics is a 
polemic against a new generation which, in stark contrast to Trilling, chose to renegotiate the 
Freudian heritage in a way that could eventually lead to a free and more expansive life. 
Trilling takes them to task for forgetting, or pretending to forget, the limits which are 
imposed in any effort to transcend unhappiness and social oppression. His criticism is based 
on the following argument: any transcendence, such as it is envisaged by the New Left 
spokesmen he attacks, must by necessity negate the principles upon which our current life is 
structured. Such a negation would, by its sheer dynamism, destroy the intricate semantic 
webs o f shared meaning and would lead to a situation where we would be unable to make 
any value judgment as even the concept o f  value itself would be hardly usable. In short the 
‘polymorphous perverse’ o f O ’Brown, the ‘libidinal revolution’ o f Marcuse and the ‘liberating 
‘madness’ o f Laing all lead us to the lamentable situation where the
falsities o f  an alienated world are rejected in favour o f  an upward psychopathic mobility to the
point o f  divinity, each one o f  us a Christ — but with none o f  the inconveniences o f  undertaking
,<M I am borrowing this phrase from Nathan A. Scott’s Three American Moralits: Mailer, Rellow, Trilling, p. 208.
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to intercede, o f  being a sacrifice, o f  reasoning with rabbis, o f  making sermons, o f  having 
disciples, o f  going to weddings and to funerals, o f  beginning something and at a certain point 
remarking that it is finished” (ibid, 171-72).
The result is, as Trilling saw it, a solipsisdc universe where people as social monads can 
never really engage in anything related with the actual world as we perceive it. Trilling was 
very perceptive, as all gifted conservatives are, when he identified and attacked the most 
extremist positions o f his ideological adversaries, but in this case one cannot help coming to 
the conclusion that he missed the point. The metonymical use o f ‘madness’ was not 
something Trilling was sensitive enough to perceive, nor did he ever see the political 
implications o f  his adversaries’ ideas. W hat he did see was the threat they posed to the 
existence o f a certain order, which no m atter how much Trilling disliked it was for him still 
the only cultural and political order w orth preserving. T rilling was acutely aware o f  the 
shortcomings o f the poetics and the rhetoric o f radical progressivism but he was ultimately 
unwilling to confront the far more compromising aspects o f the liberal ideal he so clearly 
defended.
T h e  U n e a sy  M o r a l  a n d  P olitical  Sta tus  o f  L iberalism  in  M id -T'w e n t ie t h  
C e n t u r y  A m e r ic a : A n  A ppraisal o f  T r illin g ’s C ritical  T h o u g h t  
Trilling’s work shows his importance as a moral critic and his relevance to any ethical- 
political discussions o f the role o f criticism in the present day. Although his work founded 
no school o f  criticism it was at its time one o f  the most interesting and in some ways 
exemplary' instances o f a criticism sensitive to the ideological demands o f its time and 
attentive to the social and by extension political aspect o f  literature. His social and political 
sensibilities are expressed through the medium o f a morally inflected criticism which 
systematically attempts to articulate a new critical language based on moral rather than purely
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aesthetic categories. This attempt which lasted for nearly thirty years led Trilling from the 
optimistic liberalism o f the forties and the early fifties to the more detached and pessimistic 
views o f  the sixties and the early seventies. In other words, from the belief that there was a 
possibility and a responsibility o f re-educating the liberal middle-classes to the realization that 
such a re-education or refinement o f cultural and moral sensibilities was more an ideal 
pursuit than a realistic one. W hat I aim to do in this part o f my discussion is to explore how 
some o f  the key elements o f T rilling’s thought related to the dominant ideological currents in 
post-war America.
O ne o f  the m ost central concepts in Trilling’s criticism is the concept o f the self. Around 
this concept Trilling constructs his critical system in opposition to the leftist and, in his view, 
crudely sociologistic critical systems o f  his time. Trilling’s early works — up to and including 
the Liberal Imagination — exhibited a critical spirit still very much concerned with the world’s 
social and political actuality. His idealism was already evident even then, but his optimistic 
belief in the relative superiority o f  liberal ideas and the necessity to expand on them did not 
allow him to acquiesce in the status o f  the (slighdy disillusioned) critic who only observes the 
adventures o f the com m on m en from above as if he is somehow disconnected from the rest 
o f  the world, a position that Trilling would later assume without much trouble.
Trilling’s first period is very much a product o f his contradictory influences; left and 
progressivist ideas on the one hand, Victorian moralism on the other. Working through these 
contradictions is what makes the Liberal Imagination such an interesting book. In it we see 
how politics and morality are at the intersection o f literature and criticism. But that is not all. 
Below the surface we see that politics is only an illusion, an ideological trompe I'oeil' its 
manifestation is nothing else but a rather abstract and general background which frames the 
main argument. As William Chase correctly points out in discussing T rilling’s attitude 
towards politics: “society and history are (...) rendered (...) ancillary to what [Trilling] saw as 
a more serious and exalted pursuit” , which is in fact a kind o f  literary criticism whose “high-
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flown nature owes much to his transcendence o f  certain forms o f  local identity and local 
circumstance” (Chase, 1980: 11-12). The result is o f course a marginalization o f real history 
and its substitution with an idealized conception o f it. According to Chase, this history “in 
which Trilling was so decisively uninterested” is considered by virtue o f this substitution “as 
no more than a setting against which a real event — an event o f the mind and the critical 
imagination — takes place” (ibid, 11-12). Trilling’s main argument, drawn from the ideological 
resources o f  classical bourgeois liberalism, did no t so much need politics, at least not in the 
sense this word can have for a critic inspired by the Left, as it needed a certain temper, an 
attitude towards the world that does not completely exclude the political as long as the latter 
is transformed almost beyond recognition. As Mark Krupnick argues, by the mid-forties 
“ there was a conflict within the first generation o f New York intellectuals between their 
political hope for a socialist society and their commitment to the American ethos o f 
acculturation and success” (Krupnick, 1986: 188). Trilling was the critic that forcefully 
articulated these conflicting aspirations and the one to attempt to negotiate critically a 
passage to a new situation, where acculturation and success would not carry the negative 
connotations still attributed to them  by certain left-leaning intellectuals. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that Trilling built his moral-aesthetic system on the assumption o f  an individual 
consciousness which, in true Hegelian fashion, moves gradually toward self-realization. This 
idea o f  the self is directly related to Trilling’s own experiences during the thirties and 
particularly to his renunciation o f socialist ideas in favour o f the liberal conceptions o f self 
and society. During the thirties there was a marked tendency to consider the self as an 
amalgam o f  various, heterogeneous determinations, among which class determinations were 
considered to have the greatest significance. Trilling saw this as degradation o f  the 
Variousness and complexity’ o f the human soul, and although he never completely refused to 
take social class into account he did in fact consider it a phenom enon o f  secondary 
importance. As I argued earlier on he contended that by acknowledging social class one
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could produce even finer literature and never did he seem to believe that this 
acknowledgement is a powerful critical tool in the examination o f  the social, economic, and 
political organisation o f society.
In the later phase o f his career Trilling came to regard the ‘self, now increasingly 
perceived as the sole uncorrupted entity in a corrupt world, as a normative ideal. This ‘self 
became even more disconnected from actual society, predicated as it was on the assumption 
that it alone held a privileged, even a unique position, in the order o f things, whereas all 
things social and by extension political were perceived as conspiring against its moral purity. 
The more American culture became complex and seemingly impenetrable to T rilling’s critical 
powers the more he took his distance from the social-political context that informed his early 
work and moved towards the aesthetic-metaphysical conception o f selfhood that 
characterized his work in the sixties and the seventies. This transition from the social to the 
aesthetic is vitally im portant for understanding his work, as it gives us an indication o f  the 
ideological tensions that Trilling had to negotiate in a period (the sixties) when many o f  his 
key assumptions were to be challenged. The moral inflection o f  his early work, which was a 
product o f  an immediate awareness o f  actual needs and aspirations, gradually lost its 
connectedness with the world and became a style, an attitude, a feature o f  the individual 
mind which bestowed the agent a certain value to the extent that was a gesture o f 
appreciation, not unlike an aesthetic judgement. The moral self in Trilling’s later works was a 
self that selected a certain style, one that vied with its own conception o f  the good life. It is 
not always very clear what was the ‘good life’ according to Trilling but his essays in the fifties 
give us more than a clue. In them and particularly in the Keats, W ordsworth, and Orwell 
essays we see that middle-class values are the best foundation for a life still in touch with the 
sense o f  the tragic, a life that does not wish to be oblivious to the radical irresolution o f  the 
mysteries o f  the world.
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This privileging o f  middle-class values is best understood as a ‘symptom’ o f the 
interaction between two closely related spheres. The first is Trilling’s personality and the 
other is the social and political situation o f  America after World War II. In as far as the 
former is concerned it is worth noting that Trilling was for a long time tom  between his 
progressivism and his deep-rooted need for acceptance by the gentile world. His 
progressivism, part and parcel o f the Jewish milieu in which he took his first steps as an 
intellectual, found itself in a uneasy relationship with his need to assert himself in a world in 
which he believed such an act could have any practical and psychological value. That world 
was o f  course the world o f Ivy League Columbia, a bastion o f  traditional humanism105 and a 
place where an upwardly mobile Jewish intellectual like T rilling could prove himself as equal 
if not better than his gentile colleagues. As far as the political situation in which he found 
himself is concerned the picture is radically different. Post-war America saw an 
intensification o f all things that would eventually make it a world power o f  fearsome 
proportions. Capitalist economy was to progress unencumbered by the opposition o f the 
thirties. The Cold War initiated a new era where the limits for political dissent became even 
more narrow, and the new consumerist orientation o f the economy was to intensify all means 
for the institution o f  ‘middle-class’, happily consuming America as the supreme ideal to be 
emulated by all. The American dream and the ideological docility this entailed were a brute 
cultural and sociological fact in Trilling’s time. In addition to that, the defeat o f the Left and 
the complex process o f ideological re-positioning o f the surviving left-wing intellectuals 
provided a fertile ground for a thorough re-examination o f  the radical aspirations o f earlier 
times and an attem pt at establishing some sort o f a modus vivendi between critical intellect and 
power. In the fifties Trilling, apparendy content with the situation he described, famously
105 Mark Krupnick (1986) discusses this in greater detail and he argues that “Columbia's humanistic ideal o f  
moral-aesthetic refinement had as its social counterpart a conception o f  the university as a bulwark against 
political radicalism. (...) Trilling adapted both parts o f  the Columbia ethos - its concern with refinement and its 
opposition to radicalism - to the critique o f  "the liberal imagination" that established his reputation in the 
forties.”, p. 50.
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declared that the ‘party o f money’ and the ‘party o f  mind’ were no longer in opposition thus 
paving the way for a politically suspect and potentially dangerous relation between the two.1"6
This conservative turn to middle-class values is very im portant to my discussion as it 
shows how quickly the progressive liberal project mutated into a neo-conservative apology o f 
the status quo. It matters little if Trilling him self actually endorsed all that was implicit in his 
work. His privileging o f middle-class values may be seen as an ideological ploy, a cunning 
manoeuvre which aimed at enhancing the results o f  his previous efforts. I have already 
remarked how problematical Trilling’s relation with actual politics was. William Chase has 
argued that, in relation to the Liberal Imagination, Trilling “seems prepared to resist the 
shadow o f politics, past and present” and yet “politics, impelling him everywhere to make 
dense the complexities o f literature and life, nonetheless makes its claim upon him ” (ibid, 
97). That was exacdy what Trilling wished to  avoid: the fatal attraction o f real politics for he 
knew that his whole critical system would be contaminated by too close a proximity with the 
actual political struggles o f  his time. H e was aware that if one wishes to articulate a moral 
kind o f criticism, and moreover, if  one wishes to do that by adopting the point o f  view o f the 
individual mind, one should be very cautious as to how much o f real history one would want 
to admit into one’s critical system. Trilling’s solution took the form o f  the acceptance o f 
those values that were the least amenable to any sort o f ‘ideological’, that is left-wing or 
overtly progressive, influences. Such values would permit the mind to find a resting place in 
reality' and they would also allow the world to be seen ‘as it is’ without any ideological 
embellishments. Consequendy the mysteries o f  the human situation would reveal themselves 
to the patient, observing and properly educated observer who, guided by Trilling’s criticism, 
would in turn realize that the order o f  the world is not to be violated but appreciated in the 
m anner one appreciates a great novel or a painting. The individual mind implied in this view
106 Trilling himself proved the point by getting involved with Encounter, and Perspectives, the former a British 
magazine funded by the CIA and the latter a quarterly launched and funded by the Ford Foundation. For more 
information see Krupnick, 1986, p. 102.
227
is the mind o f a connoisseur, refined and sensitive and, most importantly, passive. It is the 
passivity inherent in middle-class values that Trilling values so much as this passivity enables 
him to construct his moral criticism as an ideal refuge from history and politics, and an 
equally ideal means o f dealing with the m ost historically related aspects o f literature without 
allowing for an overall critique o f the society within which this literature is created.
That is the reason why the embracing o f  middle-class values went hand-in-hand with his 
re-evaluation o f  modernism. Trilling saw that m odernist works cannot be easily, if  at all, 
accommodated to the moral and cultural aspirations o f the middle classes. Therefore, he 
begun to view them as potentially destructive works. He believed that this ‘ideological’ 
destructiveness had to be counterbalanced by a new ideological formation that would 
prom ote not agitation but assurance and acceptance. So, along with Kafka and Joyce, 
Howells and Orwell must take their place in the imaginary museum o f liberal sensibility, so 
that the darkness lurking beneath the surface which modernism had been so good at 
revealing must be illuminated by the consoling narratives that see a special kind o f dignity in 
m an’s passive contemplation o f the world. This tragic knowledge, as Robert Boyers apdy 
describes it, is, for T rilling, “an exalted form o f  wisdom and is founded on painful awareness 
o f irremediable contradictions in the fabric o f life” (Boyers, 1977: 46). Because o f  that it 
enables the mind that possesses it to see that beauty may reside even in those places one 
would not normally expect to find it. In plain words that meant that no matter how 
suffocating middle-class values might be they were the best foundation for a life which was 
as far removed from the extremes o f (working-class or bourgeois) ignorance and stupidity on 
the one hand and (working-class or bourgeois) radicalism on the other. "Ihe result, as Chase 
succincdy puts it, is that “in an age well-known for its political conformity and quietism, an 
age tranquilized by the American president o f the time and by the satisfactions o f  widely 
shared consumer affluence, Lionel Trilling went about creating a sophisticated means by
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which he and his fellow intellectuals, all the readers o f  the little magazines, could surrender to 
the status quo.” (ibid, 108).
But that was not the only thing that Trilling aimed at. His implicit aim was the formation 
o f a liberal middle-class consciousness that could be at the same time both sensitive and yet 
unmoved by real injustices, intelligent and yet ignorant to the hardships o f  others, flexible 
but not too eager to embrace anything radical. This refined consciousness would, by virtue o f 
its distance from the actual world, offer itself a living testimony to the inadequacies o f  any 
secular power. It would be, as Daniel O ’Hara comments, an “ironic witness to the barbarous 
crudities o f  established power, regardless o f  its official orientation le ft or right’” 
(O’Hara,1988: 202). O ’Hara is right to observe that “ this ideal o f aesthetic humanism from 
Schiller and Arnold to Richards and Trilling does no t seem so much reactionary or even 
quaint as a sublime blank in the cultural memory” (ibid, 2002). Yet one cannot help but see 
that this aesthetic humanism, coinciding as it did with McCarthyism and with the Korean 
War in the fifties and the Vietnam War in the following two decades, with the virtual 
disappearance o f any credible organized labour movement and the intensification o f 
capitalism inside and imperialistic excursions outside, was something more than a sublime 
blank in the cultural memory; it was in fact a formidable ally in the propaganda war that was 
waged in America during that period.
This leads my discussion to the examination o f class in Trilling’s work. There is no doubt 
that class considerations play a crucial part in Trilling’s criticism. But their consideration is of 
a certain quality, which is at odds with what we are most prepared to accept as legitimate use. 
As I have already discussed, they are taken into account, to the extent that they do not lead 
to any fundamental re-examination o f  the social structure o f  society. Class determinations are 
considered as integral parts o f the human situation in the m odem  world and any knowledge 
o f these makes the (real or fictional) agent sensitive to certain aspects o f  his existence which 
would otherwise be obscured. Basically this knowledge serves its purpose by existendally
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enhancing any conception o f  the world. It also has, in Trilling’s conception o f it, stabilizing 
social effects. This is due to the fact that he only considers class as something that should 
ideally be accepted for what it is, that is a historically-specific mode o f being in the world. 
There is no question o f drawing any other conclusions from such a realization o f social 
difference. W hat really matters is for one to embrace one’s own class difference with a 
certain pride in a way not unlike one nowadays expects any disadvantaged group to embrace 
and maybe even celebrate its not complying with the standards o f physiological or social 
‘normalcy’. To this end Trilling finds inspiration in nineteenth-century English writers. In 
Sincerity and Authenticity, Trilling has this to say on the issue o f class in Victorian England
(The English novelists o f  the nineteenth century’] would all o f  them appear to be in agreement 
that the person who accepts his class situation, whatever it may be, as a given and necessary 
condition o f  his life will be sincere beyond question. He will be sincere and authentic, sincere 
because authentic. Indeed, the novelists understand class to be a chief condition o f  personal 
authenticity; it is their assumption that the individual who accepts what a rubric o f  the Anglican 
catechism calls his "station and its duties" is pretty sure to have a quality’ o f  integral selfhood. (.. .)
His sentiment o f  being, his awareness o f  his discrete and personal existence, derives from his 
sentiment o f  class. (Trilling, 192: 115-15)
Nowhere in his work does Trilling explicidy accepts what is described here as the model 
that contemporary American society should follow, and yet nowhere does he give any 
indication that this is not a view shared by him. Trilling knows that his nostalgia for Victorian 
social and moral rigidity is not a viable proposition for the ills o f his time. Although he is 
aware, as always, o f the reactionary character o f these views, Trilling is nevertheless attracted 
to them for their sense o f order, well-drawn social boundaries, and the ample space they 
provide (especially for the privileged upper middle-class) for living the moral life. He saw his
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contemporary middle-class as a social and cultural formation far beneath the cultural, and 
more specifically ideological, status o f  the nineteenth-century English middle-class.
O ne o f  the reasons he saw such a difference was the fact that contemporary middle-class 
mentalities or world-views seemed to proceed unchallenged by any formidable ideological 
adversaries. In the beginning o f the Liberal Imagination Trilling maintained that contemporary 
conservative thought had lost its intellectual vitality and therefore could offer no real 
challenge to liberal ideology. Therefore in order for the liberal ideology to shape up and take 
a long hard look at its own deficiencies there should be a real or fictive ideological adversary. 
Trilling invented such an adversary to which he gave the name o f Stalinism, a concept that in 
Trilling works is to understood as having not so much a positive content (what it is) but 
rather a negative one (what it is not). Stalinism was what liberalism was not and to make 
things even worse this inverted image o f liberalism was constandy exerting a strong influence 
on the way liberals perceived o f the world. W here there should have been appreciation o f 
‘variousness and complexity’ there was dogmatism and militancy. Where there should have 
been an acknowledgment o f the limits o f  human reason there was an imperious 
reconstructive will, lethal to the extent that it believed that all can be eventually altered to fit 
its image o f moral and political perfection. For T rilling the road to the radical abolition o f 
any and all injustices is paved with crimes and is characterized by the hubristic attem pt to 
violate a cosmic order that should not be tampered with.
It is true that nowhere did Trilling write anything that could be perceived as an outright 
endorsement o f capitalism, its economy or the ethos it endorses. As Krupnick argues “if  we 
speak o f Trilling as a conservative, it is not as an economic or political conservative” and he 
then adds that in as far as his relation to the nineteenth-century England is concerned 
“Tnlling’s aesthetic o f  personality is linked to the nineteenth-century middle class, but he 
consistently distinguishes between the cultural attitudes o f that class and the economic basis 
o f those attitudes” (Krupnick, 1986: 179). This is to a large extent true but one can
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nevertheless rightfully challenge the legitimacy o f such a distinction. N o cultural attitude is or 
should be examined apart from the economic basis o f the society within which it is 
articulated and therefore one who writes so approvingly o f such a culture, as Trilling does, 
must tacidy (even if somewhat unwittingly) accept the material basis o f such a culture. You 
cannot have a certain culture or certain cultural ideals in circulation without a political, 
economic, and social organization that provides the framework within which each person 
can or cannot pursue these ideals. Trilling betrays not only his conservatism but also his 
ideologically crippling idealism by refusing to take into account the actual history upon which 
his chosen moral and cultural systems were predicated.
T rilling was a critic who single-mindedly focused upon ideology and the effects it has on 
human and m ost particularly liberal consciousness. He consistendy did this irrespective o f 
what his subject matter was. Victorian England and Eisenhower’s America were, for him, 
both islands in the vast ocean o f  ideas. As Mark Scheduler pointedly argues in relation to 
Trilling’s contemporary historical sensibilities
such sensitivity to the dominion o f  ideas over character, based as it was upon a belief in their 
power to transform life, was brought at a price. Here as elsewhere, Trilling suppressed those 
dimensions o f  reality boosted by insurgent realism: the depression, the hunger, the evictions, the 
bloody labor wars, the advances o f  Fascism in F.urope -  in short the general desperation” 
(Shechner, 1987: 75).
'Hie reference is on Trilling’s disparaging account o f the realism o f  left-wing authors and 
critics o f  previous generations such as Theodore Dreiser and V. L. Partington. Yet it also 
holds true for all o f Trilling’s dealings with literature. The exclusive focus on ideology 
removed from any actual political and economic circumstances led Trilling to consider 
culture as a sphere where one can suffer or achieve all sorts o f things; and yet at the same 
time he refused to account for the mechanisms that put this sphere in motion. But there is
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also another aspect o f  his idealism. Culture as conceptualised by Trilling is the ideal place one 
could wish to occupy should one wish to survey society without allowing oneself to get too 
specific about practical issues. Culture becomes aestheticised and thus functions as the ideal 
repository o f all the values that society threatens to destroy. It matters little to Trilling 
w hether society moves to the left or to  the right. W hat matters is that there must be a place 
from which all other considerations and particularly moral considerations must be weighted 
and judged.
Trilling did not wish to examine the material basis upon which his ideals were predicated. 
By renouncing any attempt to dialectically examine literature and society Trilling devised his 
own version o f dialectics, a kind o f pseudo-Hegelian dialectics o f two stages, a thesis and an 
antithesis that are locked in their mutual contradictory state without any real possibility o f 
transcendence. As Gregory Jay has argued “in place o f a materialist dialectics (...) Trilling 
would propose a psychological aesthetics that at once removed the Literary Mind from 
capitalism’s history and empowered its status — however tragic, alienated, and im potent — as 
the ‘opposing se lf” (Jay, 1989: 573). It is this ‘opposing self, which is the ideal inhabitant o f 
this idealized cultural space, I spoke o f  earlier. A judge o f the dogmatic barbarism o f the Left 
and the threatening vulgarity o f  mass-society, an appreciator o f the tragic quality o f  life and 
one content with “an imagination that refused to be violated by ideas” that is “to be 
dominated by any singular conception o f  reality under whose auspices one could pretend in 
all good conscience that no other version o f  the true or real might command respect” 
(Boyers, 1977: 30). This ‘opposing self, which in Trilling’s work is but the ideal version o f  
the liberal self he wished to educate, has its own system o f ideas and its own language. This 
language is m ore than anything else moral both in its conception and in its stated intent. I 
shall now attem pt to clarify what this moral character consists of.
In Trilling’s critical method moral criteria o f evaluation take the place o f  either a purely 
textual approach or an overtly politicized one. They function so as to preserve the centrality
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o f the ‘individual mind’ in the system o f literary appreciation and thus marginalize those 
social or cultural issues that would potentially shift the focus to a more political reading o f 
literature. In Trilling, morality guarantees that any such issues will be translated into a code 
whose constitutive binary oppositions will be in Trilling’s own terminology, complex and 
life-enhancing on the one side o f the opposition or vulgar and life-demeaning on the other. 
In order to do so Trilling’s moral criticism moves a little too far into the realm o f aesthetics. 
Occasionally, it does so to such an extent that it is tempting to designate his critical method 
as a hybrid aesthetic-moral method in which traditional moral issues are aestheticised and 
aesthetic issues are moralized. This double transformation, which eventually leads to the 
mutation o f  both categories, succeeds in isolating his criticism from actual history at the same 
time that it allows him to use this history in its highly idealized form as an integral part o f  his 
critical method. Trilling’s use o f moral criticism should be thought o f as an ideal means of 
prom oting his own liberal education to the American middle-classes. It was ideal because it 
enabled him to make use o f those concepts that would prove the most effective in his moral- 
pedagogical project without risking touching upon those aspects that would force him and 
his audience alike to reconsider certain fundamental aspects o f their life and the sociopolitical 
situation in which they found themselves in.
Trilling wished to change the relation between ‘intellect’ and ‘power’ and he consistently 
tried to argue that the American middle class should also embrace this possibility o f 
coexistence between political and economic power, on the one hand, and intellectual pursuits 
on the other. W hat liberals traditionally viewed with caution Trilling wanted to present as a 
desideratum o f the m odem  era. A moral criticism like the one he employed permitted him to 
do exacdy that. By positing that criticism and literature provided a formidable area o f 
intellectual and moral excellence, middle-class liberals could get accustomed to the idea that 
they could in some ways influence real politics provided that they would not forget that their 
contribution to the political well-being o f  the nation rested upon the fact that they possessed
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a special kind o f moral knowledge and sensitivity that real politics lacked. To assume a moral 
and intellectual superiority vis-a-vis those who held real economic and political power was 
the best way to fantasise about effective political and cultural intervention, when in fact the 
only thing that should preoccupy this liberal middle-class was their political and (somewhat 
less so) cultural impotence.
Cornel West has argued that the politics o f  Trilling’s criticism served yet another 
purpose. Commenting on the relation between Trilling and his middle-class audience, West 
argues that
Trilling's apparently abstract formulations o f  the circumstantial and conditioned character o f  
human will are intended as moral guidelines for the energies o f  [the middle class]. He wanted to 
guide them away from the simplicities o f  the left and infuse their cold war and corporate 
liberalism with a sense o f  the tragic. (. . .) literature and literary criticism were political precisely 
because at their best they could disclose the blindnesses and rigidities o f  ideological orthodoxies, 
especially those o f  the left. (West, 1989, 171).
W hat is argued here brings yet another aspect o f Trilling’s criticism to our attention: his 
desire to purge liberal middle-class thought from all traces o f left radicalism and re-formulate 
a liberal ideology that would be sensitive to society and politics while leaving both virtually 
unaffected. The middle classes m ust think and act, but in ways radically different from what 
they used to. Trilling knew that there is tendency inherent in liberalism which dictates that 
one should not only be sensitive to the injustices o f the world, but one should also do 
something to abolish them. When the only outlet o f such a desire is the one provided by the 
practices o f  the Left it is no wonder that Trilling could say in a symposium held in 1948 that 
“Stalinism becomes endemic in the American middle class as soon as that class begins to 
think” (Trilling, 1948: 888-89).
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Trilling’s solution to  this ideological problem was to create a criticism which would by 
virtue o f its aestheticised moral ideas make such a ideological contamination impossible. That 
criticism would also envisage a certain kind o f politics, one that offers itself as a total view o f 
life from the vantage point o f a sensibility schooled in great literature and particularly in the 
English masters o f  the realist novel. Such politics o f  the literary imagination would criticize 
all other forms o f politics in the same way great art is but an implicit critique o f  the 
barbarism o f  the civilization upon which it is predicated. But by trying to resolve the tension 
between a radicalised liberal consciousness and the imperatives o f literary ethics, Trilling, as 
Joseph Frank famously put it, “actually criticizes politics from the point o f view o f art - a 
point o f view happily free from the limiting conditions o f all political action” (Frank, 1968: 
255).
In the end Trilling emerges as a deeply contradictory apologist o f the status quo tom  
between his desire for cultural and moral refinement and his deep-seated fear o f  radical 
change. He was never completely at ease with neo-conservatism, which, after his death, tried 
to enlist him as a precursor and ideological ally, nor was he any more at ease with simplistic 
liberalism. Instead he chose to becom e the dissenting voice o f liberal thought, which has 
been a strongly contested ideology criticized even by some o f  those who continuously 
championed the ideas put forward in Trilling’s work. This work, although critical in many 
respects, is tied with this ideology in ways that often betray such a degree o f pragmatic 
acceptance -  however ingeniously qualified -  that the critical element is effectively 
neutralized. His politics, never stated or explicidy expressed, was o f a special kind, not o f the 
kind that leads to action but o f the kind that leads to knowledge and the ensuing morally 
enhancing appreciation that comes as a result o f  such a knowledge. Yet, ultimately, his 
unwillingness or inability to take into account the material circumstances upon which such 
knowledge is predicated leaves his whole critical work extremely vulnerable to the accusation 
o f misguided complicity with the powers that went more than anything else against the main
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assumption behind his work: that literature is to be read and valued in as far as it functions as 
a guide for the effective moral re-evaluation o f  our lives and the world we live in.
237
C o n c l u s i o n
In this concluding part o f my study, I wish to discuss the work o f the Leavis, Trilling and 
Sartre in the context o f the main argument that lies at the centre o f this work, namely that 
ethical/m oral criticism is a way o f dealing with issues whose political nature can hardly be 
concealed. All three critics were direcdy or indirectly involved in a social interpretation o f 
literature. They all saw the literary phenom enon as essentially a social phenomenon and 
therefore implicitly or explicidy linked with questions o f power. Their choice to consider 
literature as a social fact — that is as something created, enjoyed and above all legitimized 
within a well-specified community o f  people linked together by ties o f  common culture, 
religion, language etc. — made them especially sensitive to the sociocultural and ultimately 
political implications any ‘use’ o f literature has. The question then is how and to what extent 
their work can be seen as an attem pt to talk about general, political issues, while using a 
specialized discourse on the interrelation o f literature and morality. In attempting to give an 
answer to that question I shall concentrate on several issues that were already alluded to in 
the preceding chapters: the political nature o f  their critical approach, the ideological 
assumptions behind their idea o f literature and criticism, their own particular brand o f 
commitment and finally the form that their work took in its endeavour to reach its intended 
audience. I want now to concentrate on the points where these critics either converge or 
diverge. N ot only will this make their respective similarities and differences clearer, but it will 
also give a wider and m ore comprehensive view o f the ideological configuration o f ethics and 
literary criticism during the time when all three critics were active. Let me start by examining 
the relation o f their work with politics in both a strict and a wider sense.
Co m in g  o f  A g e  B e t w e e n  t h e  W a r s: T h e  N e g o t ia t io n  o f  H istorical  T e n s io n s
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ITie one thing one immediately observes is that all three having been bom  roughly the 
same time (Leavis in 1895, Sartre and Trilling in 1905) found themselves coming o f age in 
some o f the m ost turbulent years o f  the twentieth century. O f  the three only Leavis was old 
enough to have a direct, first-hand experience o f  the immensely traumatic experience that 
was World War I. In England Leavis began his career in an environment o f political, 
economic and cultural turmoil. From the first signs o f trouble in the British colonies (1919 in 
India and 1920 in Ireland) to the General Strike o f  1926 and then to the troubled economy 
o f the years between 1929 and 1932 as a result o f  the Great Depression, Leavis matured in 
an era o f social and political upheavals and economic insecurity. This climate o f  uncertainty 
that followed immediately after the end o f the Wold War I had an immediate effect on the 
culture o f the time and Cambridge was certainly not unaffected. Leavis was very acutely 
aware o f the cultural changes brought about by the destruction o f virtually all pre-1914 
certainties. His eager defence o f literary modernism in an era when a favourable reaction to it 
was not taken for granted testifies to his early realization that only a new way o f  using 
language could do justice to the new ideological and cultural space that was opening up while 
the old world deteriorated beyond recognition. His faith in the transformative power o f 
poetry was to be severely tested by W orld W ar II and its aftermath. Consequendy his turn to 
the novel may thus be read as indicative o f a certain ambivalence as to whether modernist 
high culture could really bring about any significant changes in a world obviously hostile to 
this culture’s very essence. After W orld War II there are few historical events that seem to 
leave an imprint in Leavis’s work. I am not in any way suggesting that he did not really 
engage with the world in the postwar years. My contention is that Leavis’s postwar work 
gives one the impression that he had reached a point quite early in his life when he had 
concluded on m ost o f the serious issues that would elicit some response from him in the 
following years. Leavis’s work hardly leaves one with the impression that the man behind the 
often brilliant literary analyses and discussions would be willing to change his view
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considerably on any given issue. The Leavis-Snow controversy was one o f  the rare chances 
that Leavis had to acknowledge the cultural force o f the present-day world and all the 
ideological mutations and shifts o f (cultural) focus that had taken place during the thirty years 
that separate his first critical interventions and the date (1962) o f  his violent polemic against 
C. P. Snow. Unfortunately this chance was missed and for the following fifteen years that 
Leavis was still active as a critic there had not been one occasion where his work did not give 
the impression o f  an obstinate, almost reactionary clinging to his old values and beliefs.
T rilling’s case is different. Bom ten years later than Leavis, Trilling did not have a first­
hand experience o f  World War I. Although he, like millions o f  others both in America and 
the rest o f  the World, experienced the G reat Depression and its devastating effects it is fair 
to say that T rilling, like Sartre, is predominandy influenced by the post World W ar II 
historical events. That is not to say that the increasingly radicalised reaction o f the American 
working classes in the in ter-war period and the great appeasing gesture o f Roosevelt’s New 
Deal did not register in T rilling’s consciousness, but rather that the historical period he most 
readily responded to in his works is the one that coincides with the Cold War era. Trilling is a 
critic whose work recaptures its implicit, ‘hidden’ meanings in the context o f the Taft-Hardey 
Act o f  1947107, the notorious House o f  Un-American Activities Committee set up by Senator 
McCarthy, the 1952 victory, and consequendy, the almost complete political domination o f 
the Republican Eisenhower108, and finally the social, political and cultural turmoil that 
followed President Kennedy’s assassination in 1963. Unlike Leavis, Trilling, even in his late 
years during the sixties and seventies was in contact with the wider political and ideological 
currents that marked his country and his era.
107 'ITiis law, passed by Congress in 1947, curtailed the freedom o f  industrial action, effectively outlawing strikes 
by government employees, banning the closed shop and making the unions responsible for breaches o f  
contract. It was one o f  the many reactions to a balance o f  power between capitalists and workers that was 
increasingly believed to be too liberal (some would even go as far as calling it communist!) in its safeguarding o f  
basic worker’s rights. For more details see Brogan, 1990: 613.
io« 'phe eight-year period during which Eisenhower, the first Republican to become President after twenty years 
in opposition is commonly held to be one o f  the most conservative in the recent history o f  the United States. In 
the words o f  one historiographer they were the years o f  “comfortable lethargy” (Brogan, 1990: 631).
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Sartre was bom  the same year as Trilling and although he too was too young to be 
directly affected by World War I he came o f age in the inter-war years witnessing in his own 
way the often violent political and cultural transitions o f  inter-war France. I have already said 
that Sartre did not directly engage with what was going on during that time. That is not to say 
that the politically charged agitations o f  February 1934 that brought France on the brink o f 
civil war or the Spanish Civil War o f 1936-39 did not register in Sartre’s consciousness, but 
rather that these along with the antifascist movement and the bitter class-divisions o f  urban 
France were all considered somewhat extraneous to a life primarily devoted to the 
establishing o f  a new relation between itself and the world outside. It would take another 
world war and the experience o f captivity in the hands o f the Germans for Sartre to realize 
that this relation is and can only be mediated by history and the com mon fate o f collective 
entities far beyond the narrow confines o f any individual existence. After Sartre escaped 
from the concentration camp where he was held prisoner and returned to Paris he started to 
see society7 in a markedly different way. For the first time society was not merely an abstract 
conceptualization o f collective otherness but a collectivity in motion, on the verge o f  one o f 
the most exhilarating transformations o f  its recent history, namely Liberation. Sartre’s intense 
relation with politics began at this point. This close relation would remain strong until his last 
days. The most im portant events o f this whole period were those that constituted the actual 
historical context o f Sartre’s many and varied interventions: the tumultuous years o f  the 
short-lived Fourth Republic (1947-1958), and in particular the 1952 arrest o f the Communist 
leader Jacques Duclos — in fact one o f the causes o f Sartre’s controversial rapprochement w ith  
the PCF; the 1956 intensification o f the repressive measures against the FLN in Algeria; the 
Budapest invasion by Soviet troops, the latter being the cause o f Sartre’s eventual 
renunciation o f  his role as a fellow-traveller o f  the PCF. Later on there would be the Algerian 
independence, the Vietnam War and the events o f May 1968 all events against which Sartre’s
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continuing evolution as a critical, oppositional intellectual acquires its true significance and 
political value.
The fact that Leavis, Trilling, and Sartre all began their careers during a period that is 
marked by profound changes affecting every aspect o f  Western culture helps us understand 
the specificity o f  their critical, ideological projects. Certain aspects o f these projects were 
discussed in the previous chapters but one crucial aspect was only hinted at. I wish to discuss 
this particular aspect as a preamble to the more comprehensive examination o f the politics o f 
each critic’s work which will follow. In order to do that I m ust begin by setting the general 
ideological context o f  the inter-war period, that is, the general framework within which all 
three critics begun to formulate their critical projects.
In v e n t i n g  a n  A u d i e n c e : T h e  N o t i o n a l  P r o j e c t io n  o f  a  N e w  C o l l e c t iv it y
The main concepts that, in my opinion, one ought to take under consideration are those 
concepts that are bequeathed by nineteenth-century liberalism, the general ideological 
formation which came to be severely tested with the outbreak o f World War I. Eric 
Hobsbawm in his magisterial Age O f Extremes and particularly in the chapter evocatively 
entided “The Fall o f Liberalism” argues that
The official theory o f  liberal bourgeois society did not recognize ‘the people’ as a set o f  groups, 
communities and other collectivities with interests as such, although anthropologists, sociologists 
and all practicing politicians did. Officially the people, a theoretical concept rather than a real 
body o f  human beings, consisted o f  an assembly o f  self-contained individuals whose votes added 
up to arithmetical majorities and minorities, which translated into elected assemblies as majority 
governments and minority oppositions. (Hobsbawm, 1994: 138).
The implications o f this argument are o f great importance for my discussion here. If 
indeed ‘the people’ — as the supremely im portant collectivity or, from another point o f  view,
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historical agent — were officially banned only to survive in the social sciences and, I would 
add, art then in the aftermath o f W orld War I one could not escape the feeling that this 
collectivity or a variation o f it should be reinstated, at least in the collective imaginary, for 
there to be any chance for social and cultural improvement. The atomization o f the people 
might be an ideological stratagem in favour o f  the governing classes, but after the orgy o f 
homicidal destruction that was World War I it only exacerbated the intense feelings o f social 
alienation that were felt especially in Europe during the immediate post-war years. In their 
criticism Leavis, Trilling and in a different way Sartre tried not only to address the new 
psychological and social realities o f the era demarcated by the two W orld Wars but also to 
‘construct’ through their own critical discourse a new form o f audience, a new collectivity.
All three critics would address themselves to their audience in such a way as to bring
about this fundamental change in its very constitution. N o one really addresses himself to the
individual, atomized reader1'*9 and when they do they almost always imply an individual in the
beginning o f  a transformative process, moral in nature, that will eventually return this person
to some sort o f collectivity. This new collectivity, a notional, but no less real, group o f  people
w ho share the same fundamental beliefs and interests, is to be understood in moral terms
especially when one refers to it in the context o f Leavis’s and Trilling’s works. I say moral
because in both cases the implied readers o f  their work are textually constructed through the
means o f a moral vocabulary, a moral intent and a series o f  arguments that emphasize the
moral aspects o f literature and life. lE is  emphasis on and almost exclusive use o f  morality7
and ethics produces then a new ideal collectivity, which is not direcdy or even consciously
political but rather a- or pre-political. Yet, as I have tried to establish in these pages, the
essential elements o f the discursive framework within which these implied collectivities
function are political through and through. I wish at this point to see what exacdy are the
political features o f  these implied collectivities in the works o f  Leavis, Trilling and Sartre.
109 With the notable exeption o f  Sartre o f  the What is Literature? era. Later on, as I have aleady argued, Sartre 
would cease regarding the individual as the regulating concept in his aesthetic and social theory.
243
As far as Leavis is concerned the collectivity his work assumes and consequendy 
addresses is a conscious and militant minority o f lower middle-class origin. It is almost 
exclusively made up o f  relatively low-ranking professionals, e.g. school-teachers and more 
generally people working in the culture and education industries. They are almost exclusively 
lower middle class and their attitudes towards the upper middle class and its institutions or 
cultural practices are highly critical, if not openly hostile. This is a minoritarian collectivity 
which, at its best, functions like a well-disciplined army. Its mode o f cultural intervention is 
the relendess interrogation o f everything that threatens the moral purity o f the nation to 
which it belongs. Its great difference from the moralists o f  older times is that it does not 
blindly subscribe to a set o f antiquated moral rules nor does it wish to impose a certain 
morality on others. Its avowed intention is the training o f  a moral intelligence110 that would 
allow those w ho possess it to lead a full, creative life. Most o f the times its attitudes and 
beliefs are markedly anti-capitalist and anti-socialist. The excesses o f  the capitalist ethos with 
its destructive emphasis on profit and material progress and the indiscriminately egalitarian 
ethos o f socialism are both rejected and continuously fought against. Whatever is deemed 
too contaminated by a positivistic attitude, be it a scientific paradigm111 or the discourse, 
centred on the economy, o f  the communist Left, is anathema to them. Its own methodology, 
empiricist in its epistemological aspect, proceeds by small careful steps where at each point 
the subject is asked to treat literature as the grandest o f all cultural resources and thereby see 
the world in a way that does justice to the m ost fundamental moral principles that his own 
tradition has bequeathed him.
Trilling’s implied collectivity, in contradistinction to Leavis’, is the dominant middle-class 
majority. Its core members are those educated enough to be able to appreciate the fine moral 
distinctions codified in great literature. It may be legitimately said that Trilling’s implied
110 In its view all intelligence is moral. An immoral intelligence is as far as it is concerned an oxymoron.
111 The Leavis-Snow controversy perfectly dramatized the incommensurability o f  the two paradigms: the 
Leavisean one and the scientific-positrvistic one.
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collectivity is not as catholic as it appears and that in essence the collective entity that is 
codified in his works is an elite not very dissimilar from the one notionally projected by 
Leavis. The ubiquitous Sve’ in his texts may be read as connoting not so much the rather 
abstract collectivity o f the American middle class, as the equally class-determined and yet far 
more concrete collectivity that is roughly coextensive with what we may refer to as the 
American bourgeois intelligentsia. However, there is a crucial difference. Trilling’s audience, 
as I have argued, was constructed in such a way as to complement and not stand against 
those in possession o f real power. Its various intellectual and cultural interventions were to 
take place in a social space where a fundamental cultural process had already taken place: the 
reconciliation o f the propertied and the intellectual classes. In this context, the intellectuals -  
for that was precisely what Trilling projected in his works as a collectivity — could negotiate 
and potentially secure a permanent place alongside politicians and businessmen in the serious 
game o f real politics. Their aim would not be the oppositional interrogation and intransigent 
polemics o f the Leavisian collectivity, but the constructive criticism and conciliatory attitude 
o f  someone utterly com plidt with the existing order o f  things.
As far as Sartre is concerned his ideal collectivity would be incarnated in the organised 
proletariat, a force totally oppositional to the existing order o f things. Although Sartre 
himself was not entirely immune to the rather typical illusion o f the possibility o f  radical 
intellectuals spearheading the revolution he gradually accepted that the only legitimate social 
subject from the point o f  view o f the Marxist Left is the working class and its allies. Yet this 
realization, as I have argued, came rather late in his career and to some extent coincided with 
the period following Sartre’s effective abandonment o f literature. In the period from the late 
forties to the late fifties Sartre attempted one o f the most difficult intellectual tasks that a 
radical intellectual could undertake. He tried to reconcile the sovereignty o f the individual, 
the trademark o f  all bourgeois thought, with the collectivist and strictly egalitarian ethos o f 
socialist thought. As a result o f this tension, the collectivity implied in his works o f  the time
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was itself marked by the fundamental ambivalence o f all petit-bourgeois radicalism. His 
monumental late works, namely the Critique and The Family Idiot were extremely im portant in 
this respect as they represented two instances o f  Sartre’s great effort to negotiate and 
articulate a balanced position between a mysdficatory idealism o f the absolute irreducibility 
o f  the individual and a crippling and potentially dangerous — from a political perspective — 
ultra-collectivism in the Stalinist mould. The flawed Flaubert, who shines in his individuality 
and yet only makes sense in the multitude o f determinations (psychological, familial, social 
and ultimately historical) that condition every aspect o f  his existence, is the most apt 
dramatization o f this Sartrean endeavour.
Having looked more closely at the kind o f  collective social entity each o f  the critics 
discussed here attem pted to project or establish in the social imaginary I may say that each 
one represented a different reaction to the main problem o f their era, namely the collapse o f 
the old world with its attendant ideology and the dawning o f a new one whose points of 
reference were still fuzzy and underspecified. O ne thing was certain though, and no thinking 
person could avoid taking it under serious consideration. That was the great paradox of 
twentieth-century capitalism, a system which after having plunged the world into two utterly 
destructive wars and after having almost collapsed as a result o f its own continuously 
aggravated contradictions survived everything and enjoyed an unbroken period o f  nearly 
three decades o f relative stability and noticeable economic growth. This paradox features as 
an aspect, often hidden or unexplained, o f  the historical and more specifically ideological 
context o f the politics o f Leavis’s, Trilling’s and Sartre’s criticism. I wish now to look more 
closely at the specificity o f each critic’s reaction to this paradox.
M o r a l  D i s c o u r s e  a s  a  R e a c t i o n  T o  a n d  A g a i n s t  H is t o r y
Leavis, as I have previously suggested, may be considered as a pre-political critic in the 
sense that his critical practice attempted to establish a notional space where the critic and his
246
like-minded reader(s) could meet in a fundamental agreement over the most basic and 
serious issues o f life. Leavis was not interested in the actual politics one reads about in the 
daily press, nor in politics in the wider sense o f  a system o f values which underlies the precise 
way people choose to live together in the communities they form. Leavis’s own concern was 
with what lay beneath these passing configurations o f  com mon human endeavour. He was 
interested in the cultural and moral foundations that were deemed necessary for any life that 
claims to have meaning and purpose. In his own peculiar way then Leavis was ‘anti-political’ 
in that, in his work at least, he consistently avoided to face up to the task o f  providing a clear 
answer regarding the problems that his society was facing. Leavis had very litde, if  anything, 
to say about unemployment, labour disputes, foreign and domestic policy decisions and any 
other issues that can be called political. He did speak about urban alienation, mass literacy -  
or mass illiteracy as he would no doubt put it — the leisure industry and other issues, some of 
them o f  a somewhat topical importance, but his intention was never to discuss them in their 
political dimensions, but only as areas where the symptoms o f cultural decline were most 
evident. Leavis treated all problems as essentially cultural problems, all o f  them symptoms o f 
the steady decay o f traditional culture, a decay which he saw reflected in a use o f language 
that alienated people from the best resources o f their own tradition. I f  there is any point in 
calling Leavis’s work political it certainly is not because he intended it to be political or 
because, with some marked exceptions, there is anything identifiable as political in the work 
itself, but because his work ultimately deals with issues o f great political importance in a 
manner contrary to its own avowed intentions. Leavis’s proposals about ‘English’ as the 
academic centre around which all else must revolve if  there were to be any chance o f 
preserving what was worthy o f safeguarding in the English tradition is a case in point. So was 
his conception o f the role o f  the ‘enlightened minority’ in the dissemination o f  cultural 
knowledge. Leavis’s own peculiar brand o f  cultural politics, that one may designate as a sort 
o f  inverted cultural Bolshevism, was as political as any o f  the statements o f  the Marxists o f
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the thirties against which he was so often arguing in Scrutiny. However, the peculiarity o f  his 
work is that its political character lies precisely in the distance he put between himself and 
politics. This distance is exemplified by the use o f a critical method that sustains its discursive 
force by the use o f  a series o f mainly moral concepts that attempt to change the course o f 
things very much in the interventional manner a political argument does. I have already 
discussed the role moral concepts play in Leavis’s own individual mix o f conservative 
empiricism and post-romantic idealism. W hat I wish to do here is to emphasise the 
instrumental role such a moral conception o f the literary phenom enon plays in the 
suppression and eventual disappearance o f  the political.
Morality is, in its given and widely accepted forms, a social phenom enon, a set of 
regulative ideas and ideals shared by the majority o f those living in any kind o f human 
community. Yet unlike politics, with which it shares a great deal, morality seldom deals with 
questions o f political and economic power. Therefore, it is ill-equipped to constitute the 
centre o f a critical methodology which strives to explain and contribute to the transformation 
o f  the existing order o f things. Moral concepts work best when they regulate the lives o f 
individuals or, as Leavis would have it, the lives o f the members o f close-knit, ‘organic’ 
communities. Yet the problems, which Leavis’s criticism attempted to explain and ultimately 
solve, needed to be considered with a different set o f concepts than the ones he habitually 
used. By refusing or being unable to incorporate in his own thinking a critical methodology 
o f materialist provenance, Leavis was destined to repeat the same mistake over and over, 
namely pursuing his quixotic attempts at effecting real change in the world while at the same 
time refusing to account for any o f  the material preconditions o f the state o f affairs, which 
he found so unbearable. In other words Leavis wished for grand-scale cultural and 
ideological changes while shying away from employing any critical tools that might 
realistically bring about such changes.
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Leavis’s relation with politics is marred by a series o f  misconceptions about the extent to 
which cultural politics can successfully bring about results that transcend the rather narrow 
confines o f academia or any other institutions whose function is the guardianship o f  ‘high 
culture’. Trilling, while his ideological presuppositions were not that dissimilar to Leavis’s, 
was more comfortable with politics and far more ingenious in using his criticism for overtly 
political ends. Yet, he, like Leavis, pursued his ends by employing a moral vocabulary in his 
criticism in his attem pt to articulate a new ideological platform for the American middle- 
classes, not by political argument, but by making an appeal to a series o f moral truths, that, 
he asserted, were pu t forward as ideals by literature and more particularly by the classic realist 
novel. Trilling’s relation with politics was more complicated than Leavis’s. While the latter 
made abundantly clear that, in his worldview, issues related with cultural continuity and 
moral earnestness took precedence over any other issues that might relate to the more 
mundane, material aspects o f life, T rilling never became convinced about the absolute 
supremacy o f  culture over all other aspects o f human life. His work was therefore more 
sensitive to the political and ideological nuances o f  the issues he considered, his style 
perfecdy complementing this ambivalence between the cultural and political that marked 
particularly his early work. Leavis was a lower-middle class radical idealist waging war against 
both the forces o f technologico-benthamite vulgarity, as he metonymically referred to 
capitalism, and the Marxists whom he was inclined to consider more complicit with the 
system rather than potential tactical allies o f  his. Trilling, on the other hand, although he too 
was o f a lower-middle class background negotiated his class disadvantage in a markedly 
different way than Leavis. While the latter effectively displaced all class issues by elaborating 
and expounding on the old aristocratic concept o f ‘enlightened minority’ Trilling, at least in 
his more optimistic early period, had considerably more faith in the power o f  the liberal 
middle-classes to renounce their residual radicalism and thus elevate themselves to a position 
where they could exert the ideological hegemony o f  their new, aesthetically informed and
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morally enhanced worldview. Leavis, faced with a whole different set o f problems in Britain, 
prom oted the solution o f elevating a small number o f gifted individuals o f his class to a 
position o f authority in his desire to enable them (himself included) to share some o f  the 
power that was until then the monopoly o f  the upper classes. Leavis knew all too well that 
the rigid class-system o f Britain would not allow his class to participate in the kind o f 
decision-making processes which are a mark o f  real power. Therefore, his many 
interventions can be interpreted as tactical manoeuvres aiming at a re-allocation o f  power 
which would enable the English petty-bourgeoisie or at least the most gifted part o f it to 
claim cultural and, indirectly, even political authority. Trilling on his part faced a completely 
different set o f  problems. The class-structure o f the American society was far looser and 
consequendy a greater class mobility with its attendant advantages for those who made the 
transition was m ore evident there.
A nother consequence o f this fundamental difference was that elitist institutions in 
America were fewer and far less powerful than British ones. Also, the culture o f  these 
institutions was less conditioned by the ideological rigidities o f places like Cambridge or 
Oxford in Britain. Leavis, amazingly enough given his reputation and influence, was never 
wholeheartedly accepted by Cambridge and his antipathy towards all established cultural 
institutions is well-documented. Trilling, on the other hand, had no problem starting a career 
at Columbia University and climbing up the professional ladder to the highest positions, 
eventually ending up as one o f the m ost respected and well-known intellectuals in America. 
This cultural difference partly explains why their attitudes towards institutional matters were 
so markedly different. Whereas Leavis wished to subvert the established system o f education 
and cultural policy and substitute it with his highly idealized notion o f the English 
D epartm ent as the centre o f the new cultural order T rilling had no qualms in allowing 
himself being totally incorporated into the university and publishing his work from a position 
o f  established authority as a professor in one o f  the m ost respected American universities.
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Both were using ethics as an alternative to other more politicized versions o f criticism but 
due to the aforementioned differences Leavis’s moral-critical vocabulary acquired a rigid, 
polemical tone whereas Trilling’s was characterized by a suppleness and ambiguity more 
typical o f someone quite at ease with his position in the status quo.
'rhere is o f  course another difference in their critical vocabularies, one not o f tone but o f  
substance. Leavis’s concepts are put forward as antithetical to the values endorsed by a state 
increasingly driven by market-forces, forces which although never conceptualized as such 
were very much the object o f Leavis’s severe criticism throughout his career. O ther values, 
such as those prom oted by a gradually evolving welfare state with its emphasis on the 
democratisation o f  rights — particularly the broadening o f access to tertiary education — also 
met with Leavis’s increasingly reactionary skepticism. Trilling, on the other hand, never 
intended to prom ote any set o f values or a specific ideology contrary to the established 
one(s). His aim was not to fight the status quo, but to cleanse it from its ideological 
impurities. His intention was the elevation o f  the cultural status o f the middle-classes which 
in America were more in danger o f  sinking into the passive inertia o f consumerism than 
being marginalized in terms o f political power. Trilling shared with Matthew Arnold the 
concern over the apparent incapability o f  the middle class o f  complementing its economic 
hegemony with a level o f culture that would safeguard its ideological hegemony as well. 
Iherefore, his often elevated style, which carefully avoids the high-pitched and overtly 
polemical tones o f  Leavis, reflects the main purpose o f his critical texts, namely to establish a 
base upon which a discussion o f  several key moral, aesthetic and generally cultural issues 
could effectively take place.
Both Leavis and Trilling were pedagogues. Both aimed to educate their students and by 
implication the class that the majority o f their students came from in a way o f thinking that 
emphasises the essentially moral aspects o f  the relation between man and the world. Both, by 
virtue o f their class-position and their initial ideological choices, used moral concepts in their
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cultural interventions. For the same reasons both wished to restore literature to its older 
hegemonic position among the arts and both identified literature as a diachronic index o f all 
the cultural values worth preserving. In many ways, they both epitomized the idealistic rear­
guard reaction o f  a growing number o f  people o f middle-class origin in their respective 
countries against the twin dangers o f  commercialization and working-class radicalism. This 
double threat — one from the ‘right’, that is the commodification o f  cultural artefacts and the 
commercialization o f  culture in general, and the other from the ‘left’, that is the increasingly 
aggressive radicalism o f an organized working-class and its political institutions — provoked a 
strong reaction in every field from those members o f  the middle class who felt most 
threatened by it. Leavis’s and Trilling’s criticism is only an aspect o f  that reaction.
There is hardly a better way o f  achieving a kind o f mise-en-nlief o f  the specific ideological 
qualities o f such a criticism than by examining a wholly different kind o f criticism from 
another national and intellectual tradition. Sartre’s criticism is precisely such a case. Informed 
by philosophy rather than literature and indebted to ideological traditions quite alien to the 
Anglo-American tradition o f  critical thought Sartre produced a number o f  texts that explored 
the relation between ethics, literature and politics in a manner markedly different to the one 
employed by the critics discussed above. Sartre’s politics, and by extension the political 
content o f his work, is also very different from Leavis’s conservative ‘anti-politics’ and 
Trilling’s centrist conservatism.
Sartre shares with the aforementioned critics the same class-origin. Bom into a middle- 
class family it took him until World W ar II to ‘discover’ that history was not a mere accident 
that one has to grudgingly come to terms with but the inescapable context within which 
human life is made intelligible. As soon as Sartre became a historically-conscious philosopher 
his new-found faith in the possibilities o f man as a social and political animal were made 
apparent in his critical work. From that point on, roughly from the early forties to the last 
days o f his life, one can witness a constant ideological struggle and process o f
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transformation, both o f which left their traces in Sartre’s output during all those years. Such a 
radical transformation is nowhere to be found in Leavis or Trilling. Leavis may have suffered 
immensely during World War I and that had, as we know from his biographers112, an 
immediate effect on his early professional and ideological choices but from then on he 
remained more or less recognisably the same throughout his long career. Trilling’s trajectory 
is also marked by an ideological consistency from the early years till the end. This fact is not 
merely a biographical curiosity but a crucial factor in identifying the specific ideological 
qualities o f Sartre’s intellectual trajectory from a radical form o f  phenomenology to the 
embracing o f core Marxist principles and later on to the rejection o f Marxism and the 
opening up, in his later years, to new ideological and philosophical configurations. I believe 
that the dynamic character o f Sartre’s political thought through the years, the dynamism of 
its successive transformations and the endless questions that it posed indicate a fundamental 
difference not only o f character, but also o f  a way o f seeing the world and understanding the 
relation o f oneself with others. This wholly different interpretive framework makes use of 
the fundamental concept o f change, which in its m ost radical aspects considers revolution as 
a legitimate way o f moving things forward. Here we are very far away indeed from the 
conservative politics o f Leavis and Trilling.
Sartre’s critical texts are a testimony to his intellectual dynamism and adaptability and are 
marked by the radical orientation o f his thought. This is another feature o f his that sets him 
apart from both Leavis and Trilling. Sartre, in contradistinction to the aforementioned critics, 
turned his experience during World War II into the affective foundation for a new 
philosophy that would not simply reject the new in favour o f a largely imaginary tradition, as 
was the case with Leavis. N or would he ally himself with the privileged middle-class in the 
pursuit o f  a totally misconceived moral and cultural excellence, as was the case with Trilling. 
Sartre’s orientation towards radical socialism meant that, despite his occasionally
u2 The most vivid account can be found in Ian MacKillop’s F. R Leavis: A  Life in Criticism, pp. 38-47.
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controversial choices, his main concern was the promotion o f the ideals o f that tradition: 
essential equality, personal and social emancipation from all forms o f oppression and finally, 
and perhaps m ost controversially, the pursuit o f  freedom as the supreme goal o f humankind. 
This last ideal is indeed controversial as, in the context o f  any Marxist or even marxisant 
theory, freedom needs to be strongly contextualized and eventually qualified in order to be 
useful as a radical concept In the absence o f  such re-working this concept’s long history and 
semantic wealth within the liberal tradition will m ost certainly cast a long shadow over any o f 
its new attempted uses. Sartre’s uses o f freedom were certainly not indebted to the Anglo- 
Saxon liberal tradition but to different conditions, namely those o f Romanticism, 
Cartesianism and phenomenology. As a result o f this overdetermination o f  his conception of 
freedom a certain tension in his work appears whenever this ‘freedom ’ is made to co-exist 
with and even complement other concepts such as class, class-consciousness and more 
specifically the relation between subject and history in the context o f  a radical transformation 
o f  society7.
Sartre was a philosopher very much inclined to adopt an absolutist stance towards his 
concepts and methodologies, something that had as a result a certain conceptual inflexibility 
in his philosophical arguments. Nowhere is that more pronounced than in the case o f 
‘freedom’ from its early appearance in Being and Nothingness to its later adventures in the 
dialectic put forward in the Critique oj Dialectical Reason. The trajectory o f that crucial, and as I 
interpret it, mainly moral concept is what makes Sartre’s political thought so interesting and 
so ambivalent in some crucial points. O ne o f these points is the relation o f the subject with 
the world that surrounds it, and more specifically and closer to my interests here, the relation 
o f  a special, historically determined kind o f subject, the man o f letters or intellectual, to the 
world as he perceives it. Both Leavis and Trilling were quite explicit in their belief that the 
intellectual in his guise as a literary critic is the one social agent best qualified to wage a war 
against vulgar materialism, moral insipidness, o r radical over-simplifications. Sartre, on his
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part, never shared this idealistic conception o f  the intellectual as a moral, cultural crusader. 
Yet in his texts that were later to be collected in What is Literature? there is a rather vague 
suggestion that the committed writer, in his revolutionary voluntaristic fervour, may if not 
exacdy substitute organized political action, then at least lead it implicidy by virtue o f his 
sheer self-confidence in his own purpose. That, o f  course, may be seen as a typical petty- 
bourgeois illusion, an inverted view o f  the world and the necessities o f  socialist politics. Yet 
Sartre, it has to be said, was perceptive enough to move gradually away from the idealistic 
conception o f the intellectual(s) spearheading a socialist revolution to a more nuanced and 
politically inform ed conception o f the intellectual, at least the non-aligned leftist intellectual, 
as someone who willingly abdicates the powers that accompany his position in the existing 
order o f things in order to put himself in the service o f radical working-class politics113. Sartre 
was one o f the very few intellectuals who actually did attempt to put this into practice. If  he 
never quite succeeded it was because, as he knew too well, the passage from a petty- 
bourgeois mode o f existence, which is the mode o f life o f a typical intellectual, to an entirely 
different mode o f  existence, in accordance with the exigencies o f  revolutionary struggle is far 
more difficult than it first appears. But the fact that he did reach a point where he conceived 
o f the intellectual as an (often vital) accessory to  the struggle o f  emancipation in co-operation 
with others and not in position o f (an imaginary7) authority testifies to his intellectual honesty7 
and his gradual moving away from the romantic revolutionism o f his earlier days. Sartre’s 
eventual conclusion that the intellectual is, by virtue o f his acquired status as an effective 
technician o f  knowledge, complicit to the general condition o f  unequal distribution o f  power, 
offers a formidable refutation o f the idealistic and inherently reactionary ideological schemas 
o f  both Leavis and Trilling.
113 The texts that best articulate this new conception o f  what an intellectual is are “A Plea for Intellectuals” and 
“A Friend o f  the People” both in Between Existentialism and Marxism, pp. 227-298.
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T h e  O u t s id e r , T h e  M a n  o f  t h e  Sy s t e m  a n d  t h e  V o i c e  o f  D i s s e n t : D i f f e r e n t  
C o n c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  R o l e  o f  t h e  In t e l l e c t u a l
'Hie place and the function o f the intellectual faced with a rapidly changing world is, to 
my opinion, one o f  the most im portant point that must be made when one examines Sartre’s 
theory in relation to the critical theories o f Leavis and T rilling. The political value o f those 
theories lies in the precise nature o f  the ideological end in the service o f which such texts 
argue or attempt to persuade their audience, and the way in which this end is to be achieved. 
In both these levels the politics o f Sartre’s criticism offers an alternative view and m ethod to 
the questions o f cultural intervention, the extent to which such interventions can achieve 
their intended goals and, m ost importandy, the nature o f  the goals themselves. Sartre’s 
alliance with the Left, despite its ups and downs, showed in a painfully clear manner the 
limits o f  any intellectual intervention when the intended goal is the unconditional 
emancipation o f the oppressed. Sartre’s work showed that at a certain point the very nature 
o f  intellectual or cultural intervention risks reproducing the very conditions o f  inequality it 
sought to efface in the first place. It is interesting to note that no such realization ever 
appears in the works or either Leavis or T rilling, as neither o f  them ever really doubted the 
supreme regulatory powers that the intellectual, and particularly the literary critic, ought to 
have.
Intimately connected with this is the question o f  the nature o f the end o f the critical 
endeavour, that is the question for whom and for what precisely one writes. All three critics 
discussed here have been very clear regarding those issues. Leavis explicidy put his criticism 
in the service o f  an enlightened minority which by virtue o f  its moral-literary excellence could 
and should lead the way towards a future when the life o f  a whole society, especially its 
intellectual, cultural aspect, would be regulated and supervised in accordance with the moral 
standards laid down by Tradition, as this is codified in the established canon o f  a national 
literature. Trilling was equally explicit in his alliance with the liberal middle-class, which he
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believed should educate itself in the fine moral virtues that only a literary sensitivity can offer 
and therefore deservedly claim a hegemonic status in American culture. Leavis substituted an 
aristocratic minority for class and by side-stepping the whole class-question altogether he 
could easily concentrate on a moral polemic against the system, the deepest structural 
features o f which he unknowingly supported. Trilling, on the other hand, very consciously 
supported the class structure o f American society, his purpose being to influence a certain 
segment o f the middle-class so that it should renounce the radical tendencies that it had. His 
deepest wish was that this class would align itself with the ideology o f the status quo — very 
much in the material interests o f this class — which should then strive to influence not from 
the outside, as it were, in the aggressive and intransigent manner o f Leavis but from the 
inside.
Sartre in contradistinction to the other two chose to align politically with the working 
classes and the emancipatory project o f  their m ost radical members. It is this fundamental 
choice that partly explains why he never quite managed to formulate an ethics that would do 
justice to his occasionally conflicting ideologies o f  radical individual freedom on the one 
hand, and radical human emancipation on the other. In his critical texts the tension between 
a politics and an ethics o f radical emancipation is apparent, as is the fact that only through a 
thorough and constant re-thinking o f the relation between the two can there be a hope o f 
finally reconciling the often conflicting demands o f the moral law and radical politics. Sartre 
may have failed in finally re-uniting the two in perfect harmony, but only because the task 
was so impossibly difficult. What he did succeed in doing though is that he showed the limits 
o f  the political efficacy o f a moral vocabulary and also the impasses a critic comes up against 
while using it in the context o f a radical socialist project.
Leavis’s and Trilling’s moral concepts are against or, one could argue, outside politics, 
they acknowledge the social provenance o f  all morality but they refuse to allow for the class- 
determinations that condition its particular applications. Sartre’s moral concepts, on the
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other hand, such as ‘freedom’ and ‘com mitment’ bear within themselves at least in their 
particular uses in his work the opening up to the concrete, historical situation that contains 
them. In the course o f  Sartre’s life and particularly from the fifties onwards they would 
eventually become moral-political concepts following the realization that questions o f 
inequality due to class and race must be urgendy dealt with.
rIhe  possibility o f such a mutation o f moral concepts into political or moral-political ones 
is at the very centre o f  my argument here which seeks to show that a moral discourse is at 
one and the same time a negation and an implicit unconscious affirmation o f politics. As a 
negation o f  politics it functions by ignoring the collective character o f the historical subject. 
A moral discourse implicitly or explicidy refers to an T , an individual entity faced with other 
individual entities. In contrast politics refers to a ‘we’, a collective entity interacting with 
other collective entities in terms o f either co-operation or antagonism. This unavoidably 
leads to the question o f  power, which is by far the one feature that sets ethics and politics 
apart. A moral problematic ignores power, or when it acknowledges it, it does so in a way 
that regards it more as a vice than as a structural feature o f the system. Leavis’s staunch 
refusal to acknowledge the structural, material causes for capitalism’s various malfunctions is 
an example o f this idealistic tendency to regard a cultural crusade as superior to political 
struggle, while at the same time considering the latter as too vulgar or ineffective compared 
with the former. Politics, on the other hand, at least in its most radical forms can only 
acknowledge that all human relations take place in determinate conditions o f power, 
conditions which are not only independent o f  man’s wishes, but also quite unaffected, except 
only marginally, by his moral laws or systems. As a result o f this realization, a political 
interpretation o f a given situation will take under consideration the unequal distribution o f 
power and o f material and cultural resources, a fine example o f which is the luxury some 
men can afford in order to make fine, informed moral judgements without having to deal 
with hunger or persecution. It is this realization that marks Sartre’s work, from a certain time
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onwards at least, and which is so conspicuously absent from Leavis and Trilling. Trilling in 
particular, being solely concerned with bourgeois values, could not even begin to understand, 
let alone articulate, the fact that other less privileged classes ought to have been discussed in 
terms radically different from the ones he used in his criticism. His refusal to acknowledge 
the multivalent specificity o f  the working-class, this fearsome ‘other’ o f  the American (and 
any other) middle-class was a strategic move o f singular importance. W ithout it he would risk 
re-introducing a potentially dangerous political aspect o f the class-situation in his critical 
discourse. By concentrating solely on the middle-class and its values Trilling could trick his 
readers into believing that the American working class either does not exist or, if it does, that 
it is o f  no particular importance. As a consequence, in his notional universe, where only 
members o f  the middle-class are o f  any consequence, politics itself is transformed into 
morality, manners and the pursuit o f  an intellectually refined life. It is very illuminating to see 
how Sartre dealt with the relation between his criticism and the class-situation o f France 
whilst Trilling was assuming Matthew Arnold’s role in America.
Sartre not only saw the bitter class-divisions o f the immediate post-war French society 
but he committed himself in a way quite antithetical to Trilling’s. His ideological position o f 
the late thirties and early forties gradually gave way, as a result o f  his political affiliation with 
the Left, to a more politically-informed series o f  arguments that sought to assert the necessity 
o f  an emancipatory radical politics o f class and race, and the need to establish a 
comprehensive ethical theory that will legitimize such a politics. Power was always at the 
centre o f Sartre’s thought and consequendy so was inequality, injustice and the need to 
abolish them. It must be emphasized at this point that power, either in its agent-centered 
form or in its decentred aspects, as seen for example from a poststructuralist perspective, is, 
to all intents and purposes, absent from all critical thought that seeks to interpret social and 
cultural phenomena from a moral viewpoint.
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T a k i n g  S i d e s : C o m m it m e n t  a n d  t h e  N e e d  f o r  P r a c t ic a l  C h a n g e
Closely linked to the question o f power and politics is the question o f the critic’s 
alignment with a particular cause, in other words his political commitment. All three critics 
discussed here were undoubtedly committed critics in the general sense that they all willingly 
served a specific ideology and either implicitly (as is the case with Leavis and Trilling) or 
explicidy (as is the case with Sartre), as I have been arguing in this study, a specific politics. 
The differences among them are to found in the way each has conceived of, and 
consequently expressed, his commitment.
Leavis, whose commitment to the causes he deemed as worth pursuing can hardly be 
disputed, is the m ost remarkable case here as his dedication to his critical-cultural ideals 
seems strange considering his aversion to politics and his deep mistrust o f  any radical act 
which he considered as mere posturing. I say strange because I think that such dedication is 
usually, although by no means exclusively, related to a more pronounced, radical politics o f 
either extreme o f the political spectrum. Yet Leavis was ideologically indebted to neither o f 
these extremes and therefore his intransigent polemicism must be accounted for not in terms 
o f  the actual political views he did or did not hold, but rather in terms o f his unwillingness to 
engage in a thorough and systematic political interpretation o f  literature and culture. By this I 
mean that the tenor o f  Leavis’s commitment is linked to the effacement o f politics from his 
thought, to the narrowing o f his own interpretive framework and his eventual inability, 
especially in the last two decades o f  his life to comprehend the cultural, ideological and 
generally political changes o f British society in a way that would lead to a constructive 
critique o f it. Leavis got trapped despite himself inside an interpretive system which offered 
no resources that would enable him to account for the seismic changes during his time in a 
way other than viewing them as a constant fall from an imaginary state o f grace. H e was too 
idealist, too convinced that ideas are utterly autonomous in society and therefore incapable o f 
finding a plausible explanation as to why things did not in fact change in accordance with the
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demands o f the most finely-argued and totally convincing moral ideas. Left only with ideas 
such as the necessity o f a coherent moral centre knowable through the canon o f English 
literature, a centre around which all other activities ought eventually to take their place and 
assume their form, Leavis was finally proven unable to account for the political character o f 
the changes he witnessed. As a consequence o f this he grew increasingly bitter and his tone 
and the content o f his work became increasingly reactionary as, for instance, his negative 
views on the widening o f access to  tertiary education (based solely on the argument that 
academic-moral excellence cannot be ‘democratized’) demonstrate. Leavis’s commitment 
then is one which is in fact animated by the very conditions o f its political naivety and 
practical ineffectiveness. Its strength comes from the sheer ideological rigidity o f the moral 
concepts it uses and also from the fact that these concepts unlike political ones never really 
engage dialectically with reality; they just accept it or reject it, they either fight it to the end or 
give up the fight altogether. Leavis fought his own batdes to the end with a dedication and 
passion that command respect and even a certain degree o f admiration. Yet at the end one 
cannot but come to the conclusion that his considerable gifts could be put to a better use if 
only he had chosen not to completely abolish politics from his critical system.
If Leavis’s commitment was the commitment o f a radical idealist who worked in the 
margins o f  the system then Trilling’s was the commitment o f  a pragmatist who worked 
within the system trying to effect changes in a way that he thought was congenial to the 
system itself. It may seem a bit odd to talk about commitment in the case o f  T rilling, as his 
criticism makes a rather strong case against any form o f strong ideological alignment that can 
be properly regarded as commitment. Yet there is something in Trilling’s work, a series o f  
interconnected concepts loosely grouped around the master-concept o f ‘liberal imagination’ 
that testify to a deliberate ideological choice. This choice, as I have already argued, was to 
work through the contradictory elements o f  liberal thought with the avowed aim o f cleansing 
it from the ideological impurities o f  its radical past. As a bourgeois ideologue and a respected
261
professor o f an Ivy-League institution, Trilling was committed in a manner markedly 
different from the way Leavis and Sartre were. His commitment was one o f the great man o f 
letters, a commitment to abstract ideas and moral principles far removed from the actual 
reality o f the majority o f people. Trilling was what we could call in Gramsci’s terms a 
‘traditional intellectual’, that is, someone whose socio-political function as an intellectual is in 
the ideological and ultimately political interest o f  the existing order. As a critic and 
intellectual figure Trilling was very much the epitome o f  the systemic, thoroughly co-opted 
intellectual. As such his critical function may be described as a top-down cultural process, 
where the main ideas expressed by the critical work get disseminated through the 
mobilization o f  the vast resources o f the system the work ideologically supports in the first 
place.114 In addition to that, Trilling was also a distinctly non-polemical individual, his 
preferred method being a complex series o f arguments in a quasi-literary prose that often 
seemed to imply rather than state. For all these reasons Trilling’s commitment is so much 
different in both tone and political content to Leavis’s.
It was also totally antithetical to what Sartre had in mind when he first introduced the
term in the mid-forties. Sartre, as we remember, gave commitment a strictly defined moral
and political context. Sartrean commitment is the fundamental choice an intellectual makes
when he realizes that ‘right’ and ‘good’ are to be found in the demands and aspirations o f the
oppressed. It is also the taking sides with the working classes and more generally with all
those who suffer under any form o f oppression. In a way then Trilling, strangely enough,
may be seen as a committed intellectual o f sorts as his critical work directs itself towards an
identifiable social class and deals with issues that are intimately related to the real material
and cultural interests o f this class. It is Leavis, in this context at least, that seems the one
m ost remote from the Sartrean notion o f commitment as his intended audience, although
almost exclusively lower middle-class, is hardly ever, in his work, addressed as a social class
114 In order to put that in perspective it is worth reminding that Leavis had to pay from his own money in order 
to publish Scrutiny at a time when he did not even have a permanent teaching post at Cambridge.
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with a specific politics115. In other words, the implied reader o f Leavis’s work is an imaginary 
social entity. It is imaginary, because it does not correspond to either a social class or to any 
other empirically verifiable social entity. This entity is very much a figment o f Leavis idealistic 
imagination.
Sartre’s case is equally complex. His politics clearly directed his work against the 
bourgeoisie but his philosophy with its residual subjectivism and idealism made him posit as 
his ideal reader an entity quite unlike the collectivities that inspired circa 1945 his own 
spectacular turn to history. Sartre’s early idea o f a writer and a reader bound together in a 
relation o f unconditional reciprocity was more o f an axiological proposition than a realistic 
assessment o f the actual ‘political economy’ o f  the production and consumption o f literature. 
These two notional figures o f Sartre’s early literary theory, the writer who publishes his work 
as a gesture o f human generosity and the reader who is, by virtue o f  this generosity, morally 
compelled to reciprocate in his reading, are both idealistic abstractions. In reality they are 
engaged in a process far more complex than Sartre’s initial conception allowed for. There is a 
reason for that idealistic lapse in Sartre and that is his desire to preserve the sovereignty o f 
the concept o f absolute human freedom in his work. When he came to the realization that 
human freedom is severely qualified by its mere facticity he abandoned any attempt to give 
the sovereign individual consciousness any conceptual supremacy. The more intimate Sartre 
became with Marxism, the more he acknowledged the class-determinations o f all the agents, 
individual or collective involved in the production and consumption o f literature. His 
commitment, at least in its conceptual content changed accordingly. The early Sartre shared 
with both Leavis and T rilling the belief that literature and critical work can indeed make a 
difference in the sphere o f politics in general. In the following decades Sartre became more
115 This is true only if one considers, as I do here, ‘class’ to signify collectivities in relation to the mode o f  
(material) production, where one o f  the key distinguishing characteristics is material capital. If, however, one 
considers ‘class’ in relation not only to material production but to knowledge and information as well, then it is 
possible to argue that the cultural form o f  this new capital, whose political economy Leavis tried to sketch, 
makes my argument regarding the class-status o f  Leavis’s audience open to a series o f  objections. A very good  
account o f  these and related issues is to be found in Frow (1995).
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ambivalent as to the extent to which a purely cultural intervention could effect any 
substantial changes. From the sixties onwards Sartre had almost completely given up on 
literature as an effective form o f cultural politics. In a sense, his last great critical work on 
Flaubert was done as a token o f a realistic acceptance o f the fact that he, qua intellectual, 
could not but do w hat he had been training all his life for, namely intellectual work.
ITiis is a very7 different conception and ethos o f  commitment through intellectual work 
from what one sees in Leavis and also in Trilling. N one o f the last two ever turned their 
critical eyes to their own methods in a self-reflexive manner. Having both, each in his own 
way, placed themselves outside or against politics they did not feel the need to carefully re­
examine the very nature o f their critical and cultural endeavour. Leavis kept fighting a losing 
battle placing him self in such as a way as to make the possibilities o f  winning very slight 
indeed. Frilling never really fought a battle, at least not in the way Leavis and Sartre did, and 
when he did com e face to face with the strange reality o f  the rebellious sixties and the 
resulting profound changes in every aspect o f American society he withdrew into an even 
more conservative attitude.116
W a y s  o f  S p e a k i n g : T h e  D ia l e c t ic s  o f  F o r m  a n d  In s t i t u t i o n a l  St a t u s
Another aspect o f  the aforementioned critics’ work and one related to the tenor o f their 
ideological com m itm ent is the form their work took in its attem pt to reach its audience. In 
this respect, all three have one thing in common: they all wrote their critical texts in a 
language that was essentially accessible to the educated layman. 'Iheir use o f critical language 
was such that carefully avoided the use o f esoteric terminology, which was to become one o f 
the most controversial features o f later literary theory. They all used their own terminology, 
but even Sartre, w ho was certainly not hostile to the idea o f using a most specialized
116 It is certainly no coincidence that the one cultural issue where his increasingly conservative attitude was 
made apparent was, as was the case with Leavis and which I referred to earlier on, the question o f  widening 
access to tertiary education. In Trilling’s case it was the question o f  quotas for women and ethnic groups that 
offended his sensibilities.
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terminology when he saw the need for it (e.g. the philosophical jargon o f the Critique), 
adopted, at least in the texts that interest me here, an accessible critical idiom. There is o f 
course the question o f  whether com m on words do actually become quasi-technical terms 
when used within the context o f a specific work. O ne may wonder whether I^eavis’s terms 
constitute a specific terminology which, in essence, is not unlike any other contemporary, 
highly specialized terminology. My opinion is that this is not the case. All the texts that I 
have discussed in this study make their point by using certain concepts that are conveyed by 
terms that are part o f  the general vocabulary and whose specific semantic charge does not in 
any way forbid them  from entering the public discourse. W hen Leavis speaks o f  ‘organic 
community’, ‘tradition’, ‘vitality’, ‘moral seriousness’ etc. he uses words that are, by virtue o f 
their commonness, understandable by the vast majority o f  educated readers. O ne does not 
have to know in advance the specific meaning o f  a term in order to be able to make sense o f 
the critical work, instead one gets all the information needed from the context in which the 
word is used. Ib e  same holds true for Trilling’s work. His critical arguments are structured 
around a cluster o f  concepts such as ‘human variousness’, ‘moral imagination’ etc. that are 
conveyed by words very much part o f a shared vocabulary. As is the case with Leavis’s work, 
Trilling’s is accessible to anyone who is willing to read it attentively without the need to have 
already mastered a specific terminology. All that is needed is some level o f education and the 
ability to process new information. As I already pointed out even Sartre, who in his 
philosophical works can easily scare off a potential reader by the apparent impenetrability o f 
the vocabulary used, in his critical works, avoided any terminology that might have put the 
text’s intelligibility at risk.
'Hie reason for that is, I believe, quite simple. Sartre, Leavis, and Trilling, all wanted to 
reach a general audience; that was the implicit ideological and political imperative o f their 
critical project. They all wanted, each in his own way, to educate a large audience that would 
eventually disseminate their ideas even further. They all wished that eventually real cultural or
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political changes would come about as a result o f  their cultural intervention. They all shared 
the conviction that literature and criticism could at some point and under favourable 
conditions effect a real change. They differed in the way they conceived the nature and limits 
o f  that change, but hardly ever disputed its feasibility. Leavis have wished for a series o f 
profound changes despite the fact that his formidable energies were eventually spent on a 
series o f fiercely executed cultural interventions o f  limited scope. Trilling may have not 
wished for a large-scale change in the way the system worked but was nevertheless concerned 
about the possible aesthetic-moral transformation o f  outlook in his large audience. Sartre 
was, as we have seen, very much committed to a radical political transformation early on in 
his career and although he may have had second thoughts about the potential o f  a purely 
literary, cultural intervention he never doubted the necessity o f  a big change that could and 
should come about, hopefully partly inspired by his ideas.
I "his com mon feature o f  all three theorists under discussion here is im portant to the 
extent that it underlines the big differences o f  their era with ours. Theirs was one that could 
afford such a com m itted faith in the practical, political power o f the word. It was an era less 
inclined to preclude the possibility o f addressing a wider audience. W hat is more, the fact 
that all three could, as intellectual figures, find a wide audience testifies to the specificity o f 
their respective cultures and their own unique personalities, both factors that made it 
possible for them to wage their intellectual and cultural wars they way they did. O ne o f these 
specificities crucial for what I am trying to argue here has already been discussed when I 
examined the particular modality o f their discourse in relation to the audience they addressed. 
Yet, there is one m ore thing that must be brought to attention, and, I believe, this is the fact 
that the careers o f  all three show varying degrees o f dependence on an institutional 
framework.
Trilling was the m ost ‘domesticated’ o f  all three, almost totally at ease in his capacity as a 
hardly controversial m em ber o f  an elite institution. Leavis, on the other hand, was from the
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outset an outsider, an intellectual figure marginalised because o f his personality, his ideas and, 
more specifically, his hostility towards the academic ethos that he saw as prevalent in 
Cambridge during his life. Leavis brought with him a petty-bourgeois militancy very much a 
product o f his intellectual and cultural heritage o f  liberal Protestantism, which did not go 
down very well with the Cambridge establishment. Yet, it was the historical conjuncture o f 
the late twenties that provided this latent possibility o f  a certainly not very far-reaching ‘class 
struggle’, a possibility which Leavis seized immediately. Trilling also was an outsider, a young 
intellectual o f Jewish origin, left-wing sympathies, and a keen interest in Freudian 
psychoanalysis; all features that nearly excluded him from American academia during the 
thirties. However, the American metropolitan culture o f the thirties, was pregnant with 
certain possibilities, one o f  which being the ability o f  someone like Trilling to get a teaching 
post at Columbia. Trilling, like so many others, seized the opportunity although later in his 
work there is hardly any reference to the traumatic experience o f cultural and ideological 
domestication that m ust surely have been felt during those early years in his life. Trilling 
never really made m uch o f  his cultural difference in contradistinction to Leavis w ho never 
tired o f reminding his readers o f how profoundly ill-received he was at Cambridge.
Sartre, on the o ther hand, is a special case that can only make sense in the particular 
context o f mid-century French culture. Unlike the other two critics, he was never an 
academic. His only teaching position was as a high-school teacher for some years during the 
mid to late thirties. Sartre was a freelance writer and his philosophical and critical work was 
written, published and discussed outside the established academic world. It is true that Sartre 
had the mighty Editions Gallimard behind him and later in his life his enormous fame afforded 
him possibilities that were virtually undreamed o f by other intellectuals o f  his time. Sartre 
functioned outside established institutions, like academia, enjoying a level o f  autonomy which 
is evidenced not only in the multifariousness o f  his output but also in the very nature o f  his 
purely theoretical work. I have already discussed the fact that a great deal o f  Sartre’s
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theoretical texts, such as his first take on a philosophical formulation o f ethics, only survived 
in a fragmentary form. From his two major philosophical texts only Being and Nothingness may 
be considered in some way (although not entirely) com pleted.'17 This perpetual 
incompleteness that characterizes Sartre’s output from the beginning to the end is hardly 
something one w ould expect from a practising academic’s work. Sartre’s distance from the 
elite institutions o f  French tertiary education"8 is one among the things that account for the 
specificity o f  his work. This distance m eant that Sartre was able to publish w ithout the 
constraints usually im posed on academics. It also m eant that unlike both Leavis and Trilling 
he could publish w ithout taking into account the micro-politics o f  the academic departments 
and universities. Leavis had to always negotiate the uneasy relation between his precarious 
position in Cambridge and the public expression o f  his own ideas. T rilling also produced his 
work within the limits imposed on him by Columbia. Sartre, on the other hand did no t have 
to consider any o f  that, nor did he have to adhere to the rules and norms that occasionally 
ham per instead o f  promoting intellectual creativity. W hat Sartre had to negotiate was an 
enorm ous (at least for an intellectual) popularity, an early acquired ‘celebrity-status’ that often 
led him to address issues and tackle subjects far wider than those almost any other 
institutionally-bound intellectual would easily consider addressing. Consequendy Sartre’s 
output does not exhibit the apparent continuity o f themes and methodologies that Leavis’s 
and Trilling’s output does. It is a work far m ore variegated than theirs, a work that responds 
t(x> direcdy to the questions posed by the history o f its time to be as smooth and thematically 
consistent as the work o f a university professor. Sartre’s openness and willingness to engage 
with the pressing political questions o f  his time m eant that his work, in some respect, follows
ir  Its follow up which would be Sartre’s first attempt in formulating a moral philosophy never materialized. His 
Notebooks for an Ethics is what remained o f  this failed first attempt.
118 It must be reminded however that Sartre was a graduate o f  the Ecole Normale Superieure one o f  the Grandes 
Ecoles and a breeding ground o f the French intelligentsia in the twentient century. So this distance that I am 
alluding to ought not be considered in absolute terms.
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the course o f history and responds to it with a journalistic directness and a readiness o f  spirit 
quite unlike the strictly ‘academic’ critical attitude o f  both I^eavis and Trilling.
C r it ic is m  a n d  M o r a l i t y : In  P u r s u i t  o f  a  N e w  C o n c e p r j a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  G o o d  
i n  L i t e r a t u r e  a n d  So c i e t y
This brings me to the distinctiveness o f  the essentially moral or ethical discourse o f the 
three critics discussed here. Leavis’s moral conception o f  literature and criticism is the centre 
around which his whole critical edifice is erected. From  his first articles in the late twenties to 
his last essays in the mid-seventies morality signifies a set o f concepts which serve as the 
undisputed standard for any critical appraisal o f  literature or criticism. Trilling’s work is 
equally characterized from beginning to end by the almost total fusion o f the categories o f 
the moral and the literary. From his Matthew Arnold until his late essays in the seventies 
Trilling’s published output leaves us in no doubt as to whether he considered literature a 
supremely moral discourse whose sole end should be moral instruction and not merely 
aesthetic pleasure. In both these two cases, morality and the concept o f literature as moral 
discourse are immediately recognisable threads that run through the entire work o f the 
respective critics.
Sartre’s case, on the other hand, is quite different. There are certain o f his texts that can 
and should be read as essentially moral treatises. But in the conceptual universe o f his entire 
work morality7 and literature occupy a rather small space. Yet, that does not mean that moral 
or ethical questions in general do not have a prom inent place in the Sartrean oeuvre. W hat it 
does mean, in my opinion, is that the instances where the moral and the aesthetic are 
discussed together only constitute part o f  a wider network o f Sartre’s texts where the issue o f 
ethics in society is at the very centre o f  the arguments put forward. O ne has to consider texts 
quite different from each other in intention or scope to find that unifying thread that coheres 
them into a thematic set. This thread as I have argued does exist and it is what makes texts
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such as those collected in What is literature? find an echo in his Rome lec tu re  on ethics and 
politics.
Ihis conceptual thread is o f course the question o f ethics and more specifically the 
necessity to define as precisely as possible the ethics that can complement a radical politics o f 
the Left. 'ITiis is Sartre’s main concern when it comes to the question o f ethics and society, a 
concern that sets a whole series o f critical and interpretive interventions in motion, 
interventions which are far greater in scope than the issues at the heart o f this discussion. It 
may be said that Sartre’s work surveys an area, parts o f which are also covered by the critical 
works o f  Leavis and Trilling. Although this may be partly true, it is, I believe, a question o f 
an entirely different orientation and methodology. As I have argued, Leavis and, to a lesser 
extent, Trilling allude to politics but never quite bring the political content o f their work to 
the surface, to the level o f denotation. Sartre does quite the opposite: he discusses literature 
concentrating from the outset on the political implications o f his subject-matter, going from 
the specific (i.e. the situation o f the writer during the forties in France) to the more general 
(i.e. the attitude o f the writer vis-a-vis the exigencies o f a radical socialist politics) in a manner 
that dialectically relates both to each other.
It is interesting to see the extent to which Sartre’s critical methodology is different from 
I>eavis’s. Leavis pre-emptively invalidates any dialectical consideration by concentrating solely 
and exclusively on the metaphysically endorsed supremacy o f culture, mainly transmissible 
through canonical literature. In his idealistic fervour, Leavis leaves hardly any room  in his 
thought for a conception o f ethics, literature and society that acknowledges the interrelation 
o f ideas and material reality in a way that does not pre-legitimize the former. Arguably, Sartre 
also started as an idealist only soon to adopt a m ore materialistic view o f cultural and social 
phenom ena. W hen he did effectively come to acknowledge that the constitutional idea o f  his 
early philosophy, namely absolute freedom, may be sound from the point o f  view o f  a 
metaphysician but immensely problematic in the context o f  what is actually happening in
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society at large, he proceeded to discuss ethics in general or in the more specific context o f 
literature in a way that continuously referred back to the material presuppositions o f any 
ethical or literary system. This dialectical, reflexive quality o f Sartre’s thought is what is m ost 
clearly evidenced in his writings on ethics.
f  ragmentary and without ever providing a conclusive argument they point towards 
something very distant from the unshakable certainties o f Leavis. They are also quite 
different from the m ore nuanced writings o f  Trilling although for quite different reasons. 
Trilling’s writings may not betray the same absolutistic tendencies as Leavis’s do, but they too 
show a deep-seated belief in the supremacy o f  the ethical as a notional com ponent o f  liberal 
thought. The political significance o f Trilling’s literary ethics lies in his whole-hearted 
acceptance o f  the supreme validity o f  middle-class liberal ideas. Yet, unlike Leavis who 
created a critical system whose Manichaeism is all too apparent T rilling, as a critic, proceeded 
with far more caution and with far more appreciation o f  the moral middle-ground that lies 
between the two extremes o f ethics. In that moral middle ground, which in many ways is the 
natural habitat o f  Trilling’s literary criticism, he puts forward a series o f  closely 
interconnected arguments that seek to displace politics, particularly radical politics and put 
ethics in its place. The difference with Leavis, as I have already argued, is that T rilling did not 
ever wish to have politics disappear from our sights as something totally irrelevant but 
instead he wished us to see it transmuted into a moral-aesthetic pedagogy. The problem was 
that this suppression o f politics only succeeded in having it return as a spectre that haunted 
his arguments. His work from the late-fifties onwards testifies to that. It is this suppression 
o f politics that defines his work and sets it apart from Sartre’s. The latter, as I have argued, 
has managed to avoid this very act o f  suppression allowing the political to constantly 
interrogate the ethical and vice versa in such as a way as to finally show the almost 
unbearable tension these two aspects o f  human praxis produce in our particular historical 
period. The negotiation o f this tension and the elaborate series o f  arguments about the
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consequences o f such a tension for both an ethical politics and a political or politicized ethics 
is, in my opinion, one o f Sartre’s marks o f  distinction.
Leavis, Trilling and Sartre all represent three instances o f  twentieth-century critical 
thought each dealing with the relation between morality, politics and literature in a manner 
distincdy different from the others. Leavis’s suppression o f politics was so fierce that one 
may be tem pted to characterize his critical attitude as very much akin to neurosis. In support 
o f this one may cite Leavis’s systematic refusal to acknowledge anything other than his own 
critical value-system allowed. Trilling’s own treatment o f  politics in his work on morality' and 
literature also testifies to a suppression, but one hardly as absolute as Leavis’s. Trilling was 
too socially-minded to completely succeed in exiling the political from his thought. 
Eventually politics would come back as an assorted collection o f  images, ideas, beliefs and 
attitudes all symbolizing an ominous reality whose political negativity T rilling experienced as 
alarming and even threatening. Sartre is the only one here whose work does not show 
symptoms o f that suppression o f  the political that is the distinctive feature o f bourgeois 
thought. That is not to say that Sartre’s work is totally irreproachable, but rather that it 
becom es significant to the extent that it shows us that ethics w ithout the acknowledgement 
o f  an underlying politics o f power is a delusional and utterly futile attempt to safeguard at 
least the notion o f  universal good and justice, while at the same time ignoring or implicitly 
supporting the conditions o f generalised injustice, which, it must be emphasized, is what 
makes such an attem pt possible in the first place. Sartre’s work also shows us that any 
politics, especially radical politics, that neglects to self-reflexively interrogate its own ethical 
foundations runs the constant risk o f  merely reproducing the very system that it wishes to 
replace in the first place.
In replying to a question touching on the interrelation o f politics and ethics in his work 
the French philosopher Jacques R andere claimed that:
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It is when politics no longer exists that we begin to look for a mere ethics, and that we try’ to base 
politics on ethics. We appeal to the moral individual who supposedly exists inside the political 
individual, and who is supposedly the ultimate foundation, the ultimate guardian o f  the great 
principles. But there is no such thing as a moral individual who is more moral than the political 
individual. The moral individual always obeys a crrutn morality. And there are all sorts o f  moralities. 
Believing that we have to kill the ‘infidel’, or that Jews are not human, is also a matter o f  morality.
It is when politics fails that we see all these ‘moralities’ coming into play. (Ranciere, 1997: 36)
W hat I have implicitly argued in these pages is that there is a very thin line indeed that 
separates ethics and politics. I have also claimed that all discourses focusing on questions o f 
ethics and morality are nothing but thinly disguised political discourses, best interpreted in 
the context o f  the unequal distribution o f  cultural, political and economic power. I have tried 
to show that a critical discourse inspired by moral principles attracts and at the same time 
repels politics thus producing texts which may be read in a such a way so as to yield their 
implicit political content. This is what I have attempted to do by discussing the work o f 
l>eavis, Sartre and T rilling.
In an era when an increasing number o f those in power resort to a naive and reactionary 
moralistic discourse in their attempt to legitimise their totally immoral actions and, in the far 
more marginal field o f  literary studies, a significant number o f theorists turn their attention to 
ethics in speaking o f  literature, it is worth re-examining our past in order to understand the 
hidden logic behind this celebrated and, at the same time, very ambiguous turn to ethics. I 
hope that what I have argued so far may be construed as a first step towards such a re­
examination.
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